Distributive Justice - Case Study Example

Comparing and contrasting views of distributive justice presented by Rawls and by Nozick Introduction Distributive justice brings into focus two important issues that govern the human society. These two issues are social justice and individual rights. When considering each of these issues, philosophers have found some points of ambiguity particularly with regard to how justice can be achieved amid equality and rights of individuals. Major developments in modern discourse that unravels distributive justice cannot be exhaustive without a mention of contributions by John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Positions held by Rawls and Nozick about distributive justice can be divided into various parts, each of which represents a particular view of the philosopher. This section will attempt to highlight some of the different perspectives touching on distributive justice with regard to the two philosophers’ account of understanding. In the various perspectives, there are different positions held by the two philosophers either in the affirmative or opposition. Distinction between Persons According to Rawls, Justice for the individual tends to be overlooked for the general well being of the society. This position of understanding distributive justice therefore usually generates an egalitarian approach. Based on equitable grounds, a decision concerning separate individuals has to weigh available options on the utility that each of the actions would bring to the society. Utilitarianism guides the principle of distributive justice where the overall good for the society determines the worth of pursuing a particular course of action. Robert Nozick postulates the “original position” where all parties stand to benefit in a social decision making platform (Hendin, 2010). Inequalities are weeded out by distributing them among the society members so as to avoid some disadvantage on some while others benefit (difference principle). Nozick’s position is however a contestation and opposition of Rawls view under the two situations; difference principle and original position. In order for these provisions to hold true, ignorance must guide the society. Nozick argues that arbitrary scenarios guide the direction of the social decisions regarding distinction of persons based on their resource endowment if Rawls’ observations are true (Leif, 2008). Nozick instead argues that some form of sacrifice is involved where people willingly opt to dedicate their rights for the general good of the society. Different individuals make up the society and their rights are as well distinct from each other’s. In order for the rest to benefit from one individual, the person must be sacrificed forcefully, since a marked distinction puts barriers in terms of distributive justice. To facilitate distributive justice in the context of separateness of persons is a blatant interference with personal rights. The stronger of the two positions is found in Rawls’ difference principle. In a moral society, the practice of shielding the disadvantaged from their adversaries is possible only through such a principle. Separateness of Persons Rawls position on the separateness of persons facilitates the upholding of democratic values in the society. By envisioning a liberal society setting with stability, Rawls argues that there cannot be legitimacy if separateness of persons is not enshrined in egalitarianism. For political power to thrive in such a society, Rawls argues that political conception of justice and separation of individual persons must take place. In what he terms as an overlapping consensus, it is not necessary for individual citizens to hold similar views in order to support one position. Rawls argues that the necessary conception is freestanding where divergent views are accommodated in a common interest. Distributive justice takes into account the fact that different political views are accommodated by democratic values such as tolerance, despite possible distinct perspectives. Nozick projects separateness of persons as the basis of origin for property rights enjoyed by individuals. Without separateness of persons, it could be difficult for distributive justice to be established and thrive in the society. For an equal allocation of resources to be guided by distributive justice in the society, Nozick proposes that egalitarianism as well as Liberian principles must be well enshrined in the society (Favor and Lamont, 2008). Libertarian principles play a major role according to the philosophy generated by Nozick, to such an extent that fairly acceptable distributive justice establishes in the society. The market forces dictate the measure of separateness of individuals, and justice protects the rights of the persons in ownership of the property generated. Both theorists have an almost similar position regarding separateness of persons and the role it plays on distribution of resources. Egalitarianism and protection of rights of possession of resource are synonymous to distributive justice. A very thin line however exists between the two positions on the entire interpretation of principle of distributive justice. While egalitarianism promotes the protection of property rights possessed by individuals, it is not exclusive to such an extent alone. Egalitarianism is not limited to property rights in Rawls’ interpretation, unlike Nozick’s interpretation. Acquiring Resources Nozick extends distributive justice to also entail an exploration of how just wealth accumulation was achieved by an individual in his entitlement theory. According to Favor and Lamont (2008), individuals can amass resources without a direct right of entitlement which is generally determined by two components. One of these determinative components is justice in initial acquisition. This parameter seeks to establish if there was a correct procedure in the original acquisition of the resources that an individual has. It is based on the premise that, to own property, an individual must not have had it from the beginning. How the package of rights of possession came into their hands must be established on justice grounds. Nozick argues that as long as the individual acquires resources (holdings) and is mindful to leave enough for the rest to equally possess them, the acquisition is just. Nozick does not dwell so much on original acquisition since most of resources are almost already in possession of individuals. What he dwells much on is the actual shift of ownership rights from one party to the other. It is important however that a mention of original ownership is made, since the two are closely related. The reason why this premise is held is due to the fact that one cannot possess that which does not exist and it probably originally was in another persons’ ownership. According to Hendin (2010), Nozick’s position clearly demonstrates the importance of historical principles of resource ownership since they determine the future of distributive justice. The second component in entitlement theory, with regard to distributive justice specifically entails the determination of how just property was transferred from one individual to the other. It explores the justice in circumstances under which the bundle of rights of ownership changed hands from one individual to the other. Distributive justice will therefore be used to ascertain how just the procedures used to transfer ownership of property from one party to the other were. In other words, a flouted ownership transfer can render the ownership of resources unjust under distributive justice. Nozick holds the opinion that most property transfers are generally determined by the level of voluntary intention of the owner to pass the bundle of ownership rights. According to Nozick (1974, p151), transferring possession of a holding must be done within the basic principle of distributive justice. Nozick provides for fair acquisition of holdings where there is absence of application of tactics such as would appear to have an advantage over the rest. If there are clean intentions from the buyer, then exemptions of wrong doing done by the seller are made to the buyer. In view of such distributive justice to modern resources held by various parties, we can extrapolate these facts and subsequently determine if justice was followed in their acquisition. Nozick uses the example of how former unjust resource acquisitions such as the colonial system acquired holdings to present a classical case of how distributive justice can be flouted. Nozick goes further to explain that such distributive injustices committed by acquiring holdings without voluntary intentions of the original owner can be resolved. Based on the common premise that justice rules should apply to both parties, he proposes that even though it is difficult, resources should be distributed back as if the injustice had not taken place. Distributive justice position held by Rawls on the other hand dwells on equal distribution of resources, without concerns of how they obtained it. This is a major departure of the position held by Nozick, who apparently appears to dwell so much on the procedure of acquisition than the amount of resources held. As observed earlier, Rawls’ position seems to be centered on the intricacies of egalitarianism, while Nozick’s position dwells on the actual rights. Rawls establishes the attention on distributive justice and limits his proposition to the democratic issues of distribution (Leif, 2008). Based on the fact that distributive justice unravels all issues describing the manner in resources can be distributed equally, both philosophers make useful contributions which are however not exhaustive. Using each of their positions perhaps needs supplementation from the other. This is due to their limited scope of attention which they articulate well. Based on the weight of contribution to justice per se, Nozick seems to make some very weighty contributions. It can be said that his contributions on acquisition of property stands out very clearly. References Favor, C. & Lamont, J. (2008) "Distributive Justice,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/justice-distributive/ Hendin, G. (2010) “Robert Nozick on John Rawls’ Theory of Justice,” Retrieved from: http://phil160.wordpress.com/2010/02/02/robert-nozick-on-john-rawls%E2%80%99-theory-of-justice/ Leif, W. (2008) "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/ Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, state and utopia. New York, NY: Basic Books Read More