The Roots of the Israeli-Syrian Conflict - Coursework Example

Introduction The Israeli-Syrian conflict arises out of an ongoing political struggle in the Middle East over and around Israel’s efforts to establish itself as an independent Jewish nation.1 The Arab-Israeli Middle East conflict was accentuated following the First World War when British troops occupied an area known as Palestine and a number of Jewish immigrants came to the area. Arab resistance and animosity toward the immigrants led to a number of violent conflicts which garnered international attention following the Second World War. With encouragement from the United Nations, three world powers namely; the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain acted as mediators and attempted to divide the territory but rather than resolve issues it only made matters worse. A number of wars followed namely, 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six Day War, the 1970 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Lebanon War. 2 Syria had occupied Golan Heights, a plateau which borders Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria since 1946. Following the 1967 Six Day War, Isreal took possession of the plateau. Elliot Repko explains the respective positions of both Syria and Israel in the ongoing conflict over Golan Heights as follows: “Israil justifies its annexation of the Golan Heights through its victory in the 1967 War. Syria argues that the United Nations forbids land acquisition through war, and therefore Israel’s occupation is illegal.” 3 Preexisting tensions between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights border together with Syria’s friendly relationship with the then Soviet Union, and links to terrorists form the basis for Israel’s justification for its continued occupation of the region. The US role as mediator has been characterized by attempts to reconcile these disparaging conerns on the one hand, Israel’s security concerns and on the other hand, Syria’s territorial concersn.4 The discussion that follows examines the US role as mediator since that time with particular emphasis on the period from 1990 to 2000. This discussion will also articulate the major factors that influence the success of ongoing negotiations, with a view to determining where the mediation efforts have failed and what possible approaches can improve future negotiation efforts. US Mediation Efforts From 1967-1990 In order to gain an understanding of the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel from 1990 to 2000 and the US role as mediator it is necessary to look at the historical factors that gave rise to the current conflicts between the two Middle Eastern nations. Following the 1967 War the US attempted to mediate peace negotiations between Syria and Israel. There were several factors influencing all three parties involved. Syria, a fierecly proud Arab nation under autocratic rule was deeply humiliated by the Iraeli conquest of the Golan Heights region. Israel, a nation vastly outnumbered by hostile Arab nations in the Middle East finally emerged as a force to be recokoned with.5 The United States on the other hand, had and very likely still has its own agenda. Willaim Viorst maintains that the US role in its diplomatic relations with the Middle East in general was influenced by a two tier agenda which he describes as predicated on: “…pressing for concessions from all sides to establish some permanent negotiated settlement, and ensuring Israel came out of the agreement strong enough to act as the U.S. proxy in the area against Soviet threats.”6 Moreover, the US attitude toward Syria has always been one of mistrust. Aside from disapproving of Syria’s autocratic government the US has always taken a stand against that nation’s link to terrorists and its anti-Israel position.7 At the end of the day all that was accomplished in the days following the 6 Day War was an unhonored concession on both parts. While Syria agreed to demilitarize the Golan Heights area, permit international supervision together with other security comittments in return for Israel’s withdrawal neither side have been able to live up to their side of the bargain.8 Viorst points out that in the post-1967 War years a “PLO massacre of 24 children in Ma’a lot” threatened further peace negotiations between the two countries leaving Israel renewing its demands that Syria close its borders to terrorists.9 Syria’s Hafez Assad, loyal to his Arabic culture to a point that interfered with his ability to agree to such a pledge fearing he might be seen as weakening to the will of the Israelis. It seemed that both sides had reached a stalemate.10 US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger responded by sending a letter to the Israeli government indorsing whatever means of redress it desired in reponse to the terrorist attacks on its terrirory. Viorst points out that Kissenger effectively pledged that: “…no future president would withhold American economic or military assistance as punishment for antiterrorist reprisals. It committed Washington to support such attacks before the world, most notably at the United Nations. In effect, it imposed a serious new limitation on America's ability to compel restraint within the cycle of violence that so often ran amok in the Arab-Israeli struggle.”11 This letter together with American military aid to Israel during the Yom Kippor War would only serve to stiffle peace keeping efforts in the years ahead. Making matters worse for the US in its role as mediator, President Nixon was caught up in the midst of the Watergate scandal by1974. Determined to distract attention away from the Watergate scandal Nixon set his sights on the Middle East and was determined to convince the public that he was “indispensable to peacekeeping” in this hostile region.12 Nixon’s first tour of the Middle East did not turn out as well as planned. Newly elected Israeli Prme Minister Yitzhak Rabin made it clear that he wanted Israel to remain the US stronghold in the Middle East but at the same time he was not interested in the current peace-keeping negotiations.13 Be that as it may, Kissinger continued with his rigiros shuttle diplomacy tactics afraid to slow things down for fear that the Syrians would revert to their Soviet ties.14 Meanwhile Rabin was working on his own agenda. He was determined that Israel establish itself as the most powerful military presence in the Middle East and he would use the United States as a means of obtaining that position for Israel. Rabin would take advantage of the US determnation to play peace maker between the Israel and Syria and the other Middle Eastern nations.15 Rabin was not alone. Syria’s President Hafez Al-Assad had an agenda of his own although his agenda was borne out of a mutual mistrust between Syria and Israel. Both countries were determined to rebuild their military prowess following the Middle Eastern wars and to remain prepared to fight off each other should the need arise. While Rabin turned to the United State, Al-Assad looked to the Soviets.The US/USSR connection made the Israeli/Syrian conflict from 1978-1989 particulalry volitile. As Helena Cobban and Robert Neumann surmise: “This confrontation risked drawing the super powers directly into any shooting war that might break out between the local powers.”16 Divided in their military agendas, Assad and Rabin were united in their aspirations for peace. Author Moshe Ma’oz notes that: “…both Rabin and Assad sought a political solution to their countries’ conflict; and both – Assad, indeed for the first time – endeavoured to gain the support of the Americans for their respective new strategic designs, which were obviously incompatible.”17 Compromising this desire for peace however, is a power struggle as demonstrated by the proxy war fought by both Israel and Syria in Lebanon. While Syria, who has had both a political and military presence in Lebanon going back to 1976 was not directly involved in the 1982 Israel-Lebanon armed conflict in Lebanon, it maintained a presence by military support and advice. Under Syrian encouragement, Lebanon renounced the peace treaty arising out of the 1982 conflict in Lebanon.18 As the 1980s came to a close many of the issues between Israel and Syria remained unresolved. For instance, the Golan Heights dispute remains unresolved despite an agreement in 1974 between the parties to have the area monitered by the United Nations Israel subsequently passed a law that assumed jurisdiction over Golan Heights. The United Nations subsequently required Isreal to abrogate the law in question.19 It is against this background that the United States continued in its role of mediator between Syria and Israel as the 1990s came around. Israeli/Syrian Negotiations and US Mediation From 1990-2000 Author Robert Rabit maintains that the US role in mediating peace between Syria and Israel, while consitent in its approach has been a bit conflicted. The United States remians firm in its belief that Syria can “influence events” in the Middle East.20Rabit adds however, that: “At the same time, although the United States has unequivocally supported Israeli’s security and most of its policy objectives and the nature of the U.S.-Israeli cooperation began to preoccupy the two countries.”21 While US Adminstrators “have been closer to the Syrian positon” and are biased toward Syria in its approach to its role as mediator, the truth is that the US “congress has always greatly supported Israel.”22 It is “this dual attitude” exhibited by the “US government” that drives its mediation role betweent he two Middle Eastern countries.23 Stephen Zunes provides a rather simplistic analysis of the key factors compromising successful peace negotiations between Israel and Syria with the US playing the role of mediator. To begin with, there is no doubt that Syria has both political and economic reasons for wanting peace with Isreal. Obvioulsy the break up of the Soviet Union created “dramatic political and economic shits” in the Middle East in general.24 Add to this scenario the dominance of the US in the region following the Gulf War, “the establishment of the Palestinian Authority” the circumstances are such that: “Syrian President Hafez al-Assad can no longer reap politial capital from provoking conflict with Israel.”25 On the other hand however, Israel is not motivated or inclined “to take the necessary steps” to facilitate a viable settlement and similarly, the United States “appears unwilling to push its ally to compromise.26 Despite the ongoing peace talks “a final Syrian-Israeli peace accord” may not be possible any time soon.27 It becomes clearer with time that while the United Sates is holding itself out as an impartial mediator, when one looks beneath the surface the United States is slanted in its support of Israel and its approach to Syria. Stephen Zunes demonstrates how this is so by drawing on the US approach to Syria following the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in respect of Golan Heights. Resolution 242 called for peace in the Middle East by requiring Israel to withdraw from the territories it annexed following the 1967 War and for the "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency".28 Resolution 338 followed the Yom Kippur War and basically called for a cease fire.29 When Syria rejected the resolution the United States claimed that Syria was “hard-lined” for its rejection of these Resolutions. When Syria “dramatically moderated its policies” and accepted the resolutions the United States complained that Syria was “hard-lined for their insisence on the resolutions’ strict implementation.”30 The obvious consequence is “an impasse that can be broken only by a shift in U.S. policy.”31 The Madrid Conference 1991 commenced on October 30th 1991 and was co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. The conference involved peace talks themed after UN Resolution 242, “land for peace talks” between Israel and other Arab States including Syria.32 These peace talks represented a tie in to additional peace talks at various other forums up to the year 2000. Yet no accord was struck. Author Helena Cobban writes that: “…by the time of the 1991 Madrid Conference, it was clear that Syria was interested in concluding a final-status agreement with Israel rather than any further interim agreement.”33 Be that as it may, the fact remains, Syria had no political, diplomatic, military or economic might with which to negotiate. By insisting upon the return of Golan Heights with no viable means for providing an incentive or even a threat over Israel Syria had no real bargaining power.34The US with its propensity to support Israel acting as mediator it is no surprise that the Syrian-Israeli negotiations have been progressing rather slowly. Zunes notes that while the Clinton Administration was sitting in the middle of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks it was at the same time providing: “…Israel with billions of dollars annually in economic and military aid, in part to challenge Syria and its demand for the restoration of its conquered territory.”35 In the meantime, the Clinton administration was insisting that Syria call an end to its “economic boycott of Israel” and to perpetuate normal relations.36 Yet the Clinton administration made no effort to encourage Israel to withdraw from Golan Heights.37 P.R. Kumaraswamy points to a rather salient characteristic of the negotiatons that reasonably account for the persistent stalemates between Israel and Syria. According to Kumaraswamy Israel was delegated to piecemeal participation to a point where the peace talks could have been a US-Syrian conference. The absence of direct negotiations between the two neighbors was a very serious impediment to sucessful negotiations.38 One example of the confusion that arose out of these third party negotiations was demonstrated by an account described by Patrick Seale. According to Seale, in August of 1993 US Secretary of State Christopher Warren approached Al-Assad with a verbal agreement from Israel’s Rabin. According to Warren Israel agreed to withdraw from Golan Heights in exchange for security assurances. The talks that continued were based on this communication until Rabins was assasinated in November of 1995.39 Syria insisted on taking security measures based on what Al-Assad deemed necessary rather than what Israel demanded. As a result, talks continued since the parties could not come to terms.40 When Shimon Peres took office after Rabin’s assassination peace talks continued with the belief that Rabin’s undertaking was as relayed by Warren. These talks continued despite new armed conflict in Lebanon between Israel and Syrian interest groups.41 Patrick Seale submits that Rabin had used the US to manipulate Syria into only thinking that peace with Israel was at hand. The message “was tailored just enough to blunt his attack on Olso.”42 Olso was the venue for ongoing Israeli-PLO negotiations. Tanya Reinhart an Israeli journalist is of the opinion that Rabin was motivated by a goal to ensure peace for Israel in Lebanon. “Syria must restrain Hizballah to prove the seriousness of its intentions.”43 This is a natural result of any mediation where the mediator is partial to one party over the other. By speaking on behalf of Israel, Syria took the US at its word with no real means of questioning the veracity of the verbal agreement. When Peres lost the general election and was replaced by Elud Barak in 1999 negotiation efforts grew more dismal. Barak cautioned that, any peace accord with Syria would involve “painful concessions” .44 After a rigorous exercise in shuttle diplomacy on behalf of the Clinton Adminstration, President Clinton announced on December 8, 1999 that Israeli-Syrian talks would continue where they had ended.45 Talks resumed in January the following year in Shepherdstown, West Virginia and Syria was more than reasonable agreeing to maintain one monitoring station at Mount Hermon. The US prepared a draft of the discussions and Syria leaked information concerning its commitment to accept one monitoring station as well as its willingness to adjust the border line. Israel responded by leaking a report that detailed Syria’s concessions and generally leaving the impression that Israel was not required by the terms of the agreement to withdraw from Golan Heights. As a result Syria refused to engage in further peace talks unless withdrawal was top priority.46 On March 26, 2000 President Clinton was able to organize a meeting with Assad in Geneva. Believing that the Rabin proposal was about to be reaffirmed, Assad attended the meeting only this time the proposal was vastly different. Via President Clinton, Barak was proposing to resume the Golan Heights border between the two nations that existed prior to 1923. Assad, convinced that Clinton and Barak had made a fool of him, left the meeting with the parties at yet another stalemate.47 Patrick Seale summarized the reason for the failed peace negotiations as follows: “Responsibility fo the failure of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations must rest largely with Prime Mininster Barak.”48 According to Seale, Israel had taken: “...the view that, because it is stronger than its neighbors and enjoys unlimited Amerian support, it can impose peace on its terms.”49 Journalist Reinhart suggests that Barak was engaging in “war games” over the Golan Heights region. Rheinhart states that while at the West Virginia meeting Barak had been lobbying for a multi-billion dollar arms scheme that included cruise missles and fighter-bombers. Previously he had liberally spoken of a “Kosovo style” air attack.50 Just when it seemed that things couldn’t get any worse, US policy went from biased mediation in favor of pressing Israel’s peace terms to virtual isolation of Syria. Three things happened to generate this change. Hafez Al-Assad passed away on June 10, 2000 and his son Bashar took office. In Israel, Ariel Sharon took office in March the following year. In the US, George Bush, who delcared Syria part of an “axis of evil” took office as US President.51 Summary of Mediation Shortfalls and Reccomendations Stephen Zunes summarized the main difficulties for the mediation process by the US between Syria and Israel. According to Zunes, the US has an undisputed history of supporting Israel despite its blatant contraventions of International Law. This support and toleration was manifested more clearly following the UN Resolution 242. Moreover, the US has accepted without question Israel’s unsubstantiated security concerns over the Golan Heights region. In fact the United States has a propensity for citing the conflicts that existed on the Golan Heights prior to 1967 and unfairly attributes those conflicts to the instigation of Syria.52In fact Repko maintains that at least 80 percent of the Golan Heights conflicts had been instigated by the Israelis.53 Stephen Zunes plainly states that the United States will never be able to successfully mediate the Syrian-Israeli peace talks with a biased agenda. Zunes states that: “In order to play a reasonably constructive role...the United States has to approach the peace talks from the perspective of upholding United Nations Security Council resolutions, international law, and the long-term stability of the region and must not succumb to its ideological and geopolitical biases.”54 One of the US’ greatest failings is its failure to acknowledge and credit Syria for its willingness to engage in peace talks and to make concessions. In the final analysis, the US is not capable of adapting an unbiased position in respect of the Israeli-Syrian conflict. Quite possibly the only real solution might be to turn the mediation task over to a body such as the European Union or the United Nations.55 Zunes notes that over 15,000 Israelis immigrated to Golan Heights, a move that contravenes International law which does not permit citizen occupation of land taken by military force.56 If the US was serious about mediating peace talks with the two embattled nations it would allocate funds for the repartriation of the Israeli citizens currently occupying the Golan Heights illegally.57 This money Zunes said should come from the funds that only add “still more sophisticated armaments to an already-overmilitarized region.”58 As Zunes notes the US has already provided billions of dollars in military aid to Israel in response to its peace negotiations with Egypt and Jordan. Zunes maintains that the US should set its sights on totally disarming the area. Zunes adds that: “If it wants to be helpful, the US should use the peace process as an opporutnity to get serious about arms control.”59 Clearly Golan Heights is the key to peace between Syria and Israel. As Zunes points out a settlement of this issue would iron out the difficulties existing between the two neighbors. Syria has adamantly maintained that Golan Heights is the only barrier to peace. This would likely lead to peace with Lebanon since Lebanon primarily takes its cue from Syria. In other words, “Isreal can have the Golan or it can have peace.”60It is in Israel’s best interest since possession of Golan Heights poses a greater security risk for Israel than withdrawal from the region poses.61 If he US was seriuos about resolving the issues in a manner which was fair to both sides it would quite simply propose that the Israel withdraw from the region in exchange for clearly defined security gaurantees from Syria. The US can achieve this goal by threatening to withdraw its current economic and military support to Israel.62 The underlying impediment to the long history of negotiations between Israel and Syria has been the imbalance of pressure. While Syria has been pressured by a lack of military and economic aid to bend to make concessions Israel has had no incentives or pressure to at least meet Syria halfway. The United States role appears to be disingenuous since it has repeatedly failed to put pressure on Israel to be fair and objective. Its approach has been more aligned to pacifying Israel and conspiring with it to hold on to Golan Heights. Repko points out that the US bias against Syria and its unfailing bias in favor of Israel is the greatest obstacle to successful peace talks. He points out that the US was able to negotiate the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, land annexed at the same time as the Golan Heights. This deal was mediated by the US at the Camp David Accords and negotiated concessions from both sides. One of them included the recognition by Egypt of Israel as a sovereign nation. The US can achieve the same goals with Syria and Egypt if it at least appears to have both nations’ welfare at heart. The US can convince Syria to recognize Israel as a sovereign nation and convince Israel that both nations have an unfettered right to co-exist peacefully. As it is the US appears to be conveying that that right is Israel’s alone.63 Repko maintains that since the US is unable to distinguish its own foreign policies from the Israeli-Syrian peace talks, and since Israeli support is conducive to US foreign policy the US should appoint an unbiased mediator to preside over negotiations between the three nations. More importantly, the US: “…must make it clear that all parties involved must be prepared to make serious concessions in order to achieve the end goal of normalized relations between Israel and Syria.”64 All observers appear to agree that Israel is being far more unreasonable with Syria than it was with Jordan and Egypt in their peace talks.65Repko maintains that it is perhaps time for the US to take a stricter approach to Israel and depart from its current practice of justifying Israel’s stand against Syria. It is perhaps time to rethink or restructure current free trade agreements with Israel as a means of returning Golan Heights to Syria. If the US ultimately wants peace with Syria and Israel the only way is to take a fair and balanced approach. The US approach has always been heavily slanted in favor of Israel. Only then can the US hope to obtain reasonable and effective concessions from both sides. Works Cited Cobban, Helena and Neumann, Robert. (1991) The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict: Beyond Crisis Management? Praeger Cobban, Helena. (1999) Israel-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-1996 and Beyond. Washington, D.C. Unites States Institute of Peace Press Esposito, Michele. (Spring 2004) “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy: Syria-Israel” Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XXXIII p. 140 Kumaraswamy, P.R. (Fall 2002) “Israel-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-1996 and Beyond.” The Journal of Third World Studies. Available online at: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3821/is_200210/ai_n9115956/pg_2 Retrieved November 18, 2007 Ma’oz, Moshe. Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking. Clarendon Press, 1995 Rabinovich, I. (1999) The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. Princeton: Princeton University Press Rabit, Robert. (2003) Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. Lynne Rienner Publishers Reinhart, Tanya. (2005) Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948. New York: Seven Stories Press Repko, Elliot, M. (Spring 2007) “The Israeli-Syrian Conflict: Prospects for a Resolution.” The Journal of International Policy Solutions. Vol. 7 pp 25-31 Seale, Patrick. (Winter 2000) “The Syria-Israel Negotiations: Who is Telling the Truth?” Journal of Palistine Studies Vol. XXIX No. 2 p.68 Seale, Patrick. (Summer 2000) “Obituary of the Syrian Track.” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXIX p. 154 Silver, Eric.(July 1, 1999) “Barak Government Takes Shape at Last.” The Independent. Staff Writer. (Jan, 1,2001) “The Flawed Savior” International Herald Tribune. Tibi, Bassam. (1998) Conflict and War in the Middle East: From Interstate War to New Security. Palgrave Macmillan. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 UN Security Council Resolution 338 Viorst, William. (June 1987) “The Kissinger covenant and other reasons Israel is in trouble - Henry Kissinger, excerpt from Sands of Sorrow: Israel's Journey From Independence.” Washington Monthly, Available online at” http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_v19/ai_5010446/pg_5 Retrieved November 17, 2007 Walid, Moualem. (Winter 1997) “Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations. An Inerview with Ambassador Moualem.” Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XXVI No. 2 Zunes, Stephen. (1993) “Israeli-Syrian Peace: The Long Road Ahead.” Middle East Policy, Vol. 2, p. 62 Zunes, Stephen. ( February 2000)”The US and the Israeli-Syrian Peace Process.” Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 5 No. 3 pp 1-4 Read More