Role of The British Navy in the Spanish Civil War, A Demand of Circumstances - Essay Example

Role of The British Navy in the Spanish Civil War: A Demand of Circumstances Role of The British Navy in the Spanish Civil War: A Demand of Circumstances The role of the Royal Navy can never be attributed as pro-nationalist, rather the pro-rationalist role of the Navy is the demand of the time. While in the complex context of the Spanish Civil War it was difficult for then British Government to determine the course of relationships with the parties of the war, the British Navy played a crucial role in providing the informal support for the Franco and put the pro Franco scheme at great ease. The potential threat was lying in the fact that any partiality might force the multifaceted involvements of the countries to stand directly for both of the parties of the War leading the continent to a major conflict. Consequently the safest option for the British Government was to play an non-intervention role throughout the whole war but with secret support for the Franco Regime. Jill Edwards comments on this communist phobia of the British ruling class, ‘in the first weeks of the rebellion, it was the thread of anti-communism which formed the warp of British government attitudes.’ 1 The dilemma of the British Government was that on one side she had to address the fear of the rise of the socialist among the Republicans while there was another posing danger from the Nazi who were striving to establish control over the Franco Regime. Like other democratic countries of Europe officially turn a blind eye to the war just because of the fear that any bias and direct support might eventually lead to another Bloody world war. But Franco Regime received an indirect and unofficial favour from the British Naval Force just because the British Government strove to check the unanimous control over the Franco Regime. 2 But meanwhile the emotional rise of the Socialists among the Republican due to the aloofness of the European democratic countries and the direct artillery support of the Stalin Government pushed the British rulers to take a strong stand for the Nationalists. In an article ‘International Naval Cooperation During the Spanish Civil war” Adam B Siegel comments on the overall picture of the war situation as following: Among ideologues on the left and the right, the Spanish civil war was perhaps the most controversial conflict…. Moreover, European powers could not ignore the fact that it posed the greatest threat to peace…. Spain’s strategic location, the rise of fascism….drew international naval forces into Spanish waters. 3 British Naval Support for the Nationalists has a lot to do with the fear of the rise of the socialists among the Republics. During the war it seemed that the favor the British Navy showed towards the Nationalists was, to a crucial extent, a very private issue of the Admiral Lord Chatfield. But the favor of the British Navy for the Nationalist had a deep route in the British foreign policy for the Spanish Civil War. From the beginning of the war the British government was pushed to play a neutral role, as in the 1930s for the British rulers ‘Communism—and behind that the Soviet Union—seemed always to pose more of a threat than a resurgent Germany or an Italy vying with Britain for control of the Mediterranean.’ 4 Due to some legal restraints the British Government as well as the British Navy could not afford any direct military aid to the Nationalist. On the contrary the Republicans could hope, for good reasons, military aid from their democratic neighbours. As Harry Browne refers to the reasons, ‘The position in international law was clear: a constitutional government [the Republican Government of 1936] had an undisputed right to buy arms to suppress an internal revolt.’ 5 Both the British ambassador Henry Chilton and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden showed an unofficial preference for Franco’s victory though they publicly maintained a policy of non-intervention. So the situation was such that the ‘British Left was committed to neutrality, yet strongly supported the sale of arms to Spain’s legal government.’ 6 The only way that was left open for the British was to provide support that would be potential enough to overthrow the Republic Government without stirring the direct antagonism of both of the fascist block of the Nazi and the Socialist block of Soviet Union. It is widely accepted that Lord Chatfield’s admiration for Franco appeared to be a bliss of the time. As Antony Beevor comments on the involvement of Admiral Lord Chatfield, he was: ‘an admirer of General Franco and his officers in the Bay of Biscay had an undoubted sympathy for their Nationalist counterparts. Sir Henry Chilton, the ambassador at Hendaye, who still had the ear of the Foreign Office though he was not on the scene, acted as a mouthpiece for the Nationalists.’ 7 British Naval Support for the nationalist was potential in many ways for the total warfare due the geographic position. Because of the sea on most side of Spanish border the powerful British Navy was able to control much of the sea-war on behalf of the Franco Regime. Under the roundabout support of the British Navy Franco was permitted to set up a signal-base in the Gibraltar. The signal base in the water of Gibraltar proved to be useful in lots many ways for the Nationalists. Several sources prove that though the British Navy was not directly involved, it functioned as a cooperative force with the pro Nationalist Nazi and Italian military support during the war. The British Navy allowed Germans to transport the Army of Africa to Seville. British warship HMS Queen Elizabeth was used as the watchdog to prevent any Republican attack from the sea on the Nationalists. Beevor comments that the ship was positioned ‘in front of Algeciras bay to prevent republican warships shelling the [nationalists] port.’ 8 According to the report of the German charge d’ affaires, it was evident that the British Navy lent a hand to pass the information on the Republican shipping to the Nationalists and the Germans. At the same time the British helped the Franco Regime to communicate directly with the ‘non-interventionist’ allies in ‘Rome, Berlin, and Lisbon’ 9. In this regard Edwards comments, ‘By turning a blind eye both to the intervention of the dictators and to the need to protect British shipping to Spain, the British government aided Franco as decisively as if it had sent arms to him.’ 10 The cooperative role of the British Navy with the pro-Franco Alliance was extended to exchanging information through the Bilbao episode on July 30, 1936. On that day the captain of a British Ship dissuaded the captain of Albatross, a German warship from sending troops ashore for evacuation of the refugee. The German was able to avoid an embarrassing incident, as ‘Sending armed patrols ashore would have done more harm than good.’ 11 The role of the British Navy was determined solely by the policy of the British government to the Spanish Civil War. The policy had a two-fold objective: the British leaders along with other cooperative forces were concerned about the fascist expansion and at the same time they strove to ‘limit the conflict to Spain and avoid a general European war.’ 12 The British Navy was able to implement successfully this two-folds policy by playing a dual role in Spanish water. One of the aims of the Non-Intervention Committee was to prevent any foreign interference in the Spanish internal affairs in order to avoid the a major war like the First World War. Until the violation of the Arms Embargo by Germany and Italy the role of the British Navy was limited within the demarcation of humanitarian activities. 13 During the time in-between the start and the violation of the Law Embargo the Navy provided humanitarian aid to the War affected people and played a significant role in their evacuation. As it is said in an article, ‘Spanish Civil War Evacuation’: During evacuations they not only rescued Spanish citizens but also international visitors to Spanish seaside resorts. The Home Fleet patrolled the Atlantic coast while the Mediterranean Fleet guarded the east coast of Spain. 14 Besides providing humanitarian aid the Navy attempted to build surveillance in order to limit the arms sell to Spain and also provided protection of the international merchant vessels. Destroyers of the British Navy ferried successfully the war-refugees to the safer ports, Marseilles and Gibraltar. ‘Due to their humanitarian role the Navy painted red, white and blue stripes on one of the ship’s front gun shields.’ 15 Soon at the violence of Arms Embargo by Germany and Italy ‘non-intervention was equivalent to intervention against the Republican Government’ 16 and the British Navy was pushed to take the unofficial pro-nationalist role during the wartime. Endnotes 1. J. Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War 1936-9, Green Wood, Macmillan, 1979, p. 3 2. D. Carlton, ‘Eden, Blum, and Origins of non-intervention’, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 3, (1971), p. 40 3. A. B. Siegel, ‘International Naval Cooperation During the Spanish Civil War’, in Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn-Winter, 2001, Viewed on 07 March, 2009 4. H. Browne, Spain’s Civil War, Longman, New York, 1996, pp. 133-134 5. Ibid., 50. 6. Ibid., 49. 7. A. Beevor, The Spanish Civil War, Cassel Military Press, London, 1999, p. 165. 8. A. Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, Weildenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2006, p. 135 9. Ibid., 135 10. Browne, 53 11. Siegel, 83 12. Ibid., 86 13. A. Loveday, World War in Spain, John Murray, London, 1939, p. 135 14. ‘Spanish Civil War Evacuation’ in The Royal Navy and the Spanish Civil War, Viewed on 07 March, 2009, 15. Ibid., 16. R. Carr, The Spanish Tragedy, Weildenfeld & Nicholson (eds), London, 1977, p. 146 Bibliography Beevor, A., The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939. Weildenfeld and Nicholson, London, 2006, p. 135 Beevor, A., The Spanish Civil War. Cassel Military Press, London, 1999, p. 165. Browne, H., Spain’s Civil War. Longman, New York, 1996, pp. 133-134 Carlton, D., ‘Eden, Blum, and Origins of non-intervention’, in Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 6, No. 3, (1971), p. 40 Carr, R., The Spanish Tragedy. Weildenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1977, p. 146 Edwards, J., The British Government and the Spanish Civil War 1936-9. Green Wood, Macmillan, 1979, p. 3 Loveday, A., World War in Spain. John Murray, London, 1939, p. 135 Siegel, A. B., ‘International Naval Cooperation During the Spanish Civil War’, in Joint Force Quarterly. Autumn-Winter, 2001, Viewed on 07 March, 2009 ‘Spanish Civil War Evacuation” in The Royal Navy and the Spanish Civil War, Viewed on 07 March, 2009, Read More