How Did the Criteria for Statehood Change in the 20th Century - Case Study Example

Name Number Course Lecturer Institution Date THE CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD IN THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES Definition of Statehood Legal writers have suggested several definitions of statehood. Importantly, there were those definitions of a state before the 20th century, and there is modern definition of statehood. Supremacy and independence were recognised as essential aspects of a state by the turn of the century as Davis (2014) indicates. Political power was also identified as central along with the law. This article begins by reviewing how various writers defined state both modern and pre-modern era. With the report in mind, then I turn to how the criteria for statehood changed in the 20th century. The pre-modern era had several writers and scholars who defined a state and its components. Statehood is the status of being a state. There were fifty states acknowledged at the beginning of the 20th century. Just before the Second World War there were about seventy-five states. This number rose to 192 by 2005, the emergence of many states represented one of the most significant political developments of the 20th century (Jessop 2006). Before discussing how the criteria for statehood changed in the 20th century, it is important to evaluate the changing opinions on the topic since the 17th century. For instance, Grotius defined a state as a whole association of free men, united together for the gratification of rights and their mutual interest. This definition of a state is more philosophical rather than legal. Before the 20th century, the existence of a state was not taken seriously; people took it for granted. Just like the people who comprise it, a state was automatically bound by the law of nations. This law of nations was practically similar to the law of nature (Sterio 2010). Criteria for Statehood in the 20th Century The law of nature, which is also the law of nations, hardly covered all nations. Also, Pufendorf defined a state as just a composite moral person, whose will is united and intertwined by the agreements of several men, is regarded the will of all, so that it can make use of faculties and strength of individual persons for the joint security and peace (De Grazia 2009). To some extent, he agreed with Hobbes and Grotius that the law of nations and natural law were the same. In contrast, Victoria, while lecturing a century before then, defined a state in a much more legal term in implication and expression than either Pufendorf or Grotius, though her definition was still based on scholastic argument. She defined a state or community as one which complete by itself, which is entirely independent, that which is not part of another community, but which has its council and laws and magistrates, for instance, the kingdom of Aragon and Castile and the Republic of Venice and the like. She indicated that such a state had an authority to declare war. Victoria brought out the criteria for independence and government. Her definition was for a particular purpose rather than a theological or moral treatise (Craven 2010). In the 19th century, there was the addition of more meaning in the development of a state. It was known as the sovereign state. A sovereign state is that nation that governs itself, in whichever form, and which is not dependent on another nation. This is a more modified definition of a state. Mostly, the connection between these earlier views and the 19th-century positive view of statehood is well illustrated by Wheaton. He asserted that a state acquired sovereignty when recognition of statehood began in the middle of the 18th century; it started with recognition of governments. By then, there were only monarchs as Simpson (2008) emphasizes. The recognition of statehood was for elected monarchs. During then, recognition was a medium of fitting new political reality into law. This accelerated the development of political nature of statehood. Accordingly, Coggins (2014) report that the modern criteria define a state as an association of a significant number of people living within a particular territory, established as a political society and subject to the ultimate authority of an autonomous territory. The authority has means, power and ability to maintain political organisation of the association, with the help of the law, and to protect and regulate the rights of the people, to conduct affairs with other states as well as to accept accountability for its acts. In his book in 1930, Thomas Baty called a state as an organised society or an assembly of people among whom the willpower of ascertainable number usually prevails. On the other hand, Hans Kelsen defined statehood concerning law. He noted that a state is not its individuals but rather a distinct union of the order which regulates their mutual behaviour (Yamamoto & Esteban 2010). However, this definition has been the subject of criticism from several scholars, as in how can there exist a state without persons. There was no complete unanimity among writers and scholars about statehood in the 20th century. However, there was an interconnected set of principles based on the idea of positivism, the impact of which was creation and actuality of states. Statehood and international law are very much closely related. Statehood in its own is not complete; it is made complete by international law. By the 19th century, international law was regarded as the law existing between civilized nations. The formation of states was an issue of fact and not of law (Sautman 2010). Consequently, how a state became a state was not an important matter to traditional law, it concentrated on recognition as the agency admission into civilized society. Recognition of states was a matter of law; such states become subject to international law after recognition. Hence, the acquiring new territory by a new state was not recognised as a mode of acquisition of territory. Though, a rebellion was a method of losing it. The criteria for statehood are of unique character; this is because their conditions for application must apply to many other international laws. This made many States keep for themselves much freedom of action as possible concerning new the state. The criteria are also very flexible; they allow various entities with differing situations to be categorized as states (Cerny 2013). All territorial entities do not have the same obligations and rights or even the same status. No entity has distinctive traits. Otherwise, it cannot qualify as a state under such criteria. There has been recurring cases of individual cases in the criteria for statehood since the 20th century. As such, it involves the relation between two vital principles. One of the doctrines is the doctrine that the status of an entity is to be determined by specific conditions and its primary instruments and not by reference to any overall concept. The other doctrine is the doctrine that statehood is a standard legal position with a definite, occasionally relatively minimal set of significances. Sloane (2007) claim that the portrayal given by this interpretation is that, even with the inadequate quantity of state exercise, nothing in the vicinity of the international law excluded the resolution of the legal glitches raised by the formation as well as the existence of states. This later came to arise with the submission of detailed going positivism to the notion of statehood and recognition theory as well. Later recognition started to appeal thorough deliberation. Another change in the criteria for a state in the 20th century is that states were not definite members of the community of nations. Recognition, implied or express, made the states be members of the international community and was bound to observe the international law as Delahunty & Yoo (2005) articulates. The states not accepted as such (in theory) were, however, not bound by the international law. The civilized nations, as regarded then, were bound in their individual behaviour towards themselves. Vitally, only territories considered as states and recognized in the international community were subject to international law; this made them become international persons. International law did not bind groups and person. As such, they had no rights and obligations under the international law. The international law, which bound the international community, was based on the common consent of the states making it and not whatsoever the human beings. The states exclusively and solely were subject to the international law (Mazower 2009). The requisite vigor of the international law came from this course of looking to be recognised and accepted. Thus, the just created states acknowledged to international society consequently became subject to the bulk of regulations for international behavior in play at the time of their admission. The international law was explicit in its acknowledgment that a state does not exist as long as it is not recognised but it does not take notice of it before recognition as Craven (2010) asserts. This meant that the international law recognised states after recognition, that is when states could cooperate with the international community and be subject to international law as well. A state only became an international person after recognition and bound to obey international law. The Montevideo Convention in 1933 set out several requirements for statehood. The criteria include defined territory, a permanent population, government and the capacity to enter into dealings with other states. This convention viewed states as legal entities existing and operating under its power and authority. It is important to note that some of the above criteria were there is the twentieth century as discussed above. As long as an entity had a territory and a government, it was recognised as a state. This indicates how the criteria for statehood have changed (De Grazia 2009). One of the most significant effects of changes in statehood after the 20th century was the rights and duties of states. After the acquisition of territories, states were not only recognised in the international law, but they were accorded rights and duties. One of the most sought after right was non-intervention right. In 1933 during the London Convention, it was noted that any act of aggression could not be justified by the internal condition of a state; as the convention was concerned to define aggression. The intervention was, however, elusive as the definition of aggression. States were accorded rights and duties. It was the duty of a state to conduct itself in the right manner that does not contravene the right of another state. States were required to uphold their sovereignty while at the same time not demean the sovereignty of another state. This meant that there is no sovereignty of a state that is superior to that of another state (Jessop 2006). This was one of the fundamental changes of statehood during and after the 20th century. Davis (2014) adds that the principle of positivism placed all prominence on the question of recognition in the substance of statehood. Indeed, many courts around the world would decline to decide any questions of statehood for them, even when the matter concerns private entities, on the foundation that executive acknowledgment certainly determines status. This avoids dangerous effects on reserved rights of political play of recognition by the mechanism of creation. The executive may return the matter to the courts to determine but as a substance of the public law, where the international position of a party is directly in executive issue guarantee is mandatory. This is a significant effect of the modern era; it is because of this that courts are seeking to differentiate between internal and external concerns of non-recognition. The modern international law has brought in the executive power which is supreme in any matter about international law. This is a significant change in statehood. There are far reaching consequences of the breach of the international law. Conclusion Though there have been changes in the criteria for statehood in the 20th century, the international law does not provide workable procedures or policies for determining whether a given entity or territory is a state. There have been changes in the criteria such as definite territory, permanent population and existence of authority. Although recognised by the international law, it does not provide the definite rule of determining a state. In addition, the notion of sovereignty, positivism and recognition came up and became a focal point in the criteria for statehood in the 20th century. The report has also discussed the effects of such changes. Some of these effects as discussed above are executive powers of the international law where it is supreme to any state law. Moreover, individuals were given rights and obligations. References Cerny, P.G., 2013. Globalization and statehood, Issues in 21st Century World Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.30-46. Coggins, B., 2014. Power politics and state formation in the twentieth century: The dynamics of recognition: Cambridge University Press. Craven, M., 2010. Statehood, self-determination, and recognition.International Law: 3, pp.203-251. Davis, M.B., 2014. Native America in the twentieth century: An encyclopedia(Vol. 452). Routledge. De Grazia, V., 2009. Irresistible empire: America's advance through twentieth-century Europe. Harvard University Press. Delahunty, R.J. and Yoo, J., 2005. Statehood and the Third Geneva Convention: Va. J. Int'l L., 46, p.131. Jessop, B., 2006. From micro-powers to governmentality: Foucault's work on statehood, state formation, statecraft and state power. Political geography,26(1), pp.34-40. Mazower, M., 2009. Dark continent: Europe's twentieth century. Vintage. Sautman, B., 2010. Tibet's Putative Statehood and International Law: Chinese journal of international law, 9(1), pp.127-142. Simpson, A., 2008. Nations and States; Salmon, Trevor C. & Imber, Mark F. Issues in International Relation, 2nd Edition, Routledge: GP, 14, pp.46-60. Sloane, R.D., 2007. The Policies of State Succession: Harmonizing Self-Determination and Global Order in the Twenty-First Century. Fordham International Law Journal, 30, p.1288. Sterio, M., 2010. Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of Statehood, A. Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y, 39, p.209. Yamamoto, L. and Esteban, M., 2010. Vanishing island states and sovereignty: Ocean & Coastal Management, 53(1), pp.1-9. Read More