Post Colonial Intervention in Somalia - Research Paper Example

Post Colonial Intervention in Somalia Outline i. Introduction ii. Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia a. High cost of delivering aid b. Authorization of use of force iii. The US Intervention a. The US Humanitarian intervention in Somalia b. The US Military Intervention in Somalia iv. African Union (AU) military intervention in Somalia v. Kenyan Military Intervention into Somalia vi. Political intervention in Somalia vii. Cultural intervention into Somalia Somalia is one of the countries in the world that had experienced violent conflict as well as instability since 1991, when its central authority broke down. The civil war as well the endured conflict as from 2008 to 2011 has made Somalia be among the top states in the world associated with failure. This is evidenced by the fact that Jihadism has become continuously prevalent as the civil war has continued to emanate. This paper will expound on the ongoing conflict in Somalia as well explain the regional context. The paper will also address the possible solution that has been towards solving the problem. The need to address the conflict is vital to the countries within Eastern Africa, despite the importance estimated to Somalia by other nations referred to as the international community. A deeper study of the problem shows that the civil war not only affects Somalia as a nation, but also affects the international community. The destructive political instability, overwhelming violence, and crippling famine results not only to struggle on the national level, but also refugee issues with other states surrounding Somalia. Indiscriminate piracy as a result of the conflict also affects the regional as well as the international community. The civil war in Somalia has made it fall victim of the international community in which states act to the best of their interests, portraying their interests by power gains (Rubinstein 2005, 527). States have only assisted Somalia irregularly, and the assistance has not been long lasting. Some of the people, however, consider this argument tenuous because Somalia is often regarded as a failed state. The issue in Somalia is very complex; it does not involve only resolving a conflict. First, the fighting in Somalia need to be stopped, and the conflict ought to be resolved. This can be achieved by either ceasefire or by culminating an environment that would enhance a hurting stalemate-where sides will be forced to realize that fighting is worthless for the parties involved in the conflict. Civil war issue has been the main target of many humanitarian as well as peacekeeping missions; nevertheless the conflict still exists. In expounding this paper, the post-colonial intervention in Somalia will be addressed. Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia High cost of delivering aid Six main United Organizations were involved in coordinating overall humanitarian efforts in Somalia: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO. In addition, over 30 NGOs worked as implanting partners of the UN in Somalia. Among the things that were addressed by the United Nations organizations together with the NGOs included coming up with priority options that could aid combat famine and loss of innocent lives in Somalia. However, delayed international media coverage of the conflict played a significant role in triggering international responses. However, the first reports by the NGOS who were residing in the country when Barre was overthrown did not receive significant attention. The decision by both the US and the UN to intervene in the fatal famine was disastrously late. The agencies in the country faced a lot of problems in providing humanitarian assistance. As a result of high level of insecurity, agencies were obliged to depend on the costly armed protection by militia to spread emergency relief. For instance, CARE, which was associated with delivery of food supplies, used $100,000 per month for security to distribute the emergency relief. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) however had a much higher protection bill; it spent $100,000 per week on factional militias. This practice was not only expensive, but the involvement of the UN in large amounts of money involuntarily called for disarmament as well as encouragement of the war economy. The delay, in launching the intervention, was however as a result of lack of preparedness as well as information about disaster. The demise of Barre had also led to all the UN agencies and majority of the NGOS to withdraw from the country. This was as a result of lack of extensive and accurate information that was required to organize as a well as carry out large-scale humanitarian interventions. Intervening in a state without a leadership structure was somewhat new to the agencies that were fond of dealing with central authorities. Additionally, the agencies’ operational guidelines were significantly applicable to natural disasters compared to complex emergencies that required not only creative, but also flexible programming under the setting of the continuing conflict. Questions about impartiality, the right codes of conduct, as well as accountability, added to the confusion. This was almost like unprecedented intervention by agencies like the ICRC and UNICEF which have worked under conflict situations for many years (Rubinstein 2005, 531). Authorization of use of force Despite all efforts put by the international community, the situation in Somalia continued to worsen; Somalia remained stateless, and Mogadishu was divided into facets by militias. The political chaos and physical destruction by the militia hampered with the supply of humanitarian supplies. The small group of peacekeepers who were deployed to Somalia by United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) to sort out the disagreement between clans and the confusion portrayed by private armies as well as relief organizations also faced a lot of challenges. For instance, a significant amount of supplies was hijacked by armed armies of the clans or by security guards who were deployed to offer security to the relief organizations (Daniels 2012, 101). This was as a result of the UN as well as private volunteer organizations being barred from hiring armed security forces by the local tribesmen. It was as a result of this that the US decided to intervene and provide security support. The US Humanitarian intervention in Somalia The geological position of Somalia contributed significantly to the intrusion of the superpower during the Cold War period; the coast of Somalia was a used as a battlefield. It was a result of the war that Somalia lost not only its organization, but also its agrarian production resulting in a severe famine after the end of the Cold War in early 1991 (Soderlund 2008, 43). It was a result of the severity of the famine in Somalia that Herman Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State declared Somalia a civil strife disaster. This pronouncement enforced the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance to start funding the relief efforts. By mid-August 1991, the Bush administration was airlifting relief supplies to Somalia. The airlift portrayed the serious involvement of the US with the crisis in Somalia; it symbolized the political commitment of George Bush to Somalia (Soderlund 2008, 47). Additionally, it is evident that the airlifting of food from Kenya bypassed congested ports as well as reduced the looting of convoys. However, it was during the spring of 1992 that Somalia became one of the issues in Washington (Ramuhala 2011, 49). “In 1992, under UN auspices, the US carried out a humanitarian intervention-Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, where state collapse and clan warfare had caused so much insecurity, starvation, and suffering” (Ohaegbulam 2004, 82). In connection with this, Ramuhala argues that lawless gangs not only seized relief supplies, but also used them to purchase local loyalties at the cost of other people’s lives. The warring political groups also fueled the problems in Somalia by amassing food stockpiles as not only bargaining chips, but also assigns of their power. These rival entities terrorized the international organizations, stole food, and killed whoever failed to pay protection money. These were among the reasons as to why the US associated herself with Somalia; it assisted to rehabilitate the refugees, as well as people displaced internally because of the conflicts. Additionally, the US used its troops to offer security to its agencies that were associated with the distribution of food to the suffering Somalis. Unfortunately, the humanitarian mission by both President Bush and President Clinton insignificantly succeeded in restoring the situation in Somalia. Clan Wars resumed and secessionist rebellion continued in the Northern Somaliland. According to Ramuhala (2011, 36), “the emergency aid became the only currency of an already collapsed economy, thus indicative of a method of acquiring both money and power.” As the assistance poured in, it presented prospects as well as competition for resources which resulted in two problems (Ramuhala 2011, 73). Firstly, the presence of aid fueled violence as gangs and factions fought over the control of international supplies. Lastly, the choice of Mogadishu as a point of aid distribution brought desperate people into an area of intense conflict. The US Military Intervention in Somalia As introduced above, the US airlifted relief supplies to Somalia under the protection of the US Army Special Forces soldiers. It is through these relief flights that the US Army assessed dangers of various parts, conducted reconnaissance of the airfields as well as gathered crucial information for future use when on intervening on the ground. In tandem with this, the US under the leadership of Bush sent 28,000 troops to Somalia to spearhead humanitarian intervention. These troops however were joined by other forces to come up with United Task Force (UNITAF), which was obliged to ensure that the aid was distributed without any issue of insecurity. The UNITAF was blessed with not only the homogenous staff, but also a ‘Unity of Command.’ As the force commander, Lieutenant General Johnston led 38,000 troops in which 28,000 troops constituted American forces (Boulden 2013, 79). From this number, one can deduce that the military operation in Somalia was dominated by US Marine Corps. According to Zaalberg (2006, 276), the sole purpose of the UNITAF intervention in Somalia was to end famine, and they could only fight when attacked. However, the ‘psychological operations’ expressed by the leaflets the American Air Force dropped in Mogadishu proved that the US army was ready for war in case of any form of resistance. The moving Marine Corps and Navy operations in Somalia on 9 December 1992 played a very significant role. This is evidenced by the fact that the Somali warlords were forced to work harmoniously with each other as well as work with the US troop in establishing a relatively benevolent and safe environment. In addition, the technicals and heavy weapons possessed by the Somalis were moved to the cantonment areas and others out of Mogadishu to avoid destruction. Despite creating fear in Somalis, it is evident that the UNITAF intervention enhanced peaceful distribution of relief to the nine humanitarian relief sectors in south central Somalia. By December 1992, the US in support of other contingents had managed to secure almost all the key areas associated with militia attacks (Zaalberg 2006, 276) allowing peaceful distribution of humanitarian relief. In connection with this assertion, it is evident that the US intervention in Somalia managed to save many lives by enabling relief organizations to deliver the needed supplies effectively. However, supplying relief as well as protecting convoys was not one of the key strategies for solving Somalia’s problems; it was just a task that needed to be done. According to Zaalberg (2006, 173), “the lasting peace in Somalia could only be achieved by disarming the warlords, reconciliation and assisting in the restoration of law and order and societal infrastructure. Unfortunately, the US was not in a position to do this because the goals were not among the reasons as to why the president allowed the US participation in the Somalia intervention. In connection with this, the US leaders started to divert the majority of her responsibilities to the UN. It was through this that the UNOSOM was left with the responsibility of restoring hope in Somalia. African Union (AU) military intervention in Somalia “The African Peace Support Mission in Somalia has been working since 19th January 2007, when through the Resolution of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Union (AU) agreed on deployment of troops in Somalia” (Kuwali and Viljoen 2013, 69). The main purpose for the deployment of troops was to provide an African response to the security challenges, as well as impending state collapse of Somalia. Despite many years of bloody fighting, with inadequate resources that contributed to the occurrence of many casualties among soldiers, it is evident that AMISOM has portrayed the importance of the AU-led Peace Support Operation (PSO) in the fight for Somalia’s stability. The abolition of Al-Shabaab forces from their strategic positions, as well as the protection of the main government, is the key achievements of AMISOM. As introduced above, AMISOM was launched on 19th January 2007 because of the failure to implement IGASOM (Intergovernmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission) in Somalia. IGASOM was aimed at replacing the Ethiopian forces that were securing Mogadishu’s government from Al-Shabaab, a rebel Islamic movement. Transferring the power from IGAD as well as the reluctance of the Western States to deploy troops to Somalia forced the AU to quest for more African involvement in the peace operation. AMISOM was authorized by the United Nations Security Council on 20th February 2007 supporting the decision made by the AU (Kuwali and Viljoen 2013, 54). The peacekeeping mission the AU needed to meet in Somalia via the aid of AMISOM include supporting dialogue as well as reconciliation in Somalia, and providing protection to the Transitional Federal Institutions so as to enable them do their roles. The AU also aimed at not only assisting in the execution of the National Security, but also Stabilization Plan of Somalia, especially the successful reestablishment and training Somali security forces. Providing technical support in addition to another support required for disarmament and stabilization was also one of the missions of the AU. According to Taha (2010, 33), it was the mission of the AU to monitor the security situation of the places in which its forces were to be deployed. The AU mission also included facilitating humanitarian operations such as reintegration of refugees in addition to ensuring the internally displaced people were resettled. Majority of people regard the deeds of AMISOM in Somalia as “timid success”. It is through the AMISOM support that the Somali national forces managed successfully to evict Al-Shabaab, a fatal Islamist group that was formed in 2006. It is also through the support of AMISOM that Somali National Army managed to capture Jawhar on 9th December 2012. A few months ago, AMISOM also managed to develop some techniques and tactics that enabled them overcome Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. In tandem with this claim, it is evident that Mogadishu is expressing significant improvement in the security sector. Progress has also been seen in the political arena. After approximately 20 years of statelessness, the presence of AMISOM’s stabilization efforts has led to Somalia facing a post-transitional situation. This is evidenced by the fact that a new interim Constitution was launched, and a new Federal Parliament was launched in August 2012. Additionally, it is evident that Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was sworn in as the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia. To most political analysts, these political events can be regarded milestones in the bringing together a shaky state, and they have engendered hope that such happenings could unite all Somalis. As introduced above, the mission of AMISOM included defeating the areas under the control of Al-Shabaab, securing liberated areas as well as “providing support to institutionalize Somalia’s National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP). For it to achieve, it had to integrate, harmonize, and sustain security institutions so as to ensure coordination among administrative units, as well as implement demilitarization programs. Kenyan Military Intervention into Somalia In October 2011, the Kenyan government deployed thousand of its troops to Somalia to wage war on Al-Shabaab. This was the first gamble Kenya has ever taken since the gain of its independence. “Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was allowed to launch its attack on the militia despite portraying inadequate political, diplomatic, as well as military preparation. As a result of this, it is evident that the potential for the Kenya troop to fail in its mission in Somalia is very high. Although many people including the watchdog (the opposition party) have called for the pullout of the troop from Somalia, it is evident that the Kenyan government is not ready in any way to withdraw its military fight in Somalia. The Kenyan government has invested heavily in the war, and it also has pride that it needs to protect. The involvement of Kenyan military in Somalia’s insecurity was not only because of the occasional kidnappings at the borders, but also because of the high rate of insecurity in North Eastern Province as well as radical influence of Al-Shabaab. Additionally, the terrorist threat in Kenya and the neighboring nations such as Uganda made the Kenya Defense Armed Forces (KDF) to plan for the intrusion of Somalia in pursuit of the troublesome militia referred to as Al-Shabaab. Being very close to Somalia (sharing the same border), the conflicts in Somalia has led to Kenya serving as a military camp for over 500,000 refugees from Somalia. This high number has not only affected the local people, but also posed a serious economic and security challenge to the government. The high number of refugees from Somalia has also led to the occurrence of documentation problems; majority of the Somalis in Kenya receive the identification documents illegally. Despite their large number, it is evident that Kenya is not in a position to force the return of refugees to their country. It is as a result of this that the Kenyan government is using KDF to stabilize the condition in Somalia so that Somalis could go back to their country willingly. According to (xx), the occasional attacks on the Western tourists by Al-Shabaab fueled the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia. The attacks not only led to the loss in confidence on the functionality of the Kenyan government, but also the loss of economic income to the state. The presence of KDF in Somalia has played a very significant role towards stabilizing Somalia. This is evidenced by the fact that the Kenyan forces have managed to secure key strategic areas that were used by the Al-Shabaab in training as well as launching their attacks. It is also evident that the KDF has also managed to calm the condition in Somalia leading to some Somalis starting to move back to their country. Political intervention in Somalia Despite fighting for stabilization of Somalia, it is evident that some Kenyan plans contribute significantly to the division of Somalia as a state. For instance, it is apparent that Ahmed Madobe together with his militia is supported by majority of the Kenyan-Somali officers whereas Mohamed Abdi Mohamed receives support from Kenyan intelligence bodies as well as politicians such as Yusuf Haji and Aden Duale. It is also evident that the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia has led to the loss of many innocent lives. There is also a claim that the KDF is taking part in the depletion of resources from Somalia; the forces are associated with the selling of charcoal which is one of the contributing resources to the Somalia’s economy (Falola and Thomas 2013, 11). Cultural intervention into Somalia Postcolonial interventions in Somalia took place within a complex setting. In most occasions, the interveners and the receivers of the intervention are from different settings and practice different cultures. As a result of this, the interveners are obliged to have the understanding of their actions that are significantly different from the subjects of the intervention. For instance, representatives of the international community knew that their operation was humanitarian because it involved saving lives via distributing food. In contrast, majority of the Somalis believed that the intervention was aimed at converting Muslims to Christians. They also considered the operation as an attack not only on their political leaders, but also their communities. Additionally, military as well as civilians had different understandings of ‘security’ and ‘management’ making the coordination very difficult. The US intervention in Somalia was unlike in many countries such as Vietnam. This is evidenced by the fact that the US had no ostensible national interests in Somalia. The state also lacked national unity in addition to the lack of a single commander. As a result of this, majority of the Somalis joined militia groups such as Al-Shabaab so as to have the opportunity of practicing piracy, as well as terrorism. However, the international community intervention in Somalia led to the destruction of this culture; the forces of the international community fought against the militia with aim of eradicating it from Somalia. In conclusion, the diverse post-colonial interventions into Somalia have many impacts on Somalia. The humanitarian intervention led to the saving of lives from famine and diseases. The military intervention on the other hand led to the eradication of some practices such piracy and terrorism within Somalia and neighboring nations. It is also through military intervention that Somalia managed to stabilize its government as well as overcome the threats from militia groups. Despite the interventions have many significant advantages to the Somalis; it is evident that some states intervention into Somalia hampers with their political system. The involvement of Kenyan politicians on political issues in Somalia, for instance, has triggered the occurrence of the difference between people in Somalia. It is also evident that the intervention in Somalia has not managed to eradicate Al-Shabaab completely. This is evidenced by the fact that the government of Somalia is often attacked by militia groups. Reference List Boulden, Jane. 2013. Responding to Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Daniels, Christopher. 2012. Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. New York: Scarecrow Press. Falola, Toyin and Thomas, Charles. 2013. Securing Africa: Local Crises and Global Interventions: Local Crises and Foreign Interventions. New York: Routledge. Kuwali, Dan and Viljoen, Frans. 2013. Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act. New York: Routledge. Ohaegbulam, Festus. 2004. U.S. Policy in Postcolonial Africa: Four Case Studies in Conflict Resolution. New York: Peter Lang. Ramuhala, MG. 2011. Post-Cold War Military Intervention in Africa. Scientia Militaria South African Journal of Military Studies 39, no. 1: 1-101. Rubinstein, Ra. 2005. Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations. New York: Sage Publications. Soderlund, Walter. 2008. Humanitarian Crises and Intervention: Reassessing the Impact of Mass Media. New York: Kumarian Press. Taha, Mustafa. 2010. Clinton’s Rhetoric on Somalia: A Burkian Reading From a Diplomatic Perspective. Global Media Journal 1, No. 1, pp.33-52. Zaalberg, Thijs. 2006. Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations. New York: Amsterdam University Press. Read More