The rise of Al Qaeda, religious militancy and terrorism - Essay Example

?How al-Qaeda Used the Media and Internet as a Tool and Weapon After Afghanistan was freed from Soviet rule in 1988, due largely to Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and Osama bin Laden’s leadership, al-Qaeda was formed (Desrosiers, 2007). However evil bin Laden’s means are, it must be noted that he was a genius in that he was able to create an internationally well-rounded organization that served to achieve his goals by strategically utilizing and maximizing his resources. Al-Qaeda’s structure “included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a military committee, a financial committee, a political committee, and a committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda” (Desrosiers, 2007). In fact, the organization had several production centers that took care of the various types of media and communication technology (IICC, 2008). Bin Laden made sure that the world knows about al-Qaeda, and he made full use of the media and the Internet in achieving this goal. It not only serves to gain notoriety for business transactions and instill fear in his perceived enemies, but it also made sure it reached a wider scope in terms of recruitment. al-Qaeda’s Media and Internet Strategies According to Marshall McLuhan (as cited in Soriano, 2008, p. 2), one of the pillars of mass media theory, “without communication, terrorism would not exist.” Certainly, terrorism existed well before mass media; but the latter definitely gave the former a great advantage. Before, terrorism is limited to the area that goons, thugs or soldiers can reach. Today, one can just create a newsworthy event and the scope of exposure is limitless. This was what bin Laden and al-Qaeda exploited. He saw that mass media can be used “to get attention, to gain recognition, and even to obtain a certain degree of respect and legitimacy” (p. 2). It can be said that al-Qaeda’s rise to power were determined by how bin Laden used the media to get his message across to the world. He knew that his organization needed an international audience to gain legitimacy; because without it, he would not be able to get funding and recruitment would be more difficult to accomplish (Fiore, 2011, p. 27). With malicious precision in manipulating the media, bin Laden was able to propel al-Qaeda as an organization that the world needs to take seriously (p. 5). Hoffman (as cited in Fiore, 2011, p. 27) states that terrorists, as exemplified by bin Laden, aims to dominate and control by sending a message of fear—and there is no better way to instill fear to the masses than through the media. But why instill fear? Bin Laden recognized that when the masses are afraid for their lives, it propagates uncertainty and chaos, not only to a large population, but more importantly, to the nations’ democratic leaders (p. 27; Soriano, 2008, p. 2). “This instability can prompt people, and even governments, to think and react differently than they would have otherwise,” making them lean towards making decisions that would favor al-Qaeda (p. 27). Aside from exploiting this strategy, al-Qaeda also became infamous for making good on their threats and doing it in a visual manner that would gain the most attention and implant the most fear and hatred. The organization’s attacks were powerful in that it was grand yet personal, vast yet meaningful. This can perfectly be seen in the 9/11 attacks, in which the entire world was treated to a visual overload of exploding buildings—the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, no less—planes crashing, and hundreds of people dying or jumping to their deaths. Every channel for the next few days—and even years—broadcasted the attacks. The attacks were large-scale, in a country considered to be a world power, against a building that is a symbol of international collaboration, and they came at a time the world least expected them. The attention al-Qaeda got was monumental. If people were not aware of the existence of al-Qaeda, they sure were made aware on the morning of September 11, 2001. And the message was clear and powerful. It said, “Here we are. We can do this. Bow down if you do not want more deaths.” Marc Lynch (as cited in Kimmage, 2009) summarized what happened accurately when he stated that “Al-Qaeda the organization has increasingly become indistinguishable from al-Qaeda the media phenomenon.” The historic event not only instilled fear, but it also bred hate. It burned down the bridge that was created between Christians and Muslims. Muslims were once again alienated and abhorred in a land that was the modern melting pot of society. The event rallied them together, and as big the effort was made against terrorism, it grew even more after 9/11. The bold attacks not only served to make the organization known, it also gained admirers—a deep resource for recruitment. It can be said that the attacks both broke ideologies, as well as strengthened them. Truly, al-Qaeda’s goal of “reinvigorating the Islamic ummah (nation) in confrontation with the West and directing this mobilized Muslim community in a revolutionary transformation of the international order” was achieved—at least for a time (Lynch, 2005). As much as 9/11 was on every television news channel—it was even made into several movies—it also disseminated faster through the Internet. YouTube and other video sites, as well as blogs and forums, were saturated with the horror of the attacks. Although most would probably think that YouTube is one of al-Qaeda’s favorite channels, the organization’s communication and information dissemination actually made use of mainly forums and file sharing sites because the audience is more focused (Kimmage, 2009, p. 15). Al-Qaeda recognized the chaos and competition in YouTube, wherein viewers need to be fought for (p. 15). Furthermore, social networking sites such as YouTube makes al-Qaeda members vulnerable to surveillance that could lead to arrests (p. 15). Conclusion After the brief discussion of al-Qaeda’s exploitation of the media and the Internet to spread its views and widen the scope of its influence, it can be said that it is indisputable that bin Laden was indeed a smart and cunning leader. He recognized the value of the various modern communication channels and maximized its use in the propagation of his goals— distinguishing between what avenues would actually give the group the most exposure. References Desrosiers, D. A. (2007). The rise of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (1988-1992). Retrieved from http://911.gnu-designs.com/Chapter_2.3.html Fiore, J. J. (2011). Al-Qaeda’s survival and success: The spread of extreme Jihadist terrorism due to media and ideological manipulation. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univeristy. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC). (2008). Terrorism and Internet: a US Senate report. Retrieved from http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/int_140708e.htm Kimmage, D. (2009, March). Al-Qaeda central and the internet. Retrieved from http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_AlQaedaCentralAndTheInternet.pdf Lynch, M. (2005). Al-Qaeda's media strategies. The National Interest, spring issue. Retrieved from http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=1087&paper=2662 Soriano, M. R. T. (2008). Terrorism and the mass media after al-Qaeda: A change of course? Athena Intelligence Journal, 3(1): 1-20. Read More