R2P Concept and Russo-Georgian Conflict - Research Paper Example

R2P CONCEPT AND RUSSO-GEORGIAN CONFLICT by of the of the Introduction On 8 August 2008, when a whole world was enjoying opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, Russian military marched across the border into the Georgian territory. The night before, Georgia tried to recapture South Ossetia, a disputed ethnic enclave in northern Georgia, by means of military intervention in Tskhinvali, a capital of South Ossetia, in response to the attacks of radical separatists in the region (King 2014). Russian federation, which had strongly supported the Ossetia’s extremist over a decade, reacted promptly with an intention of complete invasion by sending armed platoons and aircrafts in South Ossetia and attacking crucial transport and military hubs in the Georgian region. Russia also increased its military activities in Abkhazia which is another rebel dominated region in the north-western part of Georgia (King 2014). The five-day war caused drastic consequences with over hundreds of deaths and thousands of refugees in the region, bringing the US-Russia relationship to its lowest level since the Cold War era (King 2014). The western media was quick to find similarities between the Russia’s invasion in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with the Hitler’s Sudetenland invasion or the Soviet’s Prague Spring suppression. (King 2014). But, Russia strongly opposed such accusations and defended its military intervention in Georgian territories under the justification of “responsibility to protect” (commonly known as R2P) (Evans 2008). The purpose of this paper is to analyze Russia’s R2P concept towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia by examining background, causes, and hidden politics of the conflict. On the basis of various research and reports, the paper will evaluate the validity of Russia’s R2P justification for invading South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russo-Georgian War over South Ossetia and Abkhazia Issue South Ossetia and Abkhazia possessed autonomous status into the republic of Georgia during the Soviet period (Abkhazia profile 2014; King 2014). With the collapse of Soviet Union and independence of Georgia in 1991, both the regions sought to gain own independence from Georgian republic (King 2014). Abkhazia’s fight for independent state since the early 1990s has significantly damaged its economy. During the Soviet era, less than 20% of the Abkhazia’s population consisted ethnic Abkhaz, while remaining population was constituted by Georgians (Abkhazia profile 2014). The separatist movement in Abkhazia became more violent and tension increased in the early 1992. In order to stop the civil riot, Georgia sent armed forces in Abkhazia in 1992. However, violent clashes between the Abkhaz radicals and Georgian forces ended up with the evacuation of Georgian forces from the region. The entire Georgian-speaking population was expelled from the region under the attempt of ethnic cleansing (Abkhazia profile 2014). In 1994, separation of forces and ceasefire was agreed between Abkhazia and Georgia under Moscow Agreement. Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), which consisted equal number of personnel from South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Georgia, and Russia, were deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to monitor the situation and maintain peace. However, the situation remained critical between both the parties over territory dispute (Muzalevsky 2009, p. 30-31). A Georgia attempt to recapture South Ossetia was once again cut by secessionist in 2004 (King 2014). In August 2008, the conflict in South Ossetia further escalated. Georgian settlements and positions in South Ossetia were attacked by Ossetian radical separatists. Violent clashes occurred between both the sides for almost a week prior to 8 August. Georgia blamed Russia for supporting separatists and sending hundreds of undercover Russian troops as ‘volunteers’ which were secretly merged with the South Ossetian Interior Ministry forces (Allison 2008, p. 1146-1148). Georgia further claimed that Russia provided required arms and military equipments to South Ossetian forces through the Roki tunnel which connected North Ossetia with South Ossetia. Meanwhile, Russia also claimed that the military activities of Georgian forces near the conflict area were the violation of Moscow Agreement and direct provocation for war (Allison 2008, p. 1147-1150). Eventually, on 8 August 2008, continuous clashes suddenly escalated into large-scale open war between Russian and Georgian troops. After non-stop 5 days of battle, Georgian forces were completely thrown out of South Ossetia by Russian forces (Allison 2008, p. 1147-1148). Many experts claimed that Russia’s actions in South Ossetia showed a long planned offensive attack rather than response to protect the Russian minorities. According to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, the military actions were required to “protect the Russian citizens which were living in South Ossetia” (Natoli 2010, p. 390-391). However, Russia’s response was highly criticized and suspected on the international level. After initially emphasizing on the legal right to justify the invasion, Russia later settled on the latest human rights principle of the “responsibility to protect” (Natoli 2010, p. 391). Russia’s justification was highly focused about the responsibility to protect the locals by claiming that almost 80% South Ossetian residents were Russian citizens. However, the legitimacy of Russia’s action came in further doubt as the question about such a high majority of Russian passport holders in neighbouring country was rose on an international level (Natoli 2010, p. 390-391). Russia’s Responsibility to Protect: Evaluation of Justification Concept of Responsibility to Protect The “responsibility to protect” (R2P) concept rapidly emerged in the last decade. The idea was collectively accepted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 2005 World Summit (Glanville 2012, p. 1). The concept was mainly designed to protect the populations from mass barbarity. However, the principle was widely misused by states, international media, and non-government organizations (NGOs), both to criticize and to justify certain behaviour, and both to discourage and to support international actions in response to conflicts in various regions, including Kenya, Darfur, Gaza, Myanmar, North Korea, Congo, Ivory Cost, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Ukraine, and Georgia (Glanville 2012, p. 1-2). The principle is based on the two basis ideas. One is that protection of own citizens from mass barbarity, especially from war crimes, genocides, human rights violation, and ethnic cleansing is the responsibility of each state (Glanville 2012, p. 2). Second notion is that global community have a collective responsibility to support host state to protect its population and to response to protect the civilians in situations where the host state is failed to do so (Glanville 2012, p. 3). However, the UN has failed to clearly characterize and distinguish these two notions from one another. Therefore, in most of the cases, states used R2P as a humanitarian tool to defend their illicit actions and protect own interests (Glanville 2012, p. 1-4). Russia and R2P Concept Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov were quick to frame Russian military intervention in Georgia as humanitarian mission under R2P doctrine to protect the Russian locals in South Ossetia (International coalition 2014). But, the R2P doctrine is about the responsibility of state to protect the population within its own borders and it is international community’s responsibility to take actions through the UN when the population outside the border is being threatened by barbaric activities in the host state (International coalition 2014). However, in case of Georgian conflict, Russia took military actions without consideration of the United Nations. Furthermore, the Global Centre for the R2P (GCR2P) claims that military interventions are only valid if they are subjected to the physical protection of the victim population. But, Russia’s military intervention in South Ossetia was geographically and strategically well beyond the requirement of physical security of the South Ossetian citizens from mass barbaric crimes (International coalition 2014). According to the set doctrine of R2P by the UN High-level commission under General Secretary Kofi Annan in 2005, before taking any military action under R2P principle, it is necessary to analyze actual or potential threat of mass barbarity crimes, effectiveness of such military measures to stop the mass crimes, availability of other peaceful solutions, and potential consequences of the intervention (International coalition 2014). But, in case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia issue, there was not any clear evident of the UN-mentioned crimes of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide were committed or intended to do by the Georgian forces against South Ossetians and Abkhazians (Russia in Georgia 2008). Also, Gerogia’s military actions in Tskhinvali couldn’t be justified for the military intervention as the Georgian actions were response to provocation and attacks of Ossetian separatist on Georgian settlements. Also, before taking military actions, Russian federation didn’t attempt to seek peaceful solution. A quick Security Council warning to Georgia for ceasefire would have put Georgia under immense pressure to retreat (Russia in Georgia 2008). As Russia didn’t try to notify the Security Council on August 7 prior to the attacks, it remains highly suspicious whether the protection of civilians was the primary objective of Russian intervention (Russia in Georgia 2008). The introduction of thousands of armed forces and tanks not only in South Ossetia but also in Georgian regions and Abkhazia appeared to be significantly excessive for defensive measures. Also, the Russia naval presence in the Black Sea and massive aerial bombings in the Zugdidi, Poti, Gori regions and destruction of Georgian aviation plant in Tbilisi went well beyond the required minimum military actions (Russia in Georgia 2008). Further, according to the 2005 General Assembly resolution, any state seeks to implement forceful measures to handle any R2P situation must do so only through the Security Council. But, it wasn’t case in Russo-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Russia didn’t make any effort nor give importance to gain the approval of Security Council for military intervention. In a way, Russian authorities’ justification about military actions under R2P concept remains highly questionable and invalid (International coalition 2014). Hidden Politics of Russia behind R2P Justification Russo-Georgian Conflict over Energy After the resignation of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 2000, Vladimir Putin came to power. The Putin administration adopted new foreign policies which were mainly focused on protecting Russia’s own market while capturing new markets on a global level (Giannella 2014, p.6). Russia is the largest natural gas producer and exporter and the 2nd top producer of oil in the world. As Russian petroleum sources play a crucial role in the international energy market, Putin mainly used energy as a political weapon in order to establish dominance of Russia in a global market (Giannella 2014, p. 3-7). As Europe was entirely dependent on Russian natural gas, Russia enjoyed high revenues from gas exports to European countries. After discovery of oil and gas in Caucasian countries, especially Azerbaijan, western countries attempted to diversify energy supply by importing oil and gas from these countries. Traditionally, oil from Azerbaijan and other central Asian countries would transport via “northern route” though Russia, allowing Russia to accumulate sufficient transit fees. Georgian geographic location makes it a cost-effective and shorter variant for transportation of Caspian petroleum directly to the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, comparably high transportation costs, Azeri crude oil loses its quality when mixed with Siberian crude oil while transporting through the northern Russian pipeline system. Therefore, western route was more preferable for transportation of Azeri oil to western markets (King 2014). The BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline project driven by the British Petroleum with the support of the US government was a major blow to the Russia’s domination in transportation of the Caspian petroleum to the West. As Georgia was the major transit country for the BTC route, it became the place of first open confrontation between the United States and Russia after the Cold War era (Lantier 2008). During initial period of BTC project, Russia tried to put pressure on Georgia to oppose the project as it didn’t work out, Russia implemented policies to lure Georgia by cancelling over $150 million energy debt of Georgia. But, the Russian move didn’t stop Georgia from signing BTC project agreement in 1999 (Giannella 2014, p. 10-11). In response, Russia cut the gas supply to Georgia. In early 2000s, Russia used energy weapon to achieve political goals in Abkhaz. When Georgia showed positive attitude for peace talks with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia rewarded the Georgian government with extra electricity supplies in 2003. However, the government of Shevardnadze was out thrown after the Rose revolution in the late 2003 (Giannella 2014, p. 11-12). As new government under Saakashvili administration shown interest to join NATO and move away Russian sphere, Russia increased gas shipment prices and cut the gas supply to Georgia. Even major blasts in two gas supplying pipelines to Georgia in 2006 were linked with the Russian involvement. When Georgia announced to oppose Russian accession in the World Trade Organization in early 2006, Russia responded by implementing ban on the import of Georgian wine, vegetables, fruits and other products (Giannella 2014, p. 13-14). In a way, the conflict between Russia and Georgia was linked with several series of incidents. Though the military conflict between Russia and Georgia began on 8 August 2008, the constant clashes between both the countries continued over a long period. Therefore, it is possible to state that Russia would have invaded Georgia in any case (Giannella 2014, p. 10-14). Russia’s Aggressive Policies towards CIS Countries After the collapse of Soviet Union, new independent states were recognized under a common term of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Putin administration implemented aggressive foreign policies towards CIS countries in order to maintain Russian dominance in these regions and prevent the direct access to local energy reserves from the western powers (Kakhishvilli 2013). Russia has regularly broken the attempts of CIS countries to join NATO or European Union and move away from the Russian sphere. In order to successfully implement the policies of keeping former Soviet states closer to Russia and away from western influence, Russia has used energy as a political weapon. In cases where it didn’t succeed, (like in Ukraine, Georgia) it used the protection of Russian ethnic minority as a justification for military interventions to oppress the regions (Kakhishvilli 2013). It can be evident mainly in South Ossetia and Abkhazia case. Before 2002, the process of application for Russian citizenship for people from Caucasian region was quite complex and difficult. However, in 2002, Russia adopted new policies about Russian federation citizenship to provide citizenship to ex-Soviet residents quite easily (Natoli 2010, p. 392-393). In case of South Ossetia, the investigators found that locals obtained Russian citizenship without even leaving their homes to apply. Reportedly, till the end of 2004, over 80% of South Ossetians received Russian citizenship (Natoli 2010, p. 392-393). According to some experts, Russia’s passport policy towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia was the part of long-term and well-planned strategy to invade the regions (Natoli 2010, p. 392-393). Furthermore, authorizing legal citizenship to South Ossetians and Abkhazians made it easier to Russia to take military actions on 2008 under the principle of “responsibility to protect” (Natoli 2010, p. 416-417). Conclusion The conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia has long historical background. It is linked with various political, social, and economical interests for both the parties. Based on the analysis of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the UN’s set doctrines regarding “responsibility to protect”, it can be concluded that the Russia’s justification under R2P concept in totally irrelevant and illegitimate. It is more appropriate to say that Russia misused the R2P concept to invade the regions for its own political interests rather than to provide protection to local Russian citizens. In order to avoid the misuse of the concept, it is necessary for the UN and international community to set proper norms and clear regulations about application of forceful measures under such concept. Reference List Abkhazia profile 2014, BBC, 3 June, viewed 11 November 2014, . Allison, R 2008, ‘Russia resurgent? Moscows campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’’, International Affairs, 84 (6), pp. 1145-1171, viewed 11 November 2014, < http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/International%20Affairs/2008/84_6allison.pdf>. Evans, G 2008, Russia and the responsibility to protect, 31 August, Los Angeles Times, viewed 11 November 2014, < http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-evans31-2008aug31-story.html>. Giannella, M 2014, ‘Energy: the Russian geopolitical weapon’, academia.edu, p. 1-21, viewed 11 November 2014, . Glanville, L 2012, ‘The responsibility to protect beyond borders’, Oxford Journals, pp. 1-32, viewed 11 November 2014, . International coalition for the responsibility to protect 2014, responsibilitytoprotect.org, viewed 11 November 2014, . Kakhishvilli, L 2013, Assessing Russia’s policy toward its ‘near abroad’, 17 June, E-international Relations Students, viewed 11 November 2014, < http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/17/assessing-russias-policy-toward-its-near-abroad/>. King, C 2014, The five-day war, Foreign Affairs, viewed 11 November 2014, . Lantier, A 2008, US oil pipeline politics and the Russia-Georgia conflict, 21 August, World Socialist Web Site, viewed 11 November 2014, . Muzalevsky, R 2009, ‘The Russian-Georgian war: implications for the UN and collective security’, OAKA, vol.4, no.7, pp. 29-43, viewed 11 November 2014, . Natoli, K 2010, ‘Weaponizing nationality: an analysis of Russia’s passport policy in Georgia’, pp. 389-417, viewed 11 November 2014, . Russia in Georgia: not a case of the “Responsibility to Protect” 2008, NPQ, viewed 11 November 2014, < http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2008_fall/12_evans.html>. Read More