Stability of Discrete Emotions and Their Relationship With Episodic Recall - Research Proposal Example

Stability of discrete emotions and their relationship with episodic recall College Introduction Problem ment An extensivebody of research shows that emotionally charged events are better remembered than affectively neutral incidents or episodes. However, the investigation of emotion is less well developed than that of episodic memory. Recent developments in affective neuroscience have strengthened the case for a small number of basic discrete emotions (e.g. anger, fear, sadness, and happiness), which activate unique and consistent neural pathways (Vytal & Hamann, 2010). However, they have been no studies to date examining the relationship between these discrete emotions and episodic memory capability. The relationship between episodic and emotional memory systems is undoubtedly complex. The two systems are heavily cooperative (Kensinger, 2009), yet the neuropsychological literature consistently reveals a strong anatomical and functional dissociation between them (Daselaar, et al., 2008; Cabeza, 1999). The proposed project will investigate the differences in the stability across time of the four discrete emotions (fear, anger and sadness). In addition, this project will examine the relationship between emotional and episodic memory and the intensity of these emotions in an elderly population. Significance of the study Despite the abundance of literature on the neuropsychological and cognitive-psychological processes at work in episodic memory, research on the neuropsychological, neurophysiological and cognitive structures and processes involved in the experience of emotion is sparse. Yet, there is no systematic work examining the relationship between reliably definable discrete basic emotions and episodic memory. The proposed research is an early attempt to rectify this omission and begin to fill out a gap in the evidence base. Moreover, the crucial role of emotional intensity on cognition is evident in many clinical phenomena where mood or anxiety disorders predominate, such as in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression (Tiller, 1996). Patients find themselves recurrently flooded with negatively charged emotions that significantly impair their quality of life (Piche & Rainville, 2010). Identifying specific relationships between the types of emotion experienced, its intensity and its effects on recall may help identify new therapeutic targets for the alleviation of disorders such as these. Background The cognitive revolution in psychology has yielded a wealth of new understanding concerning the intricate processes involved in human cognition and memory, marking an enormous advance on the earlier behaviourist paradigm (Miller, 2003). However, a growing number of investigators (Panksepp, 2004; Damasio, 2000; Solms & Nersessian, 1999) are questioning the relative marginalisation of affective processes as conceptually and neurobiological distinct from cognitive processes. Until the late 1990s, many neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists adopted a purely cognitive information-processing paradigm in which neuronal action potentials were considered the fundamental, measurable “language” of neural systems; a view that relegated affect to the status of a largely counterproductive distraction. In this perspective, affective and cognitive processes are seen as minor variations on an information-processing theme. For example, one prominent investigator, while welcoming renewed attention to the neurone-anatomy and psychobiology of emotion, argued that affects are better considered as epiphenomena emerging from the interplay between unconscious subcortical processes and the vastly more complex human cortex (LeDoux, 2000). A study by Gray (1990) found attempts to distinguish between emotion and cognition using pharmacological manipulations was counterproductive. The results showed that the drugs affected both emotion and cognition simultaneously and largely indistinguishably. Others argued that, although both were involved in sensory processing such as the encoding of emotionally arousing events into memory, cognitive and emotional responses could not be scientifically distinguished from one another with any reliability (Parrott and Schulkin, 1993). More recently, however, the emphasis is changing in favour of a more nuanced investigation of the role of emotion in mental processes involving cognition. The new discipline of “affective neuroscience” (Panksepp, 1991) has grown considerably stronger in the last decade and seeks to integrate cognitive science and neuropsychological investigation with behavioural neuroscience and psychobiological investigation (see Panksepp, 2004 for further elaboration). Possibly, because the new paradigm is in its infancy, the findings that are emerging, although instructive, are also somewhat puzzling. A detailed overview of the entire field is beyond the scope of this review, therefore this review and proposed study will focus on the relationship between emotional and episodic memory systems. Emotion and memory: Key research findings Events eliciting strong emotional arousal at the time of their occurrence are considerably more likely to be remembered than events that are emotionally neutral (Anderson et al., 2006). When noradrenaline receptors are blocked with propranolol, the enhancement effect of emotionally arousing stimuli on subsequent retrieval is diminished to the point of nonexistence (Kroes, Strange, & Dolan, 2010). However, Easterbrook (1959) proposed that emotionally arousal focuses attention on the affect-laden focal detail at the expense of peripheral details. Support for this proposal has come from Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton and Schacter (2007), who found that subjects remembered the focal detail of an emotionally arousing image (e.g. a snake or a car accident) but recalled little of the peripheral detail (e.g., the background in which the snake or car crash image was set). Subjects were able to recall details that are more peripheral when neutral, as opposed to affectively charged, images were presented. This effect appears to hold for sequential as well as spatial details. Hurlemann et al. (2005) found that subjects presented with an emotionally charged word are more able to recall it than the neutral word that followed it. Evidence is accumulating that the valence of the emotion aroused during an experienced event is of considerable importance, with negative valence enhancing significantly more detail during recall than positive emotion. In the aforementioned study by Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton and Schacter (2007) subjects remembered specific details about the type of snake they saw rather than the type of gown or cake they saw in presented images. When “remember / know” distinctions are, invited, negative stimuli are vastly more likely to be remembered, while positively inflected items attract more “know” (familiarity) responses (Ochsner, 2000). Positive emotion accompanying an event appears to result in reduced confidence at recall (i.e., more people “know” that the event happened than confidently “remember” that it did), as well as reduced detail. For example, when a recognition memory test was conducted about events occurring in the O. J. Simpson trial, participants who felt positively about the verdict were more inclined to believe that fictitious events had occurred than those who felt angry about the verdict (Levine and Bluck, 2004). Furthermore, mood at the time of memory testing can also influence the accuracy of recall. With participants induced into a positive mood under laboratory conditions yielding significantly more reconstructive memory mistakes (claiming that they had seen items which had not previously been presented, or failing to remember previously included items) than those induced into a neutral or negative mood (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Research into the emotional and episodic memory systems consistently shows that, while they are heavily cooperative, they also appear to be both functionally and anatomically distinct. The following reviews first the evidence concerning cooperation and subsequently the evidence revealing the distinctions between the two. Evidence for the cooperation of emotion and episodic memory systems It is agreed that effective recall involves three essential processes: 1) Encoding; 2) Conversion into a relatively stable representation (consolidation); 3) Retrieval of the representation. Evidence consistently suggests that emotionally arousing sensory input is more likely to be attended to by the subject, with the efficacy of each of the three aforementioned processes being enhanced, beginning with encoding (MacLeod and Mathews, 2004; Dolan and Vuilleumier, 2003). Emotionally arousing stimuli are also more likely to be consolidated into long-term memory than non-emotional stimuli, which are more easily forgotten (LaBar and Phelps, 1998). Neurobiological research suggests that the amygdala becomes detectably more active during emotionally laden perceptual stimuli, and it is believed to enhance both encoding and consolidation (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). Further research suggests that the amygdala interacts with the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and hippocampus to enhance memory (Cahill and McGaugh, 1996). However, discovering whether and how the amygdala influences retrieval in response to post-event emotional stimuli has been altogether more difficult to ascertain (Buchanan, 2007). Nonetheless, Buchanan’s (2007) review of studies from animal learning, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology suggests that emotion exerts a broad influence on the retrieval of episodic memory events, with episodic memory systems and emotional processes cooperating deeply with each other. Of relevance, here is the “affect priming theory” of Bower and Forgas (2000), which states that affects are held in the mind in the form of associative networks. This theory suggests that when a specific emotional state is elicited elements within the associative network for that affect may also be activated, resulting in memories with a similar emotional valence being retrieved more readily than those with a dissimilar valence. Moreover, according to a development of the theory dubbed the “affect infusion model” (AIM) (Bower & Forgas, 2000; Forgas, 1995), emotion infuses cognition more readily when subjects engage in free recall exercises rather than in more experimentally controlled procedures such as recognition testing. In one study from cognitive psychology, investigators sought to elicit positive and negative moods in participants prior to a memory retrieval exercise focusing on prior positive or negative autobiographical events. All words were initially studied in a neutral mood but, on retrieval, negative mood led to more accurate recall of negative words, positive mood enhanced retrieval of positive words and neutral words appeared immune to mood manipulation (Teasdale and Russell, 1983) Neurobiological studies of animal learning have highlighted the relevance of the dense interconnections between the amygdala and hippocampus not just in encoding and consolidation but in retrieval too (Packard & Cahill, 2001). Activity between the two structures showed marked synchronisation during retrieval exercises in fear-conditioned mice when the animals were exposed to the conditioned stimulus (CS) and to the original testing environment in the absence of the CS. Therefore, the hippocampus and amygdala appear to cooperate in the retrieval of fear events (Seidenbecher et al., 2003). Neurone imaging techniques have furthered elucidated the neural pathways and structures involved in retrieval of emotional information. Smith et al. (2006) presented subjects with neutral objects paired with emotional or neutral scenes. At the recall test, one group was asked to link the objects with the type of emotional scene they had originally been coupled with (i.e. actively recall the emotional context) while the other group was asked only if the original scene had contained people (i.e. the recall task was emotionally neutral even though the recall source was emotionally laden). These recall tasks were designed to make emotion a deliberate or contingent aspect of the retrieval process. All participants showed more activity in both the right and left medial PFC, hippocampi and amygdalae, indicating that an emotionally laden source influences activity in these structures during retrieval. However, subjects who had been emotionally oriented showed more activity in and greater functional connectivity between these structures than those given the neutral recall activity (Smith et al., 2006). Thus, emotional state at recall influences the neural processing of the retrieval task. Evidence for functional and anatomical distinctness of emotion and episodic memory systems Despite the deep co-operation that appears to exist in the aforementioned research between emotion and episodic memory, other evidence strongly suggests that they nonetheless constitute anatomically and functionally distinct systems. This growing body of material tends to support Panksepp’s (2004) long-held view that emotional systems constitute evolutionarily more ancient adaptive responses that can nonetheless guide later-evolved cognitive decision-making capacities through their unique, valence attributes. Examples of this would include eating when hungry, drinking water when thirsty, or seeking company when lonely. They help organisms decide between bad/toxic and good/survival-enhancing phenomena and are, Panksepp insists, distinct from later evolutionary developments which permit complex cognitive problem solving. To understand their role in cognition, we must first understand their distinct neurobiological foundations. Panksepp (2004) outlines a number of key phenomenological and neurobiological distinctions between affective and cognitive processes. Unlike pure cognitions, affects are always inherently positively or negatively valence. Moreover, emotional responsiveness can survive a range of brain injuries that seriously impair cognitive processes. For example, neonate rats that undergo cortical destruction are virtually unable to learn but still show intact emotional responses (Kolb & Tees, 1990). One study found that people with stroke injury to the left cerebral hemisphere are painfully aware of the damage they have sustained, while those with similar injury to the right hemisphere seemed relatively unperturbed by their plight (Gainotti, 2001). The findings lend credence to the view that the left hemisphere manages cognitive skills and more positively valence emotions, while the right hemisphere manages deeper and more negatively valenced emotions. Studies of autobiographical memory retrieval suggest that a number of spatially distributed brain areas are involved in many functions. These functions include directive, social, and self-representation activities. It also performs another function referred to as adaptive as stated by Conway (2008). Directive function is an action whereby experiences are used to solve the problems and control the present and future activities. Social function helps in sharing memories with other people. This helps in strengthening the existing bonds between people. Autobiography memory is responsible for self-representation whereby its work is to maintain self-identity. Lastly, the adaptive function of autobiography memory is to use the personal experiences to control negative moods or to maintain good moods (Conway, 2008). . Notably, these involve the visual cortex (Wheeler, Petersen and Buckner, 2000) medial temporal lobe (MTL; Squire, Stark and Clarke, 2004), PFC (Stuss and Levine, 2002), and the posterior parietal midline area (Shannon and Buckner, 2004). Specifically, the MDL and right PFC are involved in both the formation of memory traces and their retrieval, with the latter structure especially active during retrieval (Greenberg et al., 2005). Following retrieval, the mental elaboration of the memory trace seems to require visualisation, as evidenced by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans of the visual cortex during this process, which indicate increased activity (Voke, 1983). Elaboration involves significant cognitive processes such as selection and maintenance of information salient to the memory cue (Padila & Bajo, 1995). fMRI studies suggest that activity in the left PFC plays a key role during this phase (Wagner et al., 2001). Of particular interest are the findings from a unique fMRI study, which examined changes in activity over time across the spatially distributed “regions of interest” (ROI) described above (Daselaar et al., 2008). Participants received instructions via headphones whilst lying, eyes shut, in an fMRI cylinder. The researcher controlled visual stimuli to enable more accurate monitoring of activity levels in the visual cortex as the retrieval and elaboration phases proceeded. Participants were asked to respond to a series of cue words in a free associative fashion, pressing a button when they believed they had formed an autobiographical memory associated with the presented word. Following this, they were encouraged to think about, elaborate on the memory, and rate the emotional intensity they experienced on a scale of one to four by pressing a numbered button on the handset. They were also asked to rate the extent to which they felt they were reliving the memory, again on a scale of one to four. In addition to confirming the aforementioned fMRI findings, the study pinpointed the sequential nature of the structures and activities involved in retrieval and elaboration. Interestingly, the amygdala, parts of the temporoparietal region and areas of the PFC all became more active during the memory accessing phase of the exercise (i.e. just prior to the point where subjects confirmed that they had retrieved a memory associated with the word cue), suggesting that the emotional intensity of a source memory was detected before subjects. Discrete basic emotions Recent neuroimaging studies have also highlighted the utility of “discrete basic emotion theories”, which maintain that certain basic emotional states (e.g., fear, disgust, anger, sadness and happiness) have unique neural profiles (Ekman, 1999). In a positron emission tomography (PET), scan study of recalled autobiographical episodes. Damasio et al. (2000) found evidence correlating the four basic emotions happiness, sadness, anger, and fear with specific neural maps involving the upper brain stem nuclei and the somatosensory cortex. However, findings such as these have been challenged by reviews of the psychophysiological literature, which indicate that no specific psychophysiological correlates for basic emotions have been consistently confirmed (Barrett and Wager, 2006). Nonetheless a meticulous meta-analysis subjecting fMRI voxel data (“volume pixels” or voxels are the three-dimensional visual building blocks of fMR images) to a recently developed Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) method of analysis provides persuasive evidence that discrete basic emotions do indeed activate unique and specific neural pathways (Vytal and Hamann, 2010). ALE is a spatially sensitive method, which permits statistical likelihood calculations from numerous studies based on voxel distribution in fMRI scans. These investigators found that the five basic discrete emotions disgust, fear, anger, sadness and happiness elicited distinguishable and consistent neural activation patterns. Differing patterns of activity in the rostra anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and right superior temporal gyros (STG) permitted the clear differentiation of happiness from disgust, fear, anger and sadness. Each of the emotions had a unique activity profile. Sadness consistently activates the subgenera ACC and medial frontal gyros (MFG), while anger consistently and uniquely rouses the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), insula and parahippocampal gyros (PHG). The amygdala and insula were both consistently activated during fear responses, whereas the IFG and anterior angular were activated in disgust (Arsenault, 2010). These findings strongly suggest that basic discrete emotions are stable affective sets and that each elicits consistent and specific neural activation patterns. Purpose The purpose of the proposed study is to contribute toward the identification of any differences between the stability of four basic discrete emotions over time in a sample of neurologically normal elderly adults. It further aims to explore the possible effects of four basic discrete emotions on episodic memory recall across time. Research Hypothesis The hypothesis of the proposed research is that specific discrete emotions will affect episodic recall in particular ways. Negative emotions like sadness, fear, and anger are going to be remembered vividly. On the other hand, positive emotions (happiness) are will result in more reconstructive memory errors. To hone the hypothesis further; the greater the intensity of negative emotion evoked upon receiving the experimental stimuli (stories), the greater the accuracy and vividness of recall of the most emotionally charged event will be. Stability of the discrete emotions should also be considered. Are some discrete emotions more stable than others are? One of the objectives of the research is to determine whether some basic discrete emotions exert more stable effects on recall accuracy than others do. The three “negative” emotions for the test are fear, anger, and sadness. The experiment will attempt to ascertain whether these exert distinguishable or hierarchical effects on recall accuracy and vividness. High levels of emotional intensity experienced in these negative emotions will correlate more highly with the durability and accuracy of recall than will positive and neural emotions. Methodology Participants A cohort of twelve elderly participants aged between fifty and eighty years of age will be invited to participate in the study. Each will be negative for histories of neurological disease or disorder, psychiatric illness, or drug and/or alcohol misuse. The Ethics Committee at the University has appraised the protocol for ethical considerations for the study (Appendix). Participants will give written informed consent before participating in the research. Materials Each participant will report to the laboratory on five occasions. The researcher will read a series of four standardised experimental stories of similar length to the participants in the same order, each of them written on a printed sheet (Appendix). Each story is designed to evoke a specific discrete emotion (anger, fear, sadness or happiness). A series of three interference stories will also be read, one in each of session is two to five. These are designed to evoke mildly happy responses. Participants will then be asked to rate the intensity of their emotional response to each story on printed sheets containing their participant number and a Visual Analogue Mood Scale (VAMS) for each discrete emotion (Appendix). VAMS is a well-established, simple to use and reliable measure of discrete emotion intensity (Cella and Perry, 1986; Bond and Lader, 1974). After a free recall test, participants will be invited to provide subjective ratings on printed sheets similar in design to the emotional intensity VAMS (Appendix). Procedure Participants will take part in five separate sessions each lasting approximately ninety-minutes. In each of which the following data will be collected: 1. Participants’ ratings of the emotional intensity they experience for each discrete emotion tested (VAMS). 2. Free recall 3. Participants’ subjective ratings using a similar visual analogue scale to the emotional intensity measure Initial baseline data will be collected in the first session, which will test immediate and delayed recall. Immediate recall testing for each of the four stimuli (experimental stories eliciting emotional responses) will follow the same pattern. Participants will begin with a presentation in which the story stem (i.e., emotionally neutral beginning) will be read out. They will then complete a VAMS to rate the emotional intensity, by placing a mark on a vertical line connecting two simple line drawings depicting facial expressions for mood. At the top of the vertical line on each mood sheet is a neutral face while at the base, one of four basic discrete emotions will be depicted (i.e., one basic emotion per sheet). These are anger, sadness, happiness and fear. Once this data has been completed, the story ending will be read, following which participants will be asked to complete a second VAMS emotional self-report. The last task for this initial presentation step for each story is to ask participants to complete another visual analogue scale giving their subjective ratings. The latter is similar in design to the emotional self-report but uses simple words instead of line drawings. At the top of the vertical line is the statement “not at all” and at the bottom, the word “extremely.” Four separate sheets supplied to each participant, each asking a different question for rating. These are: 1. How memorable to do you think the previous story is? 2. How true (authentic, believable, factual, genuine) do you think the previous story is in general. 3. How close is the story to something that has already happened in your life? 4. How likely do you think it is for something like the previous story to happen to you in the future? Following the presentation, an immediate recall test will be conducted. The story stem only will be presented, followed by an emotional self-report. Participants will then be asked to remember as much as they can about the story and follow the stem in the original presentation (i.e. free recall). Participants will be allowed approximately two minutes to complete this exercise (supervisor to supply details, after which they will be asked to complete another VAMS emotional self-report, followed by an analogue scale subjective ratings exercise as described earlier. At this point, subjects will be asked to undertake a word recognition test before completing the third and final VAMS emotional self-report for each story. The above procedure (full presentation followed by stem only and immediate recall) will be repeated for experimental stories one to four in Session 1. At this point, delayed recall will be tested for each of the four stories, using exactly the same steps used in the immediate recall tests (i.e., presentation of story stem, emotional self-report #1, free recall, emotional self-report #2, subjective ratings, word recognition test, emotional self-report #3). Sessions two to five will each proceed according to the following protocol and will be separated from session one (and each other) by an interval of one week. The aim is to test the relative stability of basic discrete emotions on recall over time. Each session will begin with an iteration, in which the experimental story stem is presented again, a VAMS emotional self-report is completed and the story ending is again presented (the same stories used in Session 1 will be tested and presented in the same order in these sessions). Following the story ending in this iteration step, another VAMS emotional self-report will be completed, followed by subjective ratings. The analogue scales will be the same as those used in Session 1. Directly after the iteration, a free recall test will be conducted, following the same systematic pattern as described for immediate and delayed recall testing in Session 1. Each of the four different experimental stories will be subjected to the same procedure of an iteration followed by free recall test, with one story be presented per session in the same order. However, after the experimental story has been read and recall-tested in each of these sessions, one of three interference stories on mildly positive content will be presented and tested in an identical way (i.e. presentation of story stem, VAMS emotional self-report, presentation of inference story ending, VAMS emotional self-report and subjective ratings). An immediate recall test of the interference story will then be conducted as described earlier. In brief, the pattern for sessions two to five is as follows: 1) presentation of experimental story, followed by presentation of story stem and free recall test; 2) presentation of interference story (stem + ending), followed by presentation of inference story stem and free recall test. It is generally agreed that stories for elderly participants in memory studies such as this should assume a reading age of 9 years. Each of the seven stories included in the research (4 experimental stories 3 interference stories) has been carefully selected to meet this criterion, so the stimuli are well controlled for this sample. The text of each story was subject to a propositional analysis based on an updated version of Kintsch’s (1974) model to ensure readability. The density of propositions in each text is broadly similar, with none exceeding a reading age of 9.7 years or falling below a reading age of 8.9 years. The reading age of the short introductory story stems range from 7.7 years to 8.5 years. Proposed analyses To analyze this research, a mixed model ANOVA is used. Mean difference between the two groups i.e. positive emotions and the negative emotions are compared. The within-subject variables will include the negative emotions (fear, anger, and sadness). Therefore, the comparison will be within the means of these variables. Mean of each emotion is going to be calculated. This is done by determining the durability of each emotion over a particular time. The differences between these means are identified and their variance calculated. T-test will be used to determine the differences between means the variables (fear, anger, and sadness). This is going to show the differences of the variables over time. On the other hand, between-subject variables will involve the difference between the negative emotions and positive emotions. Their calculated means will be compared and the difference recorded. T-test will later be used to in calculating their differences. This is done by calculating the ratio between means these two variables. Mean of the negative emotions will be the numerator while for the positive emotions wills the denominator. Anticipated results Each experimental and interference story has been broken down into propositions for analysis of the accuracy of immediate and delayed recall. A working definition of the term “proposition” is that it refers to the smallest unit of a text that still conveys meaning (Turner and Greene, 1977). Propositions are therefore best thought of as concepts rather than words. Based on the findings from earlier research, I would anticipate that higher intensity of negative emotions (fear, anger and sadness) would produce a stronger enhancement effect than the positively–valence basic emotion (happiness), even where the latter is scaled as of high intensity. I further anticipate that this enhancement effect will be stronger over the five testing sessions for the negative emotions than for happiness, although I would expect more errors (falsifications and omissions) in the peripheral details of the stories in comparison with the most emotionally charged propositions (i.e. focal details will be recalled more accurately across time than peripheral details). Based on the findings of voxel-basis neuroimaging meta-analysis conducted by Vytal and Hamann (2010), I would expect intensity of fear and anger to be more stable predictors of future recall accuracy than sadness. I also anticipate that stories yielding a high intensity of the basic emotion happiness will be more subject to error in subsequent recall tests over times, with higher rates of intrusion, false memory, omission and general malleability than the three negatively-valence emotions tested in this research. References Anderson, A., Yamaguchi, Y., Grabski, W., & and Lacka, D. (2006). 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