Extraneous Influence on Public Policy - Research Paper Example

? Influence on Public Policy Various government bodies and interest groups have influenced the way policies are formulated and implemented. However, there are different levels at which these bodies and groups significantly influence policy making. Through readings of different articles and researches made by experts in the field of public administration and policy making, it was found that there are groups that exert more influence than another group, although a confluence of these groups wholly influence what the policies should and how it is implemented, hence, eventually directing the outcome of decision making in terms of public policy. Introduction Public policy is said to be a broad field whose principal utility is one of clarification about how the public policymaking and implementation process works (Nicholas, 1999, p. 348). Its formulation and implementation is composed of various factors which eventually influences the outcome. This paper hopes to identify and rate the various bodies and factors which influence the formulation and implementation of public policy, and would attempt to explain reasons why such amount of influence is made on public policy. Legislative Bodies Legislative bodies highly contribute to the formulation and to an extent, how a specific public policy may be implemented. The Legislature in the United States on the federal level, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not only has a role in the passage of laws, but also have other such powers provided under Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution which provides, thus, “Section 8. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States; To establish post offices and post roads; To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” State legislatures, on the other hand, also have similar functions in the passage of policy initiatives and functions such as the passage of the state budget, representing its constituents, revising their statutes and also serves as a “check and balance on the other branches of government” (Wisconsin Association of Lakes, 2009). The Legislature’s most important function of “appropriating revenue for the administration of public programs and projects” (Siewert, 2011, p.1), is the one that particularly has a significance in the implementation of a public policy. Having the so-called “power of the purse” is important pursuing a public policy which, as Justice Kennedy would say, “Money is the instrument of policy and policy affects the lives of citizens” (Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The legislature is the one that eventually “decides both the budget's social and policy objectives, and the extent of their funding.” (Todd Donovan et al., 2010, pp. 267-69). The constitutions of the forty-seven (47) states unequivocally protect this kind of legislative prerogative of “appropriations process” (Rosen, 1998, pp. 134-39). This important process is the main vehicle of the legislature in shaping policy change (Buenger, 2009, pp. 571, 606), despite the line-item veto made by a governor, which can actually cancel appropriations if such is not “overridden by a legislative supermajority” (Donovan et al., pp. 314-15). When it is “signed into law,” appropriations for expenditures are then allotted by the executive branch (James J. Gosling, Budgetary Politics in American Governments, 1992, p. 10), and the one that “administers the budget” according to its appropriation's purpose. (State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Neb. 1970); State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 S.E.2d 633, 637 (S.C. 1982) (per curiam); The Federalist No. 72, at 403-04 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Although recent there are state legislatures that have granted upon governors “the power to reduce appropriations,” (Siewert, 2011), nevertheless, such power is limited and the Legislature still identifies what the priority expenditures of public funds are reflected through the “acts of appropriations and their sources of funding” (title 32, section 704(a) of the Vermont Statutes. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). Hence, policy formulation and how these would be implemented, are heavily influenced by the Legislature having the function of enacting laws which would better suit its constituents and funding projects and programs which achieve results which “they believe without bias to be most desirable for the public which they serve.” (Lord, 2010, p.1). Judiciary In the case of the judiciary, it is actually the public policy that, most often than not, influences it in terms of decision making, hence, it is the body which may have little influence on the formulation and implementation of a particular public policy. The process of judicial statutory interpretation is highly influenced by public policy considerations (Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355, 19 How. 355, 15 L. Ed. 658, 1856 WL 8744 (1856); S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶92284, 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2003). Rules associated with the “strict and liberal interpretation” are based public policy considerations (Bettys v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 37 Wis. 323, 1875 WL 3516 (1875); Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364, 127 A.L.R. 430 (1939). Courts choose an interpretation which benefits the public especially concerning issues of public interest (Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940); U.S. v. Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-Six Pieces of Puerto Rico Lottery Tickets, 791 F. Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1992). A so-called “narrow construction” is said to be rejected by the courts if it will weaken public policy considerations, more so if it “discourages rather than encourages the specific action the legislature has sought to foster and promulgate” (Hartt v. Schwartz, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 454, 1997 WL 625467 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). For instance, the Court has taken into consideration, not only of businesses involved in the storage of hazardous waste, on cases involving the Hazardous Waste Transfer Act, it has also taken into consideration the “threat to people and the environment” not entirely dependent on “whether one stores such waste for business reasons or some other purpose” (Abely's Waste Oil Services, Inc. v. Ravenswood Development Corp., 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 329, 1997 WL 625425 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). Further, in the case of Clement v. O'Malley, 95 Ill. App. 3d 824, 51 Ill. Dec. 119, 420 N.E.2d 533 (1st Dist. 1981), judgment aff'd, 96 Ill. 2d 26, 70 Ill. Dec. 207, 449 N.E.2d 81 (1983), the Court held that the Unemployment Insurance Act should “be liberally construed” so as to achieve the “legislature's public policy” of protection against “severe economic consequences resulting from involuntary unemployment.” Even though public policy is considered as vague and has an “indefinite concept” especially when applied in the decision making of the judiciary which require precise rules, (Jones v. American Home Finding Ass'n, 191 Iowa 211, 182 N.W. 191 (1921), it serves as an immediate source of various factors “which may influence and condition the formation, validation, interpretation, and application of legislation” (National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F. T. C., 482 F.2d 672, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶74575 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Issues in particular cases will be better clarified with the help of “precise identification, particularization, and definition of relevant policy considerations.” Hence, it is said that a statutory provision founded on public policy that is established through analysis of “the history, purpose, language and effect of the provision” (In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation, 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010); U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n v. Jaffe, 433 B.R. 538 (E.D. Va. 2010). Thus, the interpretation of Courts is mostly based on such policy considerations. Values, customs and the society’s principles are all reflected on what the public policy is (Singer and Singer, 2010, p.1). It is present in every aspect of the law and “has a place in the decision making process at all levels” (Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226 (1892). Application of public policy in the settlement of particular cases often takes into account customs of a society, which has no statutory law standing (Martinez v. Louisiana Dept. of Wild Life and Fisheries Through Guidry, 514 So. 2d 140 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 126 (La. 1988). “Ambiguities in the letter of a statute” is often resolved through the use of a strict public policy concept in its application (Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP, 45 Cal. 4th 557, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 198 P.3d 1109 (2009), as modified, (Mar. 11, 2009), but are sometimes rejected in a few cases as being “void for vagueness” (Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 508, 39 L. Ed. 601 (1895). Hence, the judiciary is actually bound by what the public policy is especially in its interpretation of the law or deciding any case. Aside from the fact that the judiciary is the one influenced by public policy rather than it having influence over the formulation and implementation of public policy, there are “restraints on the federal courts,” as the judiciary does not have “the power of the purse or sword,” and they “lack any political constituency or a public climate supportive of change” (Cohen, 2004, p.1). Furthermore, if the judges in the judiciary would engage in “interpretive rewriting of statutes,” or interpret what the public policy is for instance, they eventually “become the targets of political forces” that would like to make certain that specific statutes will be “interpreted in their favor” (Krishnakumar, 2009, p.10). Hence, this shift of responsibility from the legislature to the judiciary in order to ensure representational equality would only achieve “politicization of the judiciary” (Krishnakumar, 2009, p.10). Unlike the legislative branch which has “free ranging policy initiatives,” there is more limitation to the “fact-driven initiatives and adversary process” in the judiciary (Cohen, 2010). These limitations, however, are more on the kind of cases tackled and the extent of any “judgment and remedy” (Cohen, 2010). However, although the judiciary may have little influence on the formulation and implementation of public policies, it is still said that “the key to good government is not just figuring out the best policy, but also identifying which institutions should be making which decisions and how the different institutions can collaborate most productively” (Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, 1994, pp. 2031, 2032-33). Thus, the Judiciary can make decisions which somehow have an influence on the formulation of public policy. This is done through a check on “Congress's treatment of politically disadvantaged, under-represented groups during the legislative process” without crossing the line into judicial super-legislating,” through judicial review (Krishnakumar, 2009). The judiciary also has the outstanding “enforcement power” in terms of prison cases using “special masters and monitors” and through the “liberal use of heavy fines” in the application of contempt (Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). In the case of Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, in July 2002, “Judge Perez-Gimenez of Puerto Rico had imposed fines totaling nearly $135,000,000 on Puerto Rico for failure to comply with prison reform mandates” 303 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). Although a trial court does not have to “directly order the appropriation of tax dollars,” it may still demand that there be, for instance, “the hiring of dozens of doctors, the availability of hundreds of hospital beds, the availability of a new jail, and the closing of an old facility as a safety hazard.” Hence, it was said that such “power is there” (Cohen & Aungst, 1997, p. 299), and thus have an extra-judicial impact insofar as court rulings are concerned (Cohen, 2010). Hence, court orders can still have “a direct effect” on the full enforcement of a policy and may have an extra-judicial outcome by, for instance, “inspiring individuals or groups” in achieving an important social reform (Cohen, 2010). Further, these court orders may impact on some prison officials in doing the right thing and may even change the community’s behavior, (Cohen, 2010), thus, in a sense, this extra-judicial impact resulting from a court order or ruling can result in “both symbolic and instrumental effects” (Cohen, 2010). In another view by Gerald Rosenberg which described the “Constrained Court View,” it held that litigants who ask for important social reform are actually “faced with powerful constraints” (Cohen, 2010). These litigants “must convince courts that the rights they are asserting are required by constitutional or statutory language” which, because of the “the limited nature of constitutional rights,” is not an easy to do (Cohen, 2010). Furthermore, “courts are cautious of stepping into “the political mainstream” (Cohen, 2010). Because of constraints such as a respect for the federal government and the congressional action, courts may be reluctant “to take the heat generated by politically unpopular rulings” (Cohen, 2010). And even if these factors may be prevailed upon, there is still a lack of “powerful tools to force implementation,” hence, may be rendered useless because of the opposition which it might have (Cohen, 2010). Hence, although litigants seeking social reform may have significant victories in court to achieve their goal of social reform, its implementation may “turn out to be worth very little” (Cohen, 2010). With these, the influence of the judiciary may either have a significant or small influence on policy formulation and implementation, depends on its collaboration with other government bodies and working within its limited capacity to influence reform or changes in policies. Leadership and Bureaucracy Leadership represented by the Executive Branch of government, has significant influence on policy making and its implementation. The Executive Branch is represented by the President of the United States who acts both as the head of state and as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (The White House, 2011). The President is in charge of “implementing and enforcing the laws written by Congress and, to that end, appoints the heads of the federal agencies, including the Cabinet” (The White House, 2011). The Vice President is also part of the Executive Branch, who could take on the Presidency “should the need arise” (The White House, 2011). The “enforcement and administration of federal laws” is lodged with the Cabinet and various independent federal agencies which have different missions and responsibilities to accomplish (The White House, 2011). Aside from the appointing power of the President, it also has the “the power either to sign legislation into law or to veto bills enacted by Congress,” which may be vetoed by Congress via two-thirds vote of both houses (The White House, 2011). The Executive Branch also effects “diplomacy with other nations” (The White House, 2011). “The President has the power to negotiate and sign treaties, which must be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate” (The White House, 2011). Executive orders which “which direct executive officers or clarify and further existing laws” are issued by the President and has an unrestrained power “to extend pardons and clemencies for federal crimes, except in cases of impeachment” (The White House, 2011). There are several responsibilities attached to these vast powers, one of which includes the giving of a State of the Union to Congress and “recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” (The White House, 2011). This requirement is done usually through “a State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress, although this may be fulfilled in” any way he or she chooses” (The White House, 2011). The administrative presidency “centralizes decision-making in the White House and sends vast numbers of political appointees into the agencies to monitor and control the bureaucrats” (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). The number of presidential appointees assigned in various departments and agencies were increased to extend influence over the agency work (Golden, 2000, p. 155; Ingraham, 1995). The White House also imposed reporting requirements, through regulatory impact statements to increase “its monitoring and control efforts” (Kagan, 2001, pp. 2245, 2275-77). The process that takes place is that the Congress would pass a regulatory legislation and then delegate the “policy-making discretion to agencies” using a general language (Pierce, Jr., Shapiro & Verkuil, 2009). This recognizes that agencies have “greater expertise, experience and organizational capabilities” (Pierce, et al., 2009). It is believed that the administrative presidency “compensates for the defects in the congressional oversight” (Kagan, Presidential Administration, 2001, pp. 2347-48). Further, the national constituency which the Presidency have, focuses more on issues of national scope and which have an oversight which is less parochial (Kagan, 2001, pp.2334, 2349). Aside from this, the presidential oversight is “considered to be more systematic,” as the agencies are mandated to “submit all significant regulations and all administrative guidance for review to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), located in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)” (Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). The White House also attends to interest groups which calls its attention on a potential problem (Seidenfeld, 1994, p. 46). Finally, the White House is said to have a direct “asset control through an extensive network of presidential appointees” who are deemed loyal to the president, even though the Congress is able to punish agencies through appropriation riders when its wishes are ignored (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). There are however, limitations to the oversight of White House, which include its limitation to “review the thousands of regulatory decisions that occur each year” (Steinzor & Shapiro, 2010, pp. 129-32; Farina, 2010, pp. 357, 397-98). And although the reporting requirements are systematic, the acts of the White House in selecting a particular interest on some matter on the basis of whether “some office in the White House has particular interest in it or an interest group is important for the White House or that some competing agency opposes a proposed policy” shows the unsystematic acts of the administration in this aspect (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). The leadership through administrative presidency also reveals how considerable time and resources are allotted, in order to ensure that “its policy priorities are implemented” (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). And from studies various administrative presidencies, the direction was said to be “more centralization, more political appointees, and more reporting requirements” (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). Political appointees are said to be “in a better position to defend the administration's policy preferences” (Ingraham, 1995). The bureaucracy however, may be more responsive to the” president’s policy preferences” less effective in carrying out its statutory mandates (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). Hence, it is said that the administrative presidency’s attention is averted from what really are “the fundamental problems that inhibit effective government” (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). Too much time is focused on individual policy initiatives rather than finding out if agencies can indeed “implement their statutory missions” (Shapiro and Wright, 2011). Hence, as can be gleaned from the above, policy formulation is highly influenced by leadership either by informing the Congress through the State of the Union address what policies should be focused on or signing into law those which it deems significant to serve the public. Implementation of public policy is also highly influenced by the bureaucracy accomplished through various agencies of the government deemed to have enough expertise on how these policies should be accomplished. Interest groups, Political Parties and Media Interest groups, political parties and the media also have a significant influence on the policy making as well as the implementation of such policies as “the White House officials react to the views of interest groups, influential constituents, and the media” (Farina, 2010, pp. 412-413). The Legislature also was said to “strike compromises with affected interest groups rather than single-mindedly pursuing the general public interest” (Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, 1987, pp. 691, 703, 710). Hence, statutes are said to be “typically the “product of … competing political currents ….” (Woodland Joint U. School Dist. v. Comm'n, 2 Cal. App.4th 1429, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 227, 241 (1992). Political parties are said to “shape themselves to systems of federalism or separation of powers, or to electoral arrangements such as proportional representation” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, pp. 23-30), which highly influence what policies are to be advanced and pursued. Media also influences policy making and implementation as various government bodies react to what is being reported by them and try to effect changes as a result. Further, because of the “greater need for information” both in the national and international affairs, media has an important role in American politics as well as on the “political agenda” (Omsk, 2011). Conclusion There are many governmental bodies and groups that influence the formulation and implementation of public policy, each with different strategies and range on how to effect change. However, no matter how significant or little their influence maybe, the confluence of all these relevant groups essentially comprise of what the outcome the public views as relevant to the society. Reference List Abely's Waste Oil Services, Inc. v. Ravenswood Development Corp., 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 329, 1997 WL 625425 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 23-30. Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution. Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 15 S. Ct. 508, 39 L. Ed. 601 (1895). Bettys v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 37 Wis. 323, 1875 WL 3516 (1875). Buenger, M. (2009). Friction by Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policymaking. University of Richmond Law Review, volume 43, pp. 571, 606. Clement v. O'Malley, 95 Ill. App. 3d 824, 51 Ill. Dec. 119, 420 N.E.2d 533 (1st Dist. 1981), judgment aff'd, 96 Ill. 2d 26, 70 Ill. Dec. 207, 449 N.E.2d 81 (1983). Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cohen, F. (2004). The Limits of the Judicial Reform of Prisons: What Works; What Does Not. Criminal Law Bulletin, volume 40, issue no. 5. Cohen, F. & Aungst, S. (1997). Prison Mental Health Care: Dispute Resolution and Monitoring in Ohio. Criminal Law Bulletin, volume 33, 299. Donovan, T., Mooney T.C. and Smith D. (2010). State and Local Politics: Institutions & Reform. Thompson Wadsworth. Eskridge, Jr., W. & Frickey, P. (1994). The Making of The Legal Process. Harvard Law Review, volume 107, pp. 2031, 2032-33. Eskridge, Jr., W. & Frickey, P. (1987). Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era. University of Pittsburgh Law Review, volume 48, pp. 691, 703, 710. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). Farina, C. (2010). False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Const. Law, volume 12, 357, 397-98. Golden, M. (2000). What Motivates Bureaucrats?: Politics and Administration During the Reagan Years. New York: Columbia University Press. Gosling, J. (1992). Budgetary Politics in American Governments. New York: Routledge. Hartt v. Schwartz, 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 454, 1997 WL 625467 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). Henry, Nicolas (1999). Public Administration and Public Affairs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226 (1892). Ingraham, P. (1995). The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy. Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press. In re Qimonda AG Bankruptcy Litigation, 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010). Jones v. American Home Finding Ass'n, 191 Iowa 211, 182 N.W. 191 (1921). Kagan, E. (2001). Presidential Administration. Harvard Law Review, volume 114, pp. 2245, 2275-77. Krishnakumar, A. (2009). Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process Problem. Harvard Journal on Legislation, volume 46, 1. Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940). Lord, R. (2010). Bargains Tending to Corruption or Immorality. Williston on Contracts, volume 7, § 16:2. Martinez v. Louisiana Dept. of Wild Life and Fisheries Through Guidry, 514 So. 2d 140 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 126 (La. 1988). Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. F. T. C., 482 F.2d 672, 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶74575 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Omsk, M. (2011). The Role of Mass Media in the US Foreign Policy Making Process. Retrieved from http://www.prof.msu.ru/publ/omsk/45.htm. Pierce, Jr., R., Shapiro S. & Verkuil (2009). Public Administrative Law and Process. Miami Law Review, volume 65, § 3.1 (5th ed). Rosen, R. D. (1998). Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the Purse. Military Law Review, Volume 1, pp. 134-39. Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP, 45 Cal. 4th 557, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 700, 198 P.3d 1109 (2009), as modified, (Mar. 11, 2009). S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶92284, 54 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2003). Shapiro, S. & Wright, R. (2011). The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out. University of Miami Law Review, volume 65, 577. Siewert, Tyler J. (2011). The Cloying Use of Unallotment: Curbing Executive Branch Appropriation Reductions During Fiscal Emergencies. Minnesota Law Review, volume 95, 1071. Singer, N. and Singer, J. (2010). Interpretative Relevance of Policy Considerations. Sutherland Statutory Construction, volume 2B, § 56:1. Seidenfeld, M. (1994). A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making. Iowa Law Review, volume 80. Steinzor & Shapiro, The People's Agents and the Battle To Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, Safety and the Environment 4-5 (2010), at 129-32. State ex rel. Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 176 N.W.2d 920, 926 (Neb. 1970). State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 295 S.E.2d 633, 637 (S.C. 1982) (per curiam) The Federalist No. 72, at 403-04 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The White House (2011). Executive Branch. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch. Title 32, section 704(a) of the Vermont Statutes. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 704(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009). Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364, 127 A.L.R. 430 (1939). U.S. v. Fourteen Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-Six Pieces of Puerto Rico Lottery Tickets, 791 F. Supp. 345 (D.P.R. 1992). U.S. Intern. Trade Com'n v. Jaffe, 433 B.R. 538 (E.D. Va. 2010). Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355, 19 How. 355, 15 L. Ed. 658, 1856 WL 8744 (1856). Wisconsin Association of Lakes (2009). Role of Legislative Branch. Retrieved from http://www.wisconsinlakes.org/role_statelegislature.html. Woodland Joint U. School Dist. v. Comm'n, 2 Cal. App.4th 1429, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 227, 241 (1992). Read More