US/Pakistan Security Ties after September 11th - Research Paper Example

The 61-year history of ties between the United s and Pakistan has been defined by times of engagement and periods of distrust. Beginning from the 9/11 incident, these ties have once again crossed the threshold of another age of close relations with joint interests. Nevertheless, there is a belief that the restored alliance is being motivated entirely by the need of the United States of Pakistani cooperation in its war against terrorism and is reliant upon the enduring influence and headship of President Pervez Musharraf. The belief, if true, foretells negatively severe implications for the United States and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.1 This essay explores the reliability of this belief in perspective of the historical narrative of US-Pakistan security ties. It evaluates the key forces currently manipulating this relationship and suggests a framework to develop this groundwork to boost prospective US-Pakistan alliance. I. A Historical Overview Under the regime of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinah, Pakistan gained independence on the 14th of August 1947 following a prolonged resistance by the Muslims of British-dominated India. Jinnah is regarded as the father of Pakistan; he initiated several political decisions and movements that became the pillar for the society of Pakistan.2 Jinnah was shaped by his experiences and the difficulties he won over. Jinnah is a Muslim from Karachi and obtained a great deal of his higher education in law in London. As an advocate, he sooner or later became the most important lawyer of Bombay, India. Being a politician, he was recognized for his dedication to the western form of democracy. Jinnah at first entered the Indian National Congress and initiated the resistance to liberate India from the British colonizers, collaborating with the well-known Hindu leaders, particularly, Gandhi. He later on discovered himself in conflict with the Hindu majority as he was later on persuaded that the caste-oriented Hindus did not aim to acknowledge the Muslims as citizens of India.3 He afterwards led the resistance for establishment of an autonomous Muslim state situated within the Muslim mainstream regions of India. Jinnah passed away on the 11th of September 1948, about a year after India’s declaration of independence from Great Britain. Recently independent states at the onset of the Cold War, namely, India and Pakistan, were eventually confronted with the problem of cooperating with the United States or the Soviet Union. Even though India quickly entered into positive ties with the Soviet Union, the leaders of Pakistan, largely educated in Western traditions and thought, chose collaborating with the West.4 Likewise, the first prime minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, declined the invitation of Stalin to take a trip to Moscow and instead went to Washington in 1950. From 1947 to 1952, President Harry Truman showed indifference toward Pakistan. When the administration of Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, the government of the United States became more and more apprehensive about the proliferation of communism in Asia and began to see Pakistan as a worthy ally. This acknowledgment was concluded in the 1954 Mutual Defense Agreement.5 The US-Pakistan alliance persisted to develop as Pakistan entered the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). A primary foundation of the alliance was the military cooperation between the two nations, which flourished through a vigorous training transaction program and the distributing of US armaments and equipment within the military divisions of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan provided the United States right to use the Bataber Air Force Base nearby the border of Afghanistan for U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union, at considerable hazard to its own safety measures. In the meantime, Pakistan in 1965 fought a very important war with India over the territory of Kashmir.6 Even though the Pakistan army was small it was well-trained and considerably equipped with weaponry from US which helped Pakistan defend the country against a colossal military force. Pakistan as well played a fundamental role in reconciling the United States and China the time President Richard Nixon made a decision to launch the process of stabilizing relations with Beijing. In 1971, Pakistan smoothed the progress of the confidential assignment to China headed by Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State of US. In fact, the initial meeting between the two meetings happened on board of a Pakistan Airlines plane traveling towards Beijing. Pakistan before long faced the consequences for this political activism; India, taking advantage of the political mayhem after the Pakistani general elections in 1970, attacked the eastern wing of Pakistan, which is now known as Bangladesh, with backing from the Soviet Union. In the middle of the turmoil, Pakistan asked United States for support and assistance, but was responded with an agonizing refusal. The war led to the partition of Pakistan; West Pakistan was named Pakistan while East Pakistan was recognized as the autonomous country of Bangladesh. In 1972 as a result of this tactical defeat the Pakistan Peoples Party, a socialist democratic political party, emerged into power. Consequently, US-Pakistan ties, which had expectedly weakened due to the lack of US assistance in the war of 1971, weakened even more as the United States refused to endorse a socialist regime in Pakistan.7 Identical incidents in 1979, namely, the Iranian revolution and the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan, restored the interest of the United States in recovering the US-Pakistan alliance. Pakistan all of a sudden became a major geostrategic actor as it functioned as a bulwark between the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union. The United States afterward made a decision to fight a surrogate war in Afghanistan, and the United States asked for the support of Pakistan to lead this fight. General Zia ul Haq who had taken command over Pakistan in a military coup in 1977 recommended America Pakistani advocacy in the attempt to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. Pakistan did not just serve the objectives of the United States; it as well became instrumental in expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1988.8 In recollection, the golden age in US-Pakistan security ties was from 1979 to 1988. Unluckily, both the regimes continued to be focused on tapered national interests favorable to their own security. Undoubtedly, the American concern concentrated almost absolutely on unhindered support to the Afghan jihad. Even though triumphant, it achieved merely a quite temporary and narrow strategic objective, the pulling out of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The concerns of Pakistan were also narrow-minded, typified by limited restructuring of the armed forces and US diplomatic support the military administration of Pakistan. No sensible stable economic strategy was acted upon, nor was any important economic infrastructure built.9 Generally, constructive US-Pakistan alliances of the 1980s were formed by military exchanges. Nevertheless, they did not take in any projects intended to fulfill the continuing interests of either nation. Even though it forced the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the war attempt as well generated numerous negative repercussions in the war-torn region. An abrupt impact of the US policy was a remarkable increase in the population of religious seminaries in the North West Frontier Province. These religious seminaries, also called madrassas, were constructed to indoctrinate and teach young Muslim learners from Afghanistan, tribal regions of Pakistan, and some Arab nations. The learners were as well provided with military instruction and training and were enlisted in Afghanistan to come to blows with the Soviets. The unintended effects of the policies of US in Pakistan in the 1980s comprised the expansion of what has been referred to as the ‘Kalashnikov culture’.10 Hence, the United States in some way supported several of the less favorable policies of the Zia administration; stifling freedom of the press; an increase in nativism and sectarianism; and the decline of the local institutions of Pakistan. Generally, the shared policies of the United States and Pakistan governments, with vigorous advocacy from a number of Arab nations, led to the militarization of some of the young Muslims, with sweeping consequences linked to the rise of terrorism.11 Throughout this period Pakistan endured tremendous internal insecurity thanks to the shared attempts of the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB) and its Indian counterpart, which is the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Pakistan suffered countless bomb attacks on public utilities and establishments such as trains, buses, shopping malls and others which resulted in staggering numbers of civilian fatalities. There was also an emergence of political division because of the sustained dominance by the military and worsened insecurity because of unparalleled increase in native and sectarian bloodshed. This internal conflict was intensified by the arrival of heaps of substandard Soviet weapons.12 Simultaneously, Pakistan act in response to the nuclear development program of India through initiating the development of its own nuclear power. Even though the United States was firmly against the production of nuclear weapons, it successfully ignored these developments for the reason than Pakistan was its most precious supporter in the suppression of the southward expansion of the Soviet Union. When in 1988 the Soviets abandoned Afghanistan, the interest of the United States in South Asia started to disappear. Afghanistan, during that time, was in intense mayhem as an outcome of years of Soviet incursion and civil war. Against the suggestion of the leadership of Pakistan, the United States abandoned Afghanistan.13 America’s dealing with Pakistan did not improve. Not merely was its pledged assistance of $4.02 billion to Pakistan pulled out, the United States forced penalties on Pakistan for continuing the progress of the production of nuclear weapons. The neglect, no longer hampered by the danger of Soviet expansion, started to awaken. It was at this moment that President Zia ul Haq, together with a number of his trusted military generals and the ambassador of the United States, were exterminated in a plane crash in what people though was a working of terrorism. Some in Pakistan even presumed that the US Central Intelligence Agency was involved on the basis that President Zia ul Haq had turned out to be a burden for the United States.14 The anonymity of the plane crash was never discovered, yet the consequent doubt once again descended over the US-Pakistan security ties. Hence, the engagements between the United States and Pakistan at the time of the concluding decade of the Cold War was followed by years of weakening collaboration manifested by penalties in the Pressler Amendment that banned US assistance to Pakistan except if the President confirmed that Pakistan was not in custody of nuclear weapons. Even though four democratically elected administrations are present in Pakistan from 1988 to 1998, they concentrated primarily on insignificant domestic politics to the tactical loss of the country. In several considerations, it was a depressing period for Pakistan. In 1998, Pakistan once again grabbed international attention when it set off six nuclear devices in retort to the nuclear bombings initiated by Indians in Pokharan. The United States took action through further intensifying sanctions against Pakistan. Consequently, the economic situation in Pakistan deteriorated while nativism and sectarianism began to intensify. At this time, the newly emancipated Central Asian Republics (CARs) offered the majority of opportunities in trade and industry for Pakistan. Nonetheless, the insecurity in Afghanistan persisted to hinder the relation of Pakistan with CARs. Deprived of energy resources and expecting entry to the Central Asian markets thru direct route, Pakistan began its alliance with the Taliban administration in Afghanistan.15 Growing disgruntlement among the masses in Pakistan together with consecutive corrupt administrations and the sudden fallout of the clash with India functioned as a channel for the peaceful coup of 1999. General Pervez Musharaf, the Chief of Staff of the Army, took on administrative command of the nation with a plan for reform, economic revitalization, and extermination of extremism. The style of governance of President Musharaf was basically different from former military administrations. He did not enforce his emergency powers, did not restrict freedom of the press, and did not give effort to pacify the traditionalist right. His strategy was also dissimilar from that of the former civil governments that lost integrity because of their blatant corruption. By manner of opposition, President Musharraf cleaned his own regime of the corrupt privileged few; this is comprised of the civil servants, politicians, and even top military authorities. Concerning the condition in Afghanistan, President Musharraf engaged to persuade leaders of the American society of the danger created by Al Qaeda and put forth Pakistan’s support to fight it.16 II. Post 9/11 The significant incident of 11 September 2001 had a remarkable impact on the security ties between the United States and Pakistan. President Musharraf was punctual in giving full support to the United States in the continuing fight against terrorism. He willingly accepted all the demands of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Based on the accounts of some sources, his optimistic response surpassed expectations. Certainly, President Musharaff has been oftentimes condemned in Pakistan for collaborating too eagerly and giving in excessively to the whims of the United States with no sufficient remuneration. The most possible justification for his outspoken response was his acknowledgment that United States and Pakistan could collaborate in crashing the fundamentalist religious and terrorist entities developing in the region. President Musharraf had previously been traversing this direction.17 His unreserved support to the United States consequently helped cultivate a strong relationship between the two countries. Pakistan has taken in a central position and forceful obligation in war against terrorism. There are people who argue that the support of Pakistan for the fight against terrorism is being propped up single-handedly by the charisma and firmness of the personality of President Musharraf, that it does not show the actual precedence of the country’s general public and is not in harmony with the national interests of Pakistan. Fascinatingly, this claim is exploited by the political adversaries of Musharraf and also by some of his followers. His political adversaries and the anti-US lobby attempt to indicate that promoting the fight against terrorism is very much detested in Pakistan. They claim that President Musharaff is combating a dreadful war to satisfy the United States and that he should be ousted from power.18 On the other hand, the followers of President Musharaff maintain that it is only the President who can give unlimited Pakistani advocacy to the fight against terrorism. If this is real then his extension in the presidency is critical to the interests of the United States. Both claims overlook the real thing and weaken the personal security of President Musharraf. It should be apparent that the awareness that this policy is reliant on the individual has resulted in to different attempts on the life of the President, at least two which failed. Actually, the opposition of President Musharaff to religious fundamentalism started well prior to the 9/11 incident. Contrary to the 1980 relationship between the United States and Pakistan, existing alliance, even though instigated as an outcome of the 9/11 attacks, has evolved along a more advanced schema. Instead of a one-dimensional scheme oriented on the war on terrorism, Pakistan has made use of the present situation of enhanced relations to deal with a broad array of concerns. The policies implemented by the administration of President Musharraf have been established to be addressing the paramount interest of the United States and Pakistan both in short- and long-term goals.19 This wide-ranging approach strengthens national perceptions linked to globalization, the abolition of militancy, economic progress and liberalization. The US government has as well indisputably pursued to trim down the foreign debt of Pakistan. Aside from exploiting its influence on G8 nations for economic alliance, the United States smoothed the progress of Pakistan’s bargaining with the International Monetary Fund. America has also withdrawn all sanctions forced on Pakistan and has restored confidence to the leadership of the country that its nuclear weapon potentials is tolerable and will not lead into future rollbacks. The United States and Pakistan are as well collaborating on issues associated to nuclear nonproduction, consenting to resolve the proliferation concerns including Dr. Qadeer Khan pioneer of the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan, in an equally legitimate way.20 Currently, the Bush administration hopes for security and stability in Pakistan. This hope rested on the rising influence of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. However, her assassination blew apart those hopes and endangered to immobilize US priorities and interests there: combating terrorism, guaranteeing the safety of the nuclear weapons of Pakistan and putting off regional upheaval. The government had a considerable stake in the former prime minister who was admittedly pro-West. U.S. authorities were investing greatly on Bhutto’s part because they believe that if the party would win adequate seats in the forthcoming elections they could be an effective force in the regime once again. In Pakistan, her assassination puts the party in confusion and the elections themselves in uncertainty. The assassination as well addresses a blow to a very close U.S. advocate, President Musharraf, who already may lose the electoral approvals he requires to revive his weakening integrity and authority. Worse, several Pakistanis blame the president and his supporters for the assassination, if only for the reason that they failed to thwart it.21 Pakistan has turned out to be the most trusted ally of the United States in its war against terrorism. This war will not be victorious if the hearts and minds of the general public of Pakistan are not won over. As the border of Pakistan with Afghanistan is being rinsed out of terrorist organizations, large-scale development projects have been initiated in the tribal regions in an attempt to limit future terrorist attacks. The building of infrastructures such as schools and hospitals in formerly remote and inaccessible areas has helped assimilate local residents into the mainstream of national existence. This dual technique was planned to realize both the short term aim of crushing the terrorists and the long term goal of abolishing the conditions that cultivate terrorism. Apolitical approach is in progress to assimilate the tribal elders in this process. Workings of the law enforcement organizations are opening the perimeter region and refusing right of entry and support to terrorists and other identified scoundrels. III. Conclusions Military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has endured the test of time and has evolved into a strong friendship. The Pakistan military is a force of well-trained and highly enthusiastic individuals; it served a fundamental function in the national decision making process. Moreover, the volume of the equipment of the Pakistani military came from the United States. Also, several top military generals have attended specialized courses in military academies in US and have taken pleasure of positive introduction and exposure to the culture of America. In spite of this protracted military alliance, the US military just recently lost contact with the armed forces of Pakistan. During a convention with some average-ranking officers of the Pakistani Army before the 9/11, the Commander in Chief of US Central Command was astonished to discover that no one among the Pakistani officers had formally attended a US military academy. He afterwards commented that the United States had mislaid a relationship with an entire generation of military authorities of Pakistan because of the Pressler sanction. During that time, he pledged a commitment to appropriating the error. As a result, literally multitudes of Pakistani military officials have communicated and trained with their counterparts in the US over the recent years.22 Indeed, the training of Pakistani military officers with the US military must be sustained; nevertheless, there are items for further improvement. Campaigns against terrorists are more winning when carried out by way of timely information dissemination between the United States and Pakistani organizations; while still giving respect to one another’s autonomy and virtues. Several of the senior leaders of Al Qaeda have been arrested or killed by the security forces or law enforcement organizations of Pakistan on the basis of information given by US intelligence. On the contrary, on a number of instances US forces have responded and acted single-handedly within the Pakistani territory. These events, which have primarily failed to realize their planned objectives, frequently generated civilian fatalities and destruction of property leading into powerful political and diplomatic repercussions.23 The United States should not initiate action single-handedly with neglect for the territorial honor of an ally; transgression of sovereignty does not fulfill the long-term concerns and motives of both countries. Moreover, such actions have an insignificant effect on the readily disposable leadership of Al Qaeda. Providing of information has generated the best outcomes and should be depended upon in the near future. The United States have to provide the security forces of Pakistan with technologically sophisticated equipment such as sensors, surveillance equipment, telecommunication gadgets, and automatic aerial automobiles for monitoring activities and performing search and destroy assignments in the border regions.24 Through dynamic socioeconomic mechanisms, Pakistan has to assimilate its indigenous regions into the majority of the national political system, in so doing exterminating terrorist havens. The US government and nongovernmental organizations can supply the much needed technological and financial aid to Pakistan in an attempt to reinforce regional economies. Pakistan can improve joint venture among its military activities, gaining from the productive US experience. The United States could, on a restricted basis, permit the authorized production of US military weaponry and gear in Pakistan. The support of Pakistan to the United States in the fight against terrorism is fortified by an agreement from within the nation of Pakistan and dynamically headed by President Musharaff. Emancipated through a self-governing process, Pakistan has well-built traditions of diverse outlooks in politics, religion and freedom of speech that are well-matched with US principles and strategic aims. Even though the 9/11 incident have functioned as a force for bringing America and Pakistan in a closer relationship, US policy concerning Pakistan is not exclusive to the fight against terrorism. Even though the two countries have their own national objectives and interests as well as security issues, majority of the long-term goals of the United States are shared by Pakistan. Significantly, there are no regions of important deviation when it comes to the national interests of the two countries. Traditionally, a number of concerns and remote incidents have resulted in to mutual distrust. The two countries have addressed these problems and identified key areas of concurrent interests, intentionally aiming for a closer friendship for the advantage and benefit of all concerned. Nonetheless, there are several prospects for enhancing this long-established alliance. A reinforced US-Pakistani security ties will establish Pakistan as a dependable regional ally and fortify the overall performance of the global war against terrorism, further giving peace and stability to a region that was historically weighed down with security peril. References Brunn, Stanley. 11 September and Its Aftermath: The Geopolitics of Terror. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Buckley, Mary. Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. New York: Routledge , 2003. Cheema, Pervaiz. The Armed Forces of Pakistan. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003. Chomsky, Noam. September 11. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2001. Crockatt, Richard. America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order. London: Routledge, 2003. Dell, Melissa. "Learning Curve: The United States and the Future of Pakistan." Harvard International Review (2002): 34+. El-Ayouty, Yassin. Perspectives on 9/11. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Gokay, Bulent. 11 September 2001: War, Terror, and Judgment. London: Frank Cass, 2003. Healey, Stephen. "Religion and Terror: A Post 9/11 Analysis." International Journal on World Peace (2005): 3+. Hilali, A.Z. "Confidence- and Security- Building Measures for India and Pakistan." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political (2005): 191+. Kumar, Leena Thacker. "U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia Since 9/11: Temporary Alliances or Permanent Changes?" International Social Science Review (2006): 99+. Richter, Paul. “Assassination Shatters Hopes for Stability in Pakistan.” The Los Angeles Times 27 December 2007. Silverstein, Gordon. "The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11." Constitutional Commentary (2005): 349+. Read More