Neuroscience and Identity Theory - Essay Example

Running Head: NEUROSCIENCE Neuroscience of the of the Neuroscience Introduction Neuroscience is founded on a philosophy of mind known as identity theory. John Searles, a modern philosopher of mind, asks, "Why do we think of ourselves as mindful, rational, conscious, free agents in a world which science tells us consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, physical particles being influenced by forces in a determined way? (Searle, 1994, Press) This is the mind/brain dilemma that we, as psychotherapists, face in our clinical work every day. Do we inform our patients that they are suffering from "chemical imbalances" or from "unresolved developmental traumas?" There is a conflict between these two approaches, and psychiatry, in the process of switching its "basic science" allegiance from psychoanalysis to neuroscience, is jumping from one side of the conflict to the other.”(Schwartz, 2000, 275) Current philosophy of mind, both stimulated and rejuvenated by neuroscience research, is in fast pursuit of a comprehensive mind/brain theory. But as of now, no existing theory of mind is complete (LeDoux, 1995, Press). Neuroscience has a conceptual foundation that is based on an incomplete theory of mind and brain: identity theory. This theory fails to capture essential human features and leaves psychotherapy a mysterious process. Identity Theory Identity theory was inspired by Wilder Penfields dramatic neurosurgical research (Place, 1999, 45). In the late 1950s, Penfield directly stimulated the cortex of conscious patients undergoing brain surgery for epilepsy. His findings, based on the verbal reports of patients, demonstrated the exact location in the brain of certain mental functions. The highly publicized motor homunculus that came out of his research pointed to an isomorphism between mental states and brain neuroprocesses. (Bechtel, 1998, 23) Identity theorists, then, advanced the straightforward proposal that mental terms and physical terms actually have the same referent--namely, a particular physical configuration of the brain. Identity theory is modelled after other successful reduction theories in science. Consider the example of genes and chromosomes. Genes came from Mendels research on inheritance, while chromosomes were discovered by cytological research. Chromosomes and genes were only later discovered to be identical, allowing gene theory to be reduced to chromosome theory. Other identity examples frequently cited include lightening to electricity, temperature to kinetic energy, and sound to the compression of air molecules (Rorty, 2001, 226). In each case, the original theory (lightening, temperature, sound) has been reduced to a physical theory (electricity, kinetic energy, compression of air molecules). Identity theorists reduce the original theory of mind to the physical theory of brain (Adolphs, 2004, Press). Identity theorists state their thesis strongly, eliminating the possibility of it being construed as a parallel description theory. In the words of J. J. Smart, "When I say that a sensation is a brain event, or that lightening is an electrical discharge, I am using the sense of strict identity . . . there are not two things: a flash of light and an electrical discharge. There is only one thing, a flash of lightening, which is described scientifically as an electrical discharge to earth from a cloud of ionized water molecules" (Smart , 1999, 142). There is not a mind and a brain; there is only a brain, which is described scientifically in the language of neurophysiology. Once wee have a sufficient understanding of the neurophysiology of mental events, we will no longer need a mental language to understand humans. Neuroscience and Identity Theory Although neuroscientists rarely expound upon their conceptual theories, there are clear parallels between identity theory and the foundations of research described in neuroscience texts. To quote from Eric Kandels Principles of Neuroscience: "The key philosophic theme of modern neural science is that all behaviour is a reflection of brain function . . . the mind represents a range of functions carried out by the brain. The action of the brain underlies not only relatively simple behaviour such as walking and smiling, but also elaborate functions such as feeling, thinking, and writing a poem. As a corollary, the disorders of affect and cognition that characterize neurotic and psychotic illness must result from disturbances in the brain" (Kandel, 1995, Press). Neuroscience sees the mind as identical to brain functions, and as such, it is working within the same theoretical foundation as identity theory. A research method is limited by the conceptual foundations that guide it. Just as you cannot see the stars through the tool of a microscope, you cannot see essential human features through the conceptual tool of identity theory. But what are these essential human features that are so elusive to identity theory and neuroscience methods? Philosophy of mind tries to answer this question. The essential features that consistently arise are: intentionality, consciousness, and free will. Researchers calling these features essential, because they make up practically all of our inner world and what are most human, and least machine like, about us (Phelps, 2006, 27). From the perspective of therapy, these features are absolutely crucial for dynamic psychotherapy as we know it. Lets look at the essential human features more closely. Although most behavioural neuroscientists exhibit little aversion to empirically useful forms of zoomorphism (humans, after all, are animals), most psychologists typically exhibit a reflexive resistance to all forms of anthropomorphism because humans have such a massive mental complexity compared with other animals. Among most animal behaviourists and likewise among the larger community of animal lovers that desires to appreciate the mental characteristics of their favourite species with no special interest in how their findings may apply to the human condition (e.g., Shafe, 2004, Press), there is also a widespread appreciation of the fact that other animals must be studied on their own terms (Hauser, 2000, Press). Unfortunately, the animal behaviourists who have no special interest in the sources of human behaviour sometimes fail to recognize that well-reasoned, neuroscientifically constrained anthropomorphism may be the only effective strategy for understanding certain foundational aspects of mind that cannot be studied in adequate detail in humans. In general, the traditional and still widespread aversion to anthropomorphism may reflect a blanket acceptance of conclusions from an earlier era when evolutionary issues and neuroscience were not in the mainstream of psychological thought (McGaugh, 2000, Press). To the extent that predictions from theoretical views of affective processing in animal brains yield affirmative predictions in human studies, the weight of evidence for the existence of affective processes in other animals is also strengthened. Investigators who have had historically well-reasoned objections to such approaches, most of which boil down to the fact that mental states cannot be directly observed, may now wish to soften their antagonism toward the discussion of affective states in other animals. Conclusion What relevance can clinicians take from this philosophic debate? Drug advertisers and brain researchers saturate us with images of brain scans and illustrations of neurotransmitters. Without a check on the imagination, it can seem that we have nearly solved the mysteries of the brain. The philosophy literature helps us appreciate the great complexity of mind/body interactions, and it makes us realize that current research in neuroscience is far from complete. It helps us appreciate that the greatest difficulty for understanding people will be the three essential human features of intentionality, consciousness, and free will. Because of the difficulty resolving these essential human features in neuroscience, clinicians can be assured that the need for skilled psychotherapists will last, and we can know that it is precisely our skill in working with the essential human features that will make psychotherapy valuable and irreplaceable for the foreseeable future. The essential human feature of intentionality is necessary for learning the content of our patients difficulties. Without content (or aboutness), it is impossible to derive meaning. Clinically, we refer to patients who fail to use intentionality as "nongsychologically minded," "somatisizers," or "alexothymic." If patients say to us that they are sad, but cannot say what they are sad about, our task becomes very difficult. If a patient tells us he is sad about the loss of his wife, we have psychotherapeutic material to work with. One of the consequences of biological psychiatry is that more patients tend to identify mental problems as symptoms of "physical illness." As a result, they use less intentionality in explaining their symptoms. Patients now often complain of depression without being able to describe what their sadness is about any more than patients who come with stomach pain can tell us what their pain is about (Dolan, 2000, Press). In psychotherapy, we not only work with our patients consciousness, we try to increase it. D. M. Armstrong, reminiscent of Freud, defines consciousness as an "inner eye." (Armstrong, 2000, 193) Consciousness, in this sense, is the capacity to perceive and make discriminations between different and subtle internal mental states. Our patients come to us in a state that resembles partial automatic pilot. They often cannot tell whether they are mad, sad, frustrated or disappointed. They react reflexively to events in their lives with little perspective or distance. Therapy, of almost any school, helps patients develop their inner eye (or consciousness); like developing an ear for music, or an eye for photography, therapy is the process of developing the capacity for inner awareness. Instead of acting reflexively, patients have increased options through their increased awareness. But increased options are of little use if you are not free to choose between them. In psychotherapy, we are also attempting to increase our patients autonomy; to do that we assume that people have at least some free will (Maren, 2005, 90). Consider the notion of external coercion. You may be considered individually free (sidestepping neurological determinism) if you are not being externally coerced. If someone puts a gun to my head, and tells me to give up my wallet, my decision is not a free one. In psychotherapy, we try to increase our patients freedom by reducing "internal" coercion. We try to help them increase their free will, or autonomy, which will be exceedingly difficult to do using deterministic approaches like neuroscience alone. The explosion of knowledge in neuroscience will result in a continued evolution in philosophical and clinical views of mind and brain. But for now, there is no unassailable unified theory of humans (Verhulst, 2003, 122). Clinicians must accept this theoretical ambiguity rather than prematurely adopt a science that, as of now, only provides a futuristic explanation of humanness. If we become so enamoured by neuroscience that we let our psychotherapy skills slide, we will severely limit our abilities to care for the problems our patients bring us. We are in a time when we have no choice but to embrace the heuristic tool of the biopsychosocial model, not because it is a complete theoretical mechanism of mind/brain (environment) interaction, but because it is the best organizing concept we have that encompasses the most essential features of humanness. References Adolphs R (2004) Processing of emotionaland social information by the human amygdala(chapter 73) In M.S Gazzaniga (ed.) The cognitive neurosciences (3rd edition) MIT Press Armstrong, D.M. (2000). The Nature of mind. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 190-199). Press. Bechtel, W. (1998). Philosophy of Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 23-25. Dolan, R.J (2000) Emotional processing in the human brain as revealed through functional neuroimaging.In M.S Gazzaniga (ed) The new cognitive neurosciences. Cambridge: MIT Press LeDoux, J (1995) In search of an emotional system in the brain (chapter 69.In M.S. Gazzaniga (ed) The cognitive neurosciences. Cambridge: MIT Press Maren, S (2005) Building and burying fear memories in the brain. The Neuroscientist, 89-99 McGaugh, J et al (2000) Modulation of memory storage by stress hormones and the amygdalois complex.In MS Gazzaniga (ed) The New cognitive neurosciences.Cambridge: MIT Press Phelps,E.A.(2006) Emotion and cognition: Insights from the studies of human amygdala. Annual review of psychology, 24 (57): 27-53 Shafe, G.E and LeDoux, J (2004) The neural basis of fear (Chapter 71) In MS Gazzaniga(ed) The cognitive neurosciences (3rd edition) MIT Press Hauser, M. D. (2000). Wild minds: What animals really think, Press. Kandel, E.R. (1995). Principles of Neural Science. University Press. Place, U.T. (1996). Is consciousness a brain process? The British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50. Rorty, R. (2001). In Defense of eliminative materialism. In D. Rosenthal (Ed.), Materialism and the Mind-body problem (pp. 223-232). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Schwartz, S. (2000). Organic or functional? Why psychiatry needs a philosophy of mind. Psychiatric Annals, 20, 271-278. Searle, J. (1994). Minds, Brains, and Science. Cambridge, MA: University Press. Smart, J.J. (1999). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, 68, 141-156. Verhulst, J. (2003). The Psychotherapy curriculum in the age of biological psychiatry. Academic Psychiatry, 15 (3), 120-131. Read More