Hare and Kants Point of View - Case Study Example

Kant’s Philosophy of Universalisation Kant’s notion of universalisation refers to the moral law which inspires and teaches us how to consider it as the ultimate truth of the possibility of moral obligation. Kant considers that universalisation refers to the autonomous freedom of every existence which holds the opinion that any practical issue should not be hindered in our way of experiencing moral obligation, since it cannot be explained with reference to any object of the will, or in accordance with any law of nature. What Kant believes is the significance of good will in universalism so that every individual act should be performed not as a duty, but as a moral deed in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. One of the main reasons that justify Kant’s philosophy to treat and understand humanity as a rational agency allows an individual to maintain transparency by keeping his heart and soul clear from the malice. This way an individual values his or her morals and is able to perform his worldly duties without any obligation. Kant believe this as the only way to assure oneself of the necessary obligations involved in moral values which upholds a possibility for the individual to work under the pure concept of universality. This gives a sense of believe to the person that some particular action can acquire the strict universality required to explain its unconditional necessity (Lake 2000: 5). Ethics provides opportunity to the individual to believe in virtue, that is what Kant believes that ethical universalism supports ethical reasoning that allows autonomous authority to every individual to adopt the principles based on ethical values to lead a simple but effective life (O’Neill, 2005). There are reasons that help in justifying our inner selves, this way justification is done with reasoning, rather than solely maxims that hollow our principles without reasoning. Checking our moral judgements In order to seek justification for morality for every person in our society, there is a certain criteria reserved as the role model of moral law. This criteria serves by means of which we can check our inner moral judgements, that is, our judgements to ‘must’ act or ‘must not’ to act in certain ways. Now, how to assume or believe our judgement depends upon the ‘maxim’ of the action what Kant has proposed. That is our ‘right’ judgement can be perceived as a universal law without contradiction, and in order to provide reasoning to believe that our judgement is correct, we feel the need to judge in our inner self the state of being ‘correct’ or ;incorrect’ in our moral decisions. If some thing gets wrong or one feels that some act cannot be perceived correct or moral, the best indicator is the inner conscience. Since maxim is not that matters as it cannot be willed as a universal law, this gives us the reason to believe that this verdictive judgement is correct (Lake 2000:5). Morality close to universalism Good morals is all that matters, this illustration of Kant can be analysed by the notion that a person having good morals would not hesitate what he or she should solely because his or her maxim can be willed as a universal law without contradiction. Secondly it is not necessary for that person to built maxims, as action speaks louder than words. Moral person’s morality is motivated and universalised by his or her deeds, for this reason a morally good person does what he or she should tends to be identical with the normative reason to do such act. Morality provides reasons to believe, it allows our deeds to seek and get an answer whenever justification requires, and therefore it teaches us to give equal respect to the autonomy of everyone. Following this it turns out to consider only those actions that are obligatory on every individual and those which can be universalised without opposition. But when we hear to our inner selves, we see that it is not our maxims that let us permissible actions to be universalised without negation that means negation comes from within us. Thus, if individual autonomy or universalisability makes our acts morally obligatory, it follows that permissible acts are considered as morally obligatory ones (Lake 2000: 5). Maxim matters but less than morality Such a problem can be solved by perceiving understanding of our action with respect to the moral laws which are understood in this universe, without any maxims. The best illustration here is by mentioning prohibited acts. When we talk about prohibited acts, we realise in this context that ‘forbearing’ takes place maxims cannot be universalised and there are reasons to it. Prohibited acts are prohibited for the sake of unfulfilling certain universal maxims of obligatory actions, i.e., those acts whose denial of a maxim cannot be willed as a universal law, as they are unlike ‘law like’ maxims. That means maxims are only universalisable if they are up to the morals of a good-willed person who is keen to keep his or her promise, for example, solely because he follows an act that requires ‘law like’ maxim. Hare’s Philosophy of Universalisation Hare’s philosophy of universalisation gives equal privilege to the viewpoints of everyone. What Hare believes is somewhat conservative as it escorts us to keep boundaries to universalisation. This way Hare believes in ‘universal prescriptivism’ which unlike Kant suggests that morality itself possesses two semantic properties at one time, ‘being universal’ and ‘being prescriptive’. Unlike Kant, Hare does not solely emphasise upon ethical maxims or maxims that justify our perception, but emphasises upon those moral judgements that are justified both, physically and psychologically. For example in order to determine the validity of a universal action, i.e., to check whether it is right or wrong, one must analyse it in the light of law and order. Hare distinguishes between various kinds of universal actions for the reason he believes that there are relations to which judgements may be universalisable as a judgement is considered to be universalised only when subjected to duties (Hare 1997: 98). This means Hare does not believe in the autonomous freedom of individuals as he suggests that nothing can be autonomous, because if an individual is subjected towards such‘autonomy’ he or she would never perform what is dutiful towards them. The reason for such perception is that there are limitations and boundaries which must be maintained. This contradicts with what Kant claims to be ‘moral’, because Kant considers duty in terms of morality whereas Hare considers duty to be duty devoid of emotivism. This is true to the extent as long as there is a ‘rule-governed’ world which distinguishes Hare from Kantian philosophy on the basis of the existence of principles which are necessary. Such a philosophy is not based upon physical freedom as that of Kant, but emphasises upon logical freedom and brings physical responsibility based on ‘law’. This contradiction is largely on the grounds of two recognisable things, one that allows logical freedom of the mind of individual since he succumbs to the law. This logical freedom does not wake a sense of moral responsibility in a person, but provokes physical liability towards the universe by enabling human determinations to follow rules that limit human universalisation. The second thing is the external necessity of determination that allows a person to keep his word of mouth to which he feels as a necessity to involve in beliefs or activities which we are already involved in or committed to. Artificial Intelligent morality Unlike Kant who believes morality is something independent of rules and close to nature, Hare believes morality to be a problem of machine intelligence which is not a real problem for humans in the sense that nothing hangs on its solution (Robinson 1998: 92). According to Hare, we are unable to perceive any legal, moral, social or diagnostic ideas unless we train our inner sides, or we put some rules upon us to be morally good. Hare rejects the notion that a person is capable enough to perform acts on the basis of his good morals or free will, because there is no use to it. Since humans are just like some machines that are unable to perform effectively if set free, therefore it is essential to set some limits on them. However the disputed thoughts between Kant and Hare’s universality are over the feature whether the universalisability of moral judgements is a logical or a physical feature that embodies a significant moral principle. In case it is a rational feature, humans are and should set free to decide and perform actions as their free will however, in case we perceives it to be a physical feature, there is no need to consider human emotions as artificial intelligent machines are devoid of emotions. Hare believes that one ground for holding such a narrow view refers to a human reaction when he or she reacts to certain violations of the principle in the same sort of way as he violates logical principles. It is often claimed that the thesis of universalisability does not go a long way with the principle that supports imperceptibility since Hare claims that no two principles are identical to prove universalisation. The reason is that if two situations found identical in all their universal properties, moral judgements would be the same (Hare 1997: 23). Hare’s Moral Judgement Hare’s moral judgement adheres to what Kant believes as the first formula ‘universalisable’ which is the Formula of Universal Law. However the difference is that Hare claims that if we make different moral judgements about situations with respect to our inner contention to admit to be identical in their universal descriptive properties, we contradict ourselves. A moral judgement according to Hare is a judgement that reveals a particular situation which is described in universal terms as scientific as law is about a kind of situation. It is not necessary for the person to matter the validity of the scientific law and know all its ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’, but that he must adhere to all laws that are specified in universal terms. Hare’s morals are not deprived of the most important consequence that requires that the individual is not allowed to make special exemption for his or her own case, since exemption is not allowed in Hare’s philosophy and the person for this exemption would require individual reference to himself or herself (John 1997: 18). Prescriptive Judgement Hare refers the second requirement of moral judgement as ‘prescriptive’ because it narrows the fundamental principle of reality. What Hare believes about moral judgement is to advice what to do, base upon the physical laws imposed on us. There must be some consistency between what we say for ourselves and what we say for others as this condition requires consistency between our actions and words and any discrepancy goes to prove oneself insincere if who says he ought to do something in some sort of situation, and then repeatedly fails to do it when the situation arises. Moral evaluations are unable to be differentiated from other kinds of evaluations and all evaluations entails logical features of universalisability and prescriptivity discussed above. What distinguishes moral evaluations from others is the feature that Hare calls ‘over-riding’ and Kant calls as a ‘categorical imperative’ (Kant, Oct 2001). However the main idea behind both the principles is the same i.e. to treat a universal principle as a prescriptive moral principle which must not be over ridded by any other kind of principle. Another feature of Hare’s moral judgements is ‘overriding’ which contradicts with Kant’s as it suggests that a moral principle must be overridden, for it would be an obstruction for decision making, therefore it is necessary to allow over riding so as to ensure the application of physical laws only. Kant’s opinion about universalisation suggests rational human freedom which is shared as an idea of reason. For Kant, a law refers to implication of the universal validity when a person makes it valid for cases which fall under his or her authority. Kantian perspective supports law of freedom that presents a complete conception of free agency while taking into account authoritative principles of action. Kant perceives freedom as an attribute that is built in and possessed by every individual who like to be considered separately, where that property is defined with reference to individuals’ capacity for desire-based choices (Flikschuh 2000: 82). To be universalised is to be set free, therefore the concept of freedom presented by Kant is more impressive for it denote the absence of constraint by laws. Universal freedom provides opportunity to the individual whether or not to perform a particular action for which the individual qualifies as free and can be settled independently of whether the action accords with generally valid principles of action. Kantian perspective of universalisation demands freedom in context with the person acting in accordance with their choices (Flikschuh 2000: 82). Kant’s philosophy of universalisation presents a more realistic and rational opinion since it provides solution to individuals to exercise the authority of a external freedom. Universalisation does not just affirm the right to freedom of every individual but stipulates that the exercise of the freedom must be compatible with the equal right to freedom of everyone else. Given Kant’s general conception of freedom as a shared idea of pure practical reason, we must take into account that Kant and Hare has their own suppositions, for Kant considers an individual while delivering a philosophy, and Hare considers the benefit of the entire society. References Flikschuh Katrin, (2000) Kant and Modern Political Philosophy: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England. Hare R. M., (1997) Sorting out Ethics: Clarendon Press: Oxford. John E. Hare, (1997) The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance: Oxford University Press: New York. Kant, Oct 2001, accessed from < http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5i.htm> Lake Philip Stratton, (2000) Kant, Duty and Moral Worth: Routledge: London. O’Neill, 2005 (BBC May, 1999) Accessed from Robinson Guy, (1998) Philosophy and Mystification: A Reflection on Nonsense and Clarity: Routledge: London. Read More