How will Russia and Ukraine likely address their current and future conflicts in the coming decade Is war likely - Essay Example

How will Russia and Ukraine likely address their current and future conflicts in the comihe conflicts ess ures 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ng decade? Is war likely? The relationship between Russian and Ukraine is seeped in intrigue and controversy. Accordingly, a Russia-Ukrainian conflict will have regional as well as global ramifications. What is the likelihood that these two regional powers will engage in conflict over the next coming decade? Is the outbreak of violence likely? Why or why not? What role will the European Union have in a joint Russia-Ukrainian conflict? Seeking to address these questions and many more with the respect to the potential for violence between these two important eastern actors, the following aims to provide a holistic analysis of an increasingly topical issue. As Ukraine looks towards the Western world and Moscow’s traditional regional role diminishes, one would expect the likelihood of conflict between these two states to increase. We now aim to explore the likelihood of this issue by the addressing the potential for current as well as future conflicts in the Crimea region. Issues of natural wealth, such as oil and gas, in the Crimea are very important to all actors involved in the region, including modern day Russia, the United States and Ukraine.1 Issues surrounding accessibility as well as resource scarcity have recently come to the fore and have involved all actors with a stake in the region.2 On the surface it may seem clear that the stronger regional power (i.e. Russia) would have the upper hand over Ukraine and eventually determine the fate of the relations between the two countries. Yet there are complexities that dictate the intrigues of international relations and foreign affairs. Ukraine, although is not yet a member of the European Union, is looking forward to NATO membership in order to safeguard its defense in an unforeseen political future. The most immediate resistance to Russia’s regional hegemony is the European Union, which continues to stymie its attempts to throw its weight around regionally (Recall the brief Russian-Georgian War last year caused by the break-away Republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Still, the EU is burdened with the scarcity of natural resources and consequent economic dependence on other nations; 82% of its entire consumption of oil and 57% of gas makes it the world’s leading importer of fuels. The major supplier for these fuels is Russia, and this has been increasing following strategic investments and agreements from Russia. The EU is hampered by its economic dependence - a factor that cannot be overlooked. The isolation of Russia amongst the former members of the Soviet sphere of influence is a real threat to the decision makers in Moscow. Most of the former members of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Georgia and Ukraine, have joined the European Union to strengthen themselves, particularly in the face of Russian pressure. Nascent movements within Georgia and the Ukraine long to break free from Russia influence; this is combined with the fact that Russia attempts to maintain its influence. These two competing issues are probably the most important underlying factors in explaining the recent conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine. The Ukraine currently depends on a natural gas deal that is not for the needs of Ukraine itself but also for a number of EU member states.3 To both Russia and the EU, the Ukraine thus serves as a strategically important transit country for delivering and receiving primary resources. Conflict began when the gas prices sharply increased; the rate in 2008 was $179.50 per thousand cubic meters, which has now increased to an approximate price of $450.4 It is this sudden and unexpected increase which precipitated the conflict. While gas supply lines have been cut off, the EU has been compelled to explore alternate energy solutions. Schelling explains that the ‘face’ of a nation is deceptive and not very important in political affairs. However there is definitely the ‘image’ of a country that is taken seriously and understood by other countries in terms of behavioral expectations. In order to maintain the reputation of the country, Russia becomes a good example of a country trying to exert its influence within its former sphere for influence (i.e. among the ex-Soviet member states). Russia must behave cautiously however as pre-emptive war could backfire by intensifying the reasons to join the EU as well as attracting unwanted attention in the post-Cold War world. Shutting down a natural resources deal will severely damage the EU economy and Ukraine, unless there is quick remedy in alternative energy and if industrialists leave Russian establishments to seek their future in European industries. Shutting down the deal is also a gamble in the sense that Russian oil producer Gazprom5 will lose its market share significantly (about 80% of Russia’s natural gas production).6 What is the state of Russia’s current energy industry? Gazprom recently suffered losses of $800 million7 in its move to increase the price of natural gas which led to a significant global decline in demand. At this point Russia could decide to reduce prices in order to repair relations with the Ukraine and the West but this option was not taken. A ‘spree of agreements’8 were made during regime of Vladimir Putin with the EU to further increase its dominance over the continent. These agreements suggested an investment of $14.7 billion in a project that would build a 550 mile pipeline to deliver natural gas from Russia directly to an increasing number of EU member states. This would also increase their overall dependence on Russia’s resources (leading to 40% of the EU’s total consumption of natural gas). This dependency further reduces the resilience in negotiating deals for the buying party, therefore compelling them to comply with demands of Russia. This was a move to seriously undermine the ambitious Nabucco project which would carry natural gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkey and into Europe. To counter this sense of insecurity Russia manipulates economic stability to bring more regional influence and assert its power. Likewise, the EU does not see a solution in terms of war but in terms of establishing economic independence9 by creating energy alternatives. Interdependence is said to economically unifying the EU member states in becoming a larger voice in the face of an ex-superpower. Yet these indirect ways of shifting a power balance only apply to the transformation of long-term relations. Yet there are also risks in implementing these goals. Russia today remains threatened by Ukraine’s decision to allow NATO and U.S. defence installations: a direct threat to Russia. There is a significant possibility that Russia owns several energy plants who may be compromised if conflict breaks out between East and West. Thus, the exchange of natural resources can facilitate peace between the warring parties. If such a case is true then economic dependence would be one of the many goals to achieve and ensure less resistance from suppliers. A safe example is Norway, which is known to generate mostly ‘green’ or renewable energy solutions, i.e. wind or water power. At this point Ukraine may have to juggle such decision as retaining its own industries or accommodating Russia’s demands. This is thus a very good example of Schelling’s ‘Manipulations of Risk’ and ‘The Art of Commitment.’ If we analyze the factors determining the possibility of war and peace, it is evident that war is unlikely and the status quo will remain. Schelling summarizes these factors as ‘inherent propensity towards peace or war’ which may come from weaponry, geography, and the military organization of the time. At this point geography appears to be the strongest factor which would allude to the possibility of war. However, despite the accumulation of advanced weaponry and military organization, this is no longer a war of weapons but a war of economics. It is Russia’s idea of ‘false optimism’ that leads to stringent policies in energy resource sharing. This false optimism suggests that a country fall sunder an illusion that the outcome of its political moves should be good onto itself. Russia does not realize the impact of the loss of its dominance and remains committed to assert itself on a regional stage. As Vladimir Milov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains, “The ‘energy super power’ concept is an illusion with no basis in reality.” Being a mass producer of a form of energy makes the country dependent on its consumers, which eventually determines the consumption of that resource. Once EU companies demand other solutions for energy, this may cripple Russia’s top producer Gazprom. Secondly, the EU developed its first ever energy policy in 2005 that increases the use of renewable energy. Thirdly, the Nabucco project could be reinitiated to bring alternative pipelines for supplying natural gas to the EU. These two approaches reduce the EU’s dependency on Russia’s energy reserves and qualify as a long-term reliable solution for EU member states. These factors help determine the chances of revival of peace for the countries involved. They are important factors because issues from a Ukraine-Russian dispute are creating ripple effects which have become a concern for the EU. This analysis finally proves Schelling’s Segregation model, which suggests that nations tend to cluster with others that have common interest until they are in a ‘happy’ state of affairs. The dispute from Russia is finally leading other countries to either associate with the EU or NATO, or also find alternate resources. While Russia’s influence appears to be dwindling, conflict in the near future is unlikely. Works Cited Kiev Me Liberty or Kiev Me Death. (2009, September 20). Newsweek . Partridge, M. C. (2009, January 12). Deja vu: Gas Conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Diplomatic Courier . Russia’s Gas Clash with Ukraine: Geopolitics or Just the Money? (n.d.). Retrieved from Center for strategic and international studies: http://csis.org/blog/russia%E2%80%99s-gas-clash-ukraine-geopolitics-or-just-money Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. Schwarz, P. (2006, January 5). The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. World socialist website . Scott, M. (2009, January 13). Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict Takes Bizarre Turn. Business Week . ZARAKHOVICH, Y. (2009, January 4). Russia and Ukraines Annual Gas Spat. TIME Magazine . Read More