On Defending Humes First Principle - Term Paper Example

of On Defending Hume’s First Principle In David Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748), he sets out his empirical reconstruction of the foundations of philosophy.1 Herein, Hume formulates his theory of meaning based on his explication on two main categories of perception, namely, ideas and impressions. According to Hume, all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, which correspond to them and which they exactly represent (Hume 14). In other words, where there is no impression the idea is meaningless (Lavine 156). He uses this empirical theory as his empiricist principle, which will serve as his foundational or first principle for understanding human nature.2 Herein, I take Humes empiricist principle to mean that true knowledge must be derived from sensory experience alone. Thus, “trying to go beyond perceptions, as metaphysics must, inevitably involves going beyond anything that can have cognitive content” (Morris, “David Hume”). However, if one were to take the empiricist principle itself, questioning its own validity, then one would come to understand that it fails to answer to itself, for Hume’s theory of meaning itself is not readily traceable to an empirical impression on which it depends. Therefore, Hume’s principle is meaningless (Groothuis 5). The problem I will address in this paper then is: where does the impression of Hume’s idea of the copy principle lie? In this essay, I shall defend the veracity of Hume’s principle from the aforementioned criticism. For despite such criticism, Hume’s empiricist principle nevertheless remains to be a valid foundational principle for his philosophy. Hume acknowledges the role of psychology in our process of thinking. In his Enquiry, Hume’s aim was to track patterns in experience or through observation, which would give rise to knowledge and certainty. But where then does the impression of this said principle stem from, since it obviously isn’t derived from any of our sensory perceptions? Since it does not come from our sense perception; it must come from the mind, based on Hume’s explication on the psychological laws of association of ideas. He points out that the idea of necessary connection, i.e. cause and effect, cannot be found in the objects we observe, but resides only in our minds, and hence is simply a habit of the mind; it is but a mere subjective compulsion to relate things by the psychological necessity of associating an idea with another idea. Thus, could it be that he is also subject to the same subjective compulsion when stating his said empiricist principle? Hume emphasizes that there is an exception to his empiricist principle. Here, he gives an example, which states that if a person has perceived all shades of blue except for one shade, and then you present to that person a spectrum of the color blue with this one missing shade, then by the use of imagination, that person will be able to form an idea of that missing shade of blue. This, Hume claims, is an idea that has not been copied from an impression. Lacewing argues for the importance of this example: If it is possible that we can form an idea of a shade of blue without deriving it from an impression, is it possible that we could form other ideas without preceding impressions? The reason the question is important is because Hume uses his ‘Copy Principle’ repeatedly in his philosophy, to reject ideas such as SUBSTANCE, the SELF and, in his discussion of causation, causal NECESSITY (2). Given this example, it shows an instance of Hume’s principle to be unfounded. And if this is the basis of his philosophy, then his entire philosophy breaks down. Is there any way by which we can defend Hume from this dilemma? Before I present my defense, I’d like to present another version of this criticism. Groothuis’ Objection Douglas Groothuis gives a strong attack on the legitimacy of Hume’s principle. He argues that any valid theory of meaning or foundational principle must abide by its own requirements. That is to say, it should not contradict itself nor exempt itself. Groothuis contends: Yet this idea (the theory of meaning itself) is not readily traceable to a corresponding impression on which it depends. If brought under the kind of scrutiny Hume recommends for questionable ideas, its defense is less than immediately forthcoming. In fact, Hume’s theory of meaning seems to be self-referentially incoherent, because it violates the very condition it lays down as universal. We cannot find a preceding impression from which to trace its genesis, either directly or indirectly (5). It seems that this objection is well founded insofar as any coherent and legitimate theory of meaning should indeed abide by its rules. So how do we save Hume from this objection now? Defending Hume A probable solution for solving this dilemma is perhaps by using basic logic as its basis from which it derives its truth. According to Hume, there are two types of propositions, matters of fact and relation of ideas. And in approaching this said problem, why not use his explanation of propositions of relation of ideas, which would include the said empiricist principle? I will argue that this is perhaps one way to compromise both ends wherein despite it having no impression, it is still accepted as a valid and meaningful principle, given Hume’s theory of meaning. We all know that mathematical propositions are self-evidently certain; they can be demonstrated by deductive logic, which will prove them to be valid and true. For example, the equation (1+1 = 2) does not have any impression, because in the first place, "1", "+", "=", and "2" do not have an objective representation that can be experienced. So in effect, they turn out as ideas without impressions, but it would be absurd to consider the equation (1+1=2) as meaningless. Propositions such as these give us knowledge of the relation of ideas, which indeed has absolute certainty, but on the other hand, do not give us information about existence or facts. This is because such propositions are based upon deduction, and must therefore be ‘necessary truths’, which Hume accepts as a valid structure for his claim that “where there is no impression, the idea is meaningless” (Lavine 156), which is equivalent to saying: If there is no impression, then the idea is meaningless. The statement above is an implication statement, and with the use of Modus Ponens (Copi and Cohen 350-351), we can apply it based on Hume’s principle in such a way that: If not p then not q If the idea of god has no impression, then the idea is meaningless Not p The idea of God has no impression Therefore not q Therefore, it is meaningless My use of logic herein is an attempt to give an abstract theory a basis for its validity, based on the said principle. Deductive logic describes patterns of arguments that transmit truth with certainty. So based on my understanding, as Hume accepts logic to be a domain of certainty, then it as a possible basis for such a claim. Hume is fully aware of the importance of his principle. In fact, one can infer that his point in sketching out his theory on ideas and impressions is to establish this very empiricist principle itself. For in that way, he operationalizes the terms and concepts, which will be of use for him in order to build the foundation of his entire philosophy. This enables him to formulate such a principle. Nevertheless, this still does not provide us a clear answer to the problem. This is my solution, with the help of logic, instead of us asking ‘where’ the impression of his empiricist principle lies, affirming its validity by reductio ad absurdum is, I believe, the only alternative to prove is validity and defend Hume from its criticisms.3 How will this defend his so-called principle? The answer is simple, for to think of its negation or opposite, is absurd. And thus Hume’s empiricist principle must be true based on the law of excluded middle, which states that a proposition must be either true or false, otherwise it would violate the principle of non-contradiction, and that cannot be so.4 Hence, although Hume’s empiricist principle fails to be verified through observation or fails to possess a corresponding direct impression, it does not mean that it is meaningless. From this point, it cannot be explained further. The empiricist principle represents what, for Hume, was the unquestionable truth about the human mind. He never questions himself as to whether his theory of ideas and impressions is correct, and he never gives arguments in support of it; for the basis of the argument is its logical nature, as well as its place in propositions of relations of ideas, and not by sense experience or observation alone. To speak of the principle itself, versus that of its use or applicability in the empirical world are altogether two different things. Mathematical truths are necessarily true, but are nonetheless empty truths. But its use and applicability in the empirical world is beyond compare. Conclusion Therefore, although there may be no concrete impression to be derived from Hume’s empiricist principle, it does not mean that it is meaningless. For to think of its opposite, i.e. to perceive of a meaningful idea that does not have a corresponding impression in reality is simply unthinkable and absurd for Hume. We can only but accept his principle as a necessary truth because its negation is impossible. This is a valid form of reasoning in logic. Therefore, it is not a matter of an idea following necessarily from its corresponding impression when questioning the validity of Hume’s empiricist principle, but rather, a matter of its logical coherence as it corresponds to reality. Notes Read More