Analysis of The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A Half-century Later Article by Gerhard L. Weinberg - Essay Example

Scholarly Article Review ‘The Nazi-Soviet Pacts: A half-century later’ by Gerhard L. Weinberg The central theme of the article is the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939, which occurred about a week prior to its attack on Poland and the outbreak of World War II. It discusses the history, terms, context and purpose of the treaty it involved including the economic agreements and the secret protocols that aimed to eliminate the eastern European countries and create German and Soviet spheres of interest. A synopsis of the subject matter of the article follows, and a brief analysis of the sources utilized and historical significance is made at the end. The writer is the author of several books on German and Soviet history during the World War II period, so he draws upon a thorough knowledge of the history of the region and period concerned but does also make use of some other valuable sources such as foreign affairs documents. In On August 22, 1939, Adolf Hitler directed his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, to go to Moscow for a nonaggression pact with Soviet Union involving the signing of a treaty and a secret protocol for immediate effect. The German delegation conversed with Stalin and his commissar for foreign affairs at the Kremlin, and “an agreement was reached on all points”. The pact, to initially last ten years, and the secret protocol were both signed, and this occasion was celebrated as it marked a new era of German-Soviet friendship. The terms stipulated that neither country would attack the other subject to certain conditions. The secret protocol carved Europe into German and Soviet spheres of interest. Some remaining details were settled a month later along with another friendship treaty, “later supplemented by a boundary protocol”, “a confidential agreement on the exchange of populations across the borders separating the Soviet and German spheres in Eastern Europe”, a secret protocol pertaining to non-tolerance of Polish agitation, and extensions of several economic agreements. These agreements were seen as providing “the Germans with a green light for an attack on Poland”, and whereas previous nonaggression pacts signed by the Soviets were invalidated in the case of either party attacking a third country, this was not the case in this pact. Moreover, the economic agreements were designed to maintain the German war effort through acquisition of raw materials, and enabling Germany to concentrate all its forces on the western front. It is pertinent to note that the friendship was actually “cemented with blood” given that both had attacked and divided Poland between them during this time yet they “publicly called for an end to the war”. But the pact also suited the Soviets who expected an attack by Germany in the west after its attack on Poland, and preferred to see both Germany and the western powers weakened. As for Britain and France, this pact dashed “all their hopes of a multifront war against Germany” with assistance from the Soviet Union. Germany’s pact with the Soviet also upset a host of other nations especially France, Japan, Italy, and the United States as it affected their own ambitions. The U.S. was concerned about the Soviets aligning with Germany fearing German expansion in western Europe. In the end, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made it clear to Hitler that his country “would go to war with or without allies”, and that it would last “until Allied victory”. The writer then questions how the German-Soviet agreements came about given that the two had animosity for each other beforehand. He suggests that both had different motives. Following Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the establishment of a dictatorship, and the desire to expand Germany and strengthen its position in Europe, the Nazi’s looked to the east where there were people of ‘inferior’ Slavic stock ruled by what the Nazis considered to be ‘incapable Jews’. Hitler imagined the seizure of these vast lands to be easy by either displacing or killing its inhabitants. He also wanted to consolidate Germany’s position in the Ruhr industrial area, which required crushing the French and by extension the British. Against the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany was carrying out a massive rearmament program. Apparently, Stalin tried to warm German-Soviet relations but Germany was not disposed towards this, that is, until the winter of 1938-39 when Hitler had plans for Czechoslovakia (a Soviet ally), Hungary and Poland before attacking the west. For this, he required “a quiet eastern border and the subordination of the two eastern neighbors…” This was the context therefore in which Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union changed. In particular, “A partition of Poland with the Soviet Union appeared to offer a number of advantages to Germany”. In short, Hitler found the prospect of an alliance with Russia attractive notwithstanding the fact that a tie “to the center of communism” was an affront to the Nazis. But Hitler made concessions to the Soviets only so that the situation would suit his time frame for attacking the west in a one-front war, and later return to deal with the east. Thus, “the disappearance of the smaller countries between the two powers” suited Germany while the precise demarcations were not so important. It was simply a “chance for Germany to secure its eastern border while fighting a war in the west… [and] once the agreement with the Soviets had served its purpose of shielding a German victory over Britain and France, then the campaign in the east against the Soviet Union would follow”. For the Soviets, the pact was seen as assisting them in facing the capitalist imperialists, and “a war between Germany and the western powers looked to the Soviet leader like the best prospect for both the safety and the future expansion of the Soviet power”. It also made Germany more inclined to do so, hence Stalin’s repeated approaches to Berlin before the pact. It was an opportunity to clarify the Germans’ seriousness on an agreement given that it previously aborted a Soviet led economic mission, how much the Germans were prepared to concede Polish territory, and ascertain whether Germany also saw the need to eliminate the small independent European states. Whereas England and France wanted to maintain the existing equilibrium in this region, German and the U.S.S.R. had a shared desire to change it. In fact, the public siding with the western powers to put pressure on Germany was an attempt to make the terms more acceptable to the Soviets. The pact was seen by the Soviets as the moment to help dissolve the ‘old equilibrium’. Germany quickly seized the opportunity brought about by the pact and attacked Poland hoping at the same time that no one would ‘cheat’ Germany out of war through arranging a compromise as in the Munich agreement in 1938. The Soviet Union eventually moved in also, to capture the territories assigned to it. Both countries assisted each other in striking against other countries and dividing Europe between them, and the Soviets provided Germany with raw materials in exchange for machinery and naval equipment. The pact “enabled Germany to concentrate its forces on one front at a time when it was not yet exhausted”. Initially, the two partners cooperated well, but friction became apparent following Soviet action against Finland and Romania. Despite an acceleration of Soviet supplies to Germany, it was evident that Germany “went to war with others on the basis of its calculations, not on the policies of those it planned to strike”. The June 22, 1941 pact actually “pointed up the terrible miscalculations made by both parties to the Nazi-Soviet pact”. For the Germans, the premature attack was a dangerous move, and their doctrines of ‘racial determinism’ also proved false. The Russians were equally deluded by communist ideology, and being caught by surprise after finding itself alone with Germany on the European continent. Although the official justification for the Soviets signing the pact depicted a peaceful intent at the time, it was later argued that the western powers had made insufficient concessions to the Soviet Union that led to the pact with Germany. Besides, Stalin believed that “ending the independence of the countries of Eastern Europe was in the interest of the Soviet Union as well as Germany”. The Soviets also mistakenly saw it as providing “an additional buffer against a German invasion”. Until recently the existence of the secret protocol was denied by the Soviets. But the whole pact had a very significant impact on the course of German-Soviet relations before and during World War II, and indeed determined the course of the war itself. Although several aspects of the pact are discussed at length, the article neither touches upon the pact’s wider significance in shaping the course of World War II nor does it make clear the reason for the German invasion of Russia in 1941, which effectively broke the treaty. This pact is significant because it occurred prior to Germany’s attack on Poland, which triggered the war. It was during the signing of these agreements, on September 1st, 1939 that Germany invaded Poland and World War II began, and later on September 17th, the Soviet Union invaded eastern Poland. Had the pact failed, the western powers were intent on securing the Soviet Union on their side for a joint front against Germany. Germany would then have had to face not only the west but also the east simultaneously with considerably fewer chances of success. The pact was not unprecedented however. In the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887, Germany and Russia agreed to remain neutral in case either was attacked by a third. The intention behind this was similar in that it was devised to prevent Germany having to fight on two fronts (against both France and Russia) at the same time. This treaty expired however and years later in World War I, Germany found itself at war with both France and Russia. Even the nonaggression pact did not prevent the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 in ‘Operation Barbarossa’ during World War II, but then it did not serve this purpose. Rather, Hitler’s Mein Kampf was the true guiding document for bringing about his plans for European hegemony with the pact a mere tool for a limited period to gain a strategic advantage. Read More