International Relations - Case Study Example

Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect (1) Take the opposite sides of the debate on the humanitarian intervention in Haiti and develop their arguments. Make sure to identify not only the protagonists of the debate, but also their positions, and interpret those using international relations analytical frameworks. The argument that forcible or coercive means can be lawfully exercised to uphold human rights, which is an ideal held by humanitarian intervention, is still widely and fiercely debated. In the 1970s a vigorous legal debate occurred, concluding with the investigations ordered by the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute.1 The debate was restored in the post-Cold War period with the Resolution 688 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the 5th of April 1991, which allowed coercive measures in Northern Iraq.2 Humanitarian intervention in Haiti, alongside those in Kosovo and Bosnia, which exercised force as strong-arm peacekeeping to end hostilities related to humanitarian crises, intensified the debate because the United States was the dominant entity behind these humanitarian interventions and because of legal rights that were considered with earlier measures.3 In 1992, Thomas Weiss and Jarat Chopra foretold that UN legislation would lead to definite requirements for coercive humanitarian intervention: “The international community is moving toward codification of principles and identification of the appropriate conditions under which humanitarian imperatives will override domestic jurisdiction.”4 Unfortunately, getting involved or arbitrating to safeguard human rights has remained politically oriented, not legally established with objective guidelines. The humanitarian intervention in Haiti has strengthened all the irreconcilable arguments of the divergent legal sides, one group condemning deceitful humanitarian measures and supporting sovereignty and the other side criticizing sovereignty as an excuse for hostile force and oppression.5 Because the case of Haiti has been only conditional humanitarian triumph and largely military, and a success that was unable to promote democratic security and nation-building, the debate remains lively and unsettled. After the takeover of the military regime in Haiti the humanitarian condition disintegrated quickly as the new rulers started to acquire political backing by terrorizing the Haitian people. Cases of human rights violations rose rapidly while Cedras’ junta embarked on eradication political resistance by means of property seizure, rape, physical mutilation, and murder.6 Throughout the period of the military tyranny roughly 4,000 Haitians were methodically slaughtered by the junta. Besides that, the plundering of the Haitian finances by the military regime brought about insufficient supply of basic necessities resulting in famine. Such inhumane situations pushed a massive number of Haitians to abandon the country and look for a safe haven in the US.7 This development raised humanitarian problems on the American government. The humanitarian condition in Haiti was horrendous and severe in spite of the reality that the casualty rate may suggest a lower level of inhumaneness compared to other countries that faced humanitarian emergencies.8 The detailed, comprehensive account of humanitarian intervention is derived from a framework of natural law whereas the obstructive argument is based on a rigid account of the UN Charter’s Articles 2(4), 39 and 53. A similar difference is present in the American constitution.9 Charles Black’s naturalist model supports a national protection of human rights derived from the 14th Amendment’s immunities and privileges and citizenship sections, the Ninth Amendment, and the Declaration of Independence. Robert Bork’s positivist model claims that rigid creation of constitutional documents must be complemented by knowledge of the framers’ initial purpose.10 The Haitian case could establish legal precedents preferring coercive human rights security over state sovereignty, relying on the way states understand the legitimacy of such government. Detractors of the humanitarian intervention in Haiti consider it as incapable of stimulating problem solving to reunite the people; extremely forcible, further alienating conflict-ridden communities; extremely ‘spick-and-span’, or, basically, preventing all combat fatalities but not rescuing lives until the opponent surrendered; and extremely late to end the slaughter.11 A detractor of humanitarian intervention, known for his description of the foreign policy of the Clinton government as ‘social work’12, criticized the Kosovo operation in relation to Haiti: The bombing of Serbia, moreover, continued an ugly pattern that the Clinton administration had followed in Haiti and Iraq, a pattern born of objection to particular rulers and reluctance to risk American casualties… The crushing embargoes of Haiti and Iraq were the equivalents of the bombing of the Serb infrastructure… The Clinton administration… had gone to Haiti to restore democracy and had left anarchy.13 Advocates of humanitarian interventions emphasize that they were carried out in protection of ideals and values, not motives. Moreover, they argue that humanitarian intervention signifies policy reform and a promotion of human rights, which has been referred to as the key concept of this period. To allegations that the interventions were failures, a speech author at the U.S. National Security Council stated14: “Perhaps, the Administration’s foreign policy lacks a snappy slogan. But it has strengthened our country’s security and prosperity and has lifted the lives of people abroad, [and] end[ed] the conflicts in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.”15 Without sustainable international court to settle political and legal disputes bringing about massive numbers of casualties, the process of united humanitarian intervention in the 1990s grew with the Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti.16 Nevertheless, the new principles concerning humanitarian intervention were supported by the sharp declaration of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1999 that “massive and systematic violations of human rights--- wherever they may take place—should not be allowed to stand.”17 This is directed towards nations that assume that sovereignty enables them to escape inhumane conduct such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. He declared as well the emergence of a new period of U.N. interventionism wherein a radical Security Council (SC) would serve a vital function.18 Kofi Annan mentioned the potential implications to any government engaging in ‘criminal behavior’ based on the belief that the inviolable character of sovereignty and boundaries would stop the SC from implementing measures to stop and punish human rights abuses.19 In view of this, intervention implies the eagerness of sovereign states to collaborate for the purpose of implementing the principles of humane actions identified by the international community. Although it is expected of a UN secretary-general to endorse legal precepts in international relations, Annan’s statement is still vital because it seems to mark the ‘beginning’ of humanitarian intervention.20 Even though humanitarian intervention cannot be viewed as supplanting the usual quest for power, it has attached a new vital ideal to international political relations. It has been reported that more national governments denounce the principle of humanitarian intervention than advocate it. Almost all countries that experienced colonial rule, like Haiti, know how outside interference was exercised on various grounds on behalf of colonialism.21 On the SC, Russia and China denounce humanitarian intervention irrespective of the situations. Moreover, the past performance of humanitarian intervention is anecdotal and incoherent. The humanitarian intervention in Haiti was an effort to reaffirm democracy, but has been unsuccessful to completely realize this goal. The expansion of international humanitarian and human rights law and the remarkable progress of international institutions have facilitated humanitarian intervention. Still, conservatives would claim that international law emphasizes the essence of non-intervention as an international relations ideal and war prevention.22 It is such vagueness that encloses the idea with two sets of law apparently contradicting each other. There is an absence of international treaty that establishes intervention rights. The obvious triumph of the Haiti mission hid several fundamental issues. Although the international community identified a potential US-led military conquest as practical, numerous states expressed severe misgivings about the precedent being institutionalized for world power-led intervention to reestablish democracy.23 Specifically, they were apprehensive about the legitimacy of this form of intervention without a global or domestic armed conflict, or rampant human rights abuses on the magnitude of Rwanda, Bosnia, or Somalia, and about the obvious disrespect of the Charter’s agenda for UN-led military activities in support of handing over control to a sole, strong, member state.24 (2) Why was there a humanitarian intervention in Somalia and not in Rwanda? Discuss the arguments made by the main decision making actors in each case and in their political contexts. The direct outcome of disconnection from Somalia was the Western repudiation that genocide had taken place in Rwanda. The two incidents were not the same in the sense that although the Rwanda’s Tutsis and Hutus had a history of hostility and dispute over the control of the government, dissimilar from the Somalis they did not challenge its importance, nor had it failed.25 However, they were the same in terms of marginalization in relation to Western, specifically American, value. Rwanda served a crucial, even though unclear, function in the development of humanitarian intervention, both in theory and practice. Concerning the issue of legality, it has already been witnessed that Somalia had proven that the Security Council had broad decision in explaining the Charter. If the SC decided it could exercise chapter VII—“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and to engage in non-military and military operations to “restore international peace and security”26-- in any situations; however, it needs not to. In this case, it intentionally decided to view the danger raised towards global security and peace in a limited and conventional manner, although it immediately became evident that the crisis had perilously threatened the Great Lakes area in general.27 Moreover, major states also intentionally avoided referring to the genocide by its appropriate label. If the Genocide Convention had been launched in 1994, it would have been harder or more problematic to escape intervention. Hence they repelled the categorization until the slaughter was done. As pointed out by Bruce Jones in his in-depth research entitled Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure28: “it is evident that UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali failed to provide leadership within the UN Secretariat and Security Council at this critical juncture.”29 A top peacekeeping authority eventually revealed to Jones “that it was only after the outbreak of the genocide that he learned of the Genocide Convention and of the United Nations’ legal capacity and moral obligation to respond to genocide.”30 Even though the initial Somalia operation was triumphant, the second mission (UNISOM II) failed. In terms of structure, operation, and policy, all aspects of the Somali intervention revealed a new reality, but eventually, its failure revealed it was a transitory program.31 When ethnic cleansing in Rwanda exploded into abrupt hostility in 1994, immediately after the Somali intervention operation was not able to realize its goals— on top of US embarrassment in the 1993 on-air rendition of Mogadishu violence outcome—the US deliberately decided not to abide by a humanitarian intervention approach. Indeed, the US hindered the UN from dispatching a peace-building operation to Rwanda. It was only in 1994 did the US set out a group of humanitarians to supervise relief organizations’ logistical activities and transportation.32 Choosing nonintervention in the case of Rwanda was not unexpected; choosing humanitarian intervention in the case of Somalia was unusual. In essence, intervention into Haiti embodies policy maintenance. Intervention into Rwanda and Somalia signify policy reform. Actual adjustment in the practice of intervention has taken place in the post-Cold War period. However, as regards threat evaluation, the concept of national interest still overshadows humanitarian interests in relation to the decision of the US to intervene.33 In Somalia, the SC approved a humanitarian intervention on the basis of total anarchy in that collapsing state. A minor technical operation and afterwards similarly insufficient UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was unsuccessful in providing security to humanitarian groups in situations of chaos and hostility between the opposing sides.34 As a result, the SC decided in accordance to Chapter VII that the crisis represented a threat to global security and peace and approved the exercise of all needed ways to create a safe haven for humanitarian missions. A huge peace-building, mostly American, Unified Task Force was formed, enlarged into UNOSOM II, with a greater, more intensive instruction to bring back peace and order in Somalia.35 Yet, hostility intensified up to the point where UN service providers were not able to deal with the condition and the SC chose to end the operation. The Somali mission provides a severe case of a condition that cannot be effectively regulated within the context of the guidelines created for UN-humanitarian missions and necessitates a clear-cut collaborative security enforcement campaign, supposing that an intervention in circumstances similar to Somalia has any possibility of attaining its goals.36 In Rwanda, amid a civil conflict and due to the failure of the UN Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda to guarantee enforcement of a previous peace treaty between the fighting ethnic factions, the SC decided to establish the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which, though, failed to thwart a total genocidal conflict.37 Consequently, the SC, deciding in accordance to Chapter VII, chose to pull out almost all of the UN forces from Rwanda and allowed France to safeguard the people until the UNAMIR could be restructured and dispatched in a secure territory. Yet, genocide in Rwanda had by that time taken place.38 Thus the UN mission in Rwanda should be regarded as the most important humanitarian disaster of UN diplomacy. The response of the international community to the petition for UNAMIR II forces was unimpressive. No world power expressed its support for the mission. As an outcome of predictions that the new operation could last for several months to set up in theatre, the Secretary-General proposed to the SC to take into consideration a bid from France to set up as soon as possible a task force to tackle the humanitarian emergency until an abdication could be achieved with UNAMIR II.39 Referring to the positioning of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia as an example, Boutros-Ghali proposed, on the 20th of June, that the transnational mission supervised by France be approved under Chapter VII.40 The SC reacted immediately to Boutros-Ghali’s recommendation, ratifying resolution 929 on June 1994. The resolution’s expression was filled with humanitarian issues41: … stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation… Deeply concerned by the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population… Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community… Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region… [the Security Council] authorizes Member States… to conduct the operation… using all available means to achieve the humanitarian objectives.42 The statement of SC resolutions and UN declarations reveals that humanitarian issues were the main concern for approving UNAMIR II. Having proven that the principle of humanitarian intervention was established by the SC in tackling Rwanda, it is important to explore other barriers to crucial measures being implemented.43 These barriers could be a failure to take measures, because of inadequate caution or military weakness, or a hesitance to do something.44 The performance of humanitarian interventions on the basis of Chapter VII contradicts the established explanation of the Charter, which would view these interventions to be joint security missions. However, in any case, although humanitarian intervention depending on the implementation basis is regarded legally acceptable, the SC has a specific obligation to show proofs to the international community.45 The massive number of fatalities in the 1994 Rwandan ethnic cleansing should be seen as a very discouraging failure of the international community to act in response to a humanitarian emergency of magnitude seldom witnessed. Bibliography Anstey, Mark, William Zartman, & Paul Meerts. The Slippery Slope to Genocide: Reducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012. Badescu, Cristina. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights. London: Routledge, 2010. Carey, John, William Dunlap, & R. John Pritchard. International Humanitarian Law: Origins, Challenges, Prospects. New York: BRILL, 2005. Chesterman, Simon. Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Ethridge, Marcus & Howard Handelman. Politics in a Changing World. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2014. Evans, Malcolm. International Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010. Feste, Karen. Intervention: Shaping the Global Order. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003. Krieg, Andreas. Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations. New York: Springer, 2012. Messitte, Zach & Suzette Grillot. Understanding the Global Community. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013. Murphy, Sean. Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996. Murray, Leonie. Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism: Rise and Fall of a Policy. London: Routledge, 2007. Soderlund, Walter. Humanitarian Crises and Intervention: Reassessing the Impact of Mass Media. Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008. Welsh, Jennifer. Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003.   Read More