Administrative Law - Legislative Control of Bureaucracy - Term Paper Example

?Legislative Control of Bureaucracy Legislative Control of Bureaucracy Too Much Bureaucracy or Too Little? Congressional Treatment of Defense Department Legislative Liaison The contemporary American political culture has been facing animosity in its public administrative field. Due to the need for an extensive administrative apparatus for running the government, the animosity can result in a love-hate or dependency-resettlement relationship of politics of administration. The US congress’s negative view towards federal bureaucracy is characterized with consistent hostilities towards external communications activities by the federal departments and agencies. The Congress has enacted a number of laws since the beginning of the 20th century to address the issue of bureaucracy. These prohibitions are inclusive of a 1913 repeal that sought to ban the hire of “publicity experts,” a 1951 ban on the agency spending on spending on publicity and propaganda, and a 2005 the ban on video news, with a provision that allowed the release of such videos if the source was willing to be identified as the originator. Scholars have described the evident Congress antagonism to public relations in public administration as part of an institutional planned push back by the legislature to the natural tendency of government agencies to seek autonomy. This has offered public administrators with an opportunity to mobilize support in an effort to increase autonomy of the agencies and reduction of the Congressional advantage over it (Lee, 2009). The congress in 1919 enacted a law that criminalized lobbying of the law-making agency. Funny enough, legislators cited the law when disagreeing on particular activities o f the agency but not a single prosecution was enacted by the by the US department of justice. The law however was revised in 2002 that decriminalized agency lobbying by the congress, but retained the provisions of engaging in such activities. Crisis Bureaucracy Bureaucratic structure is responsible for shaping the legal interpretations and regulatory decisions of agencies, offering a framework through which modern governments operate, and it is due to this reason that Policymakers fight to effect the necessary legislations. The article discusses two new issues that harbor important implications for lawyers and political scientists, which encompass how of legislative process responds during a crisis and the underlying uncertainties that surround major bureaucratic reorganizations. The result of this perspective illustrates how agencies make use of their administrative power and how they interpret their legal mandates. As crises enlarge opportunities for legislative action, changes in homeland security policies are mostly driven by the efforts of politicians who try to effect regulatory and administrative activities in various domains of the said sector. Changes in the nature of and scope of security policy may have adverse effects on other legal domains Coast Guards environmental regulatory functions or the application of laws in immigration departments of the country. Politicians cunningly use the occasion of legislation to force changes in other areas that have little to do with the principle issue being addressed (Cohen, et al 2006). A possible reason why the president changed his mind about the reorganization of the systems may be because he did not want to be part of the loosing side. The Administration appears to support such a move to further domestic policy priorities hat are independent of the homeland security. Such changes put the president’s legacy into question, more significantly fixing the precise extent to which the president and his top advisors knowingly planned to weaken the domestic legacy without paying attention to the corresponding homeland security benefits. Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy This article argues that a bureaucratic insulation degree from political control processes that is moderated by law increases rather than reduces the majority of problems that are inculcated in bureaucratic policymaking. It thus points out that a politician, who is elected by a majority, should always act in the way of the majority, which is not always the case. It states that even though the average policy position of an elected politician is supposed to track the policy views of the median voter, the average divergence between the preferences of the maiden voter and the president is generally greater than zero. The tendency of the elected leader of not always serving the interest of the majority electorate draws a sharp contrast with the perceived wisdom that the electorate serves the best interests of the majority to the degree in which politically elected officials are supposed to control bureaucrats who are unaccountable. The more an elected official responds to the preferences of the majority, the lower the majority’s optimal level of insulation. Moreover, the greater the policy bias arising from bureaucratic system, the lower the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation, and its inference is deduced from this relationship further supports the fact that the more as voter preferences tend to shift overtime, the more serving the majority’s interests will require sudden and dramatic policy changes, the lower the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation. However, these comparative results do not alter the fact that the optimal level of bureaucratic insulation to always remaining positive with exemption of a few cases (Stephenson, 2008). It is only in very few exceptional cases where, the convectional wisdom regarding the inferences being drawn in the article does not apply. It is true to take a pre assumption that politicians respond to the preferences of the majority, while bureaucrats do not respond to the majority preferences. While political elects enjoy special expertise among other advantages, bureaucrats do no have such privileges. Except in special circumstances, elected politicians ought to have maximum influence over bureaucratic policy making in order to respond to the preferences of the majority. The assumption that democratic institutions generally should maximize in responding to the preferences of the majority is faced with variety of criticisms which include claims that one cannot articulate coherent preferences to a collective body, that political institutions should focus on achieving normative goals other than satisfaction of the preferences of the elective, while the majority may also reduce the aggregate voter welfare. Comparison of the Journals The above discussed scenarios clearly show the dangers in legislative control of bureaucracy. While there are hurdles and time lapses in the whole process, there is imminent blame game arising from the actions taken by various people in the offices. Such a case is portrayed by the decision of the president to effect changes in the home land security without much consultation from the people in the lower levels. The damage this brought to the security of the country and especially the disorganization of the Guard Security has become a source of ridicule for his administration. Effects of increased bureaucracy is evident from the administrative congress and the laws enacted there in. the congress constantly enacted the laws were rarely followed by the same law makers. The apparatus for overseeing this implementation were suppressed by the law making body, making it impossible to enact these laws. The congress kept repealing the said laws to suit their behavior. Not unless the chambers overlooking the implementation are vested with more power, and respect bestowed in these areas, not a single day will the congress respect their decisions. Optimal control of bureaucracy shows how elected leaders choose to ignore serving the preferences of the voter majority, to serve the interests of the bureaucrats. The politicians, choosing to disobey the rule of the majority, act in contrast to the wish of the majority. Although this assumption is true, the majority preference is not always right in relation to the situation. The politicians can respond to the majority preference at ease, but bureaucrats will act in their most preferred ways. This knowledge shows that even an elected president is unlikely to obey this provision and act in the way of the bureaucrats. Thus, bureaucracy, though good in setting the checks and balances for a smooth running system, is likely to be faced by quite a number challenges. This knowledge is quite essential in understanding how bureaucratic systems function and in the drafting of policy laws. References Cohen, D. K., Mariano, F. C., & Weingast, B. R. (2006). Crisis bureaucracy: Homeland security and the political design of legal mandates. Stanford Law Review. Lee, M. (2009). Too much bureaucracy or too little? congressional treatment of defense department legislative liaison, 1950s-1990s. Public Administration and Management. Stephenson, M. C. (2008). Optimal political control of the bureaucracy. Michigan Law Review. Read More