Germanys Culpability in the Outbreak of the First World War - Essay Example

Running Head: GERMANY AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR Germany’s Culpability in the Outbreak of the First World War Germany’s Culpability in the Outbreak of the First World War Responsibility, guilt, blame, and culpability are four nouns that have been used over and over again when a discussion of the role of Germany and the First World War is initiated. Although A. J. P. Taylor (as cited in Pearce, 1997) makes a valid point when he compared tracing the causes of World War I to “a motoring accident for which it makes no more sense to blame the driver of the vehicle involved than it does the inventor of the internal combustion engine,” the question of causation when it comes to the First World War is still worth considering as it presents an understanding of, not only past events, but of present and future world conditions. Furthermore, it also prevents the onslaught of another great war as leaders of the world will be able to learn from the mistakes of the past. This is also one of the main objectives of studying history in general. Although it can be said that World War I is a topic that has been reviewed, analysed and debated upon over and over again, a discussion of why it started in the first place is still and will forever be relevant in the study of World History (Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 1). Why is this so? While this task is quite daunting, it is necessary simply because the First World War has engendered, not only a transformation of Europe’s political map, but more importantly, a creation of a legacy that has changed the world (Pearce, 1997). The legacy of World War I includes and is not limited to World War II, the termination of Europe’s reign of supremacy, the emergence of Fascism, Nazism and Soviet communism, America’s rise as a “top nation,” and even the Great Depression (Pearce, 1997). In short, it is pertinent to history as it brought about a great change in the world—an event that is still making its presence felt through its ramifications. It is therefore highly significant to study the First World War and who is responsible for it in order to fully understand the start of Western “modern consciousness,” and as mentioned earlier, to be able to avoid committing the same mistakes critical to ensuing another world war (Pearce, 1997). However, the impossibility of pinpointing a single and definite cause that led to World War I—as there are a combination of factors that can be traced decades before it happened—is a reality that cannot be ignored when attempting to answer the “why” aspect of the great war. And so, in order to fully present a logical, although contentious, analysis of the events that ultimately led to the First World War and avoid a lengthy diatribe of historical affairs, it is deemed by the writer of this paper to focus on Germany’s premeditated decisions between the periods of 1870 to 1914 that ultimately led to the instigation of the First World War. It must be noted, however, that several world powers, at that time and some until now, have also contributed to the Great War. Nevertheless, it is Germany’s ambition, which is manifested in her actions, of establishing a German Empire that “creat[ed] the conditions for conflict” piloted the War that Ends All Wars in a “bid for world power” (Sheffield, 2002; Frischer as cited in Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 150). Laying the Groundwork for a War of Domination It cannot be denied that alliances, imperialism, militarism and nationalism all contributed to the setting off of World War I (Hewitson, 2004). Here, it will be shown how Germany has manipulated all of these general grounds for war in order to further her—or rather her leaders’—aspiration of building an Empire that will dominate the world. Indeed, as Fischer, Hillgruber, Röhl (as cited in Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 150), and Rubinstein (2003) put it, it all boils down to Germany’s belief in her “preordained role in civilisation,” which is supremacy attained through warfare (Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 186). How Germany reinforced and acted on this belief throughout history, shortly before the war, will be elucidated here. Most certainly, Germany’s justification of her actions as only a reaction to to impending war and “national defence” is something that rings no truth in it (Hewitson, 2004, p. 2). This involves a discussion, not more on events, but further on the decisions and actions made by Germany’s key leaders—kaisers and those close to him. Otto von Bismarck The establishment of the new German Empire was attributed to Bismarck; and rightfully so, as his reign as the first Prime Minister of Prussia and later on as Imperial Chancellor has unified Germany in such a successful way in that it perpetuated “an enormous expansion in German economy” and military (Henig, 2002, p. 2). The Franco-German War during 1870-71 served this purpose in acquiring Alsace and Lorraine; and not soon after, the German Empire and the German Emperor were proclaimed (Henig, 2002, p. 9). He made it so that the new Germany was composed of federal German states that bow down to Prussia (Henig, 2002, p. 3). In short, it was an empire ruled by Prussia, which was in the hands of Bismarck and not the kaiser (Balfour, 1992, p. 12). Under Bismarck’s rule, Germany established herself as a European power (Balfour, 1992, p. 16). Furthermore, Bismarck initiated the “League of the Three Emperors” in which Germany became the mediator between the conflicting Austria-Hungary and Russia (over the Balkan states) (Henig, 2002, p. 5). He succeeded in gaining all three countries’ pledge of neutrality in the event that a fourth entity would threaten any of the three aforementioned countries (Henig, 2002, p. 6). After finding a way to reconcile Austria-Hungary and Russia, Bismarck then targeted another influential European country, Italy (Henig, 2002, p. 6). The year 1882 saw the establishment of the Triple Alliance composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy (Henig, 2002, p. 6). Bismarck also found a way to get close to France as he developed policies that allowed him to get in the French government’s good graces at the expense of Great Britain during his short stint in strategically conquering parts of Africa in the late 19th century (Henig, 2002, p. 6). However, the Franco-German War has made France bitter and hostile towards Germany, something that will prove to be disastrous for Bismarck’s successors as “no network of diplomatic agreements, however elaborate, could extinguish France’s resentment over her defeat in war, her loss of territory, and the manner in which she had been outmanoeuvred by Bismarck both militarily and diplomatically” (Henig, 2002, p. 7). Furthermore, the rapid expansion of German economy and its resulting breadth and power were viewed as a threat by other European powers such as Russia and France, causing them to attempt to “catch up with their neighbour in industrial output and in military technology and development” (Henig, 2002, p. 9). Thus, the major consequence of Bismarck’s ingenious political and military strategies is the increase in attention to armament by the major parties involved in the First World War. It elicited fear in the hearts of European leaders that stems from the question “What if war ensues; is our country prepared for battle or are we just sitting ducks waiting for Germany to annihilate us?” If the world has not reacted to Germany’s thirst for power, the threat of war would have easily been quelled by talks of peace. Instead, the international arena became poised for the war that they thought to be impending. Bismarck’s international policies and treaties are numerous and it would be lengthy to enumerate them all. Suffice it to say that it can be seen here how Bismarck’s ambition to create a new German Empire that is unrivaled by others dominates his policies and decision-making. Hence, Bismarck not only unified the German states, but more importantly, he also united German society in a premeditated fashion, which instigated the rise of nationalism, the reinforcement of imperialism and militarism and the establishment of strong alliances. Moreover, the ramifications of Bismarck’s drive to establish the new German Empire became apparent to the world and in the concept and instinct of self-preservation; other European countries prepared themselves for a bloody war. Kaiser Wilhelm II After ruling for a mere ninety days, Frederick II died of cancer and left the position of kaiser to his son, Wilhelm II, who was only 29 years old at the time (Balfour, 1992, p. 20). Although Bismarck has already laid down the groundwork for establishing supremacy even through warfare, it is Wilhelm II and those closest to him who can be said to be responsible for jumstarting World War I. In order to explain Wilhelm’s actions and decisions fully, it is important to delve into the character of the kaiser. Queen Victoria’s grandson, the son and successor of Frederik II, was born of British and German descent (Duffy, 2009a). He had a birth defect that caused his left arm to remain weak (Balfour, 1992, p. 20). Although this did not interfere with his skills as a horseman and marksman, it has prompted him to become a perfectionist, adopting “an exaggerated air of self-importance” (Balfour, 1992, p. 20). Balfour (1992, pp. 20-21) stated clearly that in order to understand the kaiser’s character, it is crucial to know how his damaged left arm, coupled with his overbearing mother and his contrasting English and German influences, has affected his life; so much so that these made him unstable, impulsive in his decision-making, and a show-off by all standards—“[t]he trouble with the Kaiser is that he wants to be the bride at every wedding and the corpse at every funeral” (Wilkinson, 2002). The desire to be the Englishman, and to win applause from the British, was alternating all the time with the desire to be the Prussian and to win applause from the Germans…. [He inherited] a strong constitution, a quick and enquiring mind, a keen intelligence often at odds with his emotions, a preoccupation with himself which left him insensible to the views of others, and an inability to judge character. (Balfour, 1992, pp. 20-21) The combination of these qualities makes him a prime candidate for an instigator of a great war. His inconsistent nature and contradictory attitude towards Germany and Great Britain, which can both be considered as his motherland—contributed a lot to the creation of tension between these two powerful countries (Wilkinson, 2002). The naval race between the British and Germany in the early 20th century, instigated by the kaiser’s exaggerated enthusiasm in matching the naval fleet of Great Britain, became the start of the fall of Wilhelm II’s popularity in Great Britain (Wilkinson, 2002; Williamson and May, 2007, p. 342). However, as Wilkinson (2002) explained, the German navy was developed only for show. “[I]n fact the antagonism caused by the naval rivalry had subsided by the summer of 1914. Britain had demonstrated her determination to maintain her lead in battleships which Germany had come to respect” (Wilkinson, 2002). The Events Leading Up to the War Crucial Decisions The assasination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, on June 28, 1914 by a young Serbian nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, directly ignited the First World War (Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 151). However, this was just a pretext of war as “Franz Ferdinand was not the sort of personality who commanded popularity, and his demise did not cast the empire into deepest mourning” (Strachan, 2003, p. 68). Austria-Hungary used the assasination to declare what they thought would be a quick war on Serbia. Russia, being Serbia’s ally, rushed to protect the underdog. Austria-Hungary then used Germany’s “blank check” to which the kaiser and his generals quickly responded to—declaring war on Russia and France in a matter of three days; to which Great Britain answered with her own declaration of war on Germany (as France is Great Britain’s ally) (Williamson and May, 2007, p. 360; Willkinson, 2002). If all the major European countries were involved, why then was Germany given the burden of guilt? It is because it has been revealed that the kaiser, along with influential German statesmen Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow, was instrumental in Austria-Hungary’s decision to wage a “local war” with Serbia (Williamson and May, 2007, p. 361). It was even asserted that these German politicians urged Austria-Hungary to “resolve the South Slav issue once and for all” (Williamson and May, 2007, p. 361). Furthermore, Germany’s crucial decision made it possible for the European powers to become involved in what should have been a war between Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Russia. Instead of attacking Russia, Germany decided to act on her ambitions of growing the German Empire by attacking Russia’s ally, France through the occupation of Belgium (Wilkinson, 2002). In fact, “Germany had no quarrel with France. The right answer therefore was to avoid any provocation in the west and deliver an all-out attack on Serbias ally, Russia” (Wilkinson, 2002). This paved the way for the domino effect wherein Great Britain and her allies and colonies, as well as Italy, were thrown into the pit of war. The Schlieffen Plan. The kaiser’s decision to attack Paris through Belgium was a result of General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger’s urging that “Germany had but one operations plan”—and that is the Schlieffen Plan (Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, pp. 151-152). The Schlieffen Plan is devised by Alfred Graf Von Schlieffens in 1905 (some say in 1906) to invade France through Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg (Mombauer, 2005, p. 858). Although this is almost a decade before the First World War, the plan was continuously being improved to match the times. Specifically, Moltke modified it into a two-front war that involves the invasion of Germany’s achenemy, France, through Belgium in the West—because Germany did not see Belgium as much of a threat to her massive armies—and the stalling of Russian forces in the East while the war against France is ongoing (Hamilton and Herwig, 2003, p. 152). However, this “great symphony” is not destined to succeed, mainly due to Germany’s over-confidence. The Germans belittled Belgium and in this they found the first challenge to their attacks; at the same time, they failed to anticipate the coming of the British to the rescue, the speed in which they arrived, and the Russians’ strong attack in the Eastern Front (Balfour, 192, pp. 31-32). Scarborough. On the morning of December 16, 1914, Germany showed her true colors in what can only be called a massacre of innocents as her naval fleet attacked Scarborough (Wilkinson, 2002). 29 vacationers and boarding school students were killed and Great Britain was enraged—inciting nationalistic feelings among the citizens and making recruitment easier (Wilkinson, 2002). This attack is worth mentioning as, contrary to Germany’s proclamation that the vast improvements and expansion of her navy were just for show, it was actually used against Great Britain—her friendly naval competitor—in such a heinous way. This shows how Germany was willing to do anything to win the war and guarantee the supremacy and expansion of the German Empire. Conclusion Although World War I is a complex historical episode that is rooted in more compound events that make up the intricate web that is the actual cause of the war, it can be said, through the above elucidation of Germany’s instigation and participation in the war that the Reich has the most culpability in, not only its beginning, but also its duration and aftermath. It cannot be said that Austria-Hungary was hungry for revenge on Serbia due to the assasination of Franz Ferdinand as he was not significant enough to wage war over. Austria-Hungary’s hesitation can be seen in her need for Germany’s urging to start what was then thought to be a local war. Once it has started, diplomatic relations and efforts would have been enough to suppress the onslaught of a world war and the war would have indeed remained local—if only Germany has not decided to pursue her ambition of defeating and invading France through Belgium. The Schlieffen Plan and the kaiser and his generals’ overcnfidence, powered by their greed in establishing and brandishing Germany’s supremacy, ultimately led to the involvement of the other great European countries in the war—making it the war of the Triple Alliance (although it should only be called a Dual Alliance as Italy retained her right to neutrality as it was obviously not a deffensive war that Germany was waging and later on sided with the Triple Entente) and the Triple Entente (Duffy, 2009a). “Germany’s civilian leaders “deliberately risked the outbreak of war” because they believed Germany could win” (Williamson and May, p. 363). Hence, Germany’s thirst for supremacy and power, on the whole, fueled the First World War. References Balfour, M. L. G. (1992). Germany: the tides of power. London: Routledge. Duffy, M. (2009a). The causes of World War I. Retrieved November 3, 2009 from http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm Duffy, M. (2009b). Who’s who: Kaiser Wilhelm II. Retrieved November 3, 2009 from http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/wilhelmii.htm Hamilton, R. F. and Herwig, H. H. (2003). The origins of World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Henig, R. (2002). The origins of the First World War. Lobdon: Routledge. Hewitson, M. (2004). Germany and the causes of the First World War. Oxford, UK: Berg. Mombauer, A. (2005). Of war plans and war guilt: The debate surrounding the Schlieffen Plan. Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(5), pp. 857-885. Pearce, R. (1997). The origins of the First World War. History Review, 27, pp. 12+. Rubinstein, W. D. (2003). The origins of World War I. History Today, 53(11), pp. 76+. Sheffield, G. (2001). The origins of World War One. BBC. Retrieved November 3, 2009 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml Strachan, H. (2003). The First World War: to arms. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilkinson, R. (2002). Germany, Britain & the coming of war in 1914: Richard Wilkinson explains what went wrong in Anglo-German relations before the First World War. History Review, pp. 21+. Williamson, S. R., Jr. and May, E. R. (2007). An identity of opinion: historians and July 1914. The Journal of Modern History, 79, pp. 336-387. Read More