Terror Risk Assessment and Counter-Terrorism Strategy - Essay Example

 A risk assessment of a terror attack should be conducted according to the current model provided by the Department of Homeland Security, which has been updated several times since 2001. The latest version follows a formula that weighs threat as well as vulnerability and consequence. Threat makes up twenty percent of the risk factor, while the other eighty percent is based on the vulnerability and consequence. The latter two categories are really single factor, but have four sub-divisions: population index, economic index, national security index, and infrastructure index (Masse 11-13). In short, the likelihood of the attack determines that it is at least a significant risk, while the potential damage to human life, the economy, structures, and to the overall state of order and security determine the real impact of the attack. An attack that is low threat level—i.e. unlikely—still calls for a strong counter-terror strategy if it would potentially have a large consequence. The intelligence received suggests that the terrorist group does indeed exist, and has a known intent to carry out an attack with extreme motivation, especially culturally and politically. This raises the threat level to the maximum, and thus the attack is at least twenty percent likely to develop into action. Known intelligence also indicates that there is a sure target that is high profile. This means that the infrastructure risk is high, and that the national security risk is high due to the extreme penetration of security that this attack requires. In addition, mass casualties are predicted, and thus the population index of the risk is also extremely high. Finally the economic index is at least moderate, as damage to a high profile target with mass casualties would have some sort of economic effect as a result of fear, damage, reconstruction, loss of life, medical expenses, and finally, disruption of daily life and business. The results of the assessment place this attack at a risk that is on par with the September 11th attacks, the most deadly to date. A quick strategy that many governments adopt when confronting terror is one of deterrence. However, one academic’s discussion points out that deterrence is hardly an effective strategy, although it still is a crucial part of any comprehensive plan. Deterrence, in the case of Israel for example, requires extreme, “Draconian” measures for success and thus defies justice. Overall, the most effective form of deterrence may be an all-out assault on the leadership structure of a traditional terrorist organization, but little else can be done. (Radlauer) That said, the best counter-terror strategy is a readiness for response after the movement of the attack begins, but before it can be effectively carried out. In a sense, this can be compared to structuring a vehicle to be durable and ensure the safety of its passengers in the case of an unavoidable accident. One of the most devastating possible terrorist attacks is use of a biological weapon, as chemicals and diseases are a threat to human life that can arrive undetected and cause massive loss of life from a small source. For potential terrorists, biological weapons present a method of destruction that requires a lower level of infiltration and effort with a high-yield result. A research fellow from the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies describes how the Israeli government’s counter-terror efforts in the realm of biological and chemical attacks present a model for the US government to follow when making policy. He describes how the Israeli government provides a kit to all citizens, free of charge, consisting of a gas-mask and sterilization tools. This is part of an overall strategy that recommends keeping a “sealed body in a sealed room” during the event of a biological attack, and also recommends that citizens set the radio to a station playing only static while sleeping—this station is used by the government to broadcast warnings. However, these strategies may not be practical in the US, where society is not so highly concentrated nor at immediate threat from nearby states and non-state actors. In the US, it is pointed out that first responders to a threat such as anthrax would be emergency rooms and paramedics. This fellow suggests three strategies that the United States needs to adopt: better training for emergency room employees concerning exotic biological threats; a centralized stock of biological defense gear for citizenry; and secure construction of air intake vents and air filters in high-profile or government buildings. (Tucker) It is tempting to place oneself in the shoes of a terrorist, and imagine all the creative methods of carrying out a terrorist attack that the United States government may not expect. However, it has been suggested that this very approach is while the 9/11 attacks were so effectively carried out without successfully prevention or intervention from the US government. In a research article titled Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11, it is said that while the US government was developing new strategies to prevent the effectiveness of unconventional terrorist attacks, a years-old strategy of hijacking commercial airliners was not prevented. This is in spite of the known popularity of this tactic with terrorist organizations. It was also believed that terrorists sought publicity, but not a guaranteed high rate of casualties—only a high possibility of casualties. (Hoffman 4) Thus, a current US strategy should not try to stay one step-ahead of terrorists, but instead seek out the known vulnerabilities and be sure that they are never taken advantage of again. Primary to the US counterterror strategy for the event referred to by the latest intelligence should be border security as well as the security of transportation, of seaports, of airports, and of all major infrastructure of cultural, political, or economic importance. An assessment of European Union counterterror strategy follows these same tenets, listing borders, transportation, and transportation infrastructure as a part of the overall concept of “protection” as part of the EU campaign against terror (Argomaniz 9-10). These are the most obvious targets, and the giants that will fall the hardest in event of an attack. As also mentioned by Argomaniz, the US should maintain its intensity in the monitoring of passports, visas, and passenger information on airlines bound to the US from foreign countries. Quite simply, sticking to what we have already learned from 9/11 will at least form an excellent foundation for counterterror that the United States lacked before 2001. A report that investigated the effectiveness of current US counterterror strategies recently pointed out that many strategies have no research that indicate their success rate. However, this report also indicates that some strategies due work, and some have no effect. Among the successful strategies are airport screenings and other airport security. Fortification of embassies, for example, is not effective. (Lum 2) This suggests that some targets will remain targets despite any attempts to protect them, but also that use of human security is one of the best deterrents, especially in areas with high amounts of human traffic. The same report lists many useful strategies for counterterror and protection, and the items from the list that the US should use are as follows: airport screening; building security; emergency response preparedness, diplomatic efforts; detection devices for biological weapons; medical antidotes for various biological threats; emergency response preparedness, educational and awareness support; arrest; seal/tamper proof devices; use of media (Lum 34). These are all very basic, physical strategies that improve general security and minimize damage. The use of security and secure devices thwarts attempts at attacks. The medical suggestions will help preserve human life, while education for citizens, professionals, first responders, and government employees can help produce a better, more efficient response that also minimizes damage. Diplomatic efforts, finally, can strengthen external and multilateral security while creating less political and cultural motivation for attacks. The most immediate need, however, is implementation of security, medical preparedness, and public awareness in major cities in anticipation of this near term attacks. The key to everything in a situation of unknowns is strong prevention forces, supplemented by strong capacity for damage control. This provides for dual planning—one plan counting on successful deterrence, and one providing for successful response. Finally, the existence of this imminent threat should be communicated to the public in a different method than in the past. This provides not only security and response readiness, but also public awareness. It is important to remember that citizens are as much a deterrent as the non-civilians who act as security. The previously mentioned assessment of Israeli strategies suggestions that past warnings by the US government have been vague and poorly coordinated. A successful system would be to have a single, reputable member of the US government announce the threat, especially if intelligence suggests it is imminent. This could be the Surgeon General, in the case of a biological attack, or other figures depending on what is predicted. The government needs to also have a prudent list of recommendations for the public. (Tucker) Government recommendations should be to be complicit with security, observant of strange practices, belligerent passengers, and threatening speech. The failure of American military officials to recognize the threatening remarks of a member of the US Army led to the recent shooting at Ft. Hood—this should be prevented by encouraging people to report suspicious persons and actions. It should also be pointed out that the innocent will not be punished, but that we must err on the side of safety. There should be information given for who to contact if one is in danger, as well as a general indication of what sort of target is suspected—in this case a high profile target with a large population. This results in an alert population who have a more than vague idea of what to watch for—also, the population is more willing to be vigilant when they know a legitimate piece of intelligence points to the attack, rather than a rumor. Overall, US policy can learn from that of other nations, as well as our past successes. We should maintain all measures brought into effect since 9/11, while also increasing our use of human security, preparedness of medical and other response officials, and finally, a sense of public trust and awareness. Immediate actions should include circulation of materials for response to biological attacks, notification of the public, inspections for strong adherence to security principles at border and transportation sites, and finally, training for medical and civil services on damage control and disaster response. We need to have a secure, impenetrable force around major infrastructure, but also accept the fact that we are unable to predict the unknown at full capacity—meaning we need to be ready more than anything to respond and save lives. References Argomaniz, Javier. (2010). The European Union Post-9/11 Counter-terror Policy Response: An Overview. Research Institute for European and American Studies, 140. Hoffman, Bruce. (2002). Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25.303-316. Lum, Cynthia, Kennedy, Leslie W., &Sherley, Alison J. (2006). The Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Strategies.A Campbell Systematic Review. Masse, Todd, O’Neill, Siobahn, & Rollins, John. (2007). The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress. CRS Report for Congress. Radlauer, Don. (2010). Rational Choice Deterrence and Israeli Counter-Terrorism. Institute for Study of Asymmetric Conflict. Retrieved from http://www.asymmetricconflict.org/index.php/articles/radlauer-rational-choice.html Tucker, Jonathon B. (2003). Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience.Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute.Retrieved from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/tucker-israel.html Read More