Moral Testimony and Its Authority - Article Example

This essay discusses the philosophical premises, which can lead to either the acceptance or rejection of moral testimony in theory and practice. Academic and philosophical opinion has pointed out a number of objections to this proposition in the forms of moral non-cognition and the problems in the identification and credibility of moral experts or moral authority. Firstly with regards to the possibility of moral expertise it has been argued that whether or not moral experts do exist, there is a problem of identifying such people because of the obvious problem of "credentials". For example , when a person claims to be able to give moral judgements ,it is very difficult to tell whether or not they should be classified as experts as academic opinion has pointed out the complexity pertaining to such a decision as, "Moral experts have no need to seek out others' moral expertise, but moral non-experts lack sufficient knowledge to determine whether the advice provided by a putative moral expert in response to complex moral situations is correct and hence whether an individual is a bone fide expert."1 The acceptance of moral testimony has been challenged on the basis that it does not make knowledge available to the recipient and therefore the use of such a knowledge is illegitimate.Before the reasons for this objection are discussed it is worth noting that little academic attention has actually been paid to the idea of whether or not testimony can be a legitimate source of moral beliefs.2 Hopkins (2007) has advanced the view that while , "we should be open to being persuaded by others, responsive to moral argument; but we should not take their word on moral issues, not allow ourselves to be influenced by the fact that they hold a certain view''.if, on the other hand, reliance on moral testimony is legitimate, there will still be questions about the conditions under which it is so". 3 This means that even though it is hard for us as humans to reject or accept moral judgements and considerations subconsciously , we cannot let these considerations to become a part of our analyses in real life. For example my idea that a certain person is "racist" or a "liar" is based on my own perceptions and experiences. When dealing with this person my prejudices will inevitably suffice (even though in a very subtle manner).However any action by a third party based on my views or "moral testimony" should not be relied upon. Even if my moral testimony does form the basis of another party's reaction or action and it is subsequently accepted Hopkins(2007) believes that there should be a more "solid" reason for doing so rather than my own value judgements. It has been further suggested that "moral discourse, for some reason or other, cannot meet the conditions necessary for learning from the word of others. Since the epistemology is wrong, there is no knowledge to be had from testimonial transactions on moral matters."(Hopkins 2007). It is for this reason that it is believed that it would be rather "illegitimate" to let other's claims guide one's moral belief. For example as an employer of a person I might be faced with the moral testimony of the hiring committee that this person has "moral shortcomings" but I cannot base my judgement on these moral shortcomings. Firstly because morality is largely a matter of perception and the evidence offered in this regard will also be based on "feelings" or the personal experiences of the moral expert, and not actual evidence of their shortcoming like theft or irresponsibility on the job. Of course the contrary view in this regards is that in the right circumstances, moral dialogue may meet and fulfil all the criteria of testimonies in general (Hopkins 2007). The problem however remains that moral testimony lies in a standard that only relates to morals and since knowledge is right, testimony does make moral knowledge available. (Hopkins 2007) For a more profound analysis of this issue it is necessary to delve deeper into what the words "moral" and "testimony" entail in separate usage and whether moral testimony has any special considerations as opposed to normal testimony. Where as morality is perceived as a matter of opinion or feeling and expressions of expressions of sentiment, perhaps of approval and disapproval. The question arises whether a testimony which is actually based on statements of fact actually communicate moral knowledge' Another criticism to the acceptance of moral testimony is with in the "Assurance View" which is sometimes explained by the popular example of " natural and non-natural meaning" where a "photograph of a man and a woman together is evidence for their meeting, regardless of the intentions of the photographer or the presenter of the photograph. By contrast, a drawing of the two persons has the non-natural meaning of their illicit meeting, dependent on the intentions of the artists."4 Therefore the moral expert here is susceptible to assigning a non-natural meaning tainted by their own perceptions and beliefs to such a matter. The moral expert giving the moral testimony "interprets" certain problems with a certain moral perspective.The fact is that the picture is evidence or testimony to the fact that these two people men.The moral testimony will try to assign the situation a motive and pass a value judgment as to the purpose and outcome of that meeting rather than recording and setting out that situation as a fact. So we can narrow down the main objections to moral testimony to the fact that firstly it cannot be said to give rise to moral testimony at all. Secondly even if it does it is probably not good enough as moral knowledge. An important example in this regard has been given by Jones (1999) who gives the fictitious example of Peter who has principles and certain moral beliefs which fit within those principles. It is not that he lacks these beliefs or morals yet he dislikes the beliefs of the women he is working with in the selection criteria because he thinks that they are prejudiced. This dilemma is well set out by Jones (1999) where it can be said that the women are right but is Peter not right aswell'Peter's confusion is more recognisable when he asks one of the women how she assumed that a certain white man was a racist or a sexist and she responds that she "just had the feeling" or that she "knew" it.Here the danger is apparent.These women considered themselves moral experts,gave a moral testimony and rejected the applications of those residents.The reason Peter was reluctant to understand their "criteria" for selection is apparent because they didn't seem to offer any actual evidence or testimony which would have shown something like their views or police records concerning any racial or sexual offences. Critics have often asked whether this is the same difference as between "aesthetics and maths". We often speak about hiring people in our offices or selecting our social circle on the basis that these people should have a good reputation or wear decent clothes. These are all matters of aesthetics. So if we are so much concerned with appearances ,is the reliance on moral testimony not the same thing'Here I would like to revisit the related question of the qualifications of a moral expert.There is no single universal set of values in our society and the problem with moral experts is that they will always have their own set of values to give different testimonies.The query that jumps to our mind in this regard is whether these people are "passing themselves off as something they are not",consciously or subconsciously'One moral expert might disagree with the views of another moral expert because they think that the other person's judgement is too weak .This is inevitably lead to a plethora of conflicting decisions (Jones 1999) An interesting example in this regard has been given by Karen Jones as mentioned before in the Peter situation (Jones 1999) It can be asked if he is able to grasp the reasons behind the moral judgments he saw being pronounced' Maybe some other extraneous facts would have made him see the situation more clearly, like the factual history of those men who were rejected. According to Jones(1999) if you accuse somebody of sexism you are making a moral judgement. Holton makes a very interesting point in connection to the Peter example; "Let's grant that. More plausible: he has the moral principles ('Sexism is wrong'), and hence the main reasons that justify his moral actions; but he needs help in making the low level moral judgments that are needed to apply them. Acceptance of low-level moral judgments on the basis of bare testimony, is fine when fitted into a justificatory framework of higher-level principles. Contrast two cases we are not happy with: someone accepting testimony concerning higher-level principles; someone accepting testimony concerning low-level judgments when these are not fitted into a framework of principles." In the statement above Holton has agreed with the views of Jones(1999) in this regard and has pointed out the obvious deficiency of a "framework" of universal principles which lead to irregularity in moral testimonies(as some of them will possess too high a threshold and other will be weak and low level judgments) He goes on to ask whether it becomes possible to separate judgements from principles.He revisits what many theorists have said already about moral experts. These moral experts cannot be trusted simply because they might be neither "moral" nor "experts" as they would like to refer to themselves.As long as these people know they are not experts like in the Peter case there is no need to worry. However if these people not only call themselves moral experts when they are not there should be a problem. The more moderate view comes from academics like Driver (2006) who have pointed out that the low credibility given to moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. Driver 2006 has regarded this puzzling because "aesthetic judgments that have been 'borrowed' by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts.". In the light of the above it can be said that "if testimony requires knowledge to transmit, there cannot even be testimony about moral matters."(Karen 1999,Hopkins 2007).The problem of "moral epistemology" is that it requires the acceptance of moral testimony based on "knowledge".For Jones(1999) therefore, such an analysis should fail because it does not meet a moral condition or standard. Mainly, this is a failure of moral knowledge to meet up with the conditions necessary for "learning" from the words of others.(Jones,1999). Conclusion Moral testimonies have borne the burnt of academic and philosophical opinion as mentioned above. It seems that the philosophers are opposed to value judgments as testimonies and Jones (1999) has shown a very interesting dilemma in this regard through an example in her article. In this essay we have seen that the main problem with testimony is that a vast number of our ideas and beliefs come from what people say, but just because we believe in them does not mean necessarily that these are true assertions at all. The point remains that the "epistemological problem of testimony" will never allow moral testimony to be accepted as legitimate. It can be concluded then that we may oppose moral testimony in principle and philosophy but psychologically we will never be immune from accepting moral judgments no matter how carefully we are warned by philosophy about the demerits of doing so. _____________________________________________________________ References 1. 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Jones Karen,Second Hand Moral Knowledge,The Journal Of Philosophy XCVI 1999 8. Cholbi Michael ,(2007)Moral Expertise And The Credentials Problem ,Journal Ethical Theory And Moral Practice ,Publisher Springer Netherlands, Issue Volume 10, Number 4 / August, 2007 ,DOI 10.1007/S10677-007-9071-9, Pages 323-334 9. Hopkins.R (2007) ,What Is Wrong With Moral Testimony' ,Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 74 (3), 611-634, 10. Holton.R ,Moral Psychology: Moral Testimony (Available At Http://Www.Ocw.Cn/NR/Rdonlyres/Linguistics-And-Philosophy/24-120Fall-2005/16E50A72-D501-44C3-A4B8-CF160C371F3D/0/Lecture20.Pdf) 11. Driver,Autonomy And The Asymmetry Problem For Moral Expertise ,Journal Philosophical Studies ,Publisher Springer Netherlands ISSN 0031-8116 (Print) 1573-0883 (Online) Issue Volume 128, Number 3 / April, 2006 Pages 619-644 12. Http://Plato.Stanford.Edu/Entries/Testimony-Episprob/ __________________________________________________________________ Read More