A Model of Social Reality: a Comprehensive Understanding of the Origins and Central Elements - Research Paper Example

Introduction John Searle’s theories involve an exploration of the fundamental relationships between physical phenomena and social reality. His writings have established a basis understanding how the natural world comprises the raw material for the construction of social reality. The contributions of his theories impart a novel context for understanding the origins and manifestations of social and institutional components of culture. These contributions extend to both simple and complex realities of society. The purpose of this essay is to explore the central concepts of Searle’s theory of social reality and to provide relevant examples of how these ideas relate social phenomena with the natural world. Searle’s philosophy of social reality has had profound applications in the areas of law, economics, political institutions and social customs as it defines multiple layers of reality, including institutional and cultural realities that have their origins in the natural world. His contributions extend to the further development of the legal, social and political philosophies that define our age. Searle’s concept of intentionality Searle’s definition of social reality is rooted in realism, a philosophy that acknowledges the existence of a physical world that comprises an objective reality that is independent of human representation and interpretation (Weber, 1947; Ruben, 1985). Thus, physical reality is the basis for construction of a social reality that is the product of human perception, organization and representation (Gibbons, 2006). To examine this relationship, Searle has attempted to identify the causal links between these two essential realities. Searle invokes the Correspondence Theory of Truth, which states that statements may be viewed as true if they can be validated by natural phenomena, as a tool to explore this relationship (Searle, 1992. 1995). Searle takes a reductionist approach in defining the central components of physical versus socially constructed reality. In this context, he defines “brute facts” as naturally occurring physical entities that exist independently of human thought or perception (Anscombe, 1958) They comprise objects of objective, physical reality. “Brute facts’ include such things as trees, rocks, and water that comprise elements of the natural, physical world. Searle considers brute facts to be objective facts, since their existence is not subject to human expression or opinion. Searle defines a second category of “mental facts” that are essentially the products of the mind. These include feelings, perceptions, ideas and other cognitive, emotional expressions. Mental facts may be either subjective or objective, depending on whether they originate directly from natural phenomena or represent subjective opinions, attitudes or perceptions that are dependent upon the individual. Searle has attempted to link these two basic categories of fact by stating that mental facts depend upon physical reality and, therefore, are ultimately rooted in physical facts (Searle, 1992, 1995). In the same way, Searle believes that social reality is ultimately rooted in physical reality; moreover, social reality is a construct that has its origins in both brute and mental facts (Searle, 1995). A fundamental component of Searle’s theory of social reality involves the concept of intentionality, which serves as a useful link between internal consciousness and the external social world (Searle, 1983, 1990). Intentionality is rooted in mental facts as Searle divides them into two categories, intentional and non-intentional. A non-intentional fact has no object; in contrast an intentional fact is directed at a specific target; it has a directional component. Intentionality is defined as an attribute of facts or statements that signifies an object as an “intention”. An intentional mental fact in this context is an expression that involves an object. According to Searle, intentional mental facts may be identified and experienced by a single individual or may be experienced by more than one individual (Searle, 1983, 1990). If recognized by a group, the intentional mental fact assumes the further distinction of being characterized as a “social fact”. A social fact that produces a consensus of opinion or recognition among groups of individuals can be classified as having “collective intentionality”. Social facts, like mental facts, can be either subjective or objective, according to Searle. A subjective social fact involves the value of a $5 bill. In the US, a socially accepted consensus ascribes a certain monetary value to this object that can be used to obtain another object of similar, socially accepted value (for example, a magazine). In other countries or cultures, $5 bill may be meaningless or useless. This represents, therefore a subjective social fact. Other social facts may be defined as objective. For example, the role of a police officer has a socially accepted meaning that is almost universally recognized in civilized societies, and may be viewed as an objective social fact. In this context, Searle defines objective social facts as epistematically objective, as they are not subject to opinion, yet retain a subjective component, defined as “ontologically subjective” in that their objectivity does not result from their physical reality, but rather to a collective, societal consensus of interpretation. Searle refers to this concept as “collective intentionality” (Searle, 1983, 1990). Collective intentionality converts an objective social fact to a status-function. In a further level of complexity, Searle states that brute-facts may serve as “status indicators” of social facts (Searle, 1983, 1987, 1990). Searle further defines a category he calls “institutional facts” that are social facts that originate in culturally accepted social institutions. Examples of institutional facts are government, marriage, business and other socially agreed upon institutions. The brute facts that underscore and serve as “status indicators” for the institutional facts include, for example, churches, government buildings and stores. These brute facts comprise the physical, real world structure that is the collective gathering point or symbol for the institutional fact. These definitions and classifications of fact are represented in hierarchical fashion by Searle, and this comprises an essential unifying element of his theory of social reality (Searle, 1995). The foundation is the level occupied by brute-facts, which are dither direct product of physical reality and the natural world. In this context, brute facts take on a logical priority that exceeds other fact categories. Brute-facts, in turn, are the foundation of social facts. Social facts are then the source of institutional facts. Based on this hierarchical structuring, there is no social reality in the absence of a physical reality that is the ultimate source and foundation of social reality. Social reality is the product of brute fact and social fact, integrated to generate a social consensus that forms the basis of collective intentionality. This hierarchy ultimately generates a social reality (Searle, 1990). Moreover, in Searle’s view, social reality is the product of the relationships between people that involve mutually agreed upon rules that regulate and define these interactions (Searle, 1995). Among these social constructs are rights, privileges, duties, laws, regulations, restrictions that are designed to create order in the context of societal relationships. This concept is expressed eloquently by Searle when he writes: “[There is a] continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, money, and nation-states. The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform these functions without that imposition.” (Searle, 1995, p. 41). The importance of language In Searle’s theory, language becomes the essential attribute that forms the basis of this linkage (Searle, 1965, 1969). Language is a social function limited to human society that comprises the essential tool through which physical reality achieves the hierarchical status of social reality (Austin, 1961, 1962). Searle imposes a logical realism to his analysis of the role of language in the construction of social reality that incorporates the base of knowledge that is the result of scientific inquiry and our understanding of the functions of the natural world (Schuhmann and Smith, 1990). For Searle, language itself is not the endpoint of philosophical inquiry. Like everything else, its source lies in the context of an essential and irreducible physical reality. This physical reality that is the source of language consists of the human brain with its immense cognitive, emotional and social capacities that are expressed in the form of language. In this context, words and language are not the fundamental tool of the philosopher but rather an essential means to an end whereby one’s “intentions” may be understood (Nerlich, and Clarke, 1996). The nature and objects of these expressed intentions, using the tools of language, become the foundation upon which social reality is constructed in the form of a “collective intentionality”. (Searle, 1983) Searle articulates the role of language in the construction of social reality in his philosophical expose entitled, “Speech Acts”, which he wrote before writing his text on the construction of social reality (Searle, 1965). His philosophy of language, developed in this text, was integrated more fully into a theory of social reality and the role of language in its construction in the latter book. His ultimate goal was to develop a theory that integrates the functions of the mind, language and society as a unified whole. Searle’s understanding of language takes the form of a representation of reality that expresses or defines the nature of the physical world in a functional manner (Tuomela and Miller, 1988). Language is a social function as its fundamental purpose is to permit or facilitate communication between human beings (Taylor, 1985). As such, it comprises a critical foundation of social reality (Searle, 1969). Searle expands Husserl’s concept of language by restricting its assessment to its external expressions, whereas Husserl was more interested in the conscious expression of internal thought (Husserl, 1900/01). Thus, Searle emphasizes the communication function of language as the basis of social reality as it is the essential component of his theory of intentionality. Reinach built upon Husserl’s philosophy of language to define performative acts of language as essentially social acts. For example, warning, advising, threatening, and explaining are all performative uses of language that define the act of speech in a social context (Austin, 1946). Searle expanded these theories further to develop a theory of language that stress its representational functions as they relate to the nature of physical reality and its intentional functions as they comprise the basis of social reality (Searle, 1969). This more comprehensive view of language is the basis from which he constructs his theory of social reality (Smith, 1993, 2001). The use of language as a basis upon which social reality is constructed is explored further in Searle’s definition of regulative and constitutive rules of society (Smith, 2001, 2002). According to Searle, regulative rules may be defined as language that regulates pre-existing behaviours. For example, regulative rules have been formulated to specify how one should eat meals according to socially acceptable table manners. These rules are regulative since eating was going on long before they were established by human cultures. In contrast, constitutive rules define new patterns of behaviour that are contingent upon the expression of these rules. Examples of constitutive rules are those that regulate games, such as baseball and other sports. The rules are the basis for the game which comes into being in the form of a proscribed behaviour. Without the rules, the game would not exist. Searle’s “counts as” theory Searle’s philosophical explanation of “social object” comprises an important element of his theory of social reality. He attempts to do so by proposing the formula: “X counts as Y in context C” (Searle, 1995). This formula attempts to provide a formulaic linkage between physical objects or facts and their social constructs. The formula generates a link between the two hierarchies upon which social reality is constructed, the physical reality and the social context in which this reality is perceived and understood (Searle, 1995). The three essential components that define the ontology of social reality as defined by Searle include: physical objects, cognitive functions which assign a defined functionality, the function that is encompassed by the object (Searle, 1999, 2001). These three elements are expressed vis-a-vis specific “contexts” that are relevant to the object and its cognitively associated functions. There are many examples that illustrate the “counts as” rule in everyday life. Raising one’s hand is a basic limb movement function that depends on skeletal muscle activity. This is the X component. In the context of a classroom, the c component, X becomes Y, which is a signal that the individual would like to ask or answer a question. This interpretation is made possible, according to Searle, by the application of constitutive rules that proscribe behaviour in specific contexts. Constitutive rules may also apply in the realm of language. For example, the statement, “I will make dinner for you this evening” implies a promissory obligation imposed by the rules of society. If you show up tonight and I am not home, this violates a very basic rule of social conduct. The verbal statement of intention is made in the context of a constitutive rule that implies a verbal contract. This type of regulatory rule therefore comprises the basis of social interaction and the more formal legal system, which is based on the Common Law (Zaibert, 2001). In this context, the Y component represents the consequences of the statement, X. The Y component of the previous statement involves an obligation to prepare dinner for one’s friend on the agreed upon evening. In the context of more complex behaviours, Y may refer to a context involving an entire set of rules that must be performed. For example, if one expresses the intention of playing a game of baseball (X), one must fulfill that obligation, (Y) in the context of the rules that govern the game of baseball (C). X counts as Y since the intention of playing baseball involves following a series of rules, including: putting on uniform, getting a bat, attempting to hit the ball with the bat, running to bases and playing the position in the field ordered by the coach. In the next level of hierarchy in the social construction of reality, Searle combines groups of constitutive rules to formulate a category defined as “institutional facts”. An institutional fact is based on the existence of constitutive rules which constitute its foundation. These groups or systems of constitutive rules are defined as “institutions”. Institutional facts are related to brute facts vis-a-vis the X counts as Y association. The institutional fact, however, is a construction based upon the incorporation of brute facts into social facts and constitutive rules. In society, hierarchies of institutional facts may exist, one level superimposed upon the previous level based on the integration of systems of constitutive rules (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Kasher and Sadka, 2001). Searle defines institutions based on the fact that they are not “observer-independent” structures such as trees, flowers, birds and oceans that exist whether or not a human observer is present to attach any significance to their existence as they comprise elements of physical reality in the natural world (Nelson, 1994). In contrast, the existence of institutions is directly dependent on the significance attributed to them by human society (Searle, 1995). Included in this latter category are the institutions of government, business and marriage, each of which plays an exceedingly important role in the construction of modern societies. According to Searle, the existence of these institutions depends upon their origin as systems of constitutive rules, the basis of which is the X counts as Yin the context of C formulation (Searle, 1995). An important illustration of the “X counts as Y” phenomenon can be seen in each unique individual in which X is the “self” comprised of mind, bogy and underlying genetics that confer a unique physical entity to each human being. The Y component is defined contextually, depending on the nature of C. Y may be defined as a citizen of a specific country, a student at a specific university, an employee of a particular establishment, marriage status, professional status and other designations depending on context. Each of these represents a social fact that is contextually dependent. In addition to objective realities in which Y has its origins in the physical reality of X, Searle has defined “free-standing” Y terms which exist independently of any X foundation. For example, a corporation may exist in the form of a mutual agreement that has no physical reality, but exists and may an important role in society nevertheless. This represents an additional dimension to institutional reality that is not based in physical reality. Searle attempts to integrate the free-standing Y elements of social reality by emphasizing that a process or activity constitutes a physical reality even though it is not embodied in a specific physical object. In this context, symphonies, corporations and other activity-driven or process driven entities may encompass both a physical and social reality (Searle, 2001). This more inclusive representation of social reality involves a complex ontological hierarchy whose primary level is occupied by socially constructed entities (Y) that have their origins in physical reality (X) (Searle, 2001). This level is occupied by entities that can be represented by objects or events, such as police officers, teachers, football stadiums, churches, schools, tennis matches and weddings. Higher levels of institutional reality may be constructed upon this framework and may not have a direct relationship to a physical manifestation (X). These higher levels may include representations of more complex status-functions and exist as free-standing Y elements. Examples include securities notes, complex business functions and other non-physical phenomena that represent higher-order composites of status functions. In this hierarchical model, physical reality forms the core and foundation of social reality, although not every aspect of social reality is directly rooted in an objective, physical basis (Kuhn, 2000). The nature of social reality Language, in the form of expressed statements, is the tool through which brute facts are transformed to social reality in the form of institutions that comprise the fabric of social reality (Austin, 1956–57; Austin. 1961). In this context, the role of language is not merely expressive, but transformative, in that it is fundamental to the construction of social reality (Baert, 2005). Searle explores the role of language in this transformative process further by exploring in greater depth the meanings of language as it connotes intention, responsibility and the freedom to act (Smith and Zaibert, 2001). This exploration requires not only a fuller assessment of the functions of language but also of the human mind and its fundamental cognitive processes, as well as the laws of physics and chemistry that proscribe the organizations of matter and the living system (Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 2000). In this philosophical context, he acquiesces to the Aristotelian concept of the mind as the apex of the system, from which all other capacities derive (Ragin, and Zaret, 1983). In this context, Searle views intentionality as a product of the mind that is socially communicated through language (Searle, 1990). This notion is incorporated by Searle into his theory of social reality as an emergent property of the natural world in the same way as conscious thought is an emergent property of the function of neurons (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). This naturalistic emergentism of social reality is a core principle that comprises the ontological foundation of social reality as envisioned by Searle (Searle, 2001). The social construction of reality that emerges from these fundamental principles and processes is nevertheless complex. Searle explores the ontological basis of social reality and its complexities in the form of a simple everyday event he describes at the beginning of the Construction text, involving the simple act of ordering a beer at a café (Searle, 1995). As it is constructed in social reality, a highly complex ontology emerges that includes the following elements. The waiter who gives him the beer does not own it, but works for the restaurant that owns the beer. The patron must pay the price required by the restaurant for the beer. The restaurant must follow rules of licensing imposed by the government. All of these elements taken together construct the social reality experienced by the patron who sips beer in the café. This is the reality that society has constructed in the form of constitutive rules and institutional facts that regulate the social interaction (Quine, 1960). This type of social interaction that is characterised by rights, duties and obligations imposed by society are termed ”deontic” powers by Searle and derive from constitutive rules that direct and determine patterns of social behaviour (Searle, 1995). These deontic powers, in turn are the product of the collective intentionality whose ultimate source involves the nature of the human species and its unique mental capacities that include the capacity to create complex language (Little, 1991). Searle thus views language as the fundamental institution of social reality as it is the ultimate source of collective intentionality (Rorty, 1993; Smith, 1990). Collective intentionality is distinguished from individual intentionality which is based on individual feelings, perceptions or attitudes. An example of individual intentionality is an expression of anger from one individual directed at another person. This statement represents what Searle terms a subjective dependent fact that depends on the subjective intentionality of the individual (Cohen, Morgan, J. and Pollack,1990). In contrast, social facts give rise to collective intentionality (Searle, 1990; 1999). Social facts rise to the level of institutional facts when they are accorded “status functions” by society. These status functions construct a social reality superimposed upon a physical reality. For example, the yellow line running down the middle of a paved street has a status function that is superimposed upon the physical reality that a line of yellow pain has been painted in the middle of the road. Its status function is that in the context of social reality, it determines which directions and street sides are occupied by automobiles. The physical properties of the yellow paint in the road do not constitute a traffic barrier; its function derives from the status function with which it is accorded by collective intentionality. Money is another example of a status function that is not intrinsic to the physical properties or value of the paper itself. Institutional reality as it is socially constructed often involves a hierarchy of power (McCarthy, 1996). Collective intentionality is the basis of institutional power that regulates individual and group behaviour in society (Meijers, 1994, 2002). Examples include licenses to practice law or medicine, conscription rules that impose a draft and prison penalties for criminal behaviour. The power of governments to create and enforce laws represents a primary example of institutional reality as it relates to a power structure that is socially constructed by collective intentionality (Mulligan, 1987). Another important question Searle addresses involves the ontology of institutional reality as it relates to intentionality (Searle, 2001). Here he argues that, in the construction of institutional reality, the usual relationship between intentionality and ontology is reversed (Faigenbaum, 2001). The usual relationship based on natural phenomena is that the existence of the entity precedes the acknowledgement of its reality (Grice, 1957 Segal, 2000. For example, my understanding that candy is sweet results from the pre-existing fact that candy is made with lots of sugar. That candy is sweet is a reality that is not derived from intentionality but rather precedes it. In contrast, in the ontology of an institutional reality, intentionality precedes the reality. In order for money to have value, a collective intentionality must decide that certain paper or metal items possess monetary worth. This reality that money has value occurred subsequent to the collective intention that precedes it. These institutional facts are not based in physical reality but are the product of collective intentionality. This concept has a restricted application as general agreement or consensus that something is true, does not necessarily make it true. For example, prior to 1492, most people thought the world was flat. Thus, institutional reality represents only abstract social constructs that are products of social consensus (De Soto, 2000; Hacking, 1999; Smith and Ziebert, 2003 ). Conclusion Searle has presented a model of social reality that has its origins in the physical world. He has ambitiously attempted to integrate vast and divergent elements of physical being and social organisation to a comprehensive understanding of the origins and central elements that construct the social reality that defines the experiences of civilized societies. To accomplish this lofty goal, Searle has defined principal elements that comprise the foundations of social reality. These include the designation of categories of fact that have their basis either in physical reality or in the interpretations and collective uses of elements based in the physical world. The stone becomes a physical structure, the structure is called a church. From the physical and chemical formations of the natural world, a social reality is constructed that derives its meaning ultimately through the intellectual and cognitive manifestations of the human mind. Expressed language becomes the tool by which the social construction has its foundation. Using language to generate intent, a collective will is formulated that is reflected in the laws and systems of society that promote achievement and regulate human activities. Searle has generated a philosophical base that unifies many diverse components of social reality, including the arts, government, as well as the social mores and conventions that define social reality. This influential social philosopher has had an extraordinary impact on our understanding of social reality. Most importantly, his model of social construction is one that is open to social adjustment and changes in collective intentionality that may be used to address important challenges of our times. References Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. “On Brute Facts”, Analysis, 18: 3, 22–25. Austin, J. L. 1946. “Other Minds”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1946), reprinted in Austin 1961, 44–84. Austin, J. L.1956–57. “A Plea for Excuses. The Presidential Address”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57:1–30, reprinted in Austin 1961, 123–152. Austin, J. L. 1961. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Austin, J. L. 1962 How to do Things with Words. 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New York: The Free Press. Zaibert, Leo. 2001. “On Gaps and Rationality” (with response by Searle), Philosophical Explorations, 4: 2, 78–86. . Read More