Combating Future Terrorism - Essay Example

Combating Future Terrorism Combating Future Terrorism Introduction Terrorism entails the systematic, although un ized, use of intimidation, terror or extreme violence as coercion means to achieve political objectives. Although the international community does not provide a legally binding definition or one based on criminal law, common definitions refer to acts of violence committed for ideological, political or religious purposes (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Such acts may also target or deliberately ignore the safety of civilians. The United States asS a region, through the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has categorized terrorism in the nation into two types, which are domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism has been described as the violence focusing on populations or the nation’s facilities but have no foreign direction. Such activities of groups of terrorists or individuals are homegrown, meaning they have no external assistance, such as funding, to attack populations or government elements. On the other hand, international terrorism involves activities that are either or both foreign-sponsored and foreign-based. Under the FBI’s foreign classification, the activities of violence may either extend beyond the US’s national boundaries or originate from foreign countries. In this sense, the distinction between international and domestic terrorism is not based on where the violent acts take place but rather, on the responsible groups’ or individuals’ origin (Enders & Sandler, 2006). Since the al-Qaeda led the 2001 September 11 attacks on the US, it has become difficult to clearly determine, define and predict the future characteristics of terrorism. Subsequently, the US has developed counter-terrorism strategies that will address any form of terrorist attacks aimed at its facilities and populations. Basing on the decision that foreign terrorism constitutes the greatest threat to the US, this paper will support the decision and discuss combating future terrorism using diversity, cultural and historic aspects. Terrorism, evidently, results from the interactions of human beings sharing an environment with other groups, individuals and governments. The government may or may not meet the expectations and needs of its people; the people increasingly and continuously identify with radicals founded on different reasons; the people may have experienced genuine or perceived trauma or discrimination, which may either be indirectly or first hand; the people may also have met charismatic leaders or heard of resonant messages that interconnect with their emotional vulnerabilities. With this knowledge and understanding, the US government can use both military and socio-economic strategies to eradicate the motivation of terrorist individuals or groups. Further, constitutional amendments and future legislation can also be used to detect and mitigate potential terrorist attacks. A study on the nature of historical occurrences of terrorism can also help in strategizing on preparedness and prevention of such acts (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). Large-scale terrorism attacks that have taken place on US soil include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; the Murrah Federal Building 1995 bombing in Oklahoma; the second-time attack on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001; and the anthrax attack. Presently, the general terms under which the international terrorism threat is presented to US interests arises from extremists of Sunni Islam such as the al-Qaeda organization, and can be categorized into three. They include the radical international movement of the jihad, formalized organizations of terrorists and states that sponsor the activities of international terrorism. US interests, both within the nation and abroad, are under threat from each of these categories. However, the al-Qaeda threat is just part of a larger threat presented by the radical jihad movement, which is international, and comprises individuals of diverse races, tribes, ethnicities and nationalities. To justify the greater threat posed to the US by international terrorism, studies have established that global trends signify that the terrorist groups’ increasing number will become more difficult to identify and track as they get more networked (Rosenfeld, 2011). The unique features of some economies within the US also compound the problem, for example Texas. The state’s geographical location affords it a critical infrastructure and valuable resources that present various challenges to counterterrorism. Quite agreeably, consequences of domestic terrorism have the potential to be more devastating compared to international terrorism, but this notion seems to stem from a misconception and stereotyped perception of who a terrorist is (Hoffman, 2006). For example, when Representative Giffords was shot in Arizona alongside other civilians, the act was disturbing not so much because of the terror unleashed, but more of the fact that the young male who committed it was white. This implies that a nation’s consciousness can be damaged irreparably when it is known that acts of terrorism were perpetrated by its own citizen(s). After such occurrences, citizens can live with the fear that domestic terrorists amongst them can capitalize on their privilege of being citizens, not requiring passports or visa processes and fluently speaking English. However, in spite of these realities and the relative ease with which domestic terrorism may be carried out, it is much less likely than an attack from an international terror group. After learning the great Revolution’s history and the Pledge of Allegiance, most US citizens tend to be very patriotic, while those who deviate are most likely to end up in local crime gangs rather than bomb experts or suicide bombers (Hoffman, 2006). Although the terror tools at the disposal of the assailants in both domestic and international terrorism are essentially similar, the effects vary greatly. Large terror groups such as the al-Qaeda are inherently a greater threat than the smaller homegrown groups because of their tendency of being better organized (Schmid, 2004). A myriad of open source analysts coupled with the advent of the internet has allowed the FBI and CIA to identify and contain homegrown terrorists from their formative stages. Increasingly, it has become more difficult to do the same with international terrorists mainly because of the capabilities afforded to them by their large organization, making them more of a threat in a physical sense. Terrorist networks have been evolving in recent years, enabling them to isolate themselves from state sponsorship (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). This has created room for some of the most dangerous individuals or groups to operate as non-state actors. They take maximum advantage of international and interlinked systems such as transit, communications and finance, and with the presence of porous borders, the terror groups can access any geographical region worldwide. The al-Qaeda is often used as an example because it is positioned at this trend’s forefront, with its network spreading from its base between Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s borderlands to Southeast Asia, Yemen and parts of Africa. This group is made more dangerous by its fundamentals based on the extremities of the salafi ideology, which is characterized by hardcore disagreement with Western influence as well as the drive to create a worldwide Islamic caliphate (Rosenfeld, 2011). Because of its nature of having potential to transpire at any region and moment, it is difficult to forecast terrorism with any or much accuracy. As a strategy, the Department of Homeland Security issued the Homeland Security Advisory System, which is a terrorism warning scheme based on a color code (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). The scheme provides five levels of threat or varying intensity, each represented by a different color. In ascending order, the intensities are represented by green, blue, yellow, orange and red. The low-level threats (green), need protective measures like regular assessment of facilities for apparent weaknesses and implementing means to minimize them. They also call for the training of local government and state employees in ways of dealing with situations of terrorism. The second level (blue), denotes guarded threat intensity with general risks of coming under attack. It requires reviews and updates of communications systems and emergency response processes by government agencies through the provision of necessary information to the public. Thirdly, the yellow or elevated level portrays significant risks of coming under attack. The government is required to increase surveillance of vital locations. It should then coordinate emergency plans with jurisdictions neighboring such locations and implement emergency response and contingency plans. The orange level denotes high risks of attack that demand the coordination of appropriate security efforts with law enforcement bodies and the disciplined forces. The authorities must also prepare to work from substitute locations or with dispersed personnel and at the same time restrict access to crucial personnel. Finally, the red level denotes a severe risk of attack. Preventive governmental action includes setting up teams of specially trained persons and assigning others for emergency response. Further, the government must constrain, redirect or monitor transportation systems and close some or all of its facilities. Apart from the color-coded approach, governmental strategies must also focus on the entire scale of radicalization, which includes the elementary reasons that drive people towards participation in terrorism. This implies that the government must devise strategies that will counteract the simple yet popular messages that almost always resonate with people (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). The basic way to attain this is by having focus on collective grievances or social injustices such as the situation of occupation by a foreign authority. This idea is informed by the knowledge that terrorism breeds well on deprivation. Although the sum of data available to the US government is vast, the processing and using system is relatively weak (Rosenfeld, 2011). Therefore, an effective way for it to counter terrorism would be shifting from the emphasis of needing to know to that of needing to share information. However, this should not be misinterpreted to denote that the government should stop gathering new information. The government already knows that the enemy or threat is not simply terrorism, but the threat Islamist terrorism poses through its leaders who draw on enduring customs of excessive intolerance in a marginal strain of Islam. Such minorities do not distinguish religion from politics and, in doing so, distort both. Islam is not the threat; the threat stems from its perversion. The threat extends beyond al-Qaeda and encompasses the radical movement of ideology, of which al-Qaeda partly inspires (Rosenfeld, 2011). This, inadvertently, spawns other violence and terror groups. Therefore, the US government strategies must address the two key objectives of, first, dismantling the network of al-Qaeda and secondly, as a long term strategy, triumphing over the philosophies that contribute towards and support Islamist terrorism. The socio-economic front can also be effectively used to combat terrorism. Growing uncertainties and risks of terrorism have been known to bring down the willingness of consumers to spend, especially on key consumable durables and discretionary items (Hoffman, 2006). This depresses growth by cutting down on investment on consumer goods. The insurance, postal, restaurant, accommodation, tourism and travel industries are specifically susceptible in the event of a terrorist attack. The most affected are economies and regions concentrated with such industries through falling employment and outputs, but the general threat of terrorism retards overall economic growth. New measures in counter terrorism call for one-time investments that incur mid-term and short-term expenses of conducting business (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). Ultimately, such expenses become dividend paying investments by increasing the efficiency of trade and reducing risk premiums. Advances in technology that augment security, apart from their ability to reduce exposure to terrorism, can also boost the movement of people and cargo handling efficiency which, in turn, lower the costs of trade and makes its flow more efficient. Economic growth in both regional and global levels is achieved through the prevention of restricted trade flows as well as the encouraging of investment. Through expansion and prosperity, organizations and the nation can fund activities and policies that spread out a new middle class, especially within communities traditionally known to have supported groups of terrorists. With a continued recognition and acknowledgment of the economic benefits brought about by peace, the population will endeavor to slow down the local support that terrorism receives. According to the recommendations presented by the 9/11 Commission, sound developments in economic policies are key elements to the identification of potential terrorist safe havens and preventing their eventual fruition into operational terrorism. The US government’s comprehensive counterterrorism strategy must entail economic policies that promote better living, more open societies and encourage development. When economic growth is ignited and sustained in the poorest neighborhoods, there is less motivation for the population to seek alternative routes, such as terrorism, to survival. When it comes to the trial of terrorists, the government should consider having them prosecuted in federal rather than military procedures and commissions. Ideologically, when terrorists are tried in military tribunals, they are elevated to warrior statuses (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). When they are tried in civilian courts, their prestige is considerably lowered, projecting a more confident image of the US. At the same time, terrorism must be fought while maintaining focus on respecting and promoting human rights. Possible terrorist attacks could also be hindered by constitutional amendments and future legislations (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011). From earlier changes in the legislation, membership in an organization that has terrorist intentions was made punishable. Having been made more explicit, the participation concept currently encompasses material and financial support as well as the preparation of brutal crimes. Through the anti-terrorism legislation, some types of law are designed and passed with the objective of fighting terrorism. Most often than not, such legislation is informed by and based on specific patterns of past assassinations and bombings. In such anti-terrorism legislation, there are usually specific amendments that allow the nation to bypass its own legislation in a bid to fight crimes related to terrorism through the logic of necessity. A particular example is the USA PATRIOT Act, which is an Act of Congress that President Bush signed into law in 2001. Broken down into titles, the PATRIOT Act has provisions for enhancing domestic measures of security against terrorist activities; surveillance procedures; prevention of money laundering; border security; removing investigation obstacles to terrorism; terrorism victims and their families; increased sharing of information for protection of critical infrastructure; terrorism criminal law; improved intelligence; and a miscellaneous title that altered several laws that did not fit into any other section of the Act (Wulf, Haimes & Longstaff, 2003). The PATRIOT Act necessarily affords the government additional powers to acquire personal information on its citizens and detain aliens deemed to threaten national security as well as holding them without acknowledgment from the public. The additional power is necessary because it allows federal law enforcement agencies more wiretap authority and access to library and student records as well as bookshop sales records. Through this power, the government can establish a trend in what people have generally been reading, which is an indicator of the general public mood and opinion. Conclusion Although the frequency of attacks may decrease over time due to preparedness of the US to counter terrorism, terrorism in itself may get more sophisticated in its operational trends in future (Rosenfeld, 2011). Having evolved and survived through several millennia as a conflict method to thrive in the modern age of information, terrorism is adapting to meet the challenges posed by emerging conflict forms. Just like they have demonstrated historically, terrorists will continue to develop new attack capabilities and improve the efficiency of their existing methods. In a bid to demonstrate international capabilities, terrorist groups have successfully and significantly moved away from the subordinate position in nation-state clashes to the prominent global manipulations in their own right. Over the long term, they have exhibited their ability to adapt to the methods and techniques of intelligence organizations and counter terror agencies, a trend that is likely to carry on in the foreseeable future (Hoffman, 2006). The efficiency of terrorist activities will be enhanced by aggressively using modern technology to communicate and manage information. Further, with their increasing purchasing power and the availability of weapons technology, international terrorists are more likely to match the efforts and strategies designed against them, albeit short term. References Asal, V., & Rethemeyer, R. (2008). The nature of the beast: Organizational structures and the lethality of terrorist attacks. Journal of Politics, 70(2), 437–449. Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (2006). The Political economy of terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Enders, W., Sandler, T., & Gaibulloev, K. (2011). Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics. Journal of Peace Research, 48(1), 319–337. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rosenfeld, J. (2011). Terrorism, identity and legitimacy: The four waves theory and political violence. London: Routledge. Schmid, A. (2004). Statistics on terrorism: The challenge of measuring trends in global terrorism. Forum on Crime and Society, 4(1), 49-69. Wulf, W., Haimes, Y., & Longstaff, T. (2003). Strategic alternative responses to risks of terrorism. Risk Analysis, 23(2), 429–444. Read More