Objective Causal Connections and Criticism of Rationality - Essay Example

Hume and the Problem of Induction The Problem of Induction Assuming an individual is hungry and needs to bite the food. However, he or she is being stopped by a friend who insists he or she should not claim that a piece of food would poison the person. Of course, this seems to be absurd. What can the individual say in reply? The individuals should probably reply that the food that smells delicious like that has never poisoned him or her in the past so there are fewer chances of him or her being poisoned now. Such arguments are as being strong inductively. More so, the premises are known to be true. However, no truth is being guaranteed by any inductively strong argument of its conclusion. It is possible that a piece of food will poison the individual even though it has never poisoned him or her in the past. Therefore, the individual has weaken his or her conclusion by claiming that probably the piece of food is not going to poison him or her. The statement is true concerning the statement of psychological conviction. The question that rings is, Is It rationally justifiable in any sense of objective? Therefore, it can be said that any form of inductive argument and reasoning is only reliable when the outcome or the conclusion from the statement is almost true most of the time. According to Hume, if at all there were any of such arguments it will be simple enumerative induction. Hume himself does not use the concept of induction. In any case, whatever has come to be called the problem of induction has come down to everyone. Hume problem of induction is into two different parts. The first part is the descriptive problem. In this part, it explains how human’s beings are able to form opinions out of fact matters that are unobserved. The second part is the normative section. The second part tries to answer the question of whether the beliefs that are in such ways are justified. Hume’s tries to answer questions of life on whether individuals who reason out just the same way people do, have the reason to believe on his or her conclusions, on the parts of nature he or she knows nothing about and has not observed (Sloman and Lagnado, pg. 95). The descriptive problem The first claim of Hume is negative: a priori cannot be from any knowledge that is not observed. Rather the priori must be derived from the knowledge that has been gained through observation and experience. Imagine an individual who has never heard about snow leave alone seeing it. For the first, he or she is shown a snowball and asked to make a prediction even before he or she has touched it, whether it will be hot or cold. Spontaneously, any person can predict that the snowball will be cold. However, what an individual can do is to put all the possibilities into consideration. He or she has both possibilities; he or she can conceive that the snowball will be hot; he or she can conceive that the snowball will be cold. Neither of the prediction to be made is involving any set of opposition from internal being, so long as the individual will not be allowed to put the matter into investigation, he cannot rule either propositions from being considered as a choice. In this case, we learn that no priori before an individual makes any relevant observations has any strong ground for making any opinion. The difference between this individual and those that have been exposed to snow does not lie in the power of intellect. His or her reason is considered to be at par with anyone else. The difference in experience creates the gap. The analogy seems to be completely general. One fact is that individuals do to know how experience is relevant to their prediction. However, that is relevant is somehow obvious. Regarding this basis, Hume asserts a general proposition. From this general matter of inductive reasoning, it can be concluded that before any individual conclude, he or she must ask herself or himself whether it is true that all beliefs regarding the future and any other parts of nature that are unobserved have been derived from his or her experience. The normative problem Supposing that the arguments of Hume are correct regarding on how individuals do think, so far what is available revolves around the cognitive psychology of humans. Surprisingly, this available fact has never settle down the normative question on whether it is legitimate for individuals to proceed in that way, and whether the conclusions that area reached by individuals in regard to cognitive reasoning are actually justified or not. Hume on induction In all of Hume’s argument, the term induction is not seen to appear. Hume’s concern is inferences that are entailing connections that are casual, which, according to his account is seen to be the only one that can lead individuals beyond their memory and senses that is immediate. Today, the difference that exists between the inferences and induction, which allows for the increasing complexity of the contemporary notion, is considered just a matter of terminology. In addition, Hume’s work divides all kinds of reasoning into demonstrative, by which he derives the meaning of deduction, and probabilistic, which he means casual reasoning generalization. The deductive system of reasoning that Hume was using at the time was just a complex and weak theory of thoughts that were in force at that moment. His use of demonstrations as opposed to structured deduction reasoning are based on the principle that, it is possible to have conceivable information, impossible connections that are inconceivable and the necessary connections of the denials if which they can either inconceivable or impossible. According to the interpretation standards, the argument of Hume’s suggests pointing out that most of our opinions regarding what we have not seen have no basis of being justified. An object is said to be irremediable; no matter how many several observations individuals are able to make, we would still not have any right to make any opinions on what we have not seen. Hume’s point is not the conclusion that is relatively tamed and that individuals are not allowed to make predictions with whole certainty. The conclusion according to Hume seems to be more radical: that individuals have no single right to have any degree of confidence no matter what to make conclusions and opinions on what they have not seen. In denying the epistemic credentials of all the proudest outcome of science, Hume’s problem has not been able to gain its notoriety from its boldness. For someone to declare him or herself unpersuaded by the opinions offered to make predictions on something, it takes nothing at all. The strength of Hume’s argument has been used to derive the power that Hume’s problem has that it is impossible to justify any individual’s modest degree of confidence in any of the predictions made. On the hand, it would look to be unimpressive for someone to argue that since previous attempts on justifying inductive reasoning has failed; there is no reasoning at all to put induction into justification. Hence, it seems, there is no warrant at all to make a mere conclusion to support induction. In addition, Hume’s argument and reasoning can be said to be ambitious. Hume suggests that not merely to show out several ways, apparently more routes to justifying induction all failed in the end, but also to excluding the very many possible routes that should justify induction. It is imperative to note that the application of Hume’s argument is to what is known today as enumerative inductive reasoning. This reasoning is based purely on instances and primarily to the predictive inferences that are singular; however, again, its attempt to generalize to other forms of inductive reasoning is straightforward. It is here that the normative component of Hume’s project strikes; that the principle of uniformity that applies in nature cannot be deductively or inductively be proved. Moreover, this shows that the casual reasoning is not driven by the principles only if our reasoning, which is casual, leads to a conclusion that is true as the natural effect of several beliefs in premises that are true. In Hume’s general account of induction, the negative argument and reasoning forms the vital first part. It rules out any account of induction that views it as reasoning work. The positive account of Hume starts from a different dilemma, this time a constructive dilemma: the work of reasoning and of imagination must be the one that causes inductive inferences. Because it forms the negative arguments, it has been shown that it cannot be the outcome of reasoning, and it has to be imaginative. It is easy to describe Hume’s positive account of casual inference in that it involves the amount to embed the enumerative singular form in human nature, and at least some bestial, thinking. The experience of constant conjunction that fosters a “habit of the mind” is considered Hume’s positive view. This leads individuals to anticipate the conclusion derived form an occasion of an instance that is new from the second premise. The force that derives the inference, which is the force of induction, is thus not considered the world’s objective feature. It is the power that is subjective, the ability of the mind to creating a capacity of forming inductive habits. The instance that Hume calls the minds greatest propensity to spreading itself on external objects is an illusion derived from the causality objectivity and the objective support of inference that is inductive. The causal inference of Hume raises the problem of induction in a form that is acute that is to say that inductions that are good and reliable are those that only follows the causal necessity; lines. However, causality is considered not to be an option in case of situations where it is not a feature of the world. This can be that Hume’s induction problem is, therefore, concluded as a problem that mainly distinguishes good from bad habits of induction in the absence of any objective distinction that corresponds. From the argument, two sides of the induction problem have to be distinguished: the problem of epistemology is finding methods that distinguish good or reliable habits of induction from the bad and habits that are unreliable. The second problem that is deeper is the metaphysical problem. This problem distinguishes inductions that are reliable from the ones that are unreliable. Now as concerns inductive inferences, it is not surprising enough when told that the problem of epistemology is insoluble. In addition, no recipe or formula can be in existence, however complex it is, for ruling out inductions that are unreliable. If at all Hume’s argument is correct, it will be having apparently much more consequence as opposed to this. Hume’s response to this tries to insist that the connections of probability, no less that connections that are simple causal, are depending on the habits of the mind and are not seen in individuals experiences of the world. Inductive habits can be complicated and divided to weaken the forces of inference between the conclusion and the premises, but this does not weaken them at all. The probabilistic laws alone have no more empirical content that what logic deduction has. Even though Hume is the progenitor of the work of induction that is today, induction is still presenting problems, indeed problems that can be said to be magnitude, quite in its own right. By now, traditional methods would have been the matter used for justifying actions. To justify induction, an individual should show that the reasoning is leading to the probable conclusion or linked to the true premises. Therefore, it safe for an individual to say that in the absence of any assumptions the problem that exists is and should, therefore, be considered insoluble. Humes problem undermines science One major problem that is in this response is that non-realist interpretations of science are implausible. Realism is considered the only philosophy that does not make science look like a successful miracle. What science is doing is that it is not solving the problem through addressing the heart of the issue but only pushing the problem backstage. If science theories are to be treated as the tools in making prediction, then, individuals will be presupposing that the human experience will be acting like a manifest of casual regularities that can be captured in science theories. The science position has been undermined by Hume’s thinking, according to Hume; individuals can only be entailed in thinking of the things we know and have observed. The idea in these aces would be that Hume’s view that our human belief in objective causal connections and it is impervious to criticism of rationality. Hence, it portrays the need of human beings to dismiss science, any more than causation, as it is an illusion. From this, individuals might be unable to justify it through rational talks or even doubt it through psychological thoughts. This does not mean that Humeans should have a need to regard individual’s beliefs that are in it as either strictly meaningless or false. Just like any problem, the problem of Hume can be solved through logical reasoning. It is not obvious that we have to see everything to make some justification on their existence or not. If the science can provide prove to the existence of things that were once thought not have been or not to be in existence that Hume’s problem will take a different turn. As long as prove of existence is provided, it is same as being in existence and observed; hence the justification can be made. Works cited Sloman, Steven A., and David A. Lagnado. “The Problem of Induction.” The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. N. p., 2005. 95–116. Print.  Read More