Hume: Empiricist or Empiricisms Greatest Critic - Essay Example

Running head: HUME: EMPIRICIST Hume: Empiricist or Empiricism’s Greatest Critic? What we know versus how we know it has been a topic of discussion among philosophers for centuries. Defining a philosopher as belonging to a particular school of thought can be tricky, since the acquisition of knowledge itself is a complex study. Hume, as generally understood, is defined as an empiricist whose “position is that since human beings do in fact live and function in the world...(they) should try to observe how they do so” (Kemerling, 2001), and based on these observations come to logical conclusions. Eschewing any evidence not based on actual observance and scientific method, Hume insists, “We cannot rely on the common-sense pronouncements of popular superstition, which illustrate human conduct without offering any illumination...”1 As the definition of empiricism suggests: experience, especially of the senses, is the true source of knowledge, and as logical conclusion, all other forms of knowledge attained in other ways must be at the very least suspect. Pragmatism [that claims that ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ and ‘foundations’ are diversions, and that we simply need to produce theory that works] and Rationalism (that claims there are innate [non-empirical] faculties of reason that constitute the foundations of theoretical and empirical knowledge] are viewpoints latent but not central to Hume’s analysis of ‘Empiricism’ expounded in his Treatise on Human Nature and The Enquiries. Countering Hume’s empiricist approach, both epistemologies concern themselves with the nature and scope [limitations] of knowledge which addresses the following: what is knowledge? how is knowledge acquired? what do people know and how we know it? Pragmatist C.S. Peirce scrutinized Hume’s empirical theories in relationship to miracles as counter-intuitive. In effect, Hume’s argument against “miracles” amounts to what C.S. Peirce typically calls a “pooh-pooh” argument.  A “pooh-pooh” argument is a limited form of induction that consists in denying improbabilities.  This may seem hardly like an argument or reasoning at all, but Peirce includes it as a crude or rudimentary form of induction because it possesses the self-corrective tendency characteristic of induction.2 As Peirce articulates it in 1903, “The first order of induction, which I will call Rudimentary Induction, or the Pooh-pooh argument, proceeds from the premise that the reasoner has no evidence of the existence of any fact of a given description and concludes that there never was, is not, and never will be any such thing.”3  This form of argument is self-corrective because the shock of experience may provide evidence for a fact previously dismissed.  Modern Pragmatists [whatever works] have found not only holes in Empiricism as epistemology but discovered its evolution into a more logical form that today would make Hume’s insistence on what he saw as the philosophy’s pure form outdated and irrelevant to modern thinking, thus turning Hume and his theories upon himself so to speak. Frankenberry (1987) speaking of philosopher William James writes, “...he [James}had no way of foreseeing that the classical empiricism he was thinking of would soon give way, not to the radical empiricism he [and Hume] favored, but to logical empiricism, linguistic empiricism, and postpositivistic forms of neopragmatic empiricism.” 4 Rationalists, on the other hand, believe that reason contains innate and foundational knowledge – synthetic a priori knowledge --and that the mind [or the understanding] is active in the process of producing knowledge of the empirical world. The dispute between rationalism and empiricism [for instance] questions the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge. Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience. Empiricists claim [as stated above] that sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge.5 The question of whether Hume, as an empiricist, drifted in his philosophical view into the more questioning critical aspects of epistemology is an interesting one. Even more so is the notion that given philosophical viewpoints tend to build on each other, it might be unreasonable to assume that Hume, as a major thinker of his time, might completely discard the theories of epistemology old as Aristotle. The question is interestingly studied in Humes position on ethics [Moral Philosophy] based on his empiricist theory of the mind. He asserts reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions; morals are not derived from reason but from sentiment; while some virtues and vices are natural, others such as justice are artificial.6 There is heated debate about what Hume intends by each of these theses and how he argues for them. There is the question of Humes’ position, for instance, on religion. David Humes various writings concerning problems of religion are among the most important and influential contributions on this topic. In these writings Hume advances a systematic, skeptical critique of the philosophical foundations of various theological systems. Whatever interpretation one takes of Humes philosophy as a whole, it is certainly true that one of his most basic philosophical objectives is to unmask and discredit the doctrines and dogmas of orthodox religious belief. There are, however, some significant points of disagreement about the exact nature and extent of Hume’s irreligious intentions. One of the most important of these is whether Humes skeptical position leads him to a view that can be properly characterized as “atheism”. Although this was a view that was widely accepted by many of Humes critics during his own lifetime, contemporary accounts have generally argued that this misrepresents his final position on this subject.7...although many of Humes own contemporaries were happy to label Hume an “atheist”, our own contemporaries are more divided on this issue. It is important to clarify the basis of this disagreement and consider the extent to which this situation reflects ambiguities and ambivalence in Humes views. 8 Hume draws a distinction between levels of belief in a higher being in The Natural History of Religion when suggesting that belief in a higher intelligence does not necessarily include belief in other superstitious entities such as fairies, goblins etc., whose believers he termed, “superstitious atheists.”9 This stance suggests his criticism of one unprovable entity over another, or degrees to which a lack of empiricism may be acceptable. Theism, the belief in higher intelligence then, while not suiting his strict empirical protocol had validity in the human experience. The genuine theist, he maintains, believes, at minimum, that there exists some “supreme intelligence” that is the origin, creator and governor of this world.10 While he seems to concede that there may be some intellectual foundation for this stance, he firmly disputes its credibility when it comes to decision-making on a moral level. In a final statement Hume says, “Generally .speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.” Perhaps the most caustic criticism of Hume came from the Rationalists, particularly Immanual Kant, for whom the various philosophical approaches, including empiricism and pragmatism, were intellectual subterfuge. Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza are important figures, but perhaps the most relevant in this respect was Kant and his response to the devastating analysis of the limits of empirical observation found in Hume’s Treatise and The Enquiries, which presented Hume, the greatest of Empiricists, as its most obvious and greatest critic. Restating Hume’s theory: all ideas are copies of [sense] impressions, and that it is impossible for us to think of anything which we have not felt before that through our senses. If we entertain questions about what we actually think, we need only inquire of or conjure that from which the thought is derived. But it is Hume’s analysis of cause and effect that most brings Kant in conflict with Hume and his empirical theories. In Kants view, Humes skepticism rested on the premise that all are presentations of sensory experience, and the problem that Hume identified was that basic principles like causality cannot be derived from sense experience only. Hume argued that we experience only that one event that regularly succeeds another, not that it is caused by it. Kants goal was therefore to find some way to derive cause and effect without relying on empirical knowledge, pitting him squarely against Hume. There is no idea in metaphysics more obscure or uncertain than [that of the] necessary connection between cause and effect.  We shall try to fix the precise meaning of this term by producing the impression from which it is copied.  When we look at external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover a necessary connection; any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders one a necessary consequence of the other.  We find only that the effect does, in fact, follow the cause.  The impact of one billiard ball upon another is followed by the motion of the second.  There is here contiguity in space and time, but nothing to suggest necessary connection.11 According to Hume we imagine connections from observing single repetitions. After a repetition of similar instances the workings of the mind take on the workings of habit—the connection of cause to the effect.12 Hume, however, excludes metaphysics from empiricism because it does not contain any opportunity for reasoning based on fact—a problem for his empirical view for Rationalist Kant who would necessarily maintain that the mind [or the understanding] is active in the process of producing knowledge of the empirical world. Most principles of metaphysics from Plato through Kants immediate predecessors made assertions about the world or God or the soul that were not self-evident but could not be derived from empirical observation. The following lengthy excerpt from Kant’s Critique of David Hume places the former’s position in perspective and forwards a serious argument that Hume, without realizing, was perhaps but not necessarily empiricism’s greatest critic. IT may be said of David Hume that he initiated the attack on pure reason. My own labours in the investigation of this subject were occasioned by his sceptical teaching. He argued that without experience it is impossible to know the difference between one thing and another; that is, we can know a priori, and, therefore, the notion of a cause is fictitious and illusory, arising only from the habit of observing certain things associated with each in a succession of connexions. On such principles we can never come to any conclusion as to causes and effects. We can never predict a consequence from any of the known attributes of things. We can never say of any event that it must necessarily have followed from another; that is, that it must have had an antecedent cause. And we could never lay down a rule derived even from the greatest number of observations. Hence we must trust entirely to blind chance, abolishing all reason, and such a surrender establishes empiricism in an impregnable citadel.... My investigations led me to the conclusion that the objects with which we are familiar are by no means things in themselves, but are simply phenomena, connected in a certain way with experience, so that without contradiction they cannot be separated from that connexion. Only by that experience can they be recognized. I was able to prove the objective reality of the concept of cause in regard to objects of experience, and to demonstrate its origin from pure understanding, without experimental or empirical sources. Thus, I first destroyed the source of scepticism, and then the resulting scepticism itself. And thus was subverted the thorough doubt as to whatever theoretic reason claims to perceive, as well as the claim of Hume that the concept of causality involved something absolutely unthinkable.13 Let us be clear, however. Hume and Kant did not disagree on everything. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant said he was “awakened from his dogmatic slumbers” by reading Hume. And Hume, for example, says that that cause and effect are not ‘objectively real’. Kant agrees... but they are, as Kant clarifies, “a priori categories innate to our ability to understand [a function of the mind]. In Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Kelley (2008) writes that Hume argued all ideas come from antecedent impressions. Here the challenge and the burden of proof is clear enough: If we produce an idea that we contend is not derived from an original impression, or lively perception, then it is Humes business to produce that impression or admit that his theory, empiricism, is not correct...The difficulty with this test for Hume is that he himself discovers many ideas which evidently have not been derived from an original impression.14 Kelley (2008) finds that in order to deal with this inconsistency, Hume merely corrects his statement and proposes, ...there are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, than those of power, force, energy or necessary connection....15 In terms of Humes own challenge, one might say that he has discovered several ideas that refute his empiricism. However, he has already protected himself against such refutation: Having proposed his test, Hume almost immediately took it back and shifted the burden of proof, saying Kelley (2008) “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea [as is but too frequent], we need to enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. 16 Perhaps Miller (1995) quoting Hume on his deathbed provides the best insight into whether or not the philosopher ever seriously questioned or countered his empiricist views. It does not seem so. Miller writes, The story of Hume’s death properly begins in April 1776, when he composed a short autobiography, declaring that even though he now reckoned upon "a speedy dissolution," he did not fear death. "Notwithstanding the great decline of my person ... [I have] never suffered a moments abatement of my spirits.... I possess the same ardor as ever in study, and the same gayety in company." Hume also claimed that he had achieved a kind of serenity that came from being "detached," as he put it, from life.17 In conclusion, while it might be said that Hume, over time, admitted inconsistencies in his theories, to say that he became in the end its greatest critic would not be correct. Perhaps the following statement by Kelley (2008) regarding Hume’s willingness to challenge even the scientific monolith, mathematics, to defend empiricism clears the air regarding this question. Kelley (2008) writes of Hume in relationship to empiricism versus mathematics, “Although Hume has already said, "Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence" he must turn against geometry where it conflicts with his empiricism: Quantities too small to be seen correspond to no "impression" and are thus "without any meaning or idea"18 –hardly the statement of one with serious questions regarding the epistemology. Had he juggled views at times to suit the needs of particular and pesky questions, particularly regarding religion. Yes, but that does not mean he despised his basic empirical views, but simply admitted there may at times be exceptions. But perhaps the best argument is put forth by Hume himself in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, particularly in the area of religion. “No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation.” 19 While Kant insisted there is genuine a priori [innate] knowledge that can be advanced independent of all experience [using mathematics as an example] Hume certainly resisted. Bibliography Frankenberry, Nancy. Religion and Radical Empiricism:Shaking the Foundations of Empiricism. New York: State University of New York Press, 1987. Hume, David. Humes Moral Philosophy. Web Site: First published Fri. Oct 29, 2004. Retrieved (2 January 2010) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ Hume on Religion. Was Hume an Athiest?First published Tue Oct 4, 2005. Retrieved (28 December 2009) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/#10 Hume on Religion.Web Site: First published Tue. Oct 4, 2005. Retreived (28 December 2010) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/ Kant, Immanual. Immanual Kant: Critique of David Hume. Outline of Great Books, Vol. 1. Retrieved (29 December, 2009) from: http://www.publicbookshelf.com/public_html/Outline_of_Great_Books_Volume_I/immanuelk_bih.html Kemerling, Gary. Hume: Empiricist Naturalism.The Encyclopedia Brittanica: 2001. Retrieved (3 January 2010) from http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4t.htm. Miller, Stephen. “The Death of Hume.” The Wilson Quarterly. Vol. 19:3 (Summer 1995) 30+. Copyright 1995 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Copyright 2002 Gale Group. Retrieved (3 January, 2010) from Questia Media: www.questia.com. Rationalism vs. Empiricism. First published Thu. Aug 19, 2004; substantive revision Wed Aug 6, 2008. Retrieved (3, January 2010) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ Ross, Kelley L. Hume Shifts the Burden of Proof. Copyright (c) 1997, 2001, 2007, 2008. Retrieved (30 December, 2009) from http://www.friesian.com/hume.htm Towards Understanding Pragmatism as the Logic of Explanation. 2009 SAAP Paper Submission. II: Contra Humean Historiography. Retrieved (3 January, 2010) from: http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/SAAP/TAMU/P32G.htm Endnotes 1. Kemerling, Gary. Hume: Empiricist Naturalism, (The Encyclopedia Brittanica, 2001. para. 1-2. http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4t.htm. It is generally conceded that Hume sought to expand on the semi-empirical notions of earlier philosopher John Locke by relying purely on scientific statistically based observation. 2. Peirce’s later articulations of “pooh-pooh” induction most closely match the second genus of induction described in the 1901 monograph. 3. “A Pooh-pooh Argument is a method which consists in denying that a general kind of event ever will occur on the ground that it never has occurred. Its justification is that if it be persistently applied on every occasion, it must ultimately be corrected in case it should be wrong, and thus will ultimately reach the true conclusion.” 4. Frankenberry, Nancy, Religion and Radical Empiricism: Shaking the Foundations of Empiricism, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), 37 5. Rationalism vs. Empiricism, (First published Thu. Aug. 19, 2004; substantive revision Wed Aug 6, 2008: 1.) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ 6. Hume, David. Humes Moral Philosophy: Web Site: (First published Fri Oct. 29, 2004) Sections: 3,4,7,13, from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ 7. Humes Moral Philosophy, Web Site:. (First published Fri. Oct. 29, 2004.) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/ 8. Hume on Religion, Web Site: ( First published Tue. Oct. 4, 2005.) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/ 9. Hume on Religion, Web Site, Was Hume an Athiest? (First published Tue. Oct. 4, 2005.), (10:1) from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/#10 10. Ibid (10:1) 11. Ibid (10:1) 12. (Student—look at your Hume notes and fill in footnote information here. It’s a quote from your notesbut no indication where it came from) 13. Kant, Immanual, Immanual Kant: Critique of David Hume. Outline of Great Books (Vol 1) from: http://www.publicbookshelf.com/public_html/Outline_of_Great_Books_Volume_I/immanuelk_bih.html 14. Ross, Kelley L. Hume Shifts the Burden of Proof. Copyright (c) 1997, 2001, 2007, 2008 Kelley L. Ross, Ph.D. All Rights Reserved, from http://www.friesian.com/hume.htm p. 61-62 15. Ibid. 61-62 16. Ibid 22. 17. Miller, Stephen, The Death of Hume. The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 19: 3 (Summer, 1995, 30+.) 18. Ross, Kelley L. Hume Shifts the Burden of Proof 25 19. Ibid Ross citing Hume: Enquiry 156 Read More