Importance of a Human Interventionism - Essay Example

Human Interventionism An evolution as sweeping as globalization simultaneously creates the need for the new world order. All the nations desperately need to engage with each other, taking due caution they do not rule the less powerful or be ruled by the more powerful countries. Some kind of global governance is necessary, but it must protect and promote the national sovereignty and dignity of each nation within the global world. The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention suggests that when all other diplomatic actions have failed, states can legitimately employ military force against another state in order to protect civilians in danger. Military interventions have a long history both prior to and during the Cold War, and even at the turn of the decade it was not apparent that they might no longer be undertaken in the future. These interventions were justified on moral grounds, or on the grounds of international law, or as selfless acts. On October 7, 2001, the U.S. launched a massive military assault on Afghanistan that effaced its political structure and created an enormous refugee situation. From the middle of 2002, the U.S. threatened to do the same thing to Iraq, running through a spectrum of reasons that changed as each previous argument collapsed. After giving up on efforts of U.N. inspectors to find weapons of mass destruction in that country, the Bush administration's inability to do so dissolved that pretext as well. The assault on Afghanistan, mounted in response to the events of September 11, 2001, was part of a two-decade-long series that included Grenada (1982), Panama (1989), Iraq (1991), and Yugoslavia (1999). Each assault had its own peculiarity, and violated certain principles of democracy and international law; yet, each received overwhelming support in the U.S., at institutional and popular levels. Though its moments differ, they reveal a common structure and the series as a whole poses an enveloping question concerning its general acceptability. After the 9/11 attacks, though no one took credit for this coordinated act of destruction, the U.S. government immediately claimed, without evidence, that a Saudi expatriate allegedly living in Afghanistan was responsible, and that 19 men of Middle Eastern origin, whose names the FBI published two days later, had committed this act of collective suicide and mass murder. International law provides the right to defend against terrorist attacks, but not to retaliate without going through certain international channels and procedures, which the U.S. ignored. Though in violation of international law (the Geneva Accords and U.N. Charter), the military assault on Afghanistan constituted the first act in what was declared to be an "endless war." The massive bombing of Afghanistan created a civilian death count considerably beyond that of the World Trade Center; whole villages were obliterated, and an already critical refugee and starvation situation was exacerbated, stretching well into Pakistan. In place of the Taliban organization, an interim government was invented. Though objection to this assault in the U.S. was small, it was repressed: public figures who spoke against the attack were vilified, people were fired, students suspended from school, social programs closed, university professors sanctioned, etc. to arrest one man. The assault on Afghanistan, according to military experts, would have required at least three months of logistical preparation; indeed, plans for the assault had begun the previous July. (Stan Goff) If so, the arrest of bin Laden was merely a legalistic pretext for a prior political project, the change of regime in Afghanistan. This raises two issues. The first is the use of international legalism to symbolize rather than explain or authorize an intervention, the pursuit of which violates international and U.S. law. The second is the structure of popular acceptance that likewise ignores illegality (the violation of a treaty, of international codes, and the principle of national sovereignty). The U.S. invaded Panama militarily to arrest a Panamanian, Manuel Noriega (the proverbial "strongman," sometimes president, sometimes not) for drug trafficking in violation of U.S. law. The invasion violated the OAS (Organization of American States) Charter, which guarantees the sovereignty of American states. In a massive-scale international SWAT-team operation, Noriega was returned to the U.S., tried, and jailed. Panama was left to bury its 300 fatalities, care for its 3,000 wounded men, women, and children, tend to its 18,000 homeless, and rebuild the war-torn districts of its capital city (Physicians for Human Rights, December 1990). No person/entity is entitled to be punished or adjudicated under any law falling outside of its residing state. U.S. violated this common rule all along its humanitarian interventionism in other countries. "Internationalization" of U.S. law was extended further by the 1991 bombing of Iraq, and later by the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia. In those cases, the person named criminal had not violated U.S. law. Nevertheless, the U.S. government chose to proclaim a violation. Saddam Hussein was charged with aggression against Kuwait, though the reality of what had transpired between the two countries was left unspoken. The practice of humanitarian interventionism since the end of the Cold War is flawed in many ways (Todorov, 2004). Below is a short list, partly inspired by Todorov's analysis: Lack of consensus in the international community, in particular the rejection of humanitarian intervention by China and Russia Illegality of a number of large-scale operations (lack of authorization of the Security Council) Mutual and opportunistic manipulation by spokespersons of alleged victims (such as the UCK in Kosovo) and by spokespersons of governments and international organizations with a rhetoric of righteousness; Lack of democratic responsiveness, transparency and accountability False negatives, such as Kosovo 1999 and Iraq (from a strict humanitarian point of view), next to false positives, such as Cambodia 1976 and Rwanda 1994; Fluctuating records of performance as to both low numbers of saved lives and high numbers of collateral damage; Arbitrary decisions and non-decisions as to stepping in or staying out; Confusion among the military between professional use of violence and amateur social work (and similar confusion among those involved in development aid about the limits of neutrality); Confusion within Western publics and electorates (comfort in war-time, lack of long-term personal commitment Humanitarian intervention for bringing democracy to other nations has become a primary focus since World War II. However, "bringing democracy" to another place or people is a self-contradictory and self-subverting project. If democracy means rule by and for the people, then the people in question must decide freely and for themselves how and through what forms and issues they will determine their destiny. Sovereignty is the most essential prior condition for this endeavor. To intervene to facilitate democracy implies violating the sovereignty on which democracy depends. The ethical objections to interventionism pertain to its consequences. Unanticipated consequences, such as the mass movement of people in the Kosovo case, provide sufficient grounds to claim that good intentions cannot outweigh bad results. First, as realists such as Henry Kissinger contend, intervention in the name of humanitarianism or democracy is likely to create more problems than it solves. It is impossible to know beforehand if intervention will succeed or whether it will lead to an acceptable level of casualties; there are simply too many unknown variables that the intervening state cannot control. Second, any use of force, no matter how well intentioned, can potentially lead to chaos. As Robert Jackson has argued, while states have a responsibility to pursue international justice where they can, they should not jeopardize other fundamental values in the process. In balancing these considerations, international peace should have particular weight, since it is in situations of war--particularly war between great powers-where humanitarian values are most likely to be threatened. There is a moral obligation to prevent war, which trumps the moral obligation to promote human rights and democracy elsewhere. While effective and legitimate states remain the most solid foundation for international society (resulting from globalization), the reality of the post-Cold War world has frequently seen the opposite: fragile, fragmenting, or collapsing state entities that expose their civilians to displacement, terror, or slaughter The international community can no longer accept the killing of innocent civilians as a necessary part of state making--not only because it may threaten international peace and security, but also because the citizens inside weak states should enjoy the same basic rights as those in the developed world. As international organizations and NGOs become increasingly involved in state building around the world, new goals and measures must be established to ensure balance among the goals of stability, individual freedom, and economic development. Finally, the use of force does not imply that law and morality have ceased to operate. It is possible to conceive of a limited and regulated practice of intervention designed to address extreme cases. In developing regulations for morally defensible intervention, both Wheeler and the ICISS rely on the traditional "just war" framework. Wheeler identifies four criteria that would constitute a legitimate humanitarian intervention: just cause (a "supreme humanitarian emergency"); last resort; proportional use of force; and high probability of achieving a humanitarian outcome. The ICISS takes a more ambitious line, listing six principles for the "responsibility to protect": right cause; right intention; right authority; last resort; proportionate means; and reasonable prospects. In reality, the spectrum of possible action is wider. To date, the policy debates surrounding humanitarian intervention have been skewed in favor of issues like strategic bombing, exit strategies, and criminal proceedings. There is also a tendency to equate failure with a lack of military action on the part of the international community. The possibility that the international community has already failed if the need for military action arises has not been adequately acknowledged. The alternatives are not simply invasion or inaction. If there is indeed a responsibility to protect, then the crucial time for action is when human rights reports arrive that document deteriorating situations in foreign countries. There is also an ongoing need and responsibility to build capacity in weak states to provide for basic human rights. Interventions always require legitimacy, and wherever possible the intervening powers claim altruistic justifications as they have always done. Interventions are supposed to reduce tension and stabilize the situation, to provide humanitarian aid and end the uncontrollable violence. But the well-meaning postulates of this opinion hardly ever take the trouble to explain how these high objectives are to be achieved in situations of chaos. An intervention with chances of success necessitates a social, political and administrative base in the target country. It must be able to draw support from functioning and stable structures - this is one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the interventions of the last five decades, especially those involving counterinsurgency. Any intervention that is not just aiming at short-term and superficial results (the US. air attacks on Libya in March and April of 1986) necessitates infrastructure in the target country, as well as a political and social sector it can lean on. This is a dilemma of interventions in regional crises, be they of imperial or humanitarian intent. The intervention itself serves a function, but the main burden in achieving the goals of the intervention is carried by the local political force. It may be supported, financed, protected and armed - but the success of the operation requires the success of the local client. This type of operation is difficult enough, as the Vietnam War and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan proved. There is often no competent conflict party worthy of support, often only a choice between two evils. In an even less pleasant alternative, there is no conflict party that one can, or wants, to support. Intervention then entails taking over the role of government, administration or control. This is especially true in situations of chaos, or near-chaos. Regardless of the tasks involved - whether a Third World country is to be dominated, land reforms enforced, counterinsurgency combated, food supplies delivered, elections held, militias unarmed - constructive, as well as destructive, measures will be difficult without functioning structures. To seriously consider turning over these tasks to intervention troops is to call for colonial administration, and one that will have to be set up overnight, without the many prerequisites that a classic colonial administration has at its disposal. Knowledge of the language and cultural environment, the armed bands, their location, motivation and methods of operation, a total presence in the whole country including its tiniest villages, and practically unlimited financial means - these are only some of the necessities of success. Moreover, this would only be forthcoming if the majority of the conflict parties and groups were willing to co-operate. Without this, humanitarian intervention can easily turn into normal war. Far from serving humanitarian interests, this would contribute to further complication and intensification of the war. Works Cited Norman Graebner. Ideas and Diplomacy New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Jennifer M. Welsh. "From Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society." Global Governance. Volume: 8. Issue: 4. (2002): 503+ Kai Bird. "A Foreign Policy for the Common Citizen" The Nation. Volume: 270. Issue: 18. (May 2000): 11. Steve Martinot. "The Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the U.S." Social Justice. Volume: 30. Issue: 1 (2003):112+ Jos de Beus (A Panel with Tzvetan Todorov) Amsterdam: Felix Meritis (26 April 2004) "A Note on Todorov's Humanistic Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" March 18, 2006 http://www.thenation.com/doc/20000508/bird Read More