The US-German Relations - Case Study Example

US- German Relations September 11 heralded a new era for US foreign policy resulting in controversial military interventions in the “war on terror”. In particular, the post September 11 policies of the Bush administration resulted in a political standoff with Germany in relation to Iraq, which has created tension in US-German relations. The focus of this analysis is to critically evaluate the impact of September 11 and the Iraq war in US-German relations. It is submitted that the crisis in US-German relations was precipitated by the Bush administration’s knee-jerk approach to September 11, which culminated in military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it was the intervention in Iraq, which triggered a crack between the two states as Schroeder asserted that “it would be a mistake to intervene militarily in Iraq” (Schroeder, 2002 at http://eng.bundesregierung.e/top/dokumente/Artikel/ix_431789, accessed 14 May 2009) and impacted military relations by negating any possibility of providing German soldiers for the Iraqi intervention. Moreover, Fuss refers to the well publicised frustration of previous Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfield in references to the difference between Old Europe and New Europe (Fuss, 2004 at www.eric.ed.gov accessed 14 May, 2009). Fuss argues that “by “Old Europe”, he meant mainly the traditional European leaders, France and Germany, which adopted a stance critical of US policy in Iraq” (Fuss, 2004 at www.eric.ed.gov, accessed 14 May 2009). Indeed, it is posited that the disagreement over Iraq resulted in a break of a significant period of mutual cooperation (Fuss, 2004 at www.eric.ed.gov, accessed 14 May 2009). In seeking to understand the cause and effect on US-German relations by the tension over Iraq, Larres refers to two polarised propositions (Larres, 2003, 23). Namely, the crisis was caused by electoral point scoring goals in a tight election campaign. Conversely, Larres refers to the argument by some commentators that Germany’s opposition to the Iraq intervention signalled “the end of an era in close post-war relations between Washington and Berlin” (Gardner & Dalle, 2003 quoted in Larres, 2003, 23). However, Larres posits that these polarised views are too dogmatic in ignoring the “fundamental problems at the core of the US-German relationship that go far beyond the conflicting personalities of the two leaders” (Larres, 2002, 23). Alternatively, Larres posits that the political climate post September 11 and Germany’s opposition to US proposed military action in Iraq merely catalysed the underlying tension between the two countries. At the core of the heightened tension in US-German relations is the “mutual incomprehension of each other’s political culture and deeply held political values. Especially evident is the profound difference between the two countries’ positions on the permissibility of the use of military force in international affairs” (Larres, 2003, 23-24). On this basis it is posited that a multilateral approach to international foreign policy would go further towards addressing the balance between US and German relations. If we firstly consider the differing perspectives on Iraq, it would appear that politically Schroeder’s opposition to the Bush administration and the Iraq issue proved to be a key part of his election strategy. Additionally, in an interview with the New York Times, Schroeder appeared to highlight his indignation at learning of Cheney’s intentions regarding US pre-emptive military actions in Iraq where he commented that “Cheney has or seems to have committed himself so strongly to war that it is hard to imagine how he can climb down (Erlanger, 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/08/28/world/iraq-speech-by-cheney-is-criticised-by-schroeder.html accessed 16 May, 2009). Furthermore, the economic decline of Germany necessarily required assurances regarding use of resources in the election battleground and Schroeder commented that whilst Germany had provided military assistance in the 1991 Gulf War, “the time of check-book diplomacy is over once and for all” (Hooper, 2002). Indeed, Schroeder’s rhetoric appeared to be markedly anti-US in relation to the Iraq issue however it is arguably too dogmatic to attribute this solely to electoral concerns. Larres argues that from an anti-terror perspective, Schroeder felt that “fighting a war to unseat Saddam Hussein would be a great mistake. Berlin did not consider Iraq an imminent threat to the Western world….. the United States had been unable to link Saddam to the September 11 attacks” ( Larres, 2003, 24-25). In terms of foreign policy, there was a clear dichotomy in approach with a German propensity towards combating terror through containment as opposed to the US favoured regime change, which the Germans feared would precipitate a potential nuclear attack. To this end, Germany felt that Al Qaeda posed a greater imminent threat than Saddam Hussein and unless Saddam’s acts could fall within the international crime of aggression, Germany felt there was no legal justification for a pre-emptive attack on Iraq. If anything, Schroeder felt that such an attack would further undermine any attempts to address the radicalisation of Islam in the Middle East, which contrasted with the unilateral approach of US to foreign policy post September 11. Larres further comments that “Berlin felt Washington should expand greater efforts to obtain the long overdue resolution to the Israel-Palestine problem, arguing that this step would most contribute to regional instability and help prevent the further development of anti-Western sentiment and terrorist onslaughts” (Larres, 2003, 25). This observation further highlights the political differences between Germany and US in terms of approach to foreign policy, which in turn has created cracks in diplomatic relations due to the shift in dynamic of the world political framework post 9/11. This is further highlighted by the differing approaches to international law in terms of the use of force. Indeed, the lack of substantive justification in international law for action against Iraq clearly set a dangerous precedent and in turn has fuelled insurgency and radical Islam with Pervez Hoodbhoy highlights the flaws of current policy by directing unreserved criticism at US foreign policy initiatives: “America has exacted blood revenge for the Twin Towers. A million Afghans have fled the US bombs into the cold wastelands and face starvation” (Hoodbhoy, 2001:www.variant.randomstate.org). Directly correlated to this is Germany’s fear of proliferation of anti-Western sentiment. For example, Betts highlights the point that “a strategy of terrorism is most likely to flow from the coincidence of two conditions: intense political grievance and gross imbalance of power. Either one without the other is likely to produce either peace or conventional war” (Betts, 2002: p.36). This further not only supports the concerns of Schroeder in highlighting the rationale for Germany’s opposition to the US action it further supports Larres’ argument that the disagreement over Iraq underlines the diverging foreign policy approach of both states underlying the tension in contemporary diplomatic relations. From the US perspective, it is argued that Bush viewed German opposition went deeper than merely being against the Iraq invasion and that the crux of the tension was rooted in the fact that “above all, the overconfident if not arrogant and moralising tone of several of the chancellor’s electoral statements appeared to indicate the Germans’ certainty that they knew best how to deal with the Iraq problem” (Larres, 2003, 25). Indeed, Schroeder somewhat ironically highlighted that his non-violent proposal indicated the “German way – “made in Berlin – to bring about a resolution of the conflict” (Hoagland, 2002 quoted in Larres, 2003: 25). To this end, Larres posits that Schroeder’s statements support Kissinger’s arguments that contemporary Germany “seeks its security in an abstract moralism veering towards pacifism, which enables it to feel superior to its powerful ally” (Kissinger, 2002). Therefore, it is arguably the vying for political power on the international stage that has created an inherent underlying tension between Germany and the US, which has been catalysed by the Iraq situation. Indeed, Schroeder’s moralistic rhetoric clearly offended the White House and was perceived as being anti-American and superior as opposed to merely being rooted in being against the proposed action in Iraq per se. This crack in the diplomatic union of the two states was further fuelled by the fact that Bush viewed Schroeder’s comments as a u-turn on the assurances he felt Germany had given during Bush’s visit to Berlin in May 2002 (Larres, 2003: 26). These assurances were quickly shot down by Schroeder’s comments that “under my leadership, this country won’t participate in adventures” (In Hooper, 2002). This comment was interpreted by Bush as a direct personal attack and undermining of the traditionally co-operative alliance between US and Germany. This was further cemented by the US interpretation of Justice Minister Daubler-Gmelin’s comments that Bush’s proposals for military action in Iraq were a diversionary tactic from unpopular domestic economic policy, denouncing Bush’s plans as “a classic tactic….that Hitler also used” (In Larres, 2003: 26). On this basis, both the personal and political relationship of countries reached an all time law and it is observed that “when the chancellor reiterated his opposition to war against Iraq immediately after election-day and then again over the course of the following weeks, emphasising that no German troops would participate in an invasion of Iraq, an “ice-age” descended upon US-German relations, with the White House convinced that Schroeder had managed to retain his job only “by planting his feet firmly in Uncle Sam’s face.” (Larres, 2003, 26-27). However, as highlighted above the importance of the opposition over Iraq cannot be underestimated in creating significant cracks in US-German diplomatic relations, nevertheless it is important to consider the long term reasons underlying the recent rift between the two states. On the one side, post-war German politics has indicated a propensity towards independent foreign policy initiatives, whereas “Bush, in contrast, believes strongly in his personal mission and the manifest destiny of the United States, placing a high premium on loyalty and reliability in domestic as well as international affairs” (Larres, 2003, 27). Directly correlated to this is the contrasting political framework of both states, which is evidenced by criticisms of the “imperial presidency” and lack of Congressional powers to shape foreign policy Schlesinger, 1973, quoted in Cronin, 1980, p.211). Indeed, Einer extrapolated that “the American system of government disintegrates the leadership of Congress, and then largely stakes the fate of itself and the world of nations with which it is merged by physical oneness, upon the character and ability of one solitary man in the White House, that is upon an accident….ruin as well as bliss is risked upon a single throw” (Einer, 1951, p.688). It is too early to see how the rift and political framework will change under the Obama administration however the Bush administration’s response to Schroeder’s comments were regarded by Berlin as exaggerated. Indeed, it would appear that Schroeder somewhat naively believed that Bush would forgive his comments as part of necessary electoral campaign rhetoric, however “their assumptions, however, clearly proved mistaken” (Larres, 2003, 27). If anything, this further supports the proposition that the rift created during the Iraq affair symbolises the lack of mutual comprehension, which is at the heart of diplomatic relations between the US and Germany. To this end, Larres asserts that “this mutual incomprehension and the differing priorities go far beyond the crisis in Iraq. Rather than serve as a source of conflict, the Iraq question merely brought three growing and fundamental value gaps in US-German relations….. to the surface, multilateralism, nationalism, and the role of force in international relations” (Larres, 2003, 28). With regard to multilateralism, this arguably became essential to the readdressing the damage done to the position of Germany’s international relations post World War II with co-operation and integration with European counterparts being as central part of German foreign policy: “this multilateral and co-operative foreign policy has become second nature to German politicians” (Larres, 2003, 28). Furthermore, cooperation with NATO partners during the Cold War enabled a growing role for Germany in international relations and the role enabled it to play a part in western military policy. In contrast, the Bush administration’s “go it alone” approach and apparent indifference to the role of NATO, the EU and the UN clearly put Berlin offside in its traditional multilateral stance. This further contrasted with Rice’s declaration in 2000 that the Republican administration “would proceed from the firm ground of national interest and not from the interest of an illusory international community” (Rice, 2000, quoted in Larres at 27). Additionally, as a result of the World War II scars, Germany has politically converged towards being a pacifist nation and in addition to the multilateral approach to foreign policy “Germany’s responsibility for Hitler’s rise to power, World War II, and particularly for the six million deaths during the Holocaust still considerably shape German society’s worldview” (Larres, 2003, 31). As such, whilst the use of military terminology in US foreign politics is common such as the “war on terror”, German politics prohibits such word usage due to the World War II legacy associating war with negativity and Hitler. Therefore the German political preference for non-military enthusiasm is in “part a result of the successful effort that the United States and Great Britain made after 1945 to transform Hitler’s militaristic Germany into a more peaceful and cooperative country” (Larres, 2003, 32). This in turn further highlight the dichotomy between US and Germany foreign policy and in the latter case, the pacifist non-military approach of German society shapes its approach to international relations. A prime example is the difficulties Schroeder had in convincing Parliament and the German populace of the need to use force against Serbia in Kosovo. Moreover, the decision of Germany to support the US in Afghanistan proved controversial and “Schroeder was only able to obtain parliamentary approval to send German soldiers to Afghanistan by linking the question to a vote of confidence” (Larres, 32003, p.33). Notwithstanding, from a political perspective Germany views military action as a last resort. In contrast the US has adopted a knee-jerk responsive approach to military action, with a pre-emptive strategy in Iraq, which was viewed as illegal and immoral in Germany. Arguably, this has been the crux of the recent tension in diplomatic relations between the US and Germany, as in “Germany, the concept of war fought more fairly with ground troops and large armies is still prevalent, whereas the United States regards such tactics as the exception rather than the rule in modern warfare” (Larres, 2003, 33). In contrast, the previous Bush administration’s foreign policy approach was further responding to the political framework of the country and the need of the people to seek reassurances regarding national protection from their Government. As such, this informed the unilateral approach towards Iraq rooted in the national interests approach as opposed to Rice’s view of the “illusory” international community. Whilst Obama’s election signals a disillusionment with Bush politics, it is important to note that many Americans supported the war and that “Bush’s firm, outspoken and unambiguous leadership style has won him extremely high popularity ratings in the United States and allowed him firmly to consolidate the shaky authority with which he began his presidency after the 2000 election controversy” (Larres, 2003, 34). Again, whilst Obama’s electoral rhetoric indicated a US convergence towards a multilateral approach, ultimately the inherent nature of contemporary US politics is overwhelmingly influenced by national interests. As such, it remains to be seen how far a change in US strategy will be effected in practice. In any event it is submitted that the dispute over pre-emptive military strikes in Iraq clearly catalysed a right between US-German diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, at the root of the tension is the long term strategic difference in politics and foreign policy. To this end, Larres highlights that cooperation will not bridge the underlying long-term causes of the dispute. On the one hand Germany’s need to address its shameful military history has fuelled a multilateral approach rooted in cooperation and pacifism. In contrast, contemporary US politics have been redefined by the events of September11 bringing national interests to the fore, thereby undermining US German diplomatic relations as a result of the inherent lack of mutual understanding. BIBLIOGRAPHY Betts, R. K. (2002). The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 117, NO. 1 pp.19-36. Einer, H. S. (1951). The Theory and Practise of Modern Government. Methuen Steven Erlanger (2002) “Iraq Speech by Cheney is criticised by Schroeder” New York Times, August 28 2002: www.nytimes.com/2002/08/28/world/iraq-speech-by-cheney-is-criticised-by-schroeder.html accessed 16 May, 2009). Tony Fuss (2004). Germany’s Opposition to the Iraq War and Its effect on US-German Relations. Social Education Volume 68 p.285 May-June 2004. Available online at www.eric.ed.gov accessed 14 May, 2009 Nile Gardiner & Helle Dale (2003). What Berlin Must Do to Repair the US-German Alliance. 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