Critique of Public Administration - Research Paper Example

Critique of Public Administration Introduction This paper seeks to evaluate and critique three articles; the Critical Role of Street level Bureaucrats by Lipsky, the Politics of Public Budgeting by Irene Rubin, and the Rise of the Bureaucratic State by JQ Wilson. The three articles have a similar theme in their coverage of public administration with a bias towards bureaucracy and the way it affects public administration. Lipsky’s article covers the influence that bureaucrats working on behalf of the elected officials have on policy while Wilson’s article deals with how these bureaucrats ingrain themselves into public administration, and just how much influence they wield making them difficult to disband. Rubin’s article narrows down on the effect that these bureaucrats have on the budgeting process. Overall, the three articles deal with how these unelected officials have more effect on public administration and policy than the elected officials do. Summary In his article, the Critical Role of Street level Bureaucrats, Lipsky undertakes an examination of the functions and roles, which bureaucrats perform at what he refers to as “street level”, have in the process of policy formulation, as well as the process of its implementation. While the public policy theory model traditionally assumes that choices on policy are done by the political executives elected by the electorate, with the implementation of the policy choices left to bureaucrat jurisdiction, Lipsky challenges this model. He bases his argument on his belief that since the bureaucrats at the street level possess a wider room for discretion during the performance of their work, they are actually the ones who make these policy choices (Lipsky, 2010: p4). On top of implementing them, they also create them. JQ Wilson, in his article the Rise of the Bureaucratic State, raises pertinent issues concerning the power wielded by bureaucratic agencies, as well as their lack of accountability towards the legislature and the public that formed them. He also covers the discretion that these agencies possess in carrying out government affairs. The author goes further to talk about the agencies as self-perpetuating. These self-perpetuating agencies are created by the separated powers regime, which acts to protect them from change that is unwelcome since the major change is new legislation, which, in effect, must maneuver similar hurdles to those faced by the original law (Wilson, 1975: p9). This time, however, one hurdle they must clear is the wish of the particular agency, as well as its clients, which is raised higher. The agency, therefore, once created, becomes almost impossible to disband. The author concludes that this process of public power delegation to private interests that go unchallenged, as well as various factional interests is able to set a public agenda sans modification of competing interests or scrutiny. Irene Rubin, in her article the Politics of Public Budgeting, shows how political interests beset public budgeting. She argues that this allows short-term goals to trump long-term goals interests of the public, the erosion of public and institutional capacity to deal with collective issues, and erosion of the democratic process. When Rubin presents a local, state, and federal budgeting in a framework that is competitive, he gives attention to federal issues that are reactive to power struggles between various levels and branches of government (Rubin, 1997: p190). She addresses issues such as how much autonomy is present at each government level, as well as what influence elected officials have on priorities of the government. Through an analysis of each process of decision-making, she shows the coordination that is involved when passing a budget and achieving some accountability. One of her conclusions is that the public budgeting process must be divorced from politics. Critique of Articles One weakness that I found in Lipsky’s argument in, The Critical Role of Street Level Bureaucrats, is that he pays little attention to the resolution of the systems negative impacts on the clients. While he does address client participation, it is almost an afterthought, and he erroneously, according to my view, claims that this will not occur in a society of vested interests (Lipsky, 2010: p8). I do have a problem with some assertions made in the article. For instance, it is noted that when the author explores the patterns of adaptation or coping, he almost stereotypes them in as much as he views the bureaucrats stereotyping the clients that they serve. I also question whether the coping mechanisms that he talks about are a mechanism of stimulus response that is ironclad at work and will produce, inevitably, the behavior of rigidity and disinterest that all street-level bureaucrats seem to possess at their worst. I also find that Lipsky’s view on these bureaucrats as being in the job for altruistic purposes but soon being swamped by the system (Lipsky, 2010: p9) as questionable. The author is not consistent since he seems quite ambivalent on the particular point as he concludes his article. It is my opinion that these street-level bureaucrats are embittered and frustrated by a perceived deficiency of thanks for their performance of often dangerous and difficult jobs. However, I will also state that, despite these questionable views, the author does craft an excellent article that deeply penetrates and made me think seriously about the various crucial elements that make up the process of policy making. JQ Wilson’s article, the Rise of the Bureaucratic State, although, being an insightful read has some points that I do not support. I do not agree with his assertion that the investment of discretionary authority under the control of a public agency is such that the manner in which it exercises power does not respond to the good of the public (Wilson, 1975: p3). I believe that these bureaucratic institutions are created for a well-meaning purpose. While they may serve special interests, it is impossible not to see that they do come good at times. His assertion that it is possible to have civilians oversee these activities (Wilson, 1975: p4) I also find flawed. The very legislators that the electorate elected create bureaucratic agencies. It is Congress, in my opinion, which should shoulder the blame. In any case, Congress is the central institution in the process of policy making since the constitution vests the legislative authority in it. In Article 1 Section 8, various Congressional powers are laid out that include making any laws that are proper and necessary. Therefore, Congress through oversight could reign in these bureaucratic agencies. It is incorrect to lay all the blame on the bureaucratic culture since Congressional committee chairs, share disproportionate influence on policy because of their ability to determine the agendas of the committee. Bureaucratic agencies can only work on a policy that has been passed by these committees and, as such, they are to blame for any special interests creeping in on public policy. In any case, these committee chairs have vested special interests as the bureaucratic agencies since they depend on donor funding for their campaigns. Rubin’s article, the Politics of Public Budgeting was the most difficult article to form an argument against, especially given the amount of research put into it. However, I do find a problem with her assertion that the public budgeting process should be delinked from politics because the two are antithetical. Rubin refers to politics in this sense as the opinions and priorities of special interest groups and elected officials offering unwanted intrusions, which, in effect irrationalizes the making of decisions and reduces efficiency (Rubin, 1997: p198). While allowing for the removal of these interest groups from the process, it is important to keep the elected officials in it. Failure to do this would require bureaucrats to step in, which would re-introduce special interests into the process. An individual cannot have your cake and eat it. The public budget process requires the “intrusion” of these elected officials because the public entrusts them with processes such as this. Even if, these elected officials do clash with professional staff as Rubin puts it, there is nothing to suggest that this professional staff will not bring special interests to the process. It is my opinion that a consensus reached between the professional bureaucratic staff and the elected officials would be the best compromise rather than one reached by one side of the “divide”. Conclusion While bureaucracy is a hindrance to accountability to the collective in public administration, they do carry out some valuable service for the public. What makes the bureaucratic agencies open to suspicion is a lack of legislative oversight. While Wilson and Lipsky argue that these bureaucratic agencies are now out of the control of the legislative bodies, this is not entirely true as the elected officials are empowered, by the constitution, to keep these agencies in check. References Lipsky, Michael. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010. Rubin, Irene. The politics of public budgeting : getting and spending, borrowing and balancing. Chatham : Chatham House Publishers, 1997. Wilson, James. The Rise of the Bureaucratic State. National Affairs, (1975): 1-11. Read More