Philosophy of Science - Essay Example

Philosophy of Science 28th April, Philosophy of Science Meaning of Science and the Demarcation Problem Demarcation problem refers to the philosophical problem of giving a set of criteria of distinguishing science from non-science or from pseudoscience. Defining science is one of the major problems of philosophy of science. The problem of defining Philosophy arises because it is not easy to demarcate what distinguishes science from non-science disciplines or from pseudoscience. Philosophers of science have made various attempts to come ups with a criteria that seek to demarcate science from non-science; a critical look, however, at the various demarcation criteria given by the philosophers of science shows that none of the criteria captures the essence of what science in general is. This fact shows that it is not possible to formulate a criterion that is unproblematic, i.e. a criterion that allows unambiguous demarcation in all cases. The following is a critical analysis of the main demarcation criteria given by various philosophers of science. The critical analysis of the three criteria lays bare the weaknesses in each of the criteria. Firstly, let us critically look at Klemke’s demarcation criterion. According to Klemke, the following are the main characteristics of scientific process that set science apart from other disciplines: science makes accurate observation and records these observations in an intelligible manner, organizes the observations into categories, extracts general statements from the observation using induction, uses deduction on these general principles to deduce additional statements so as to generate predictions, test these deductions through additional observations, and develop theories that that connect and explain the most laws. A critical reflection on Klemke’s demarcation method reveals that the Klemke’s criterion is problematic because it does not actually capture all what is termed science. This is because even if empirical sciences in the modern world uses the method that Klemke has laid out, scientific method in the ancient world did not necessarily follow the Klemke’s method, and yet these methods were deemed scientific in ancient times. In the ancient world, many superstitions were regarded as part of scientific knowledge and yet they were not based on observable facts. Again, Klemke’s demarcation criterion rules out non-empirical disciplines from the domain of science; this is indeed problematic because scientific knowledge is not a preserve of empirical sciences only. After critically analysing Klemke’s view of science, let us critically looked at Karl Popper’s demarcation criterion, also known as the falsification method. According to Popper, science proceeds through conjectures and refutations. According to Popper, the criterion of distinguishing the scientific and the non-scientific disciplines is the principle of falsification; for Karl Popper, scientific knowledge must be falsifiable. What this meant for Karl Popper is that, in order for any knowledge to be regarded as scientific, there must be a way of proving the knowledge false, i.e. the knowledge must be falsifiable. Popper had a negative attitude towards induction as a method of science; for Popper, induction method does not yield scientific knowledge, but is deduction only that yields scientific knowledge. A critical analysis of Popper’s falsification method shows that Popper’s criterion of demarcating science from non-science is insufficient because it does not cover all what is regarded as science. This is because there are forms of knowledge regarded as being scientific and yet they are not falsifiable. For example, the theory of evolution is a scientific theory and yet it is not falsifiable. For this reason, therefore, Karl Popper’s demarcation criterion is not a sufficient criterion of demarcating science from non-science. Thirdly, let us look Kuhn’s demarcation criterion. According to Thomas Kuhn, what sets science from pseudoscience apart is the fact that science has a puzzle solving tradition, while pseudoscience has no such puzzle solving tradition. Kuhn was particularly critical of Popper’s falsification method. For Kuhn, science does not proceed through conjectures and refutations as Popper had argued, but it rather proceeds through a tradition of puzzle solving; For Kuhn, scientists do not falsify the existing scientific theories, as Popper had argued, but they build on the existing scientific theories and come up with better scientific theories. A critical analysis of Kuhn’s demarcation criterion shows that the criterion is not sufficient. This is because, even though Kuhn’s criterion explains how scientific knowledge proceeds, Kuhn’s criterion, however, doesn’t explain what exactly distinguishes scientific knowledge from pseudoscience method. This is because puzzle solving tradition doesn’t explain sufficiently is not a sufficiently what distinguishing scientific knowledge from non-scientific knowledge. A critical look at the demarcation problem shows that the demarcation problem is important to science and to the scientific process in genera. This is because the knowledge of what constitutes science can help the scientists in their research to focus only on the informational sources that are scientific. Without a clear understanding of what exactly constitutes science, scientists are likely to mix scientific methods and processes with unscientific methods and processes. The Scientific Method and the Scientific Theories The observational- theoretical distinction refers to the distinction that is made between the observable entities and the theoretical entities; many philosophers are sharply divided on the ontological nature of theoretical entities. Some philosophers of science are of the view that theoretical entities do not denote actually existing things, while other philosophers of science are of the view that theoretical entities denote the reality in the world. The observational-theoretical distinction debate revolves around two questions. a. Is it possible to divide our language into theoretical and non-theoretical aspects? b. Is it possible to categorize entities and events into observable and unobservable ones? Philosophers of science have answered these two questions in different ways. Let us critically analyse the views of Maxwell and Van Fraassen on this issue. For Maxwell, there is really no major distinction between the observational and the theoretical entities; in supporting this view, Maxwell argued that it is not possible to divide our language into theoretical and non-theoretical entities and to categorize them into observable and unobservable entities. Maxwell gave the following argument to support his views on this point. It is normally possible to describe a range of what is observable. There is no a non-capricious point in this range, however, where we can discriminate between what is observable and what is unobservable. In most cases, what determines this point is situation and purpose driven. The problem is that this means that on one distinction, entities might be see real, while on another instance the entities might be seen unreal and fictitious. It is also possible to arrange empirical entities according to their sizes and scale. Just as the distinction on observational range is capricious, so also is capricious to argue that large molecules are observable and real, while small molecule are unobservable and unreal. In conclusion, this means in essence that there is no, in principle, any distinction between the observational and the theoretical. In his viewpoint on the observational-theoretical debate, Van Fraassen agreed with Maxwell’s on the view that theoretical entities denote actually existing things in the world. For Fraassen, it logically erroneous to talk of observational-theoretical distinction. This is because, for Fraassen, there are two different distinctions in observational- theoretical distinction; the first distinction is linguistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical vocabulary, and the second distinction is the second distinction is the epistemological distinction between the observable and the unobservable entities. Fraassen agreed with Maxwell that the theoretical- non-theoretical distinction is false because language is laden with theories. Fraassen, however, disagreed with Maxwell on epistemological distinction. Fraassen argued that there is, indeed, a real distinction between the observable and the unobservable entities; for Fraassen, observable entities are the entities that are directed sensed by human sensory apparatus, while the unobservable are the entities that are not directly sensed by human sensory apparatus, although, they may produce effects that are directly perceived by human senses. For Van Fraassen, therefore, the observational-theoretical distinction is false on linguistic level, while it is real on epistemic level. The main role of the observational-theoretical distinction in science is that it helps to find out whether or not the scientific knowledge is a factual knowledge that gives us real knowledge of the universe as it is. If the observational-theoretical distinction is real as the logical positivists argue, then this means that the theoretical scientific knowledge that we have is not a true knowledge of how things really are; it would mean that the theoretical knowledge that we have is not the knowledge of the real world. On the other hand, if the observational-theoretical distinction is false, this would mean that the theoretical scientific knowledge that we have is the knowledge of the real world. This distinction, therefore, is quite significant in science. In my view, the observational-theoretical problem is not resolvable because it is possible to give a strong and a Science and Value The question of the relevance and the significance of values in science has been a hot debatable issue. The traditional or the historical view has been that values have no role in science, that science is value free. A critical view of this position, in light of the modern views of the role and the relevance of values, shows that this position is not plausible. Values can, indeed, be said to have significant roles in science. The following is a critique of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science, and an argument that values do indeed play significant roles in science. Let us begin by briefly and critically analysing the traditional views of the role and the relevance of values in science. According to the traditional view, science as an empirical discipline is an objective discipline in which values judgements have no role or relevance. The main proponents of this traditional view were the logical positivists who argued that science relies solely on observation, and for that reason therefore, it is observation that determines significance in Science; for the logical positivists, to be verifiable is to be observable. For that reason, therefore, the logical positivists contended that since value judgements have no objective observable basis, the value judgements are not verifiable, and for that reason value judgments have no role or significance in science. For some logical positivists like Rudolf Canarp, value judgements are impossible because values are merely emotional responses. And since emotional responses are purely subjective, Canarp argued that there is no objective basis upon which objective judgements can be based; hence, value judgements are not verifiable. Having looked at the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values science, let us look at the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science. According to the modern view of the role and the significance of values in science, science is value laden. According to this view, to pursue science at all, rather than some other epistemological process involves a value judgement. In supporting this view, the proponents of this view contend that all intentional human actions are motivated by one’s beliefs and values. For this reason, therefore, the proponents of this view contend that all intentional actions of scientists, including the actions that involve the choice of scientific theories and scientific hypotheses require value judgement. One of the chief proponents of this view is Rudner. According to Rudner, Value judgements are endemic to science. Rudner argues that choice of scientific hypothesis is inevitable in the choice between scientific hypotheses. According to Rudner, in the choice of scientific hypotheses, neither complete verification, nor complete falsification is possible; for this reason, Rudner conclude that the choice of scientific hypotheses involve value judgement. For McMullin, on the other hand, value judgements occur in science in the choice of scientific theories, rather than in the choice of scientific hypothesis. McMullin viewed Rudner’s “hypothesis acceptance” as an ambiguous concept; McMullin argued that, since science aims at theoretical knowledge, science proceeds through theories, rather than through hypotheses. For this reason, McMullin argued that value judgements in science occursat the point of choosing scientific theories. A critical view of these two positions shows that the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science is a flawed view. The proponents of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science are indeed right in their claim that as an empirical discipline, science relies on observations and verifications; the proponents of this view, however, are wrong in their claim that scientific method does not involve any aspect of value judgement. This is because, as the proponents of the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science have rightly argued, scientific method is not completely without value judgements because the choice of scientific hypotheses or scientific theories is an intentional human action, and for that reason is driven by values and beliefs. The main limitation of the traditional view of the role and the fact that, the traditional view doesn’t distinguish between the epistemic-cognitive values, and the social-political values; indeed scientific method doesn’t involve any aspect of social-political value, but it is laden with the epistemic-cognitive values as Canarp and McMullin contend. For this reason, therefore, the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science is not plausible. sound argument on either side of the argument. The Scientific Process According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution refers to a non-cumulative develop-mental episode in which an incompatible rival paradigm replaces the current paradigm, where the replacement is either complete or partial. In Kuhn’s analysis of the structure of scientific revolution, the main function of scientific revolutions is to bring about a paradigm shift, so as to enable the paradigm to meet the need that led to their creation. A look at Kuhn’s conception of the nature of scientific revolutions and the main reason why revolutions occur in science will help us to understand better the role of revolutions in science. Kuhn saw problems in a scientific paradigm as a prerequisite for a scientific revolution. For Kuhn, problems arise in a scientific paradigm when the existing paradigm is unable to effectively deal with new challenges that arise. For that reason, therefore, the challenge calls for a change of the paradigm, so as to come up with a new paradigm that is able to deal with the new challenge. Kuhn goes also argue that when a scientific revolution occurs, the change might appear to be a revolution within the current paradigm, while to outsiders it might seem a natural developmental process. For Thomas Kuhn, the main goal of scientific revolutions is to change the status quo or to change institutions or paradigms in a manner that the institutions and the paradigms will be able to overcome the new challenges that have arisen and that the old paradigm is not able to effectively overcome. Kuhn argues that the old paradigm and the institutions prohibit the revolutions. This fact shows that scientific revolutions are normally resisted either by the existing paradigms or the people who will be affected by the paradigm. Kuhn also contends that, when serious problems becomes more pervasive in an organization or in a scientific paradigm, there is a fragmentation within the political or scientific communities. This, therefore, ultimately leads to scientific revolutions so as to change the ineffective paradigm. For Kuhn, there is a choice between incompatible institutions or paradigms and the no cross-institutional or cross-paradigm evaluative criteria that are available through which to determine the most appropriate choice – these criteria are all intra-institutional and intra-paradigm. Kuhn argues that revolutions in science are, and must be invisible. What this means in essence is that scientific revolutions are the principles that drive scientific paradigm shift. As principles, scientific revolutions, therefore, are not visible. For Kuhn, therefore, revolutions are invisible because they are the source that underlies and determines science’s basic image disguises their existence and significance. Although revolutions are invisible, however, Kuhn argues that we have sufficient evidence that revolutions exist. The evidence that we have is that, although we do empirically seen revolutions, we, however, empirically see the results or the products of scientific revolutions. For instance, when there is a paradigm shift in a scientific theory, we see many changes that happen in the new manner of doing things. The new changes that we observe when there is a paradigm shift in a scientific revolution is a sure evidence of the existence of scientific revolution. For that reason, therefore, the evidence that we have of the existence of a scientific revolution is the result of the revolution. Science and Value The question of the relevance and the significance of values in science has been a controversial issue in the Philosophy of science. The traditional or the historical view has been that values have no role in science, i.e. science is value free. A critical analysis of this position, in light of the modern views of the role and the relevance of values, however, shows that this position is not plausible. Values can, indeed, be said to have significant roles in science. The following is a critique of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science; the critique of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science is followed by an argument that shows that values do, indeed, play significant roles in science. Let us begin by briefly and critically analysing the traditional views of the role and the relevance of values in science. According to the traditional view, science as an empirical discipline is an objective discipline in which values judgements have no role or relevance. The main proponents of this traditional view were the logical positivists who argued that science relies solely on observation, and for that reason therefore, it is observation that determines significance in Science; for the logical positivists, to be verifiable is to be observable . For that reason, therefore, the logical positivists contended that since value judgements have no objective observable basis, the value judgements are not verifiable, and for that reason value judgments have no role or significance in science. For some logical positivists like Rudolf Canarp, value judgements are impossible because values are merely emotional responses. And since emotional responses are purely subjective, Canarp argued that there is no objective basis upon which objective judgements can be based; hence, value judgements are not verifiable. After looking at the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values science, let us look at the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science. According to the modern view of the role and the significance of values in science, science is value laden. According to this view, to pursue science at all, rather than some other epistemological process involves a value judgement. In supporting this view, the proponents of this view contend that all intentional human actions are motivated by one’s beliefs and values. For this reason, therefore, the proponents of this view contend that all intentional actions of scientists, including the actions that involve the choice of scientific theories and scientific hypotheses require value judgement. One of the chief proponents of this view is Rudner. According to Rudner, Value judgements are endemic to science. Rudner argues that choice of scientific hypothesis is inevitable in the choice between scientific hypotheses. According to Rudner, in the choice of scientific hypotheses, neither complete verification, nor complete falsification is possible; for this reason, Rudner conclude that the choice of scientific hypotheses involve value judgement. For McMullin, on the other hand, value judgements occur in science in the choice of scientific theories, rather than in the choice of scientific hypothesis. McMullin viewed Rudner’s “hypothesis acceptance” as an ambiguous concept; McMullin argued that, since science aims at theoretical knowledge, science proceeds through theories, rather than through hypotheses. For this reason, McMullin argued that value judgements in science occursat the point of choosing scientific theories. A critical analysis of these two positions shows that the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science is a flawed view. The proponents of the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science are indeed right in their claim that as an empirical discipline, science relies on observations and verifications; the proponents of this view, however, are wrong in their claim that scientific method does not involve any aspect of value judgement. This is because, as the proponents of the modern view of the role and the relevance of values in science have rightly argued, scientific method is not completely without value judgements because the choice of scientific hypotheses or scientific theories is an intentional human action, and for that reason is driven by values and beliefs. The main limitation of the traditional view of the role and the fact that, the traditional view doesn’t distinguish between the epistemic-cognitive values, and the social-political values; indeed scientific method doesn’t involve any aspect of social-political value, but it is laden with the epistemic-cognitive values as Canarp and McMullin contend. For this reason, therefore, the traditional view of the role and the relevance of values in science is not plausible. Work Cited Forster, M.R. Demarcation, Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos. Web. Read More