How Did the Media Fail in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 - Case Study Example

How and why did the Media Fail in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994? Introduction In Rwanda, there are only three ethnic groups that include Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. The Hutu is the majority, followed by Tutsi and Twa respectively. Ethnic differences began to emerge in the early 90s when Hutu extremists within the country’s political elite accused the Tutsi ethnic group of Rwanda’s increased social, political and economic challenges. In addition, civilians from the Tutsi ethnic group were also accused of supporting the rebel group dominated by the Tutsi ethnic group. During this period, the Hutu extremists took advantage of the volatile situation in the country to spread propaganda that increased the division between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013). Further, there was a fear culture among the Hutu ethnic group against the Tutsi because of a long history of oppressive rule by the Tutsi minority in the country. The events that followed after the heightened tension in the country included shooting down the plane that carried the President on April 6, 1994. President Habyarimana was a Hutu and immediately after the shooting down of the plane, violence broke out in the country. Consequently, Hutu extremists took advantage of the situation and decided upon themselves to wipe the entire Tutsi population in the country. In the weeks following the shooting down of the plane, approximately 800,000 men, women and children were massacred in the Rwandan genocide (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). However, until the present date, the world is still wondering how and why the international community and, in particular, the media, never played its role appropriately in terms of informing the world appropriately regarding atrocities taking place in Rwanda. One of the key roles of the media, both local and international is to act as a watchdog. In this regard, the media had a responsibility of informing the world about what was taking place at that time (Schimmel, 2011). This paper explores how and why the media failed in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. How and why the media failed in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 While over 800,000 innocent civilians were massacred in the Rwandan genocide, the media, on the other hand, blamed the international community for failing to intervene quickly. However, it is also necessary for the media to share the blame because, they failed to recognize the extent of the killings immediately and mobilise the world’s attention. Further, the media failed in its duty to report the nationwide massacre that was taking place in Rwanda and only alerted the world three weeks after the violence began. At that time, over 250,000 civilians from the Tutsi ethnic group had already been massacred by Hutu extremists (Schimmel, 2011). In the first week of the Rwandan genocide, the reporting by the international media had a number of flaws. First, the international media thought the genocide was a civil war. Between 1990 and 1993, the country had experienced a low-level civil war, and the international media mistook the genocide for a full-scale civil war. Rwanda has a long history of animosity between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority that dates back to the late 1950s. On this note, when the violence erupted on April 6, 1994, the international media reported the initial violence in the country’s capital city as a resumption of civil war between Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority. In addition, early reports from the western media indicated that the Tutsi rebels had overpowered the government and rejected any notion of a cease-fire from the Hutu-led government. As such, the report by the Western media contradicted the idea that the real victims were the Tutsi minority. By 13th April, 1994, for instance, the Radio France International claimed that Kigali was falling in the hands of the Tutsi Rebels (Schimmel, 2011). In other Western Media organisations, it was reported that the Hutu feared vengeance from the Tutsi rebels. This created a situation where the western media presented a picture that violence in Rwanda was on the wane while, in reality, the violence was mounting (Schimmel, 2011). In another example that depicts how the international media failed in the Rwandan genocide; the New York Times alluded just four days into the genocide that the violence in Kigali had reduced. These contradictory reports were as a result of the mass exodus of foreigners from Rwanda at that time, including the international correspondents from various international media organisations. In addition, because of the exodus, the press coverage of the events taking place in Rwanda was virtually halted. However, at the time that the media coverage of the violence in Rwanda was halted, this is the period when the massacre of Tutsis heightened (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). On the other hand, the early death count reported by the media was an underestimation of the reality of events taking place across the country. In the second week of the genocide, the media still did not have the actual estimates, and the death count reported never increased. As such, the death count reported by the media was not considered genocidal for a country that had a population of approximately 8million of which 85% were Hutus and 14% Tutsis (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). After the second week, some media organisations still estimated the death toll at less than 20,000 deaths. All this time, the western media did not have an idea of the actual carnage taking place in Rwanda (Cook, 2013). On another note, for almost two weeks during the Rwandan genocide, the international media maintained their focus only in the country’s capital city, Kigali. On the contrary, Kigali was occupied by only 4% of the country’s population (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). As such, the media failed to report on the events that were taking place elsewhere other than Kigali. The only reports from the countryside regarding the violence associated the events taking place in ethnic clashes or civil war, but not genocide. The first report that indicated a mass ethnic cleansing only emerged later on April 16. While the killings were mounting, the media still misinformed the world regarding the situation in Rwanda. Some media organizations even late into the genocide still speculated on the death of the Tutsi ethnic group (Cook, 2013). While the international media were ignorant or misunderstood the events taking place during the Rwandan genocide, the local media on its part played a role in fuelling the killings of Tutsis. For example, a local radio station such as the RTLM (Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines) took part in fuelling the killings. This radio station, for instance, disseminated fabricated reports that increased the animosity of the Hutu ethnic group. Despite the radio being the most significant media tool during the genocide, print media also contributed to the worsening of the situation in Rwanda. For example, the extremist newspaper known as “Kangura” was notorious for spreading hate speech against the Tutsi ethnic group. In essence, the newspaper and the radio station played a role in mobilising the Hutu and propagating the violence against the Tutsi minority. According the United Nations Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, the paper actually corrupted the minds of readers (Kohen, 2010). In many forms, the Rwandan media was responsible for inciting racial tensions that later transformed into a full-blown genocide. In Africa, it is evident that international media agencies devote fewer resources to news coverage compared to other regions around the world. In particular, international media agencies tend to neglect smaller countries that have fewer strategic values (Feinstein, 2005). Prior to the genocide in Rwanda, the media presence in the country was purely internal with most of the international journalists establishing their stations in Nairobi, Kenya. As such, the international journalists only came to a smaller country such as Rwanda when there was an event to report, but in many occasions, the international media relied on information provided by the local correspondents. During the war, the reporting by local correspondents may have been partial. For instance, it is possible that the correspondents hired by some media organizations were supporting Hutu extremists and as such, did not provide information that is impartial. On another note, the international journalists who came to Rwanda when the genocide began knew nothing regarding Rwanda. Many of the stories that they reported were only focused on the killings but provided limited information why the ethnic cleansing was taking place in Rwanda (Waldorf, 2009). Eventually, when the journalists decided to come, most of them were based in Nairobi, not Kigali, and this contributed to the misunderstanding of the Rwandan genocide. Further, coverage in many parts of Africa in the 90s appeared challenging for various news organisations from the western world. This is because of the dictatorial rule by some African leaders who vehemently opposed freedom of the press. As a result, most international media organisations at that time were reluctant to cover events from Africa. In addition, fewer newsgroups from the western world could establish their offices in Africa because of the volatility evident in countries such as Sudan, Somalia and other parts of the North and West Africa, for example (Sakota-Kokot, 2013). Because of the fear of risks to journalists, the international media was reluctant to report the carnage taking place in Rwanda. Because of the ethnic clashes common on the African continent, the international media relied on a stereotype that viewed conflicts in the continent as predominantly tribal warfare. These stereotypes, for instance, emerged in the colonial era when Africans were still viewed as primitive and irrational. Consequently, some parts of the western world still viewed African conflicts in simplified terms such as fighting between two tribes (Sakota-Kokot, 2013). On the same note, it appeared that the Western media was still fixated on the idea of tribal differences simply because it resonated with African primitivism. The other frames that the media may have used to cover the conflict in Rwanda include a focus on racist depictions such as, for example, animals. When the media does this, it provides an opportunity for the international community to ignore what is happening and viewing the warring factions as unworthy of sympathy (Sakota-Kokot, 2013). For example, there are certain American magazines who while covering the situation in Rwanda described the people there as animals by using metaphors such as comparing the perpetrators to irrational animals. As a result, it was difficult for readers in the U.S, for instance, to have sympathy for people who were suffering in Rwanda. Some media organizations appeared to focus on the savagery, irrationality and anarchical nature of Rwanda rather than concentrate on reporting how the genocide was planned (Bellamy, 2012). Depicting Rwanda as a failed state by some western media is a factor that also contributed to the view of the carnage as common incident in that part of the world. The media should have viewed the events in Rwanda in a similar way that the Yugoslavia plight was provided wide coverage by the media. As a result, the international community was quick to react in order to avoid being blamed. However, the misrepresentation of the Rwandan plight by the media meant that the international community was not under pressure to intervene immediately (Bellamy, 2012). On the other hand, when looking at the reporting lapses by the international media in retrospect, three factors emerge to help understand the failures by the international media in the Rwandan genocide. First, because of the evacuation of foreign nationals from the country, there were a few reporters left in Kigali in the early days of the genocide. This restricted their coverage, for instance, in the countryside where the mass murder of Tutsi ethnic group was more pronounced. Second, the events taking place at that time were rather confusing for journalist because, there was the news of Tutsi rebels waging a civil war against the Hutu-led government. Similarly, there were also reports of the rebels retaliating against sympathisers of Hutu extremists and at the same time; the Tutsi were being massacred (Herman & Peterson, 2010). Third, the experts on conflict matters were also slow in terms of providing directions on how to stop the conflict. For example, a commander from the Belgium peacekeepers that was stationed in Rwanda at the time of genocide claimed on Radio France International that the fighting had halted. In addition, human rights groups were also slow to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. The media on its part was in a hurry to criticise the United Nations and the International community for not taking immediate action to stop the massacre of innocent civilians (Fowler et al. 2002). It is clear that the media failed in the Rwandan genocide because there was a lack of timely reporting and was exploited by both social and political powers to commit genocide. As such, the genocide in Rwanda showcases the dangers of leaving the state to own the media and how the media can be used as a tool to corrupt the mind of the masses. As a result of the media failure to cover the event, the Rwandan genocide was never captured entirely since there are only a few pictures of the genocide. As such, the lack of images and information from the genocide is directly associated with media absent at a time when history regarding the genocide needed to be written, broadcast and captured on camera (Gibson, 2003).On the other hand, foreigners left the country regardless of their responsibility and influence in stopping the genocide. As a result, the killings were never stopped because of a lack of any powerful opposing influence to intervene and stop the violence. The West simply ignored the plight of Rwandans during the genocide because of a continued neglect of the African continent, and particularly, the limited resources dedicated to foreign reporting in Africa. Had the media played its role of appropriately reporting the genocide, the international community could have pressured the Hutu extremists to stop the killings of Tutsi ethnic group (Schimmel, 2009). While some media organisations stayed back in the early days of the genocide, they faced challenges. For instance, it was difficult to convince their media houses to acknowledge the gravity of the events unfolding in Rwanda at that time. In addition, it was difficult for the journalists who remained to report facts on the ground because they lacked informers, and there was also the issue of the language barrier. This could explain the reason most of the reporting that came out of Rwanda missed the real story completely (Mayersen & Mcloughlin, 2011). While it was important to show the world everything that was unfolding in Rwanda, the foreign media houses censored the material that was coming from Rwanda. This is because some of the footages were disturbing, and they were also concerned about the sensitivity of their viewers. However, it was necessary for the media to show the world what was happening in Rwanda. Consequently, the reaction would have been fast in terms of efforts to stop the violence (Janssen, 2008). Most of the images from the Rwandan genocide that is in the media today were taken after the genocide ended. This is the time when the entire international media flocked Rwanda to report on the aftermath of the carnage. Conversely, the local media in Rwanda also failed because rather than embracing sound practices such as impartiality in providing information to the public, they shifted the blame and encouraged hate speech. The local media at that time appeared to incite resentment of a particular ethnic group, fear and anger. The broadcasters in Rwanda at that time appeared to forget their role as journalists and took sides, leading to an unfair reporting of the events unfolding in the country at that time (Glanville, 2006). Essentially, the Rwandan genocide revealed the shortcomings of the international systems in responding to a crisis. The genocide also illustrates that inadequate information is not the problem, rather, the lack of political will to prevent crimes from happening around the world (Glanville, 2006). Conclusion The Rwandan genocide revealed the unpreparedness of the media to deal with worst case scenarios in Africa at that time. Fewer resources were dedicated to foreign reporting at that time, and this did not have a far-reaching effect on the events that were unfolding in Rwanda. As a result, the world was mystified regarding what was happening in Rwanda and thousands lost their lives because of a lack of immediate response from the international community. During the Rwandan genocide, the media failed both internally and internationally. While the local media played a role in fuelling the killings, the international media, on the other hand, were reluctant in reporting the Rwandan genocide, and this slowed the intervention processes that were needed to stop the carnage. 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