A Working Definition of Nature or What Qualifies as Natural - Essay Example

? A 'natural right' supposes a working definition of nature or what qualifies as natujral. It will be presented in the following, an argument that maintains that Hume's criticism is not focused so much on the notion of 'right' as he is on how we know or understand it in the first place. For Hume, how we know nature is different, and in turn, different according to the contrast or comparision of perspectives – that is, between Hume and Locke themselves. Of course, while Hume had the advantage of criticising Locke, the converse of that relationship was not true. However much Hume is critical of Locke's notion of what is natural, there is much incorporated in the view that could essentially be described as Lockean. Finally, this analysis will close with an analysis of literature which is critical of Hume's critique. The question will be asked as to whether or not, Hume is not essentially setting up a straw man as he criticises Locke? Is Hume doing Locke justice will be a question examined in the closing of the analysis? Finally, this analysis will close by arguing that the radical scepticism of knowing, when implied to the self demonstrates to am impossible situation. Where Locke believed that the self was substance with attributes, Hume maintained because of his scepticism that it could not be known at all. That is the logical outcome of his logic, and the closing of this paper will examine why that it is so. Whether it is Hume discussing Locke, or just Locke discussing something like private property one has to understand what Locke argued to be a natural right. Moreover, to understand what Hume understood by natuin more detail, his particular views on private property when he criticized Locke on this and a number of different areas connected to the our relationship to to the external world. One of the interesting aspects of Locke’s view on private property. Locke writes: “that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants”. [Locke 23] Central to the basically communist like view about private property, was that there ought to be a right to land is only guaranteed insofar as a particular individual can labour upon it. [Locke 21]. As we shall see for Hume, this is point of criticism which is often described in terms of the distinction between what 'ought' to be versus what is? The state of nature is in practise for Locke, unstable in its essence, and this follows from his claim that humans, unless coerced, often infringe on the natural rights of others. [Locke 10] It is soon apparent in the Second Treatise, that in order that humans or a community enjoy their natural rights, and for the sake of creating stability, they must join together and form a ‘social contract’. The function or the purpose of this contract, is to form a civil society in which humans will maintain their natural rights, within a government that has been established to enforce laws for the end of protecting those rights, and in turn, to adjudicate or legislate disputes. This law of nature gives humans their natural rights, and within this, we all have a right to life and a right to some liberty, as long, however as our actions do not infringe upon the natural rights of others: “the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” [Locke 9]. Before the creation of civil society, or in the state of nature, ma has a right to amass or acquire private property only in so far he has a use for it. For example, a man has a right to as much food as his family might need, but he has no right to a surplus of food which might perhaps spoil. Thus, the way in which problems are resolved in a community of equals, is that a ruler serves the purpose or the function of providing the conditions under which citizens can enjoy these rights. So, if the king either violates the rights of individual citizens or fails to provide the conditions under which citizens may enjoy their rights, then, the people are entitled to remove him. On issues that do not threaten any natural rights, Locke argues that majority opinion should prevail. David Hume, who lived between 1711 and 1776 [Norton 31] was a Scottish philosopher who thoroughly defended a philosophical method called "scepticism" [Hampsher-Monk 125]. Sceptics call into question the reliability of our knowledge (in science, morality, aesthetics, or any other area where some people claim to have knowledge), usually by demonstrating that the foundations for that knowledge are either insufficient or nonexistent. Hume called into question many kinds of knowledge, and defended his sceptical alternatives on a number of subjects, and this includes the notion of natural rights which is a notion that originated with the philosopher, John Locke (with many persuasive arguments. The definition or supposition of what is natural can be said to be one among a number of different criticisms. At the basis of all his arguments is the assumption that truth can be reached in only two legitimate ways through mathematical knowledge, and through empirical observation [Rosenberg 80]. It will be argued in the following analysis that the critique of the notion of natural rights, is not a moral position but a position that Hume defends on the ground of an epistemological critique. In short, it is a not a problem of 'natural rights', but a problem of knowing what is in fact 'natural'. Hume used this assumption, sometimes called "Hume's fork" [Penelhum 100], to locate and discard any and all claims to knowledge that do not depend on one of these two methods. Thus, his book, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), concludes with the following argument: “When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume--of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance--let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. [Hume 114] When it comes to scientific knowledge, Hume used this "fork" not to deny the validity of all science whatsoever, but to argue that it is wrong to think of such knowledge as giving us access to any necessary truth. For he believed it is impossible to use induction to reach necessity. The reason is that he could find no grounds for believing in a hidden law of necessary connection. We cannot observe such a law; and we cannot prove it by deductive reasoning. He expressed this argument earlier in his Enquiry in a variety of ways. For example, when discussing the possibility that the human will might give us access to such a law, he reasoned: “Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart and liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force ... we should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no farther” [Hume 69]. Here Hume recognized that the search for necessary connection is a search for a boundary, outside of ordinary experience, which would give us consciousness of why things are connected the way they are. But he went on to reject such a possibility, on the following grounds, which are central to understanding his notion of materialism. First, he argues that consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in the one case nor in the other are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connection, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable. Hume's argument here is that, in order to understand the reasons why the human will works the way it does, we would have to be conscious of some power underlying and determining our experience. But we are in fact conscious of nothing but our own experiences, which never give us any glimpse of such a hidden power. Moreover, this conclusion can be generalized to apply to all our experiences [Hume 79]: .. upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of (necessary) connection which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another, however, we never can observe any actual relationship between them. They seem to be connected, but we never actually empirically observe the actual connection in itself. Rather, we observe one sequence of events followed by another but not the actual connection itself. This is an important distinction from Locke, and has much to do with the difference expressed in their relative notions of what an idea is, and how that actually comes about: “Hume calls all the objects of mind not ideas, as Locke had done, but 'perceptions', and he divides them into two classes – 'impressions' and 'ideas' [Stroud 18] If the idea of necessary connection is indeed without any meaning, because our perceptions are all we have, then this creates problems for the view that the inductive method is sufficient for establishing scientific facts. This way of undermining the foundation of what was previously assumed to constitute knowledge is typical of the sceptical method in philosophy. Hume's scepticism concerning the common feeling that there is a necessary connection between cause and effect implicitly raises two challenges. It determines what is in the ‘head’ so to speak, as distinct from what belongs to the external world. Both of which he argues(internal and external) are grounded in our own sensible perception, hence they are material. As material, they are subject to the very same problem that we have when it comes to probability. Sometimes, a correlation is mistaken for a cause and perceptions are always misleading by definition. validation as the major problem In a work that was titled Hume's Naturalism, the author and scholar argues that Hume's criticism of Locke, is a criticism as mentioned in the introduction, that is aimed at taking on how we know nature. However, at the same time, Hume also wants invert Locke's idea that faith takes precedence over reason, even though reason has its own structural and practical limitations. That is, except for the type of mathematical truths or truths of deductive reasoning as opposed to anything that would overlap with a probabilistic type of reasoning and therefore, one that is not one that falls into the category of having a necessary connections. However, while he criticizes his view of nature it is argued by Mounce [Hume’s description of Locke’s view "is not altogether accurate" [Mounce 102]. For example, Locke maintained that "faith was nothing but a species of reason"[Mounce 102] "that religion was only a branch of philosophy" and with no , and that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed. Locke did not hold that a divine revelation can be established by argument or reason. According to Locke, where we are certain that a revelation is divine, we must accept what it says, even though we cannot prove it. What he held was that reason is required to show in the first place whether it is a divine revelation. Further, what are the limits to scepticism? In the Treatise, Hume devotes an entire chapter to the question of "personal identity" (pp. 251-263), and expands on this chapter within the Appendix as well (633-636). It is an important issue for Hume, or any other empiricist given that any sensible definition of knowledge must in some way posit a notion of human agency-- that is, what is it that holds, contains, manipulates, and remembers the sense impressions which are given to us? He argues that the mind is a "kind of theater where several perceptions successively make their appearance". However, his analogy of a theater is just that-- an analogy. He is sceptical as to whether or not there is a discernible self-- an actual theater, so to speak: The comparison of the theater must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is composed. [Hume 1985 253] If as Hume argues, that knowledge consists of sensible impressions made of the external world, and that it is only "habit" which creates continuity, then the self itself is inconceivable in terms of actually determining identity. Identity he argues is a concept which is definably "invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time" [Hume 1985 253], and yet, sensible impressions, like organic nature itself is changing in time: But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea. [Hume 1985 251-2] Further, even in an attempt to perceive one-self, there will always be a split between perceivor and what is perceived. If I were to discuss who I am, for example, I would state what my impressions of my self are. Yet, there is a difference-- a split so to speak, between the self who is introspecting and in turn what is the object of a perception (or a perceivable object). A person has only impressions, whether these are external or internal, both any one and single impression, or any sum of impressions does not constitute or make up a person and a self. In thinking about myself, I am always one step ahead of fully perceiving myself, given that all perceptions continually need a perceivor. In other words, I can perceive pain, pleasure, or depression, but I cannot perceive what contains these impressions. Any attempt to perceive this container of impressions-- this theater, is simply going to conjure more impressions, and not (or ever) the theater itself. Hume describes the self as unascertainable in the following terms: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never observe anything but the perception. [Hume 1985 252] Thus Hume concludes that the question concerning personal identity is "impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity" [Hume 1985 251]. Knowing consists of perceiving, and perceptions themselves (like nature itself) is ceaselessly changing. If these perceptions are not changing, then it would follow that we could have perfect memory of our experiences. However, if one's memory is imperfect does it follow, as Hume states, "that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time?" [Hume 1985 262]. That is, if I cannot recall perfectly all the events which transpired for me at age four, am I therefore a different person? As a consequence of both being incapable of actually perceiving my self (the theater), and also not having perceptions that do not change in time (imperfect memory), Hume concludes that establishing and defining the concept of personal identity itself is impossible. Radical scepticism about 'knowing', can lead to regressive problems like knowing the self. However, are there limitations to scepticism as Hume employs it? BIBLIOGRAPHY: Hampsher-Monk, I. (1992) A History of Modern Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell). Hume, D. (1993). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett). Hume, David (1985) A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by . L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Locke, John. (1980) Second Treatise of Government. Edited by C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett). Norton, D. F. (2006). “An Introduction to Hume's Thought”. In Norton, D. F. (Ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1-32. Penelhum, T. (1992). David Hume: an introduction to his philosophical system (West Lafayette IN.: Purdue University Press). Rosenberg, A. (2006). “Hume and the philosophy of science” in In Norton, D. F. (Ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 64-89. Stroud, B. (1977). Hume (London: Routledge). Hume's Critique of Natural Right. One key difference from Locke. Read More