How the US-Led Humanitarian Intervention Solved Somalia Conflicts - Essay Example

Somalia Case Study: How Far the U.S-Led Humanitarian Intervention from 1992 to 1997 Was Accountable to Solve the Country’s Political Conflicts By [Name of Student] [Name of Institution] 4052 Words [Date] Introduction For quite some time, Somalia has been described as the most unsafe place to live in the world and the site of the world’s largest concentration of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In addition, Somalia’s has been described as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, more so during the period following the breakout of the Somalia conflict (Fitzgerald, 2002). These descriptions of Somalia are indications of the extent to which the Horn of African state has deteriorated with regards to safety, economy, health, and social well being of the inhabitants of this once peaceful country. This situation and the negative portrayal of Somalia have attracted the attention of the international community, which has only responded with spells of hand-wringing and nothing more (Duffield 2008). The Somalia conflict started in 1991 when a coalition of clan-based armed opposition groups overthrew the nations long-standing military government headed by Said Barre. To this moment, tens of millions of Somalis are in great need of emergency assistance despite the existence of a new government. Unfortunately, the much needed political solution and peace has been rather elusive. Although the AMISOM and the Kenyan Defence Forces drove out the Al-Shaba, the downward spiral is likely to continue for Somalia if effective and answerable interventions are not implemented. The situation is mainly made more complex by the constant and dramatic rise in insecurity and threats to humanitarians as they attempt to gain access to the country and assist the affected citizens. While lamenting the current status of Somalia and seeking humanitarian solutions, it is necessary that the causes of its conflicts, the failures of past humanitarian intervention attempts and their accountability are understood (Wheeler, 2003). This understanding could prove quite useful in the designing and the implementation of future humanitarian interventions in Somalia or other conflict areas across the globe. The Background to the Conflict The Somali conflict started in December 1991 when a clan-based war broke out followed by the plunder of the remnants of the state by various warring factions. These clan-based factions mainly fought to take control of the country’s assets and instruments of power. In the four months ending in March 1992, approximately 25.000 Somalis died while 1.5 million Somalis fled their country (United Nations, 2003a). On the other hand, about 2 million Somalis were internally displaced due to the skirmishes. Among the ugly features of the conflict were droughts, the destruction of the socioeconomic infrastructure of the country, clan and ethnic cleansing and food supply disruption (United Nations, 2003a). These effects of the conflict finally led to the famine that ravaged across the country and caused untold suffering to the vulnerable citizens of Somali. The citizens who suffered most were those hailing from political marginalized, economically disadvantaged and poorly armed riverine and inter-riverine agro-pastoral communities (Wright, 2011). These communities particularly inhabited the southern parts of the country from where they suffered the waves of attacks from the better-armed militia from the major Somali clans. In spite of the seriousness of the situation in Somalia, the international community was rather reluctant in its response to the conflict. Among the factors that contributed to the delayed international response to the Somali conflict were the wars in the Balkans and the Gulf, on which the international community’s attention was focused. Although the Djibouti government tried to broker a deal among the warring factions in Somali, these attempts were utterly unsuccessful. It was only in early 1992 that the international community, through the UN, tried diplomatic engagement after which a cease fire was negotiated between the main conflicting sides’ leaders. These leaders were the Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed. Unfortunately, the limited UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), did not manage to bring the violence under control or to address the famine situation in the country (Pietersen, 1998). The effects of the war in restructuring the country soon became apparent when the Somali National Movement declared that the northern region would secede from the south to become the independent Republic of Somaliland. Despite the fact that the Somali conflict started just as the international order was changing and adopting a new management approach to the ‘new wars and failing states.’ It would become a laboratory for the new form of engagement in which the international community sought to respond with humanitarian and military interventions on an unprecedented scale. The Nature of the Mission The UN and US intervention in Somalia was implemented in two phases: United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) and UNOSOM II. UNOSOM I refer to the initial part of a United Nation-supported intervention to give, facilitate, and secure humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The other goal of UNOSOM I was to assess the first UN-brokered ceasefire deal of the Somali Civil War conflict of the early 1990s (United Nations, 1992). UNOSOM I started in April 1992 and lasted until Unified Task Force (UNITAF) assumed its duties in December 1992 (United Nations, 1992). Later UNITAF would be dissolved in May 1993 and its mandate taken over by UNOSOM II (United Nations, 1992). The US-led UN interventions in Somalia therefore began in early in 1991 when the civil strife started. The UN would withdraw its forces during the instantaneous violent flare-ups in Somalia. The US-led missions managed to achieve ceasefire in some instances using techniques such as diplomatic visits, Security Council resolutions, aid from relief agencies and NGOs and other international bodies such as the League of Arab States, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Organisation for African Unity (United Nations, 1992). The interventions also employed military troops to monitor the distribution of humanitarian aid and to monitor the ceasefires. Failures and Successes The United States’ outgoing administration would later join the UNOSOM by authorizing the deployment of US forces to support the besieged UN mission in Somalia. Under the leadership of the US, the UNOSOM gathered a multinational force of 30,000 troops (United Nations, 2003a). Allegedly, this massive man power was mustered for and launched for humanitarian reasons and to respond to the supposed challenge that a collapsed Somali state would pose the new world order proclaimed by President George Bush at the end of the Cold War. Following this massive deployment of UNOSOM soldiers in Somali, the mission dominated Somali politics for the next three years (United Nations, 2003b). There are several achievements that UNOSOM realised in its intervention in Somalia. First, it managed to focus the attention of the world on the neglected Somalia conflict. Second, UNOSOM helped save the lives of many Somalis through the securing of food supplies and distribution of basic materials such as blankets and medicine (United Nations, 2003b). With regards to security, UNOSOM facilitated local agreements, which not only improved security but also reopened Mogadishu airport and seaport, thus supporting the revival of key service industries in Somalia. In addition, UNOSOM helped create many local non-governmental organisations in Somalia during the conflict, thus providing employment and injecting resources into the battered Somalia economy (United Nations, 2003b). Hence, a new business class emerged in Somalia during the UNOSOM’s intervention. Although the mission realised a considerable level of success with regards to the above mentioned aspects of life in Somalia, it failed to achieve one of the most critical objectives it should have targeted; to end the hostilities among the conflicting clans and political factions (Pietersen, 2000). The other goal the UNOSOM failed to achieve was the disarming of the fighting factions. The third failure of the mission was its inability to engender a process of national healing and reconciliation for Somalia, even after the UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993 and Nairobi in 1994 (Holzer, 2008). Thus, the UNOSOM failed to foster the general revival of the state of Somalia. Since its failure to achieve these objectives in Somalia, the mission has been criticised for fuelling war economy in Somalia and lack of accountability for certain atrocities and excesses of the mission (Holzer, 2008). In this war economy, factions increased in Somalia with the emergence of structures that gave warlords immense powers over the lives of powerless Somalis. In fact, it did not take long before UNOSOM became entangled in the Somali conflict, an entangle that led to the infamous shooting down of US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu by General Aideed and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces from Somalia (Holzer, 2008). It is supposed that it is during this period in which the UNOSOM was embroiled in the Somalia conflict that the seeds of militant Islamist movements were sown, with the support of terrorist such as Osama bin Laden who was then living in Sudan. In fact, it is in during this time that Osama denounced the UNOSOM as an invasion of a Muslim country. Was the Humanitarian intervention Accountable? It is rather sad that it had to take a momentous tragedy in the form of famine and chaos in the early 1990s for the world to know the Somali people. Following the outbreak of this tragedy, the UN set out in what was supposed to be a purely humanitarian intervention mission in Somalia. With a combat troop of about 30,000 soldiers, the UN set out not only to save Somalis from themselves but also to feed the Somalis and to bring order and calm to the country. Nonetheless, UN’s plans did not go as expected for signs of failure started to manifest less than a year after the arrival of the first batch of UN troops into Somalia. The leader of the intervention, the US, fast changed status from a welcome rescuer to an unwanted occupier (Holzer, 2008). Many interested individuals and organisations have never stopped wondering what might have gone drastically wrong for the humanitarian intervention. This question that particularly lingers in the minds of many regards the universal support the intervention received. It is believed that the quick transition of the intervention from a humanitarian one to an armed one led to its flop (Pieterse, 2000). The other commonly asked question is whether the UN or the US had some ulterior motives in Somalia, hence the intervention (Holzer, 2008). In other words, did the US or the UN seek to dictate the political outcomes of the peace and reconciliation efforts in the war-torn Somalia? The pictures below highlight the atrocities committed and many wonder whether the perpetrators of these crimes were held accountable (Holzer, 2008). The pictures below show Somali children at an Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp waiting for food The above pictures indicate the situation in Somalia during the conflict and the atrocities committed by UN forces in during the intervention. Specifically, the above photos show the atrocities done by elite paratroopers from Belgium. In one of the pictures, a Belgian paratrooper urinates on the face of a dead Somali. The last US troops would leave Somalia in mid 1994 after having largely failed to achieve their objective of delivering food to the needy in Somalia. In addition, the mission failed since the warring factions and warlords in Somalia could not reach a consensus and the international relief organizations had to suspend their operations since there was widespread looting in the country. Instead of creating an environment that would allow and promote the distribution of food, medicine, and other humanitarian materials to the suffering Somalis, the mission created a hostile environment in which international relief organisations could not deliver food and medicine(Pieterse, 2003). It is hence believed that the reasons the US and the UN sent troops to Somalia were more than humanitarianism. Some critics of the intervention or the manner in which it was conducted and ended cite one reason for the intervention as the need to set up permanent base in the Horn of Africa. These critics consider that Somalia or the Horn of Africa is rather strategically placed for control and access to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The Pentagon could therefore not resist the urge to set a base in the Horn of Africa from which it would enjoy numerous advantages (Stromseth, 2003). Critics also feel that the thought that Somalia could be rich in oil may have prompted the intervention as indicated by the many billion-dollar oil companies that bought oil rights from the Somalia regime just before the conflict broke out. To start pumping oil out of the country, these multi-billion companies would require law and order in Somalia. One such company was Conoco, the oil company that had the largest holdings in Somalia. Conspicuously, Conoco allowed the U.S troops to use Conoco headquarters in Mogadishu as their command post and de facto embassy. Supposedly, the US might have wanted a mission in Somalia, prompting the intervention. To achieve these objectives, the US did not need to be accountable to anybody for their actions towards the realisation of these economic objectives (Stromseth, 2003). The US thus aligned with the factions that would see it reap the economic benefits in Somalia. There is also the class of critics who believe that the US and the UN could not simply ignore the Somalia conflict. Although they were reluctant to act on the crisis, they took one conspicuous action; giving humanitarian aid to Somalis on their own volition. For instance, the then Republican Senator from Arizona John McCain said in an interview that possibly, the intervention was not in the national security interest of the US. He however added that as a country founded on Judeo-Christian principles, the US had to do what it felt was right. Since it took these actions on its own volition, it did not see the need to be accountable to anyone. Among the unaccounted for mistakes ostensibly made by the US and UN troops in Somalia were their efforts at narrowing the cultural gaps between them and the Somalis at the start of the intervention (Hall, 1992). For instance, the US and UN troops lacked the right language for translations while communicating to Somalis on the objectives of the interventions. Consequent to this miscommunication, many Somalis did not think positively of the intervention and considered themselves slaves of the intervening nations (Holzer, 2008). Thus, by failing to factor in the cultures of the country they were intervening in, the US and the UN may have avoided the problems and issues they faced during the intervention. For instance, since the UN and the US officials in Somalia could not precisely translate the native languages, the Somali people could not easily and wholly accept those who intervened as legitimate and genuine people (Holzer, 2008). The other reason the mission was not accountable was the apparent lack of common understanding of the causes of the conflict and absence of a decisive action by the U.N. and U.S. peacekeeping forces. In other words, drought was not the sole cause of the famine; the war that ripped the country apart also contributed to the famine (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). For example, while Said Barre’s troops fled Mogadishu, they destroyed acres of farmland and huge numbers of livestock. However, this tactic was not only used by Barre’s troops, even the other factions employed it not only by cutting down crops but also by warning the affected farmers against replanting. Through such tactics, the factions attempted to deprive their enemies of food supplies. The UN and the US forces should have therefore understood that besides lack of food, the causes of lack of food and those responsible for the famine such as the warlords were the other problems they should have addressed (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). However, the US did not care about this since they were not accountable to anyone. To have a good chance at solving the Somalia crisis and to be accountable, the UN and the US ought to have acknowledged the political causes of the Somalia conflict. Instead, the US and UN peacekeepers sought to flood Somalia with food, hoping some of it would get to the intended recipient (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). Accountability also lacked since the US seemed to have lost its impartiality reputation following its handling of the crisis. Time came when the United States’ actions made it to appear as a foreign state taking sides in the Somalia conflict. Earlier in the conflict, the US had indicated its favor for some warlords and disdain for others. Instead, the US should have unilaterally declared all warlords enemies of the Somalis. Regrettably, it grouped the warlords as bad and good guys (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). This assertion is supported by the fact that the US accepted to hold talks with some warlords, giving them political legitimacy at the expense of peace in Somalia. One warlord who did not benefit from US diplomacy was Mohamed Farrah Aideed towards whom the US officials were rather hostile from the start of the intervention. The US administration did not learn from its earlier intervention in Beirut, which suffered similar fate to the Somalia intervention. In the Beirut case, the mere appearance of US forces in the land favoured a particular side, giving the intervention a partial reputation (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). In the case of Somalia, the UN placed a bounty on the head of Farrah Aideed and sought the services of U.S. Rangers and members of the Delta Force to capture him. Following such orders, Aideed felt singled out and believed there would be a unilateral disarmament of his forces only. This exercise would go against a comprehensive program earlier undertaken with all militia leaders across the country. Consequent to this feeling among Aideed’s forces, they killed 18 U.S. Rangers and 14 Pakistani troopers after which President Clinton decided to remove the majority of the US troops in Somalia (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). Further lack of accountability of UN and US in their intervention in Somalia stems from their failure to create and ensure a secure environment for humanitarian action and their seeming intent of increasingly prioritizing military over humanitarian objectives (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). Therefore, among the concerns regarding the UNOSOM military operations was that the humanitarian objectives of UNOSOM became secondary to the military objectives, implying the UNOSOM operation lost direction. The other indication of unaccountability by UNOSOM was the compromise of the security of the many NGOs involved in the humanitarian operations and the lives of Somali and international staff working for humanitarian agencies. Specifically, both Somali and UNOSOM military placed the humanitarian staff exposed to harassment and death. The mission also failed to curtail the continuing insecurity outside Mogadishu, for the most part, along roads north and south of the city (National Academy of Sciences (US), 1988). The other indication that the conduct of UNOSOM troops in Somalia lacked accountability was the little or no progress been made on its actions such as the implementation of the disarmament agreements signed by the Somali warring factions. The Medias Role in the Intervention The important role that the media played in the intervention of Somalia cannot go unappreciated. It is worth noting that the conflict in Somalia was not known to many in the West a year after the country was shaken by the devastating effects of the political instability. Quite disturbing images of massively starving and dying children and adults, records and evidences of diversion of international relief aid by armed factions and bandits helped in generating increased public pressure on the West for more effective actions. One day in July 1992, the New York Times carried a story about Baidoa, prompting other leading newspapers, radio stations and television houses to follow suit with Somalia news. Following this story by New York Times, leading newspapers started carrying stories on the crisis in Somalia. In addition, world leaders such as the Irish president, Mary Robinson, started making visits to the war-ravaged Somalia. Importantly, the then UNICEF spokesperson Audrey Hepburn, gave a focal point for media coverage. From these effects of a single story on New York Times, the role and the effects of the media in the Somalia crisis is quite apparent. The airwaves and presses were important not only in informing the world of the Somalia crisis but also for use a weapon by warlords. For example, radio stations run by Farrah Aideed were used to spread information that the US-led intervention was against the will of all the warlords and opposed to Islam. The effectiveness and importance of the media during the intervention was also emphasized by the publishing of a newspaper and the running of a radio station by a U.S. Army team from Fort Bragg just a week after the US Marine landed in Somalia. Core among the objectives of operating these media outlets was to explain U.S. policy and actions in Somalia. Second, the media would be used to counter the propaganda coming from faction leaders and to refute the supposedly inaccurate stories by the international mass media. Consequent to their role in the gathering disseminating news about the situation in Somalia and the US and UN intervention, foreign reporters became unwilling targets in the conflict. To show the fate of some of the reporters in the conflict, a mob shot, beat and stoned four journalists to death after U.S. warplanes launched air strikes against Aideed on July 12, 1992. Following these murders, major U.S. media organizations withdrew their staff from Mogadishu, leading to an absence of reporters in Mogadishu to cover the events unfolding in Somalia. The warring factions in Somalia also used the media to showcase their successes and to spread propaganda. For example, following the October 3rd and 4th, 1994 firefight, a video footage was shown of dead U.S. soldier Michael Durant being dragged through the streets by Somalis. In fact, it was during this firefight that 18 U.S. Rangers were killed by crazed Somalis seeking to locate and capture several of Aideed’s top lieutenants. Conclusion Questions have constantly been raised on whether Somalia is an accountability-free zone. This question has particularly been brought about by the belief that outside invaders and other outsiders engaged in Somalia never make themselves accountable. Similarly, these outsiders are never held accountable by others. Since the days of the Cold War, Somalia has been seen as an accountability free-zone for businesses, donors and aid agencies who implement their agendas in conjunction with self-interested Somalis who are more than willing to help them. This unaccountable and unprincipled international engagement with Somalia is the main contributor to the humanitarian collapse seen in Somalia since early 1990s. Since then, international engagements in Somalia lacked transparency, consistency and even-handed measures that should be applied to everyone, thus making them accountable to the ordinary Somalis who have largely been ignored. Although words and phrases such as accountability and ‘end to impunity’ are currently common in the language of international discourse on Somalia, little is being done to ensure their enforcement. Thus, quite a lot still needs to be done for the international community to go beyond statements of principles. Notwithstanding the growing international concerns, pressures and advocacies for accountability in Somalia, the situation will continue to deteriorate if no clear political solution or reliefs are forthcoming. As a matter of fact, there are no visible improvements for the down-trodden Somalis or aid agencies reaching out for them. It is imperative on the international community to hold all actors in the Somalia case accountable for their actions since protection measures would continue to be undermined by anyone who acts with impunity. There is thus a need to design and have an overarching framework for the regulation of the unwanted behaviour and excesses in humanitarian assistance. The brutal crimes committed by the US-led intervention in Somalia coupled with its other failures thus overshadow the initial humanitarian efforts and interests of the mission. As evidenced by the news and photos of military officers demeaning even dead Somalis, the international community remains shocked by the incidences that were brought to its knowledge by the media. The US and the UN military leaderships also came under criticism and rebuke for their lack of accountability in the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, especially due to the many cover-ups for their mishandling of the Somalia’s situation. In fact, to some extent, the intervention in Somalia damaged the domestic and international image of the UN and the US. References Duffield, M (2008) Development, security and unending war, second edition. Polity. Fitzgerald, N. J. (2002) Somalia: issues, history, and bibliography. Nova Publishers. Hall, S. (1992) New ethnicities’ in ‘race’, culture and difference, edited by James Donald, James, and Ali Rattansi. London: Sage. Holzer, G. S. (2008) “Somalia: Ends and Beginnings.” Retrieved on May 5, 2013 from http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/somalia-ends-and-beginnings National Academy of Sciences (US) (1988) Committee on human rights, institute of medicine (U.S.). Committee on health and human rights, scientists and human rights in Somalia: report of a delegation. National Academies. Pieterse, J. N. (1998) Humanitarian intervention and beyond. New York Books. Pieterse, J. N. (2000) Global futures: shaping globalization. New York: Zed Books. Pieterse, J. N. 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