Metaethics and Independent Moral Realism Analysis - Essay Example

What is ‘Independent’ Moral Realism’ (IMR)? Why might one want to be an IMRealist? Outline and critically assess ONE problem for IMR. Every moral realist is certain that moral facts are present. However, some claim that in order to be a realist in relation to these facts one should be ‘mind-independent’. It can be assumed that a realist interpretation of moral facts indicates that these facts are mind-independent (Enoch, 2011). The mind-independence concept can be divided into strong and weak type. The strong account of the argument claims that moral facts are mind-independent considering that they are inherently independent of the beliefs of real or imagined moral beings. The point here is that moral realism indicates that, although there were no real or imagined human beings representing beliefs at a given period of time, some things would be good or bad, moral or immoral, and so on (Enoch, 2011). On the contrary, the weak type of this concept states that moral facts are mind-independent to the extent that they are not a task of human beings accepting, or being likely to accept, purposeful beliefs toward non-moral aspects of specific types. Based on this manner of recognising the limitation, some agents incorporate moral aspects, but not in view of a specific agent’s having a purposeful belief of that thing (Dworkin, 1996). This essay critically discusses independent moral realism. More particularly, this essay tries to answer the following question: (1) what are the arguments of independent moral realism; (2) why might one want to be an IM realist; and (3) what is a specific problem with independent moral realism. This essay specifically analyses the coherence or validity of the arguments of IMR or determines whether the so-called ‘independent values’ are truly existent. The evolutionary theory seems to debunk the argument of the IMR that ‘values’ are independent, for the evolutionary theory does not consider ‘values’ as one of its independent normative components. The concept of ‘values’ is the one under debate here. Independent Moral Realism According to Mark Timmons, moral realists claim, “that there are moral facts (and properties) that are independent of human attitudes, conventions, and the like” (Cuneo, 2007: 34). Likewise, Paul Moser and Thomas Carson assert, “moral realism implies that some things are good or bad or right or wrong independently of facts about the attitudes (for example the beliefs and desires) of moral agents—even under ideal conditions” (Cuneo, 2007: 34-35). There are certain uncertainties inherent to and dissimilarities between such descriptions of moral realism. Widespread among them, however, is the argument that the moral realist is focused on the moral facts’ inherently independent from the beliefs of human beings. In essence, moral realism acknowledges particularly the mind-independence of moral values. Nevertheless, this appears to create more problems than it resolves, considering the diversity within official lists of the abilities and roles of the ‘mind’, which involve almost all things from desires, emotions, reasons, beliefs, and so on (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006). Totally distinct forms of ‘realism’ can be created relying on which of these things is assessed by the independence concept. If realism, for instance, demands the independence of beliefs from desires, feelings, and urges, then supporters of rationalism would essentially be realists. On the contrary, if realism demands the independence of beliefs from perception, then supporters of intuitionism would be excluded from realism in theory (Enoch, 2011). Moreover, constructing realism based on the independence of values from perceptions or rationality would seem to compromise the meaning-giving and real-world characteristic of morality, which is one of the strongest aspects of realism. Due to this, numerous realists limit arguments regarding the independence of morality particularly to the autonomy of values from ‘beliefs’. Independence of beliefs could be distinguished into three, namely, ‘causal independence’, ‘evidential independence’, and ‘metaphysical independence’ (Shafer-Landau, 2011: 4). Those who demand the causal independence of beliefs from the mind claim that if moral beliefs are ever recognised, it is by means of a form of ‘discovery’ about a thing that had previously existed, instead of a creation of a new thing. On the other hand, those supporting the notion of evidential independence view beliefs as being different from principles of reasoning and discovery; in other words, the principles of discovery could be created by human agents, but the objects or outcomes of the discovery cannot be. On the contrary, realists who support the argument that moral beliefs are independent in the metaphysical sense believe that beliefs are independent from the human mind or that beliefs may develop or arise even without the help of a moral agent (Cuneo, 2007. Although any of such descriptions have been and can be related to moral realism, realism that confirms something as solid as the overall theoretical autonomy of values appears impossible. The moral realist wants to justify beliefs as actual or ‘true’ things. Such idea of ‘stance-independence’, hence, creates issues about from ‘whose’ proof and created morality is supposedly independent—morality may be autonomous of a person’s beliefs (Shafer-Landau, 2011). Without a doubt, moral realism should include more than merely a dedication to the independence of morality from a sole person’s beliefs. A person is not automatically a realist of morality simply because he believes a specific individual has made something wrong. A stronger stance for realists is to demand the independence of values from the perspectives of all moral agents (Cuneo, 2007). Somewhat apparent is the solid observational mind-independence of fundamental moral facts, provided that all these facts are solidly mind-independent in an existential way. All things that are existentially mind-independent are observationally mind-independent as well (Enoch, 2011). Moreover, solid observational mind-independence is an attribute even of actual moral facts that are inherently mind-independent. However, what this differentiation clarifies is that any idea that moral facts are existentially autonomous of the perspectives of human entities cannot credibly be recognised to be the idea that specific moral facts are existentially independent of the perspectives of human entities. For instance, one believes that a specific moral fact like ‘killing a human being is wrong’ cannot be present unless there is an moral agent that has the motive to murder another individual (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006). Also something alike is true for numerous other specific moral facts; they are things that are fundamentally made up of the cognitive functioning of human entities. In view of this, it is sensible to argue that the idea that moral facts are existentially independent of human perspectives should be the idea that common moral facts are existentially independent of human perspectives. A specific point for a positive response to this issue is this—it is possible to think that certain moral facts exist unavoidably. For example, it is possible to think that the idea that it is immoral to hurt helpless, defenceless individuals for the sheer pleasure of it is a basic moral fact. However basic moral facts are the kinds of thing that would be present even though no humans were to demonstrate perspective at whatever time (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006). Thus, the moral realist is dedicated to the existence of certain moral facts--- common moral facts—, which are existentially autonomous of the perspectives of human entities. Why Might One want to be an IM realist There are a number of reasons why a person might want to be an independent moral realist. First and foremost, independent moral realism enables the everyday principles of logic to be used directly in moral claims. IM realists try to confirm that moral values are defensible or conflicting, in a similar manner as scientific realists would determine that a factual idea is correct or incorrect. IM realists help in arguing that starvation in sub-Saharan Africa is unacceptable. The idea of innocent civilians in conflict has to be known across the globe so that humanitarian groups can move to and from securely, and IM realists endorse that in theory. The subjugation of women can be deemed to be against the religious beliefs of a person. IM realists justify norms of logic so that a scheme of moral ideals is proclaimed illogical or inherently unsound. IM realists criticises moral scepticism and accept the notion that standards can be instituted through which to assess cultural differences, for instance, between cultures instead of taking into account all cultures similarly defensible (Cuneo, 2007). Another reason why one might want to be an IM realist is that fact that independent moral realism works as a substitute to moral intuitionism. In reaching decisions on certain cases, or evaluating levels of punishment, IM realists have the ability to settle moral disputes. However, IM realists have usually been criticised from a realist perspective, by those who are uncertain about its capacity to encompass realist perceptions. IM realism is in a vital way not sufficiently ‘antirealism’—its proponents have to discontinue their attempts to cover everything (Dworkin, 1996). A fundamental element of IM realism is its reaction to the concern that expressivism transforms normativity into a mind-dependent thing in a disagreeable manner. An average individual believes that if normative arguments demonstrate frames of thinking like planning or norm-recognition, then it should necessarily imply that normative responsibilities, values, reasons, and so on rely on people’s frame of thinking (Enoch, 2011). However, this is a grave misconception, as argued by IM realists. According to them, when individuals argue about the reliance or absence of normative facts on people’s frame of thinking, such arguments are most perfectly recognised as normative arguments—particularly, as normative arguments regarding how to respond under counterfactual conditions wherein the frame of thinking of other people and one’s own are divergent. Hence recognised, these arguments are seemingly vulnerable to the common expressivist idea (Enoch, 2011). For instance, consider the strongly realist-related claim that “normative facts are out there, subsisting independently of us” (Shafer-Landau, 2011: 7). As stated by Gibbard, this could be interpreted as “a fancy way of putting an aspect of a plan for living” (Shafer-Landau, 2011: 7-8). In a more elaborate manner, Gibbard explains (Shafer-Landau, 2011: 8): Return to a specific instance of this claim, “It’s a normative fact, out there independent of us, that one ought not to kick dogs for fun.” Accepting this might amount to planning to avoid kicking dogs for fun, planning this even for the contingency of being someone who approves of such fun, and who is surrounded by people who approve. The accessibility of such interpretations implies that it is completely allowed for an expressivist to demand, when he takes part in normative discussion as a partaker, that there are normative facts that exist independently of the person and his/her frame of thinking. As summed up by Gibbard, “The claim of independence turns out to be internal to normative thinking—though arrayed in sumptuous rhetoric” (Shafer-Landau, 2011: 8). In a specific way, the confirmation of independent normative facts itself does not belong to IM realism. Instead, IM realism merely provides metal-level interpretations of what frames of thinking are demonstrated by these arguments. IM realism, as widely explained, has as its objective the ‘defence’ of the realist-related normative discussion; it aims to allow people to continue confirming that there are independent normative facts (Cuneo, 2007). Outline and critically assess one problem for IMR Take into consideration that we are IM realists who argue that there are independent normative facts. There seems to be an issue with this. To start with, evolutionary aspects have had an enormous impact on human normative decision-making. Gibbard and Blackburn have the same thoughts about this, recognising that we perhaps give importance to a large number of the things we perform for giving importance to these things has a tendency to improve reproductive efficiencies in the setting of our forebears (Enoch, 2011). Hence, it is logical to ask about the connection between such evolutionary impact on our normative decision-making, on the one hand, and the independent normative fact on the other. Such likelihoods are thorough and far-reaching—either the evolutionary impact has a tendency to direct our normative decision-making toward the autonomous normative fact, or otherwise it has a tendency to direct them away from or in manners that show no connection to that fact (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006). Take into account the likelihood that Darwinian effects have a tendency to direct our normative decision making towards the independent normative fact. How could this have occurred? Suppose this did not occur as mere chance. The only other way to make sense of the way evolutionary entities might have directed our normative decision-making towards facts, which are in theory independent of those decisions, is to accept the tracing explanation of the evolution of normative decision-making. As stated in this explanation, it somehow endorsed reproductive efficiencies to encompass the autonomous normative fact, and hence human agents were chosen to be capable of doing so (Enoch, 2011). For instance, on this explanation we were chosen to decide that we must look after and nurture our children for it is an independent normative fact that we must look after our children, and it was reproductively beneficial to acknowledge this and other similar facts. The difficulty with the ‘tracing’ explanation is that it is scientifically defenceless. A complete justification of this argument would necessitate a rather long discourse, but luckily such a discourse is needless in the current setting, for Blackburn, Gibbard, and seemingly other IM realists who completely approve this idea. Basically speaking, the ‘tracing’ explanation assumes that we were chosen to give importance to what we give importance to because those important things or values are real, but this is erroneous; the reality of human values is not in any way included in the evolutionary account (Cuneo, 2007). The appropriate reasoning for the idea that we must look after our children, for example, is not that this is an independent normative fact which guides reproductive processes, but instead, that moral agents who decided that they should look after their children have a tendency to look after their children. Because the tracing explanation is the sole way of analysing how evolutionary factors may have directed our beliefs towards autonomous normative facts, IM realists are dedicated or loyal to the assumption that evolutionary factors diverted our values from the independent normative fact. There appears to be no justification to believe that evolutionary factors would have methodically diverted us from the independent normative fact; there is no apparent justification, for instance, to believe that it would have been damaging in a reproductive sense for our values to go in harmony with autonomous normative facts (Fisher & Kirchin, 2006). Thus, the correct assumption appears to be that evolutionary factors directed us in manners that obviously bear no connection or relevance to the independent normative fact, or that these factors affected our values in a good way in relation to the fact. Consider therefore that this is the case. The effect of evolutionary factors on our beliefs and values has been tremendous, having influenced or determined human analytical predispositions from the onset of human history. We have a tendency to give importance to the continued existence of our children, our own subsistence, the growth of our capabilities, specific forms of relationships, and so forth, and it is evolutionary factors that justify why we have a tendency to exercise these kinds of values instead of others among the human species (Cuneo, 2007). We hence identify that our values or belief system is filled with evolutionary effects. However, what if the IM realists have been compelled to assume, that effect is as good as arbitrary in relation to the independent normative fact? In all probability, our belief and values system are terribly astray (Shafer-Landau, 2011); this is the impossible cynical assumption to which IM realists are motivated from within their perspective as partakers in normative discussion. Conclusions The essence of interpretation and independent moral realism goes along with the difficulty of understanding the language and meaning of moral concepts in a manner that will substantiate viewing arguments that apply them as truly fact-measurable. Possibly even less certain is the reason that we could rationally have certain beliefs. However, it is somewhat apparent that individuals do commonly consider their moral arguments, and the moral arguments of others, as indicating actual or real things, and to the point that they themselves genuinely promote such ideas they appear to be considering as true. Independent moral realism clearly argues that there are values and beliefs that are independent from the human mind. The question is, how plausible is this claim? Some IM realists point to the fallibility of the premise of cultural relativism, arguing that there are moral principles that can be applied to all, such as the immorality of taking another person’s life. But evolutionary theory debunks all these arguments of the IM realists. For evolutionary theorists, there are no such things are independent values, since values, just like living organisms, evolve over time and do not remain unchanged. For evolutionary theorists, ‘values’ are subjective, just like how a parent chooses to take care of his/her offspring. References Cuneo, T (2007) The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Dworkin, R (1996) “Objectivity and Fact: You’d Better Believe It.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25, 87-139. Enoch, D (2011) Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Fisher, A & Kirchin, S (2006) Arguing about Metaethics. London: Routledge. Shafer-Landau, R (2011) Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Read More