The Mechanism of Revolutionizing Both Collective and Individual Characters - Research Paper Example

I. Introduction Parties have oftentimes been interpreted as mediums that convey together those of parallel political opinions. Particularly in liberal democracies, parties are generally believed as varying from one another with regard of the perspectives and ideologies they support. Parties are perceived as domains in which standpoints regarding public affairs are well thought-out; each party in a specific party system has its individual concepts and mechanisms to the association between state and society and to the responsibility of the state. Nor is this accepted perspective, that parties do have various principles, a mislaid one; according to Klaus von Beyme, “Over the longer term only parties based on an ideology has succeeded in establishing themselves” (Ware 1996, 17). Hence, it is not unexpected that a comparative research of political parties should start by taking into account parties as organizations that have, or assert to have, an ideology. Obviously, the ideological aspect of parties should be placed in its proper context. An apparent argument to make is that, even in Europe, at the time of conversion to liberal democracy there were several parties whose only rationale was acquiring support through their control of political organizations. The requirements obliged through having to vie for the votes of a mass electorate may have involved the taking in of an ideology, yet the non-ideological components of politics persisted to pollute several parties well into the twentieth century. However, while the public must not drop understanding of this aspect, the essentiality of ideology in party politics is unquestionable (Sheehan 1996). But how should political analysts attempt to interpret the espousal of a specific ideology and, more particularly, the determination of that ideology or its revision? Political parties in the United States carry out several responsibilities which are necessary to the successful operation of American democracy. These responsibilities include nominating and electing public officials, performing and evaluating the government, facilitating public opinion, designing policies and managing the electorate around those policies, making effective American federal structure of government with its division of powers, helping in the procedures of democratization and nationalization, negotiating between the citizens of the government, and functioning as liberal and social organizations (ibid, 48). Party administration is undoubtedly the distinguishing aspect of modern politics. The introduction of the partisan politician to leading function in government represents a radical change in the carrying out of public affairs. In previous times the right to rule was taken in by or accorded to military explorations, religious heads, royal public figures, or oligarchic factions variously licensed by birth, riches, or particular political skill. Throughout numerous centuries, convention, tradition and obligation have merged to create institute force, religion, property or family as the institutions for the exercise of political power. However, in modern times it is obvious that these ancient assertions to authority and power have been crudely swept aside and succeeded by a current one. It has turned out increasingly fashionable all throughout the world to thrust aside aristocrats and ruling classes and to delegate government to the leaders of the innovative and interesting organizations referred to as political parties (Ware 1996). As political parties assume an ideology for its smooth functioning, other organizations also follow the basic procedure towards compliance and consensus. The proceeding discussions will focus primarily on organizations, not only political ones, and their various components such as power, goals, management, interest, and most importantly compliance and consensus. I.1. Definition of Power Power is at the core of a political system. If the concept of the reciprocity of power is very much loaded with inconsistencies, why then should people be aware of it at all? The answer to this concern is that, for all its imperfections, the reciprocity of power has been one of the mainly essential concepts in history. It is an idea which for centuries students of international politics assumed grip the key to recognizing the intermittent patterns of behavior of states inhabiting in a situation of international disorder. Simultaneously, it was a channel for several statesmen, who observed in it a technique for protecting the continuing sovereignty of their states. This is the decisive significance of the reciprocity of power framework, that whatever its drawbacks as an instrument for scrutiny or a guide to policy, it has traditionally been a fact; a fact that merits to be evaluated and interpreted (Sheehan 1996). Nevertheless, as Dina Zinnes notes, an enumeration of definitions in this manner demonstrates nearly complete accord on the key aspect of a political power system. Reciprocity of power involves “a particular distribution of power among the states of that system such that no single state and no existing alliance has an overwhelming or preponderant amount of power” (ibid, 4). When the centrality of the concept is refined in this manner, it is unproblematic to concur with Hume that the reciprocity of power is based upon common sense and apparent analysis; even though it must be mentioned that Hume’s premise is founded upon an important assumption, which is that the sovereignty of states is a more significant objective to sought for than a course of political alliance under a hegemonic power (Etzioni 1961). This may certainly be a favorable objective, but it is an objective exclusive with a specific post-Renaissance European means of looking at international politics. There is an array of procedures by which this foundation objective could be pursued, producing alternative policies and various reciprocal power systems. For instance, in the remarkable case of a two-power system, merely a parity of power can avoid predominance, in the way appealed upon by the reciprocity of power approach. As the population of states in the system grows beyond this, nevertheless, a broad array of distributions of power becomes good enough. “In effect, any distribution is permissible as long as the power of each unit-state or alliance of states-in the system is less than the combined power of all the remaining units” (ibid, 5). I.2. Bases and Sources of Power There are three fundamental bases or sources of power within any political system, namely, force, influence, and authority (Schaefer & Lamm 1995, 426). Force is the concrete or threatened use of coercion to compel one’s resolve or will on others. When leaders incarcerate or even put to death political dissenters, they are exacting force; so, too, are terrorists when they confiscate an embassy or to assassinate a political head. Influence, on the contrary, refers to the putting into effect of power through a course of persuasion. A civilian may alter his or her standpoint regarding a Supreme Court candidate because of an issue of newspaper editorial, the professional statement of a law college head before the Senate Judiciary Committee, or a moving speech at a public meeting by a political militant. In each instance, sociologists would perceive such attempts to convince people as models of influence. The third source of power, authority, refers to the power that has been institutionalized and is acknowledged by the people over whom it is practiced. I.3. Organization and Power Even though the democratic principle is agreed or consensual decision making, as a realistic issue this principle is best devised as civilians’ agreed recognition for the polity’s common written and implied constitutional laws and the resulting guide of decisions surfacing form the political mechanism. At least, then, the political mechanism should not intensify present partitions among citizens, nor should it build new ones. Even better, it should assist smoothing the progress of liberally arrived at perception of general interests. As a result, the constitutional laws, both formal and informal, which preside over the structure within that citizen’s act are extremely essential (Lewin 1991). No set of constitutional laws and customs will be absolutely unbiased in its influence on what people do. They also function to mold the decisive pattern of action through the political structure. For both Aristotelian and democratic republican assumptions of politics, constitutional laws should aid bring into line citizens’ differed and frequently unforeseen perceptions of political concerns. This is why consensual thinkers committed so much time to evaluating constitutional framework, which is a concern of restricted interest from a majoritarian framework (ibid, 63). How people recognize the political mechanism’s institutional dynamics, specifically associations between the fundamental contradictions within civil society, will affect the form of rules people take in for a democratic polity. In order to be democratic, these rules should be relevant to all citizens fairly; integrate a multiplicity of perspectives, involving ones which are recently unpredicted; and not jump to conclusions regarding political outcomes. At this theoretical level, it is definite that a democracy cannot be intentionally organized to seek for a specific objective or hierarchy of objectives (Dizerega 2000). I.4. Use of Power The power problem is recurrent. At all levels and in all aspects of every culture it must be thoroughly addressed. Wherever human strength and the balance of human willpowers in organizations and among organizations are located, there is a concealed or overt dilemma of power. It becomes self-consciously severe, and more and more uncontrollable, in cultures which emphasize competition, domination, personal success, competitive standing, material benefits, and accumulation of scarcity goods. In the period of Thucydides and Plato, in the Roman times illustrated by Rostovtzeff, in the Renaissance, people have had earlier times when the power interest was unchecked and out of control. The excellent philosophical attempts to buildup esteem for natural justice on the side of Plato, Aristotle and later on the Roman Stoics, did not rescue that civilization from collapse, but it did present enduring components of value for the Christian medieval synthesis (Etzioni 1961). The nature of power is not clear, for it is greatly intricate and no ultimate typology of it has been developed. Nevertheless, three forms of power are already discernable, namely, as a mechanism of energy, dynamism, or determination, as a tool or means for the attainment of ends beyond itself; and as an objective pursued in itself. Human is an energy structure inherently generating power and drawing approval from the articulation of it. A healthy individual enjoys the exercise of his energetic endeavors. Children enjoy running, jumping, swinging, dancing, and asserting themselves physically and socially. Individuals take pleasure in accomplishment, in getting things completed, in realizing desires, in perceiving things come about and feeling that they have caused them to take place. Human, nevertheless, is not a basic package of liveliness. His many powers are intricately interconnected (Bryson 1947). They are concerned in his personality structure, his self-awareness and liberation, his willpower, thinking, planning, and preference. Hence, power in man is at all times a spiritual dilemma. II. Definitions of Micro-Politic Some of the questions that the discipline of micro-politic is trying to address are, “Is it self-interest or public interest that predominates in public life? Does political man try primarily to fulfill personal desires and needs, or does he act with the intent to further what he believes to be best for society as a whole?” (Lewin 1991, 1). These are the concerns addressed by analysts in the disciplines of rational choice, political philosophy, electoral study and micro-politics; nevertheless, because each field has assumed its own language and deals with these concerns at various levels of thought, it cannot be assumed that there exists much discussion between them. Nonetheless, one of the most important components of micro-politics with regard to power and organizations is the concept of compliance. Compliance is universal, present in every social unit. It is a key component of the linkage between those who possess power and those over whom they exercise it. In spite of its universality, it has been selected as a foundation for several comparative studies since it is an imperative element of organizational structure. The focus on compliance within the organization distinguishes the latter from other forms of social units. Attributes of organizations such as their specificity, magnitude, intricacy and effectiveness each improves the demand for compliance. Consequently, compliance is thoroughly related to several organizational variables. Compliance refers “both to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor’s power and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied” (Etzioni 1961, 3). Most organizations use various types of power, but the extent in which they depend on each varies from organization to organization. Majority of organizations are inclined to put emphasis on only one channel of power, depending less on others. The primary justification for power specialization appears to be that when two types of power are focused upon simultaneously, over the identical subject group, they are predisposed to counteract each other. Applying force, for example, commonly establishes such a great degree of estrangement that it becomes improbable to apply normative power effectively. This is one of the rationales why remedy is seldom attained in conventional prisons, why custodial processes are taken into account as impeding therapy in mental hospitals, and why instructors in progressive educational institutions are inclined to go against corporal punishment (Dizerega 2000). II.1. Individual and Organizational Goals and the Reasons for their Micro-Political Behavior Individuals and organizations alike that have comparable compliance systems tended to have identical goals, and organizations that have identical goals tend to share similar compliance systems. Particular arrangements of compliance and goals are more frequently successful than others. Some studies reveal that organizations which vary in their compliance system tend also to vary in the goals they sought for and in the extent to which lower participants are involved into the organizational cohesion and manipulated by its elites. Micro-politics examine the connection between compliance and the cultural incorporation of lower participants. All collectivities have a cultural structure which involves sets of virtues and principles and cognitive frameworks. Participants in a provided collectivity differ in their point of reference to this cultural structure. Some, generally the elites, understand it more completely than do others and incline to embody in dealings with insiders as well as outsiders. Others approve of it partially, while still others are against to most of its components and endeavor to sustain a subculture of their own (Etzioni 1961). In organizations, the senior ranks tend to maintain the cultural structure; participants subordinate in rank differ broadly in their point of reference to it. Analysis of consensus makes inquiries into the extent to which the cultural points of reference of different individuals or organizations are harmonious. Hence, while expressions regarding the involvement inform people what the orientations of one association of actors are expressions about consensus point out variations and continuities in the orientations of at least two associations. Moreover, the following analysis of consensus considers the key sectors wherein the organization upholds a particular perspective, from an opinion on the character of crime to an outlook regarding the fluoridation of water (ibid, 85). Lastly, no framework for the analysis of consensus is inclusive unless it indicates the status quo among which consensus is evaluated. Marx and Mannheim have specified that actors who take in various social positions vary more in their views than do those who take in the identical or similar positions. Therefore, the evaluation of consensus among actors in various positions is the essential problem in the analysis of normative and social cohesion in micro-politics. In intricate organizations, one of the key disparities depends between subordinate and senior participants (Sheehan 1996). Another differentiates those who fulfill various functions, such as personnel and line, finance and manufacturing, and others. II.2. Management and Micro-Politics Nearly all organizations have at least a number of turnover of employees, because they tend to survive the length of nearly all members’ involvement, and because they replenish at least a number of the given up positions. Hence, some organizational methods should be committed to the staffing of new members. This point heaves quite a few questions: “How are differences in means of recruitment related to the organization’s compliance structure? What are the criteria according to which participants are recruited?” (Etzioni 1961, 151). Processes of recruitment vary significantly among various types of organizations. Coercive organizations depend on intimidation employed by the police, armed forces, or delegates of the courts. Utilitarian organizations vie for prospective human resources in a labor market as they vie for other methods of production, through a price system. Ordinary normative organizations have to depend mainly on articulate communication and socialization for their subordinate members. Professional organizations are the mere type of normative organization which staff subordinate members partly through market contest. Yet even here recruitment is fairly dissimilar from that of majority of utilitarian organizations, because high status and research or preparatory facilities add or even outlast compensation and associated rewards. Even though these noneconomic incentives and circumstances also function in utilitarian organizations, they appear to bear more importance in professional organization (ibid, 154). II.3. Strategic Behavior Due to Micro-politics and Power Sociologist Talcott Parsons has emphasized that every collectivity should resolve four fundamental functional dilemmas; it must accomplish two instrumental requirements of contribution and allocation, and two articulate requirements of social and normative incorporation. Collectivities are inclined to develop separated action structures to accomplish the two sets of instrumental and articulate requirements. All systems consequently demand control positions for its course. Bales and his colleagues have demonstrated in investigations of experimental groups that the control positions of the two structures are predisposed to become differentiated, in the sense that various actors are inclined to hold them. This is somewhat because irreconcilable role orientations and psychological natures are demanded by these positions. It seems, then, that the successful operation of a collectivity demands the involvement of both types of elites, even though the forms of control are differentiated from each other (Schaefer & Lamm 1995). Articulate activities normally demand moral involvement of the actor. Therefore, they are best managed by elites possessing normative power over the actors, for normative power, is mainly sympathetic to moral involvement. Even though this power may be drawn from a position, individual characteristics, or both, individual rather than authorized normative power tends to be more successful. Thus, the elites that are most probable to regulate articulate activities successfully are informal or formal leaders; authorities, who possess the power of office yet insignificant of their own, are less successful (Lewin 1991). Informal leaders are inclined to be more successful than formal ones; they may be more entirely articulate. II.4. Micro-Political Interest of Each Party Involved In an organization, whether political or economic, there are various parties within that have their own micro-political interest. For instance, the people in Finance and Accounting department have given the task to prepare financial and managerial reports for the review of both inside and outside parties. The interest of these people in this department, thus, is to provide quality and precise accounting reports for the benefit of the company and also the personnel. On the other hand, the people in the Purchasing Department are delegated to the task of boosting sales, hence revenue for the organization. The interest of having high sales is more manifested in employees who are subjected under the commission package or the variable sharing risk in the organization that those who are under the fixed compensation package. Research and Development personnel are given the responsibility to carry out mechanisms and procedures in which they could obtain significant information for the benefit of forecasting future gains and losses. The interest of the people in this sector lies profoundly on the possibility of a promotion or higher prestige due to a job well done, thus higher compensation package. Meanwhile, the Production team is assigned to be efficient in their procedures which imply that they should, as much as they can, manufacture low-cost but quality products. The interest of people in the Production department is on the amount of labor and knowledge they are entailed to have in order to facilitate the progress of one of the most important departments in a business organization. And lastly, Sales and Personnel department, as related to the aforementioned recruitment process, is interested in recruiting people that share quite similar goals and outlooks with the organization so as to create an environment for goal congruence. II.5. Playing the Game together without losing Power Organizations are frequently compared to instruments; they fulfill a goal. The goal, at least originally, is frequently establish by a social unit rather than the organization itself. This peripheral goal-determining collectivity, such as society, community, a religious group, oftentimes delegates more than one goal to an organization. Colleges are anticipated to be hubs of mentoring and research; numerous hospitals are anticipated to cure the sick, train medical students and carry out research; newspapers are anticipated to serve culture objectives but also display a profit. Furthermore, organizations which are dedicated to one ultimate goal should seek for somehow different sub-goals or assignments in order to accomplish it. A drug manufacturer has to perform research so as to generate at a profit; prison officials frequently carry out some seminars as a custodial mechanism to keep prisoners preoccupied; and advertising departments have both creative and manufacturing duties (Dizerega 2000). Goals and duties oftentimes vary in their compliance demands. Various types of objectives demand various types of compliance mechanism. Various objectives of the same common form tend to demand various emphases on the different elements making up the specific type of compliance system. Both mentoring and research demand a fundamentally normative compliance system. However, mentoring demands a stronger focus on normative compliance than research does, which can depend more on compensation compliance. Seldom are these two goals which can be fulfilled with paramount success through compliance systems which are accurately identical in both the major component and the importance provided to it (Bryson 1947). It is due to this relationship between goals and compliance that diverse goal or diverse duties organizations confront a problem. If they continuously put emphasis on one trend of compliance, they went astray in effectiveness, since this trend is congruent with a sole task. If they provide equal emphasis to two or more trends of compliance, effectiveness is mislaid through neutralization. III. Conclusions and Results When one thinks of organizations as intricate responsive mechanisms, one put emphasis on the constitutive and productive processes of human interaction, of human communicative abilities referred to as power relations. The discourse people persistently endeavor in as they labor becomes probably the most significant attribute of organizational existence. It is in communication process that organizational and individual characters and interests emerge as stability and probable reform. Innovation comes to be interpreted as the mechanism of revolutionizing both collective and individual characters. What triggers and is triggered by the mechanism of transformation is misunderstanding. References Bryson, L. (1947). Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture: Seventh Symposium. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Crozier, Michel/ Friedberg, Erhard (1993). Die Zwänge kollektiven Handelns : über Macht und Organisation; Frankfurt am Main : Hain. 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The Balance of Power: History and Theory. New York: Routledge. Turner, H. (1955). Politics in the United States: Readings in Political Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: McGraw-Hill . Ware, A. (1996). Political Parties and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More