Foundations of Terrorism - Al-Qaedas Origin - Research Paper Example

Foundations of terrorism The modern media, whose efforts are to communicate a complex and convoluted messagein the shortest amount of print or airtime available, has labeled a range of violent acts as terrorism. One finds that acts like bombing, assassinations of states’ heads and massacre of civilians based on inadequate groundings are described as incidents of terrorism. These acts may be due to common criminals, rioters, anti-government dissidents or the governments themselves. The exact implication of a terrorist characterizes any person whose intention encompasses extending his or her own respective views via utilizing a coercive system in order to inflict intimidation (Hoffman, 2006). Hence, finding a certain ungrounded reason, more so driven by extremism to exterminate the innocent. Al-Qaeda’s origin Al-Qaeda is a Saudi opposition movement that emerged in the 1990s. Its main aim was to Islamize the Saudi society. This was a response to what they perceived as a cultural attack by the West on the Muslim religion. The group’s source of influence came from Abdallah Azzam teachings. In the 1980s, Abdallah ‘Azzam led the Afghan mujahideen. In 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan. To those who were cautioning against a Western cultural attack, this was an affirmation of their assumptions. This struggle gave young religious Saudis an opportunity to defend their religion and culture, which they deemed the West, more so the US would lead to its extinction. Hundreds of young men travelled to Afghanistan to join the mujahideen, the Muslim guerilla fighters. Instead of joining the fight to remove the US forces, they engaged Soviets who had penetrated Afghanistan. Numerous Saudis turned out to be Abdallah Azzam adherents together with Bin Laden (Javaid & Noureen, 2013). Azzam had studied the Islamic law to the extent of attaining a doctorate level whereby he embarked on teaching the same in Jordan. He had already joined the Muslim Brotherhood. After he was fired, he decided to help other members of the brotherhood movement in planning for the Soviet Jihad both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is where Bin Laden became a close ally and assisted him with the logistics and financing. According to Azzam, it was mandatory for every Muslim (fard al-ayn) to defend the Islamic lands against the infidel penetration. Several leaders coming from the Muslim community endorsed Azzams ideas. His other colleagues in Saudi Arabia were against the Western penetration and preached about it, but Azzam went as far as transforming his ideas into successful armed struggles. Eventually, he sacrificed his life for his beliefs. He bequeathed his legacy against Western penetration to bin Laden. Bin laden and his like-minded associates formed the Al-Qaeda in 1988 in Pakistan (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). In August 1990, Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan and shortly afterwards, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Consequently, this prompted Riyadh to seek US’ assistance with the intention of protecting the entire state. This helped in transforming the Saudi debate on cultural attack by the West. They saw it as a Western cultural penetration besides it being a precursor of Middle East supposed recon-quest by the Western military. It is likely that Bin Laden identified with the ideas of objecting the U.S. troops’ deployment in Saudi Arabia (Javaid & Noureen, 2013). Towards the conclusion of the1990s, Bin Laden changed his profile by aiming to become the global Jihad leader against the US and its allies. His fortune and operational skills helped him in recruiting numerous Islamist radicals who were willing to attack the Western states, hence training them in diverse camps in Afghanistan. When the US embassies in Dar es-Salaam and Nairobi were attacked simultaneously, the Al-Qaeda proved its lethality. More than 220 people died and over 5,000 people were injured. Consequently, Bin Laden gained immense publicity for Al-Qaeda as well as his ideologies. Hence, this proved Bin Ladens core focus more so regarding attacks that aimed at annihilating US military troops in Saudi Arabia but also globally (Javaid & Noureen, 2013). His aim encompassed engaging the US’ global bases globally. Al-Qaeda’s structure After the end of Afghan-Soviet war, Bin Laden embarked on creating an international militia whose core aim was to protect all Muslims from oppressions by the West. Azam described Al Qaeda as a strong movement of committed individuals who would continue on to “achieve victory” after the withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan in 1989. The group is commonly misconceived to be a distinct organization headed by Arab leader Osama bin Laden. However, in reality, it is much more subtle for it is a loose set-up of networks. In Arabic, it can mean base, foundation, a rule, a principle, a method or maxim (Soherwordi, Ashraf & Khattak, 2012). There have been numerous debates regarding the Al Qaeda’s organizational structure. This aspect affects how governments perceive the threat and respond to it. This is especially so after the organization experienced many setbacks in form of attacks by the West that destabilized its physical structure, including leadership and training camps. Hence, facilitating its relocation from a relatively stable environment in Afghanistan formerly acting as referred military base. Initially, Al Qaeda operated as a hierarchical or command-cadre structure like a terrorist army. The leadership provided intermediaries to the members with both materials as well as ideological incentives. Clear lines of authority, functional specialization and centralized decision-making are some of the characteristics of a hierarchical structure. There were separate departments for particular tasks whereby training was for all operatives and managers irrespective of one’s level. Complex tasks were broken down into specific jobs; hence, efficiency was achieved (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). After the Al Qaeda lost its base of operations and leadership, it started operating as a network. The network organization, from the perspective of a terrorist, is advantageous with regard to a network’s resistance to disruption. It allows is members to form cells without necessarily meeting in person. Therefore, communication between cells in planning an actual operation is minimal. This form of “leaderless terrorism” is hard for any law enforcement personnel to dismantle. A network-based organization is unsuited for carrying out complex tasks that require communication, significant professional trainings and cooperation. Network organizations are not capable of carrying out complex attacks such as the September 11 attack on New York and Washington DC (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). Al-Qaeda’s Motivations This group encompasses the most lethal terrorist faction of modern times. It is therefore very important to understand where and how it gained support and motivation. Terrorism experts describe states that help terrorists indirectly as enablers and motivators. In some occasions, the greatest contribution by a state to a terrorism cause is simply not acting against it. Ignoring fund raisings, not policing a border or even tolerating recruitments help terrorists to build their organizations and survive. Terrorists will not have any fear while planning attacks in a state, which is the target. This is a motivation and can be extremely dangerous in the face of terrorism. There are very many states, which tolerate certain kinds of terrorist activities. These states confinement does not only comprise the Middle East and states with aggressive dictators as rulers, but also other regions though undercover. In conducting the September 11 attacks, the Al-Qaeda recruited and raised money in Germany whereby without much interference received funding from several Saudis devoid of any obstructions by the Riyadh regime. Planning of operations was in Malaysia where after operatives were ready sent them to the US. These regimes are not sponsors of Al-Qaeda but their inaction proved as important as Afghanistan enabling it to conduct the attacks. Something worse than the training camps in Afghanistan is the preparation that took place in the US and in Germany (Byman, 2005). Al-Qaeda’s main motivation is the Jihad. The terror group makes Jihad seem like an Islamic war that is against Christians, atheist and other people holding onto diverse creeds. This is wrong, as essentially, Jihad is a Muslim’s inner struggle to improve oneself and help one’s community by becoming a better individual. However, it is wrong to see Jihad as just a way of achieving specific goals in the world. Jihad acts are seen as an individual’s demonstrations of one’s faith, which are performed for God by the individual. The Al Qaeda, for that matter, believes its acting in the Islam religion’s best interests. The Quran cites, “Fight those who fight you in Allah’s way, but do not begin any hostilities. Lo! Allah does not loveth aggressors” thus implying people should not participate in any terrorist actions without being provoked (Soherwordi, Ashraf & Khattak, 2012). Moreover, the group believed that after the defeat of the Soviets, the Jihadists could also overdo other super powers like the US. The USSR invasion was clearly the catalyst for growing religious militancy. The chain that leads to the commission of acts of terrorism is complex. A general theory based on conditions that lead to committing acts of terrorism is impossible (Crenshaw, 2010). This is because the final decision depends on the judgments made by individuals regarding the available motivations. The choice of terrorism is not automatic. Internal bargaining and psychological considerations are responsible for influencing the decision to participate in terrorism (Crenshaw, 2010). Al-Qaeda’s Goals The movement stresses the need of defending their Islam culture in the face of Western invasion; hence deter them from westernizing factions within the Muslim states. It aspires to establish the Sharia law in all Muslim states, to expel the American infidels from the Middle East, decrease their influence and bring down the Muslim regimes that are US allies or those that support its policies. Most importantly, they want to wage Jihad against the US, by setting up a front for Jihad. The Al Qaeda’s main mode of operations in carrying out these aims including mass extermination of people, causing maximum economic damage, disrupting society as well as creating settings characterized by fear. These attacks are usually coordinated and carried out without any previous warning whereby common tactics embrace suicide and car bomb attacks. Al Qaeda specifically aims to have many people watching as well as many people dead (Soherwordi, Ashraf & Khattak, 2012). There are some like-minded individuals, who are associated with the ideologies of the Al Qaeda and usually carry out on their own initiative in the name of Jihad. Mainly, they take advantage of the simplicity of undertaking terror attacks in order to achieve maximum damage and publicity. They often do not possess strong ideological or religious motivation. Instead, they are driven by their own socio-economic situations and personal frustrations against their home state. Their main goal is to cause unrest in their countries due to their own personal frustrations. Those individuals who are unable to adjust to the new environment in Western societies thus turn their hatred into terrorist missions under the name of “Global Jihad.” These elements mostly comprise radical elements of the Muslim communities across Europe, based on the evidence of some converts to Islam that have been known to participate in such acts (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010). Threats posed by Al-Qaeda Al-Qaeda is still a big threat to the western states and their allies. In the recent years, several regimes have linked numerous attacks to the group both directly and indirectly. Al-Qaeda’s terror differs in terms of direction and the territorial expansion of its affiliated organizations. Several autonomous Islamist organizations share the al Qaeda’s agenda and ideology. These organizations include the Pakistani Taliban, Haqqani and the Lashkar-e-Taiba network. This organizations merge due to ideological and tribal alliances with the Al Qaeda. These groups have attacked US forces in Afghanistan and further mounted terror operations against the Indian and Pakistani governments. With the rise of pro-Taliban, the pro–al Qaeda warlords in Pakistan have shielded Al Qaeda operatives and their leaders, assisting Afghan insurgents and planned operations to attack the West. The disrupted Barcelona subway plot in 2008, the Mumbai attack in 2007 and the 2010 Times square bombing were all cited to be the works of Pakistani terror and warlord networks (Celso, 2012). In Europe and North America, some terrorist cells and alienated individuals are homegrown terrorists. The Al Qaeda is responsible for inspiring these terrorists. In 2009, Major Nidal Hassan killed thirteen of his fellow service members at the Fort Hood due to motivation of Al Qaeda’s ideologies. In 2010, another group of Muslim immigrants in Denmark, which was inspired by the Al Qaeda, was arrested for planning to attack a News organization. The News organization had published controversial cartoons of Prophet Muhammad (Celso, 2012). The incorporation of regional Jihadist networks reflects the bloc affiliates. Forged by ideological links, groups in Arabia and the Maghreb have fallen under Al Qaeda’s organizational umbrella. Many North African fighters have traveled to Iraq to fight US forces. These Jihadist networks wish to attack the “near enemy” of apostate Muslim regimes and the Western “far enemy.” Their incorporation into Al Qaeda reflects previous cooperation and past joint attacks. The 2003 Casablanca bombings that attacked Spanish and British interests in Morocco and the 11 March 2004 (3/11) Madrid train bombings were the works of Moroccan fighters. Islamic Combat Group (MICG) comprises a deeply connection to Al Qaeda. Studies regarding the 3/11 attacks show the MICG’s relationship with Al Qaeda and the desire to carry out Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 strategy of attacking European governments. The overall objective (partially achieved with the Spanish government’s pullout from Iraq) was to weaken Western states such that they could not resolve to wage the war on terror. The attacks against North African “apostate” regimes and kidnapping of Westerners working in the region have become common. Given the presence of large Maghreb Diaspora populations throughout Europe, AQIM is capable of substantial cross-regional attacks. The group’s virtual sanctuary in the Sahel has become a source of illicit finance and terrorist training camps (Celso, 2012). The Al Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) epitomize the Al Qaeda’s incorporation of local insurgent groups. They both fight the “apostate” regimes supported by foreign occupation forces. Both organizations have mounted insurgencies, with the former attacking African Union troops tied to the anti-Islamist regime in Mogadishu and the latter fighting US and coalition forces in Iraq. Al Qaeda’s post 9/11 mutation is extremely complex. The diverse range of attacks connected and inspired by the Al Qaeda, dramatically illustrates the complexity (Celso, 2012). Effectiveness of policies to combat threats posed by Al-Qaeda In response to Al Qaedas vicious attacks against the American homeland on September 11, the US under Bush’s regime, embarked on a national effort against the Islamist militant group. Al Qaeda, its affiliates, sympathizers and adherents continue to evolve and morph irrespective of direct reaction to its policies implemented by the US and its allies. The Counter-terrorism National Strategy has evolved synchronously over the previous decade. It has implemented a wide range of procedures and strategies seeking to mitigate and eliminate the current and future threat posed by Al Qaeda as well as the Global Silafi Jihad (Romaniuk, 2012). By using the drone technology to exterminate Al Qaeda members, the intelligence community in the US presently deems that only 50 highly important Al Qaeda leaders are still alive. Drones represent one of the most efficient means of surgically eliminating current and rising threats while becoming increasingly central to the US counter-terrorism strategy (Romaniuk, 2012). The practice of transporting suspected foreign terrorists to third world states for interrogation and imprisonment is referred to as extraordinary rendition. The Obama administration utilizes renditions as a valuable mechanism for combating current terrorist threats and as a way of preempting future terrorism by extracting critical information from the suspects, and gaining a deep understanding of the operations of particular cells and larger groups belonging to any given network. Moreover, it enables the US to learn about any new terrorist cells, providing a way into those that are otherwise difficult to infiltrate particularly in the case of Al Qaeda and the Global Silafi Jihad (Romaniuk, 2012). The National Commission against Terrorism in the US (the 9/11 Commission) issued a report on July 19, 2004 that put forward a major recommendation. They recommended that the government of the US must emphasize the need to identify and prioritize terrorist threats or potential threats by terrorist networks as well as their base of operations. The culmination of nearly a decade of work trying to locate Bin Laden since 9/11 was revealed when the most senior leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist network died a as result of ballistic trauma inflicted by US Special Forces after Obama authorized the CIA to conduct an assault. The assault took place at Bin Laden’s hideout in Pakistan, roughly 100 kilometers from Islamabad (Romaniuk, 2012). Many people argue that links exist between weak or failed states and transnational terrorist networks operating within them. The Report of the Commission on Weak States and UN National Security (2004) propagated the awareness that, illegal transnational networks, in particular the criminal groups and terrorists, target the weak and the failed states to carry out their activities. A continuous expansion and improvement of economic development assistance is an effective measure against the rapid increase of transnational terrorism while simultaneously reducing the costs involved in countering terrorism for recipient governments (Romaniuk, 2012). Reference Top of Form Bottom of Form Top of Form Bottom of Form Top of Form Byman, D. (2005). Deadly connections: States that sponsor terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Celso, A. N. (2012). Al Qaedas Post - 9/11 Organizational Structure and Strategy: The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates. Mediterranean Quarterly, 23(2), 30-41. doi:10.1215/10474552-1587847 Crenshaw, M. (2010). Terrorism in context. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press. Gunaratna, R., & Oreg, A. (2010). Al Qaedas Organizational Structure and its Evolution. Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, 33(12), 1043-1078. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2010.523860 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Javaid, U., & Noureen, N. (2013). An insight into the philosophical dynamics of al-qaeda. Journal of Political Studies, 20(2), 201-218. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/1500937039?accountid=458 Romaniuk, S. N. (2012). Slaying the dragon: Combating al-qaeda and the threat of militant islam. Journal of Politics and Law, 5(1), 151-166. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/992991002?accountid=458 Soherwordi, S., Ashraf, S., & Khattak, S. (2012). The Characteristic Traits of Terrorism and Interpretation of Jihad by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pak-Afghan Society. South Asian Studies (1026-678X), 27(2), 345-358. Read More