Main Reasons of Market-Garden Operation Failure - Essay Example

OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN INTRODUCTION The Allies wanted to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible. In the fall of 1944, General Eisenhower decided to back Field Marshall Montgomery’s plan to breach the Rhine and defeat Germany by Christmas 1944. This plan, Operation Market-Garden, was very risky and very bold, traits that Field Marshall Montgomery was not known for. Giving into pressure from London and Washington D.C., Eisenhower decided to approve Montgomery’s plan versus pursuing the “broad-front” approach he preferred (Creveld 1982, 54; Harcelode, 2000, 68). In the end, Operation Market- Garden failed for a number of reasons including logistical problems, failed Allied intelligence, poor weather, and poor leadership as Field Marshall Montgomery did not have the necessary aggressive skill set to execute Operation Market- Garden successfully (Creveld 1982, 54; Harcelode, 2000, 68). BACKGROUND The Battle of Arnhem, known by its Allied codename of Operation ‘Market-Garden’, was the biggest airborne battle in the history, and the only attempt in the Second World War by the Allies to employ airborne troops in a strategic role in Europe. It was a battle of Army Groups numbering hundreds of thousands of men- 21st Army Group under Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery in opposition to Army Group B under General Field Marshall Walther Model- but constantly its outcome hinged on the actions of small forces and individual battalions at critical points (Hercelode 2000, 61). Rather than a set-piece battle with a orderly beginning and end, it began on 17 September 1944 from a perplexed and daily changing pattern of events, and ended ten days later as the only major defeat of Montgomery’s career, and the only Allied defeat in the campaign in North-West Europe (Hercelode 2000, 62). The direct starting point of the Battle of Arnhem was actually Montgomery’s greatest victory, the Battle of Normandy. The annihilation of the original Army Group B in the Falaise Pocket in August 1944 at the end of the battle was a tragedy for Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. Of 38 German divisions committed to Normandy, 25 were completely destroyed, with at least 240,000 men killed or wounded, and a further 200,000 taken prisoner. General Field Marshall Model, chosen on 18 August as both Commander-in-Chief West and commander of Army Group B, found himself organizing the disturbance of his shattered forces across northern France into Belgium and Holland (Hercelode 2000, 62). In the planning before D-Day on June 6, the Allied had understood that they would go forward progressively inland, with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), taking over the land of battle from Montgomery after a few weeks and driving the progress of his three Army Groups- Montgomery’s 21st Army Group under Lieutenant General Omar Bradley, and 6th Army Group under Lieutenant General Jacob Devers coming from southern France- a broad front in opposition to a strong German defense. Instead, the Battle of Normandy had been weeks of hard-fought virtual deadlock followed by a sudden German collapse resulting in the Falaise pocket (Robert 1994, 89). The very bulk of this victory was Montgomery’s collapse. Success in Normandy had depended on cooperation between various Allied members and services. Now, with the unexpected annihilation of Army Group B, many on both side believed that history was repeating itself, and that August 1944 in France was August 1918 once more, with Germany nearly defeated and bound to surrender before the year ended. Senior Allied commanders, trained to regard a successful war as just one episode in their developing careers, began to display candidly the self-interest and concern for their own futures they had kept buried during the battle (Robert 1994, 89). After some delay, Eisenhower was ready to take over the command from Montgomery on September 1, establishing SHAEF Headquarters at Granville in Western Normandy. On August 13, as Army Group B’s hold was being completed, Montgomery first raised with Eisenhower the idea of changing Allied strategy to a ‘single thrust’ advance by his own 21st Army Group, supported by First US army under Major General Courtney Hodges, through northern France and Low Countries and into Germany (Middlebrook 1995, 115). Montgomery’s point was that German resistance against him was insignificant, but that there was not sufficient transport to keep all three Army Groups advancing at full stretch over 500 km from Normandy. Even the convoys of Allied transport aircraft planned to mount airborne operations were being committed to ferrying supplies to 21st and 12th Army Groups. Montgomery asked Eisenhower to assign a round commander to execute the ‘single thrust’, even offering to serve under Bradley if needed, as long as the forces to the south gave up their supplies (Middlebrook 1995, 116). Whatever the intrinsic worth of this argument, it was decisively opposed by Bradley, for whom Montgomery’s behavior of the Battle of Normandy had been deeply suspect, and who was one of more than a few American commanders who believed that they had won Normandy in spite of Montgomery, and not because of him (Middlebrook 1995, 115). With concluding victory in sight it was time for American prowess to display itself, and Montgomery and the British were no longer a factor. Montgomery’s plan would also have meant stopping the American troops that had advanced farthest towards Germany, Third US Army under Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr, Montgomery’s old rival (Middlebrook 1995, 120). On August 23, Montgomery at last pressured Eisenhower into approving that 21st Army Group’s thrust into northern France should have precedence in supplies (which Montgomery chose to understand as absolute priority), to free the English Channel ports for Allied supply ships and overrun the launch sites for the V-1 buzz bombs attacking southern England. Bradley’s principal mission was to support this thrust with First US Army, sending nearly all of its divisions north of Aachen (Ryan 1999, 221). Instead, Bradley silently schemed at Patton’s continuing southern thrust towards Germany, holding First US Army back and directing it progressively more south, away from 21st Army Group. At the end of August, as Third US Army’s drive begun to stop at the gates of German from lack of fuel, relations between Montgomery and the American generals could hardly have been worse (Middlebrook 1995, 121). Allied victory in the Battle of Normandy had also depended a great deal on massive air support for the ground troupes, a responsibility imposed for Eisenhower on the often unwilling airmen by Allied Expeditionary Air Forces (AEAF) under the unpopular Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory. On 15 August, Leigh Mallory, also believing that the war in Europe was won, started to close down AEAF Headquarters and plan for his next posting (McDonald 1993, 31 & McDonald 1990, 17-21). The Allied heavy bomber forces of RAF Bomber Command and USAAF 8th Air Force went back to their preferred strategy of bombing German cities, while the SHAEF tactical air forces split along national lines, with USAAF 9th Air Force supporting 12th Army Group and RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force supporting 21st Army Group. Since the Luftwaffe in the west barely existed and the Allies benefitted from unquestioned air superiority, this appeared not to matter (Powell 1985, 48). FIELD MARSHALL MONTGOMERY Alan Palmer who belongs to the close circle of Montgomery once said that Montgomery was uncompromisingly single-minded1. And that the most noticeable of all his attributes was his unshakable confidence in him, an infectious eminence which rapidly spread throughout all ranks in the armed forces and among the general public. Lieutenant- Colonel C P Dawney, a military assistant to Montgomery, on the other hand said that one always is curious of being taught and by a great master. In this connection, said Dawney, it is interesting to note that he was privately and affectionately known by those who worked for him at TAC HQ as "Master" (Irving 1983, 51). Bernard Montgomery is the most inspirational military commanders of World War two, he was known as the hero of El Alamein and North Africa, wherein he succeeded Auchinleck (McKee 1971, 112). In addition to that Montgomery was also the senior British military commander at D-Day and held on to that position within the west European sphere of the war until the war ended (Irving 1983, 47). Born in 1887, Bernard Montgomery was educated at St. Paul’s School and Sandhurst and in 1908, when he was already 21; he gained a commission in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. He served on the Western Front in World War I. He was given a succession of command posts both in Britain and in India come 1938 because he was considered to be one of the most efficiet young officers, and after that he had been promoted to the rank of major-general (Irving 1983, 49). He became part of the British Expeditionary Force at the outbreak of World War two, and because of that he had to withstand the might of the Wehrmacht’s Blitzkrieg (McKee 1972, 113). Montgomery was given the command of the Third Division (BEF) which had to be evacuated at Dunkirk. After Churchill’s sacking of Auchinleck after the collapse of the first battle at El Alamein, Montgomery was given command of the Eighth Army in North Africa. He was compared to being like a ferret and being as popular as one. However, different from many senior officers of the day, he went out of his way to meet the soldiers under his command. He breathed a lifestyle that was not typical of a general. Though his command base was a large and lavish North African house, Montgomery lived in a caravan in the garden. Firmly teetotal and anti-smoking, he made sure that his men had a sensible access to cigarettes. There is no doubt that he was popular with the men in the Eighth Army (Irving 1983, 51). His victory at El Alamein was to twist the surge of the war. The defeat of the Germans at El Alamein was the first they had experienced and within North Africa, the Germans could only withdraw and they quit North Africa in May 1943. It is tricky to give too much weight to the importance of Montgomery’s victory at El Alamein (Hibbert 1988, 12). Montgomery commanded the British and Canadian units at D-Day. These units were tasked to take on the main bulk of the German forces at Normandy. This made possible the movement of the American Twekfth Army Group deeply into France and heads the breakout from Normandy. He wanted a full-scale rush via the Ruhr and into Berlin (Hibbert 1988, 222). This plan however is ruled against by the Allies Supreme Commander, Dwight Eisenhower. Montgomery and Eisenhower had a solid professional relationship but ‘Monty’ did not always agree with the overall strategy of Eisenhower who he believed too often favored the plans of the Americans – including the maverick General George Patton (Hibbert 1988, 21). Montgomery was promoted to field Marshall on September 1, 1944, and this is the highest rank that one can reach in British Army. At that time, the 21st Army Group was under his command which was victorious in taking the vital port of Antwerp in Belgium but was involved in the failure of Arnhem (Kershaw 1994, 64). The 21st Group was also intensely involved in the Battle of the Bulge – Germany’s unfortunate attempt to push back the Allies. Montgomery’s group crossed the River Rhine on March 24th 1945. He accepted the official surrender of the German military at Luneburg Heath on May 4th 1945 (Kershaw 1944, 63). After the end of the war, Montgomery strengthened the status he had. From 1946 to 1948, Montgomery served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and from 1951 to 1958, he was Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe (Irving 1983, 48). Montgomery, created a viscount in 1946 in recognition of the part he played in the war, was one of the British Army’s most successful generals. He died in 1976 known by many as someone who has outstanding characteristics wherein he use his professional thoroughness in planning set-piece battles and the projection of his self-confidence so as to arouse enthusiasm among his troops. OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATION The battle of Arnhem, which is also called Operation Market-garden, lasted for nine days almost ten from September 17 to 26. It failed the core of its existence which was to secure a crossing of the Lower Rhine and to open a passageway across the North German plains to Berlin. There were 11,000 casualties in this operation. Although it was able to capture 5 bridges successfully, it failed to get hold of one of the most important one – the bridge at Arnhem (Bradley 2001, 88). The capturing of the last bridge was not successful because the Airborne troops sent could not hold of long enough for reinforcement to arrive because of the great resistance from the Germans. Most importantly, the operation did not because a German collapse, as Montgomery had hoped (Creveld 1982, 119). There are a lot of theories as to why the operation failed. The one most often given is that the operation failed as a result of major intelligence inaccuracies, specially in two areas, a gross underestimation of the enemy and serious misjudgment of the terrain. At face value these concerns sound like malfunction of the intelligence community to give sufficient information. However, some have made the case that sufficient information was available and that this information was disregarded due to ecstasy brought on by recent successes (Creveld 1982, 120). As the most serious case in point, inspect intelligence information for the battle at Arnhem. Defeat at Arnhem was in piece due to the fact that Allied paratroopers were told to anticipate light resistance from no more than 2,000 recruits just learning the fundamentals of soldiering, when instead the Allies were met by 6,000 battle-hardened veterans, equipped with artillery and tanks. Were intelligence reports about troop strength at Arnhem inaccurate? The answer may be that it depends on which report one chose to believe (Creveld 1982, 120). Major General Roy Urquhart, the commander of 1st British Airborne Division, was in charge of planning airborne operations into Arnhem. He related that there was little information at his level concerning troop power at the target. However, his superior, LTG Browning, told him that his forces were not to be anticipated to come across anything more than a German brigade group supported by a few tanks. While the deffiecieny of detailed intelligence on German troop strength did not keep Urquhart and his men from planning, there nonetheless was more complete intelligence accessible at higher levels. In fact, the 10 September 21st Army Group intelligence summary (INTSUM) stated that elements of the Second SS Panzer Corps, the 9th (Hohenstaufen) and 10th (Frundsberg) Panzer Divisions, were reported to be refitting in the Arnhem area. The information in this intelligence summary established information from another source, the Dutch battle forces.This information was in the end made known to MG Urquhart and his men. But now they were faced with contradictory intelligence. Lyman Kirkpatrick (1993, 33) believes that this conflict was understandable given that planners only had one week to conceive a plan for a very complicated operation and there was not enough time to gather more data on the enemy forces present in the said area. The staff intelligence officer for the 1st British Airborne Corp, Major Brian Urquhart, under LTG Browning and no relation to MG Urquhart, disagrees with Kirkpatrick. He in person made certain that Browning saw the 10 September INTSUM but was told by Brownin that the reports were almost certainly wrong, and that in any case the German troops were refitting and probably not up to much fighting. To prove to Browning otherwise, Major Urquhart ordered that tilted photographs be taken of German troops in the area of the Arnhem drop zone from low altitude. The pictures confirmed the 10 September INTSUM and showed German tanks and armored vehicles parked under the trees inside easy range of the 1st Airborne Division’s main drop zone. Browning again dismissed this evidence. There are two main camps on this issue. One camp focuses on the time constraints of leaders and the confusion that results from innumerable publications. To this camp, quantity counteracts quality. Simply put, commanders do not have enough time to do the analysis themselves, so the intelligence community should weigh all factors and speak with one voice. Others assert that promoting various perspectives is more prudent. Persons in this camp say that no important evaluations should be suppressed. This approach is probably to guarantee that all prospective alternatives are represented. The issue, of course, is that this approach demands the operator or commander make the difficult decisions. According to Philip (2001, 166) in the best recognized cases of intelligence failure, the most critical mistakes have hardly ever been made by collectors of raw information, sporadically by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who devour the products of intelligence services. The key element is appreciation of pertinent data. This seems to be the case for those planning Market-Garden at the operational level. Commanders at the operational level had enough evidence to value a grave rethinking of the airborne portion of the operation but chose not to believe this information was valuable enough for consideration. In fact, the idea that the Germans were a totally beaten enemy powerless of resistance seems to have been a general belief instantly preceding the operation. The Germans seemed ripe for defeat. As a result, there was an intervening desire to put into practice the plan as fast as possible for quite a few reasons. First, both Montgomery and Eisenhower were concerned to test airborne operations before the war came to an sudden end. At the start of Semptember, commanders at all levels from Eisenhower down were talking of the war being over before Christmas. For that to happen devoid of having ever made full use of the airborne force, to whose creation so much expense and attempt had been devoted, was unthinkable. Second, Montgomery wanted to protect for Britain the honor of dealing Germany the concluding blow. This is comprehensible given the fact that Britain had been fighting the Germans for years before the US entered the war. EISENHOWER’S BROAD FRONT STRATEGY Dwight Eisenhower first articulated his broad front strategy almost 65 years ago about the end of the war in Europe and up to this day, the consquences of that decision still remain. Allied generals had a disagreement during that time over Ike’s decision, and after the war ended, historians have taken their stand of whether they support the decision or not. This decision sparked some of the war’s most controversial debates. Eisenhower took part by persistently believing that his choice is the correct strategy there is (Kirkpatrick 1970, 27). It was in August 1944 that the Normandy campaign ended in a rout with the Germany army in complete confusion. As the Allied armies crossed the Seine and began sweeping into Belgium and Lorraine it seemed too many that the Germans were done and the war would definitely be over by Christmas. Eisenhower announced his intention to take control of the Allied land forces in mid-August for this September 1 operation. In the spring of 1944, despite the fact that most were absorbed on the D-day invasion, a small group of SHAEF planners had for many weeks been busy examining Eisenhower’s mandate “to undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.” (Mcdonald 1983, 17-21) They presented Eisenhower with choices of action on May 3 after Normandy to achieve his goal. Some of the choices shown to him were the capture of the Ruhr in order to paralyze Germany’s war making ability, and the capture of Berlin (Kirkpatrick 1970, 112). Moreover, they also presented four alternatives on how to advance to the Ruhr, but they were all variations of a broad Allied advance both north and south of the rugged Ardennes Forest. Eisenhower discarded Berlin as a military objective and started to study his two options for taking hold of the Ruhr by either a frontal assault or through envelopment. On May 27 Eisenhower declared the broad front strategy recommended by his planners. This is the only known document that spelled out SHAEF’s post-Normandy strategy (Kirkpatrick 1983, 113). Eisenhower studied history before he entered the military, and because of that, he thought that the solution was self-evident. Military commanders dream of the double envelopment, of surrounding an aim on two sides by pincer movements and crushing it behind their combined weight as had been intended at Falaise. In 1944, when Eisenhower studied the map of Europe, he was drawn by his knowledge of history to one of his boyhood heroes, Hannibal, the Carthaginian General whose masterful defeat of the Romans at Cannaei in 216 BC is considered one of the classic battles of history. Also, around this time, Montgomery and Bradley were starting to make their own plans that would guarantee them a key role in the post-Normandy battles. They both worked hard for Eisenhower’s approval. Even though aware that his days as the acting Allied ground commander were numbered, Montgomery not only disagreed against changing the command set-up at this late date but pressed ahead to influence future allied strategy (McDonald 1990), 17-21. The unexpected collapse of German struggle in mid-August gave rise to a proposal for what he called a single “full-blooded” thrust towards the Ruhr with his and Bradley’s army group marching side by side. This force of some forty divisions “would be so strong that it need fear nothing.” Still, Eisenhower’s broad-front decision sent a visible chill through Patton and his Third Army staff and seemed confirmation of his pro-British bias. Convinced the winning of the war was being squandered on the altar of Allied cooperation, Patton regularly mourned that they were fighting two enemies, the Germans and SHAEF, writing to his wife, Bea, “God deliver us from our friends. We can handle the enemy.” (Irving 1983, 233) In what Patton called the ‘unforgiving minute of history’, the decision made was not and could be easily reversed once done. In his frustation, he said that no one understood the true value of the unforgiving minute aside from himself. Eisenhower’s declaration that his decisions were made exclusively for military reasons was not completely valid. As one historian noted, Montgomery’s plan for an advanced to the Rhur no matter how brilliant or logical it is, Eisenhower, under no circumstances would agree to give all the glory to the British as with the American forces (Irving 1983, 244). But as things stood Eisenhower could not make his decisions exclusively on military grounds. He could not stop Patton in his tracks, demote Bradley to a negligible administrative role, and in effect tell Marshall that the great army he had raised in the United States was not needed in Europe. Even though Eisenhower may well have persuaded himself his broad front decision was first and foremost military, the political aspects basically could not have been ignored. 1944 was a presidential election year in a war being fought by allies (Phillip 2001, 67). From the time he took command of Torch in North Africa his role, certainly the very foundation of his success, had been unity in a war, which would be won by allies, not by British or Americans, acting exceptionally. Thus, from Eisenhower’s viewpoint, the controversy was a tempest in a teapot. On the tenth day of September, the tension growing between Eisenhower and Montgomery came to a head on, a face-off between the two men. For the part of Montgomery, he said that he wanted to respect the custom of a subordinate that he should be the one to visit the office of a senior. Eisenhower agreed to this. The two men met in Eisenhower’s and the meeting begun smoothly and nearly ended when Montgomery angrily pulled fromhis pocket the signals that exchanged between them for the past week. The new field marshal wasted no time beginning into possibly the most extreme and foolish outburst of his career. In language fit for a drill instructor addressing recruits, Montgomery testily damned everything about Eisenhower’s plan, and why it would not work. Pulling Eisenhower’s recent signals from his pocket. Montgomery shouted that what Eisenhower is planning are just balls and nothing else but rubbish (McKee 1971, 71). Conceivably only Eisenhower would have the self-control to sit in silence while a subordinate orally assaulted him. When Montgomery at last paused for breath, Eisenhower put his hand on Montgomery’s knee and gently said, that he should chill and that he should stop talking to him the way he did because he is Montgomery’s boss (McKee 1971, 71). After that was one of the very few moments in his carreer that he said sorry to Eisenhower and then the meeting ended in less spiteful fashion, but with neither general giving in to the other. The broad front move forward to the Rhine would continue, declared Eisenhower. The basis of Eisenhower’s belief that the Montgomery’s single thrust strategy emanated from another belief that the Germans were merely too weak to hold the Siegfried Line or to stop an Allied advance on both the Ruhr and the Saar. Privately, Ike was intensely troubled by the vengeful September 10 meeting. Montgomery’s repeated challenges left him openly questioning his loyalty, and he ridiculed Montgomery’s plan as a “mere pencil-like thrust” not in agreement with his concept that the war would be fought and won by Allies advancing on a “broad front.” Montgomery’s lack of discretion, his regular letters urging Eisenhower to change his mind, and now their face-off in Brussels drove an even deeper block in their relations. Montgomery had been unsuccessful to distinguish that to attempt to run roughshod over Eisenhower was a waste of time that did more harm than good. Or that at the back the calm exterior that permitted free rein to the British field marshal was the intolerant side of Eisenhower who never forgot the slights and the criticism of his decisions (Mitcham 1982, 88). Montgomery’s pride and his belief in the precision of his plan left him equally unapologetic. He said that he was trying to fight a war and he just can’t help but do everything he thinks that needs to be done. Two proud men that believed in the strength of their cause was a recommendation for an stalemate. Eisenhower’s great intuition for negotiation influenced his decisions during the most critical weeks of the war. Had the logistical support existed devoid of completely crippling everyone else, there was a strong case to be made for Montgomery’s bold, single-thrust, the ultimate prize being an end to the war in 1944 (Mitcham 1982). The great void between their conflicting beliefs was never more evident than when, in refusing Montgomery, Eisenhower said the Americans would not stand by on such a plan and the among other else, it is public opinion that wins wars. Montgomery responded by saying that it is not public opinion that wins wars but victories. He said that if you give the American people victory, they would not care who won it in the end. Although both were right, , the plan stood no chance in the environment of coalition warfare raised by Eisenhower. Not only the months of disagreements but also the interruption of nationalism and outside pressures into the equation brought a definite predictability to Eisenhower’s decisions (Powell 1985). ANALYSIS Why did Operation MARKET GARDEN fail? Was it due to poor decision making, faulty planning, or bad intelligence? This section will evaluate some theories about the failure of one of the most famous in World War 2. Kirkpatrick (1970) in his book Captains without Eyes mentioned some possible reasons for the failure of Operation Market Garden. He concluded that poor intelligence was the downfall of the operation (Kirkpatrick 1970, 89) However, others disagree on this and instead blamed the operators for falinig to heed valid intelligence and for being to hurried to execute such a daring plan. Other theorist argue that the Germans miraculously recovered just in time to make one last stand at Arnhem, and this recovery was beyond the capability of the intelligence community to predict. Certainly, there are many other factors that contributed to the failure of the operation, to include bad weather. The main objective was to add a bridgehead over the Rhine River. The timing was pressing because Eisenhower did not want the Germans to get back the scheme. Due to the level of pressure, Montgomery’s troops had only one week to plan, with D-Day set for 17 September. As stated by Kirkpatrick (1970, 214), Montgomery’s plan was bold and daring. He proposed with one blow to cross all the water barriers standing between the western Allies and the key German industrial area of the Ruhr, to turn the end of the Siegfried line in the north and to open the way across the North German plains. Why was the Rhine River an advantage? The heart of Germany would be exposed if this river is crossed. The plan called for forces under Montgomery to seize six bridges from northern Belgium north through Holland, with the bridge at Arnhem the last and most critical. Expecting that ground forces could not move fast sufficiently to capture the bridges before the Germans could destroy them, Montgomery planned to drop airborne troops in the area of these bridges to secure them until the ground forces arrived. The airborne part of the operation was code-named MARKET (Wilmot 1982). The 2nd British Army, with the 30th British Corps as the armored spearhead, planned to attack along the narrow axis detained in advance by the airborne formations. This was the GARDEN portion of Market- Garden. If victorious, this ground operation would cut off the land exit for the Germans in western Holland. The move forward was to be on a very narrow front , with only one road as much as possible on the way (Ryan 1999). CONCLUSION The Allies wanted to end the war in Europe as quickly as possible. In the fall of 1944, General Eisenhower decided to back Field Marshall Montgomery’s plan to breach the Rhine and defeat Germany by Christmas 1944. This plan, Operation Market-Garden, was vey risky and very bold, traits that Field Marshall Montgomery was not known for. Giving into pressure from London and Washington D.C., Eisenhower decided to approve Montgomery’s plan versus pursuing the “broad-front” approach he preffered. In the end, Operation Market- Garden failed for a number of reasons including logistical problems, failed Allied intelligence, poor weather, and poor leadership as Field Marshall Montgomery did not have the necessary aggressive skill set to execute Operation Market- Garden successfully. Although intelligence failure is the most often cited theory, it is still unfair to assume that the failure of the Operation Market- Garden was due to intelligence oversights and mistakes. For one, contrary to what other authors assume, it is not the fact that intelligence was not able to portray an accurate picture of German troops’ strength and capability. To correct the data, this information was accessible along with the accurate analysis (Ryan 1999). It is true however that not intelligence summaries agreed but there was enough of a disagreement to warrant more investigation and certainly greater caution. Another reason that all the blame should not go to intelligence is the misconception that failure to accurately assess the terrain around Arnhem caused the Allies to pick drop zones six to eight miles from the bridge. In fact, terrain was only a minor issue (Rommel 1983). In addition, on this issue Montgomery was contradictory. If the German troop strength was deemed too frail to challenge ground forces, then why wasn’t it deemed too weak to challenge airlift assets? The one illustration that is clearly an intelligence failure was the lack of coordination with Dutch forces about alternating routes to Arnhem. However, this in itself did not cause Operation Market-Garden to fail. To the intelligence community’s credit, they did accurately describe the complicated nature of the route that 30th Corps was to take (Rommel 1983). If blame must be allocated, liability for the market-garden’s crash can be given to planners at the strategic and operational levels who seemed hell-bent on carrying out the operation for at least two reasons. For one, there was an rising push to test airborne operations before the war came to an sudden end. Second, Montgomery pressed the pressure of the operation in part to make sure that Britain got credit for bringing the knockout punch. On this second reason, General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British 2nd Army, offer evidence that the commander of an operation can considerably slant the viewpoint of the intelligence effort. According to Wilmot (1992), Dempsey believed Dutch reports regarding German troop strength but couldn’t talk into Montgomery. Dempsey did, however, send this information on to Browning’s 1st Airborne Corps. But since Montgomery didn’t give his backing to this information it added no credibility. In fact, according to Wilmot (1992), reports of panzers in Holland were totally discounted at Montgomery’s own headquarters. In Montgomery’s own words, “We were wrong in supposing it could not fight successfully” It might be more precise to say that Montgomery was wrong and convinced all his subordinates to agree with him. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Nelson, Mariah Burton. 1994. The stronger women get, the more men love football: Sexism and the American culture of sports. New York: Harcourt Brace. Bradley, Philip G. 1994. Market Garden. Research Paper. Air War College. Creveld, Martin Van. 1982. Fighting Power; German and USA performance. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. Harcelode, Peter D. 2000. Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors. Caxton Editions. Hibbert, Christopher. 1998. Arnhem. Windrush Press: California. Irving, David. 1983. The War Between the Generals. New York: Congdon and Weed Inc. Kershaw, Robert. 1994. It Never Snows in September. Ian Allen Publishing. Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. 1970. Captains without eyes: Intelligence failure in World War 1. London: Hart-Davis. McDonald, Charles B. 1993. “The Decisionto Launch Operation Market-Garden” . OCMH Journal 29, no. 42 (1993): 17-21. McDonald, Charles B. 1990. The Siegfried Line Campaign, US Army in World War II. Washington DC: Office of the Chied of Military History. McKee, Alexander. 1971. The Race for the Rhine River Bridges. New York: Stein and Day. Middlebrook, Martin. 1995. Arnhem 1944. Penguin Books. Mitcham, Samuel. Rommel’s Dessert War. 1982. New York: Stein and Day. Powell, Geofrrey. The Devil’s Birthday. 1985. New York: Franklin Watts. Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. 1983. New York: Harcourt Brace. Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. 1999. Wordsworth Editions. Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Europe. 1992. New York: Harper and Brothers. Read More