Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan - Case Study Example

INTRODUCTION In the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies in 2001, in retaliation for its coddling of Osama bin Laden, self-confessed chief perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks against key US cities, the government of Taliban holding the country’s fort was toppled. Political reconstruction of that country immediately began as was mandated by a United Nation- sponsored conference held in Bonn. Thus, the country adopted a new Constitution, had its first presidential election in 2004, and placed in power, through popular vote, its first National Assembly thereafter. Hamid Karzai, who was elected at large as president in 2004 was again re-elected in 2009. Notwithstanding the political progress gained by that war-torn country since the toppling of the Taliban, there remain serious challenges to Afghanistan’s political and economic transition (The World Factbook: Afghanistan 2010). On the security front, the Taliban have risen again to mount what is called today a neo-Taliban insurgency, which is slowly spreading in the countryside especially in the south because of the weakening of Karzai’s support among the local tribal leaders there. Afghanistan’s economy is also one big factor that is holding back the success of the reconstruction process. The long years of conflict had taken a toll on its economy and the infusion of funds from international sources during the reconstruction is not enough to turn it around and lift the country from total poverty. Poverty has led not only to shortages in housing, food, medical care and other basic support for its population but it has also led to the difficulty in eradicating opium poppies cultivation. As a matter of fact, opium poppy cultivation increased rather than decreased after the toppling of the Taliban and during reconstruction period in 2004 (The World Factbook: Afghanistan 2010; Gootnick 55). Finally, ethnic and religious undertones often underpin conflicts that are still raging in Afghanistan as can be evidenced from the Taliban-led insurgency in the countryside. In accomplishing a successful reconstruction in Afghanistan, the US and its Coalition must succeed in eradicating the three-pronged problem that plague and hamper it: insurgency; economic poverty, and; religious and ethnic fundamentalism. One way of affecting a solution with the least loss of lives and minimal resources is a method of engagement that has already been recently put into a test by the Coalition Forces and is known as tribal engagement. This is the most credible solution to the three-pronged problem of security, economy and identity in Afghanistan because the Afghan culture heavily relies on the tribal system where elders are extended great deference by their tribesmen. THEORETICAL APPROACH Any further action made in Afghanistan must not give the impression of being unilateral and must always present itself as a general consensus by the Members States of a credible international organization like the United Nations. In the first place, a highly contingent and pressing reason such as the 9/11 no longer exists to justify any unilateral action at this stage. Any unilateral act by the US at this stage relative to the Afghanistan situation would only be seen as infringing into the domestic affairs of the latter. Diplomacy and tact must, therefore, characterize the next steps to be taken, if at all, in Afghanistan and, under the auspices of the UN. At present, coalition military forces and foreign civilian personnel are conducting an activity called tribal engagement for the purpose of obtaining support from the tribal groups in certain parts of Afghanistan in the provinces of Paktia and Paktita for coalition activities in the country. These regions are strategic because they are the very routes through which insurgents like the Taliban, Hezeb Islami al Gubaldin and Haqqani use to infiltrate the rest of Afghanistan. These areas are strictly rural and the people are engaged in subsistence farming and are unsophisticated. The success of engagement here by the coalition is very high considering that the need of the people in these areas is simple - provision for their immediate future (Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan 2009 p.1). This method of engagement can be used as well to resolve problems in security, economic and identity to assist the present political reconstruction being undertaken in Afghanistan and can be used in all other areas as well. The NGOs will be very useful and should have expertise in this kind of activity, together with the assistance of the military. The Afghanistan political and social system is highly tribal-based as can be evinced from the study of the Pushtun ethnic tribe which constitutes the majority of the Afghan population. The Afghan’s identity is always relative to his affiliation with his family, clan and tribe and therefore, tribes are very important to reach Afghan grassroots. Tribes play a very important role in an Afghan’s life and elders, like the ulemas are given great deference. As a matter of fact, even the Taliban recognize this because in conducting recruitment activities, the infiltration usually begins by courting elders of tribes and working closely with them in the beginning and gradually easing them out of the equation. As noted by an author, Taliban insurgency least flourishes in places where elders exercised strong influence over their tribes and expanded rapidly only in the southeast where the clergies are more influential than the elders (Giustozzi 2008 p. 171). The tribal engagement can help resolve security because the coalition forces, together with the NGOs can infiltrate tribes, earn their trust and sway them away from joining the insurgency. It can help resolve economic problems because the coalition forces will be able to teach Afghan farmers agricultural technology that can result in more effective and fruitful farming. Finally, it can help solve identity problems not by introducing or imposing a new religion on the tribes but by swaying them away from religious extremism to the more mainstream version of their religion. SECURITY Although Afghanistan had successfully put in place its initial democratic institutions in 2004 by holding its first presidential election and a National Assembly, the post-Taliban government is finding difficulty in controlling all four corners of the country. One of the obstacles that underpin this difficulty is the rising insurgency spearheaded by the new Taliban recruits in the east and south of the country. Much of the success in recruitment of the so called neo-Taliban was engendered by the fatal mistakes made by the US and its allies during the early war against terror. In 2001, hundreds of Pakistanis were lifted out of northern city of Konduz and flown out to Pakistan giving opportunity to senior Taliban and Al Qaeda to escape from Afghanistan. Likewise, the inability to sustain and maintain peace and order in the country due to the war in Iraq, which led to the withdrawal of many US personnel, was also a contributing factor to the rise of Taliban insurgency. Other reasons include human rights violation by the coalition troops, and distrust of the Karzai transitional government believed to have been controlled by Tajik leaders. The Tajik is an ethnic group second only in number to the Pushtuns. Finally, the Pushtuns’ distrust of the Karzai’s government was also fueled by its inability to defend them from the abuses of warlords and insurgents after the overthrow of the Taliban government (Johnson & Mason 2007 pp. 454-455). The present constitution of the neo-Taliban is made up mostly of new recruits largely from Pakistan. The bulk of the new recruits are, however, Taliban sympathizers who were influenced by the Afghan clergy as well as those who saw the Taliban as their only protection from tribal enemies. It was noted by no less than NATO that in 2006, Taliban recruitment saw an increase. Everyone, regardless of tribal origin is welcome to join the Taliban so long as an individual subscribed to the beliefs and goals of the organization, although it is said that 95% of their members belong to the Pushtun ethnic group. The Taliban strategy in recruitment in tribal groups begins by approaching the elder of the tribe and asking permission from him. Upon the grant of such permission, the Taliban assimilate themselves in the tribe working alongside the elders or gradually relegate them to the sidelines (Giustozzi 2008 pp. 169-172). ECONOMY The reaction of the Afghan farmers after the Taliban fell from power in 2001 was to step up planting of opium poppies. Although a prior ban on poppy planting was then in effect since its institution in 2000, the disorganization of the government gave them opportunity to replant unabated from the watchful eye of the toppled government. Thus, in 2004 a dramatic increase in opium cultivation was reported (Gootnick 2005 p. 55) and in 2007, a record production of opium was noted. The growth of the opium economy in Afghanistan is alarming as it presents a real impediment to any political reconstruction because of the potential political corruption, terrorism and challenge to legitimate economic progress that it brings (Goodhand 2008 p. 51). The conflicts that the country went through since Russia invaded had worsened the economic condition of Afghanistan. Although the reconstruction meant infusion of economic funds and aids from the outside, these were not enough to reverse its economic paucity although the agricultural and the service sector seemed to have responded to it (The World Factbook 2010). Farmers turned to opium cultivation and in 2000, the Taliban issued an edict banning its cultivation. It was reported that the export value of the opium drugs in Afghanistan reached $3.1 billion, which saw an increase from the $2.7 billion the year before that, but only 24% of that amount went straight to the farmers as the larger amount went to traffickers and other “security providers.” Afghanistan-grown drugs are mostly trafficked through Iran, followed by Pakistan and Tajikistan (Goodhand 2008 pp. 52-55). In 2007, narcotics production is said to be responsible for 60% of Afghanistan’s economy (Johnson & Mason 2007 p. 453). IDENTITY There are various ethnic, linguistic, racial groups that make up Afghanistan. Its population, which at present is more than 29 million (World Bank), is made up of the following ethnic groups: 40% Pushtun or Pukhtun; 25% Tajiks; 20% Hazara, and; the Uzbeks at 6% (see Table 1). Those who speak the Persian dialects Tajik and Hazaragi live in the eastern and central areas of the country, while those who speak the Turkish dialect Uzbek inhabit the northern and southern regions (Vincent & Sørensen, 2001 pp 118-119). The politics of Afghanistan is characterized by the persistent clashes of warring ethnic groups. The Pushtuns, being the largest group, dominated Afghanistan politics with most Taliban leaders coming from their ranks. Likewise, many past shahs or kings and commanders that led the war against Russia in the 1980s were Pushtuns. Aside from their number, Pushtuns are also a very organized group. It is made up of large tribal confederations which are subdivided into smaller groups from sub-tribal groups down to family clan groups as opposed to the other ethnic groups, which have no distinct networks of clans and tribes. A code of bravery, honor and justice permeate the highly patriarchal Pushtun tribe where women are considered chattels of the men (Vincent & Sørensen, 2001 p. 119). Table 1 Various Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan (Source: Vincent & Sørensen, 2001 p. 120) The Tajiks, on the other hand, are the Pushtun’s closest political rivals and animosity is said to exist between the two groups. They are however, inferior in number and organisation to the latter, although the Tajiks were as active as the Pushtun especially in the wars against Russia and the struggle against the Taliban. The Tajiks are engaged primarily in settled farming in the slopes of the Hindu Kush but have recently began to spread in the Shamali Plain. Closely allied to the Tajiks are the Uzbeks who share the same culture as the former. At the bottom of the ladder of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Hazaragis, who had been victims of systematic killings in the recent conflicts. They are considered the most inferior of the Afghan ethnic groups and held the most menial jobs because of their religion, which is Shi’ah Moslem (Vincent & Sørensen, 2001 pp. 119-120). Only 19% of the total population practiced the Shi’ah Moslem religion while the majority of 80% follows the Sunni Moslem religion (World Factbook: Afghanistan 2010). CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION The tribal engagement approach is appropriate to the Afghan case because tribalism underpin the political and social system of the Afghans. This is reinforced by the way the Taliban conduct their recruitment activities and by the fact that Taliban recruitment is at their lowest in areas where elders of tribes are more influential and flourishing in places where the clergy are stronger than the elders. In addition, the tribal engagement approach may be employed to resolve all three problems of security, economic and identity at once as the approach necessarily goes down to the grassroots. More importantly, the approach is more humane and more in keeping with modern conflict resolution as advocated by the Johan Galtung and embodied in the Galtung Triangle, which sought to resolve conflicts by de-escalation of conflicts through peaceful means upon the contention that more violence begets more violence because it eventually becomes a cycle. Negotiation or the search for mutually acceptable solutions to problems where all parties emerge victorious should, therefore, be seen as a longer lasting solution to conflicts (Wallensteen p.33). This approach should be spearheaded by NGOs and the UN, although the military factor should not be far behind to keep the “force” angle toned down. References (2010 June 24). The World Factbook: Afghanistan. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. (2010). World Development Indicators: Afghanistan. The World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. Blatt, D. & Long, E. & Mulhern, B. & Ploskunak, M. (2009 Jan 31). Tribal Engagement in Afghanistan. http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/TribalEngagement-swmag-31Jan09.pdf. Dorronsoro, G. (2005). Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present. London: Hurst & Co. Publishers. Gootnick, D. (2005). Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U. S. Goals. DIANE Publishing. Goodhand, J. (2008). Poppy, Politics and State Building. Afghanistan: Transition under Threat by J. Hayes, G. & Sedra, M. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press. Giustozzi, A. (2008). The Neo-Taliban Insurgency. Afghanistan: Transition under Threat by J. Hayes, G. & Sedra, M. Canada: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press. Johnston, T & Mason, M. (2007). Terrorism, Insurgency and Afghanistan. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 2 by Forest, J.F. ABC-CLIO. Vincent, M. & Sørensen, B. (2001). Caught Between Borders: Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced. Pluto Press. Wallensteen, P. (2007). Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, (2nd Edition). London: SAGE. Read More