The Spanish Civil War: Impact of Foreign Intervention - Essay Example

The Spanish Civil War: Impact of Foreign Intervention. The Spanish Civil War, which took place between July 1936 and May 1939, can justifiably be termed the “defining ideological conflict of the 1930s” (Sramel, Page 1), in which Spanish Nationalists, representing the forces of Fascism, were ranged against Spanish Republicans, or Loyalists, advocating Democracy and Socialism. The roots of the conflict can be traced to the 1920s, when Spain was a constitutional monarchy under the unpopular Alfonso XIII. Alfonso was deposed in a military coup in 1923, led by Miguel Primo de Rivera, who established martial rule. Rivera’s economic policies to fund public works and industrialization were unpopular and, losing army support, he resigned in 1930. The Spanish voted by a large majority for a Republic and Alfonso went into exile in 1931. In the following general election, the Left Wing parties, led by the Socialists, won a definite majority. Manuel Azana became President and introduced agrarian reforms, advocated the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque region, deprived the powerful Roman Catholic Church of its’ privileges, nationalized many of the large Spanish Estates and attempted to reduce the military’s hold over the country. By these measures, the Republican Government alienated four powerful groups: the landowners, the church, the military and the industrialists. After a failed military coup in 1932, these groups formed a new right wing political party called the CEDA. Agitations by the extreme left against the moderate Azana Government led to the call for General Elections in November 1933, in which the Right Wing won a majority and CEDA formed the government under Gil Robles. The Right undermined the previous reforms, again leading to violent strikes by the opposition. General Elections were again called in February 1936 and a coalition of Left political parties came to power as the Popular Front, with Azana again the President. Infighting among the constituents of the Front seriously undermined the authority of the government. The governments’ economic policies brought about a crisis and the workers went on strike. The Right Wing groups, which had formed a coalition called the National Front, started a military coup on 19 July, 1936 led by military officers like Francisco Franco. Franco led a successful revolt in Spanish Morocco and the Spanish Civil War began. The Republican and Nationalist armies were more or less on par, but the equation changed with the start of International intervention. Germany took the first step with the dispatch of military advisors to Franco in September 1936. President Antonio Salazar of Portugal also supported the Nationalists, fearing that the Republican triumph would threaten his authoritarian regime and sealed the border to Republican aid. Azana appointed Francisco Cabarello as the Prime Minister of the Popular Front, introduced conscription, abolished the workers’ and soldiers’ councils and gave the Communist Juan Negrim control of the Carabineros. The Nationalist Army laid siege to Madrid in November 1936 and the Republican Government moved to Valencia. The International Brigades, comprised mainly of Soviet Communists and other volunteers from Germany, Poland, Britain, France and America, including 55 countries, reached Madrid on 8 November. Benito Mussolini lent Italian aid to the Nationalists from December 1936. Infighting among the constituents of the Popular Front dissipated the strength of the Loyalists, with the Communists emerging as the dominant faction under Negrim, culminating in the May Riots of 1937 in Barcelona. The International Brigades were disbanded in September 1938. The Nationalists breached Republican defenses in April 1938 and captured Barcelona in January 1939. The Azana Government resigned and Great Britain recognized the Nationalist Government of General Franco. The Nationalist Army entered Madrid on 27 March, 1939 and Franco declared the end of the Spanish Civil War (Spartacus Web site). The outcome of the Spanish Civil War was largely determined by foreign intervention: the strong Right Wing support given by Germany and Italy, in contrast to Russia’s conditional support and the non-intervention policy followed by Britain and France, led to the success of the Nationalists. Germany was the first foreign power to intervene in the Spanish Civil War. Adolf Hitler responded positively to Franco’s call for aid in July 1936. Hitler, a fervent anti-Bolshevik, feared that the Left Wing Spanish Republican Government would lead to a ‘Soviet Spain.’ He also hoped to use his credentials as a Spanish bulwark against Communism to foster an alliance with Britain. The War provided Germany with the chance to test the Allies resolution and distract them from Germany’s own massive rearmament program. It also gave Germany the opportunity to test military commanders, weapons and tactics in preparation for a larger war. The Heinkel 112, the Messerschmitt and other bombers all had their preliminary testing in Spain. The Germans perfected their dive and carpet bombing techniques and their military personnel gained valuable combat experience. Hitler coveted Spain’s rich mineral resources and used his aid to Franco to secure concessions in mining development companies. The Spanish Civil War also opened the door for cooperation between Germany and her strategic ally, Italy (Mochan. Chapter 1). In July 1936, Hitler dispatched 26 German fighter aircraft and 30 Junker 52s to Spanish Morocco to transport about 15,000 Nationalist troops of the Spanish African Army from Africa to Spain, along with 500 tons of war material and eleven field batteries in under two months. This airlift was a significant contributor to Franco’s victory and the first major airlift in history (Wedemeyer. International Anarchism web pages). Four German tank companies served in Spain. Although Germany was a signatory to the Non-Intervention Agreement of July 1936, Hitler circumvented the Agreement by dispatching his military aid through Portugal. Personnel from the German General Staff arrived in September 1936 to serve as Franco’s advisors, followed by the Condor Legion to counter Soviet aircraft. Consisting of Bomber, Fighter, Reconnaissance and Seaplane groups, the Legion comprised of about 12,000 men and was a deciding factor in Nationalist victories (Spartacus Web site). It bombed and weakened the Republican Army before the Nationalist Army attacked. Its’ most notorious engagement was the carpet bombing of Guernica on 26 April 1937, when 100,000 pounds of bombs were dropped on the village for three hours, reducing it to rubble and killing or wounding one-third of the population. The aim of the bombing was to demoralize the civilians and break the Basque resistance and intimidate the Republicans and the Western Allies, leading to their appeasement of Hitler at Munich the following year. It can be argued that Germany’s intervention was the single most important factor which contributed to Franco’s victory. Italy’s reasons for supporting the Right Wing Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War were similar to Germanys. Benito Mussolini, a fascist, identified with the fascists of Spain. He too wished to contain the spread of Communism and saw the opportunity to use Spain as a training ground for the larger war. In 1934, in response to Spanish Fascist lobbying for military aid, Mussolini promised one million pesetas, 10,000 rifles, 10,000 grenades and 200 machine guns. He made good his promise in 1936, recognized Franco’s regime and sent hundreds of planes, including Fiat fighters, tanks and 50,000 troops and refitted the Canaris, the Nationalist Army’s largest cruiser, in contravention of the Non- Intervention Agreement, which Italy also signed. In November 1936, Italy signed a secret pact with Nationalist Spain and, in return for the establishment of Italian bases in Spain in the event of a war with France, dispatched 130 aircraft, 2,500 tons of bombs, 500 cannon, 700 mortars, 12,000 machine guns, 50 whippet tanks and 3,800 motor vehicles. By December, Italian fascists, called the Black Shirts, eventually numbering 30,000 and complemented by 20,000 soldiers of the regular Italian Army, falsely designated as ‘volunteers,’ were fighting the Republican Army. The Black Shirts took part in the siege of Madrid and in the fall of Malaga. After their losses in the Battle of Guadalajara, they were integrated into larger Spanish companies. The Black Shirts withdrew into Italy in November 1938. Mussolini attempted to aid the Nationalists at sea by using Italian submarines to torpedo ships headed for Republican ports, but was pressurized by the Allies to stop (Spartacus Web site). Germany and Italy collaborated in their attempts to support the Spanish Nationalists and to frustrate the monitoring of the Non-Intervention Committee. Italy made the largest contribution in military aid and manpower towards the Spanish Civil War. Italian forces in Spain reached a maximum of 70,000 – 80,000 troops, as opposed to Germany’s 19,000. Italy suffered greater casualties – 4,000 killed and 11,000 wounded, as opposed to 300 German casualties. The Italian expenditure of 64 million pounds far exceeded Germany’s contribution of 46 million pounds and Italy lagged far behind Germany in the economic exploitation of Spain. Italian intervention in Spain also ruined all chances of Italy’s reconciliation with the Allies. However, Franco tended to denigrate the Italian troops and considered the “entire role of the Italian divisions in Spain a tragedy” (Mochan. Page 34). The Right Wing interventional support comprised mainly of the Soviet Union, which used the Civil War to further its’ own political interests. In an attempt to undermine any possibility of Soviet isolation in Europe through Britain and France coming to an agreement with Hitler, Stalin signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with France in 1935 and supported the Popular Front in Spain, as a bulwark against fascism. Stalin planned to pursue Britain and France’s support and persuade them to drop their neutrality and intervene aggressively in Spain. This would hopefully lead to a large scale war from which Russia would remain aloof and later emerge unscathed as the dominant European Power. In pursuit of this policy, the Soviet Union, at the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern (Communist International) in August 1935, declared its’ support of the Spanish Popular Front (Workers Solidarity Movement Web site). At the outbreak of the Civil War, massive humanitarian aid, in the form of clothes and food, was dispatched to Spain from the U.S.S.R. In line with Stalin’s policy of advancing relationships with Britain and France, the Soviet Union signed the Declaration of Non-Intervention in Spanish Affairs in August 1936. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was split between the moderates, who advocated collaboration with Britain and France and the Leftists and Anti-Fascists who wanted to provide military aid to Spain. Russia finally adopted a dual policy towards Spain. Fearing that the influx of arms from Germany and Italy would lead to a decisive Fascist victory, Russia began supplying military aid to the Republicans from October 1936, but as covertly as was possible. The Soviet Union contributed 806 fighter planes, 362 tanks, 120 armored cars, 1,555 artillery pieces, 500,000 rifles, 340 grenade launchers, 15, 113 machine guns and ammunition, grenades, cartridges, gunpowder, torpedo boats, air defense searchlights and fuel. About 200 Soviet volunteers, including military advisors and instructors, airmen, army and navy specialists, radio operators and engineers aided the Republican army. However, the U.S.S.R. continued to be a member of the Non-Intervention Committee. This gave the Committee the veneer of Socialist support and contributed to the arms embargo and naval blockade which discriminately barred arms from the Republicans, stopped the flow of volunteers to the International Brigades of the Republican Army and pressurized the Republican Government to repatriate those volunteers already serving in Spain (Compass Communist League Web site). Russian aid came at a steep price. As a payment for arms, the Spanish gold reserve was moved to Moscow. A significant part of the arms supplied was of inferior quality. When a Russian supply ship was sunk, the cost was collected from the Spanish people. Even greater was the price extracted in terms of Republican ideals and policy. Russia insisted on the marginalization of the Anarcho-Syndicalists (anarchists and Marxist labor unions). Premier Cabarello said, “I can do nothing. Russia demands complete curbing of the P.O.U.M. as the price of military aid which we must have” (Weisbord, Web page). Stalin was vehemently opposed to the Revolution of the Anarcho-Syndicalists, their war against the Church, the State and private property and their establishment of labor unions and self-governing communes, mainly because he knew that his potential allies, Britain and France, would never countenance the abolishment of capitalism under any circumstances. The Soviet Union deliberately undermined the Spanish social revolution, by using its’ clout as the only major source of military aid to Republican Spain to take control of the conduct of the war. Membership of the Spanish Communist Party grew from 40,000 at the outbreak of the war, to 250,000 by March 1937. The Communists took control of the army and the police, disbanded the militias, disarmed the workers, nationalized the major industries, returned the farm communes to their former owners, deprived the collectives of seeds for sowing and distributed arms and food only to their supporters, marginalizing all the other groups. This culminated in the May Riots of 1937when the Communist openly combated and killed the Anarcho-Syndicalists and P.O.U.M. in Barcelona, followed by the outlawing of the P.O.U.M. The resulting resentment of the peasants contributed to the disintegration of the Popular Front. The Soviet Secret Police (GPU) established secret prisons and “carried out assassinations and kidnappings --- The Soviet Union seemed to have a grip on Loyalist Spain, as if it were already a Soviet possession” (Workers Solidarity Movement Web site). Once Republican defeat appeared inevitable, Russia supported the disbandment of the International Brigades in November 1938 and its’ advisors left Spain in March 1939, before the fall of Madrid. France had the only other Popular Front Government in Europe and had signed a trade agreement with Spain in 1935, stipulating that France be the sole supplier of arms to Spain if necessary. The French Premier, Leon Blum, who was sympathetic to the Republican Government and feared the creation of a fascist Spain allied to a fascist Germany and Italy, responded to the Spanish Governments’ appeal for military aid by dispatching 70 planes, pilots and technicians. However, the anti-Republican British Government warned that if France’s intervention in Spain led to a war between France and Germany, Britain would not come to France’s aid. The Blum Government, fearing isolation, was forced to rescind on its’ decision to give military aid to the Spanish Republicans and denied them the arms earlier ordered and paid for. The Non-Intervention Agreement proposed in July 1936 was supposedly the initiative of France, but was actually done at the instigation of Britain (Compass Communist League Web site). French neutrality may also have been motivated by the fear of losing several French owned silver mines in Spain to Communist takeovers. On 8 August 1936, France closed its’ border with Spain, effectively blocking the flow of aid to the Republicans. Large consignments of arms from the Soviet Union were stopped at the border, making France a major contributor to the defeat of the Republican Army. After the fall of Catalonia in January 1939, the 500,000 Republlican soldiers and civilians who came to France as refugees were herded into concentration camps under miserable conditions (Wedemeyer. International Anarchism Web pages). France blocked the entry of volunteers to the International Brigades adhered to its’ blockade of Spain very selectively. France turned a blind eye to six German planes which flew over France to Spain, but confiscated three Republican planes which strayed into France during a storm. France even impounded food supplies headed for Republican Spain. This contributed to the fall of Bilboa, where famine was rampant (Weisbord. Web page). The Conservative Government of Great Britain was motivated by public opinion in the aftermath of World War I, which was against any intervention which could lead to another war. The economic crises of the period also encouraged isolationism and the decision to remain neutral in any European conflict. Another pertinent factor was the British Rio Tinto Company, which owned vast copper deposits in Spain and feared the Communist nationalization of its’ interests, if the Republicans came to power. The Non-Intervention Agreement was a farce, but Britain adhered to it even when faced with irrefutable evidence of its’ contravention by Germany and Italy. Great Britain directly contributed to Franco’s success by breaking the Republican blockade of Spanish Morocco at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War by denying entry to Gibraltar to Republican ships which needed refueling. This enabled Franco to transport all his troops to Spain. Britain further helped the Nationalists by importing from the Nationalists 9.8 million dollars of sherry and 8.3 million dollars of coal per year, thus funding Franco’s cause. It also permitted Franco to ship British owned metal ore to Germany at a cheap rate for conversion into arms. The British Admiralty supplied naval intelligence to Franco’s agent in London and finally recognized Franco’s regime in February 1939 (Wedemeyer. International Anarchism Web pages). Capitalist Britain feared the anti-private ownership philosophy of the Spanish Anarchists, did not wish to collaborate with Communism under any circumstance and also wished to deny Spain the opportunity to fortify the Spanish coast opposite Gibraltar, as this would weaken Britain’s monopolistic control over the Straits of Gibraltar (Weisbord. Web page). At the British Labour Partys’ conference in October 1936, Spanish delegates said that the Loyaists “are fighting with sticks and knives against tanks and aircraft and guns” and appealed desperately for help, citing concrete evidence of German and Italian contravention of Non-Intervention (Sramel. Page 2). Despite the Labour Partys’ criticism of Government policy on the Spanish Civil War, the Conservative Government did not budge. The most significant aspect of foreign intervention was the Non-Intervention Agreement. Britain and France adhered to the Agreement and denied the Republicans military aid, with France sealing her border with Spain. On the other hand, Germany and Italy, who were also signatories, ignored the arms embargo and continued sending military aid through Portugal, which was sympathetic to the Nationalists. The arms embargo on both sides was in reality applied only to the Republicans: “The professedly double-edged embargo cuts only one way. It keeps the Government forces unarmed for the benefit of the well-armed rebels” (Gilbert Murray. Letter to The Times, 22 October 1936. Quoted in Compass Communist League). Britain, France and the U.S.A. continued to pretend to believe in the efficacy and fairness of the Agreement. The U.S.S.R. contravened the Agreement and supplied the Republicans with military aid, but extracted a heavy price for the aid, by high jacking the conduct of the war and deliberately undermining the Revolution. This led to resentment among the peasants and workers and contributed to the disintegration of the Popular Front. Britain arm-twisted France to toe her line in Spain. The Western nations were wary of both Communism and Fascism. It was foreign intervention which determined the outcome of the Spanish Civil War: the aid rendered by Germany and Italy to the Right Wing exceeded the aid rendered by the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers to the Left Wing and this led to the success of the Nationalists. In the final analysis, it can be said that all foreign intervention was motivated by the self-interests of the participating nations. In the words of Albert Weisbord “Each country that meddles in Spain has its’ own selfish ulterior motive to carry out. Not one of them will hesitate for a moment to use the Spanish people as pawns in their own lust for world power” (Weisbord. Web page). Works Cited. Compass Communist League. April 1996, No. 123. The Soviet Union and the Spanish Civil War. 18 April 2007. < http://www.oneparty.co.uk/compass/com12301.html > Mochan, Frances. Germany and the Spanish Civil War. 18 April 2007. < http://www.leeds.ac.uk/history/studentlife/e-journal/Mochan.pdf > Sramel, Joseph. 6 November 1998. The Labour Party and the Spanish Civil War. Part 1. Suite 101 Web site. 18 April 2007 < http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/british_history/10457 > Spartacus Web site. Virtual School Project. Spanish Civil War. 18 April 2007. < http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/Spanish-Civil-War.htm > Treasures of the World Web site. Bombing of Guernica. PBS Public Broadcasting Service. 18 April 2007 < http://www.pbs.org/treasuresoftheworld/a_nav/guernica_nav/gnav_level_1/bombing_ guerfrm.html > Wedemeyer, Jacob. International Anarchism Web pages. A Desperate Democracy Disregarded. 18 April 2007. < http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/spain/intervention.html > Weisbord, Albert. Web page. Outcast Spain. 18 April 2007. < http://www.weisbord.org/Outcast.htm > Workers Solidarity Union Web site. The Spanish Civil War: Anarchism in Action. Chapter 3. The Counter Revolution. 18 April 2007. < http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/spain/pam_ch3.html > Read More