Government: Administration in the Political System - Essay Example

It is considered that in order to build a coherent argument the answer to Question no and 3 may be coalesced in to one singular argumentative strand. However, the intrinsic and contextual difference, of Question no.2, merits a separate treatment. The format of the paper will follow a continuous pattern however part 2 dealing with question no.2 will form a separate short essay. The paper will seek the answer these questions by, looking deeper, analyzing the structural construct of bureaucracy in a democratic polity and the raison-de-etre for controlling bureaucracy; presumably through the political oversight and accountability matrix. The primary reason to control 'bureaucracy' rests on the assumption that as an institutional monolith it possesses a structural, functional independence, which manifests itself in the bureaucracy's pursuit of interests, other than the politically defined; 'public interest'. The resultant implication is that Bureaucracy is 'inefficient' (Public Choice critique of Bureaucratic inefficiency, Niskanen. 1971). The control of bureaucracy effectively translates in to increasing efficiency. There seems to be no other rational explanation for 'controlling' bureaucracy in a democratic system. The 'efficiency factor' then will be analyzed as the core value of bureaucratic functionalism and how various reform efforts have been directed to increase this efficiency. In this regard reference will be made to Taylorian Managerialism(Fredrick Taylor.1856-1915), and the New Public Management (NPM) spurred RIGO (Reinventing Government) initiative of Clinton Administration (Osborne& Gaebler.1992). This argument will delineate our approach towards forming an opinion about increase or decrease of constitutional role and stature, perception of Federal Bureaucracy in USA. Bureaucracy is a rational construct of a modern capitalist state (Weber.1947). It is ideally an apolitical organization of state functionality through its agents; the bureaucrats. The bureaucratic organization is; rule-bound, merit-based, consistent, and hierarchical, subject to impersonal authority, possessing tenurial security (ibid. pp.329-41). It operates under the rules rather then the political oversight. Rules structure is thus implicitly assumed to be located outside and independent of the political context. This operational system of rules was assumed to construct efficiency based bureaucratic system, unhindered by political complications. It may also be considered that power is the quintessential element of real politicks. In modern democratic government systems the execution of policy to achieve political agenda is through the bureaucracy. Thus the relationship between politics and policy implementation can not be overemphasized. It can be argued that in political control of bureaucracy is the politician seeks to maximize their political interests. The pursuit to control bureaucracy in USA can be traced back to George Washington, it is contended that on the advice of Alexander Hamilton, George Washington 'a highly partisan', 'federalist oriented', party faithful, federal civil service (Prince.1977). This political trend manifested itself and became embedded in the political executive mindset in, none other then Abraham Lincoln's presidency. His time at the White House 'laid the foundation for the interventionist administrative state that would emerge full blown in 1930s' (Raadschelders.2007). When Lincoln took office he replaced more officials then any of his predecessors; 1457 out of 1639 (Van Riper.1958, pp.43). However the American administrative state system crystallized around the end of 19th and beginning of 20th Century (Waldo.1984,chap. 1, Stivers.2000,pp.5-6, 8-10). This political-bureaucratic relationship exhibits more control then oversight. It is now argued that, as the state functions grew and became more complex, the mechanism of control became more oriented towards efficiency. It is asserted that in a complex system direct control and micro management of political agenda is neither practicable nor desirable; rather the desire to control translates itself in to making bureaucracy more efficient towards objectives set by political agenda and voters priorities. Thus, by our argument, efficiency of the bureaucracy is the core value and the determining factor in the bureaucratic-politics equation. This observation can be verified by looking at the administrative reform efforts by various governments in US, since the beginning of complex modern state. It has been argued that 'efficiency, appears at, or near the top in virtually every reform report of the past one hundred years' (Light.1997, pp.21).Thus efficiency can be translated in to bureaucratic control by our argument and by the same token Bureaucratic reform may be viewed as attempts to increase efficiency; the central variable, it thus becomes a 'politically defined value' (Schachter.2007), rather then having an independent generic existence. Fredrick Taylor's management paradigm centered on the theme of efficiency and creation of input/output performance based model of organizational management (Taylor.1947a, pp.63). The primary input was information feeding into management decision making, geared towards enhanced performance. Taylor 'advocated this work science approach to efficiency over the accounting and budgeting approach of President William Howard Taft's 1912 Commission on Economy and Efficiency' (Schachter.2007). On the other hand hierarchical executive/political oversight approach over bureaucracy was the policy advice, given by various reform commissions for enhancing efficiency till Richard Nixon's times (Arnold.1986). This centralization to achieve efficiency principle was challenged by Rational/Public Choice (see Tullock & Buchanen.1962) critique of Bureaucracy emphasizing the inefficiency of bureaucracy. The bureaucratic inefficiency was defined in terms of X and Allocative inefficiencies and bureaucrats were seen as 'budget maximizers' (Niskanen.1971). These academic criticisms manifested in 1980s reforms of President Ronald Regan administration. The 'rolling back of the state' became the public sector management mantra. This trend can also be seen as state relinquishing control in order to increase efficiency and reduce budgetary deficits. Therefore it can be concluded also, that New Public Management; a product of public choice critique, establishes an inverse relationship between control and efficiency. Performance based management became the new principle for efficiency. The 'state should cost less and work better' (Osborne & Gaebler.1992). Reinventing Government (RIGO) as a policy was a direct result of this stream of thought. It maintained and advocated decentralization and a paradigm shift from control to de-control. The axioms like 'bumbling politicians and rational managers' became pronouncements of RIGO (Schachter.2007.pp 803). "Reinventing Government pronouncements displayed a constant anti-Congress animus" (Moe.1994). National Performance review invited attention towards a 'performance deficit' in bureaucracy (NPR.1993,pp2). The government hitherto had been "locked up by rules and line items" (Osborne & Gaebler.1992). An 'entrepreneurial revolution' was required to bring efficiency (ibid, pp.327). It is perhaps beyond the scope of this paper to offer a criticism of NPM and RIGO; however it is suffice to focus on the elements central to our argument. It has been emphasized that private sector management practices and decentralized entrepreneurial creativity can not be replicated in to public sector operation. Our argument is that the intrinsic and generic nature of goods/services that are provided by Public sector is different from Private sector. So is the motivational factor. The distinction between public and private goods is not merely definitional; it has wider implications and manifestations. The profit motive similarly can not be incorporated through ingenious rubrics like 'internal markets' etc. in the public sector. However reverting to our core argument, the rule structure or framework of operation can deliver efficiently and form the intrinsic linkage of political oversight. It formalizes the link between politics-beauraucratic equation. "Anyone with real world organizational experience can see, that rules and entrepreneurial moxie each help forward production under different circumstances" (Schachter.2007,pp.805). The world beyond minimal rule linkages may severe the control and effect efficiency. Secondly a public sector performance devoid of political benefits can not be visualized and seem pointless. Efficiency as an end product benefits the political government in a democratic polity by its very logic. Therefore Government's efficiency exists in a 'specific political context' (ibid). It needs to be as it is 'the' control mechanism for the politicians. It can be therefore argued that political control is manifested through ensuring an efficient bureaucracy. It is also argued that a degree of operational independence for managing a modern state apparatus. Moreover It is also argued that rule framework should be kept; however loosely as an institutional linkage between politicians and bureaucracy due to its impersonal nature. The Bureaucracy forming the fourth pillar of the state argument is not agreed to, as determined through our argument because through the above outlined instruments of control the balance may still be tilted in favor of political and democratic oversight. PART II; A newly independent democratic country is envisaged for offering policy advice as required in the question. The analogy of newly independent country has been relied on in order to avoid complexities which an older system bequeaths to a new system and the continuities have to be considered. Taking this as the point of departure following policy advice is offered: Certain core assumptions need to be outlined before proceeding to construct an ideal bureaucracy. It may be assumed that the new country has a dynamic, reform oriented political leadership. It has a strongly institutionalized two party political structure. The army as an institution is not inclined towards 'Praetorianism' (Finer.1976). The market is viable and vibrant and is a 'spontaneous social organization', in Hayekian terms (Friedrich Hayek. 1899-1992). These assumptions grant us the ideal space for our construction. We now lay the first brick of our edifice and discuss the recruitment procedure and pattern. The new bureaucracy should be recruited through a system of merit. The system of merit can be ensured through constituting a new constitutional body independent of legislature. An independent Civil Service Commission may be constituted. The members of this commission may be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. They should be non-partisan and if they are members of the political parties they should need to resign before joining. The criteria for their selection may be similar to that of a member of Higher Judiciary. This commission may have tenurial security ensured by the constitution. The procedure for their removal should be through a 2-3rd majority legislative impeachment, similar to that of a Judge of a higher court. The commission should conduct a competitive exam, followed by detailed interviews. All citizens of the state may be eligible to take the exams, who posses a standard minimum qualification. The qualification may vary according to the job and after a general standard examination and interview; the candidates may be send to different departments according to their respective qualifications. The new bureaucracy should work under a written code of rules, which should define operational and jurisdictional spheres. The new bureaucrats should function under Ministerial oversight and work towards efficiency. The reward system for efficiency may be quantified through a grading system. The independent Civil Service Commission may review the performance through this grading system. These grades may be objectively verifiable and numerically quantifiable in terms of objectives achieved. The grading system may be awarded by the superiors and verified by the Ministers. The efficiency rewards may be translated in to promotions and monitory benefits in terms of bonuses. The new civil service rules may be amended by the legislature but it should have an element of judicial review before enactment. This civil service may also have horizontal mobility especially in different areas of the country. This is a brief policy advice for an ideal civil service with other factors remaining constant. Bibliography: 1. Niskanen,W.A. (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton) 2. Osborne, David & Gaebler Ted. (1992), Reinventing Government; How the Entrpreburial Spirit is Transforming Public Sector; Reading MA,: Addison-Wesley. 3. Weber, M.(1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons.Glencoe Ill.:Free Press. 4. Carl E. Prince, The Federalists and the Origins of the U.S. Civil Service (New York: New York University Press, 1977), pp. x-xi, 2. 5. Raadschelders C.N.J,(2007), Book Review; Abraham Lincoln's Presidency as the Foundation of the Modern Administrative state; Public Administration Review Sept-Oct 2007, 943-946 6. Waldo Dwight (1984) , The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration. 2nd ed. New York: Holmes & Meier 7. Stivers Camilla (2000), Bureau Men, Settlement Women: Constructing Public Administration in The Progressive Era. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 8. Light Paul. (1997), The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945-1995, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 9. Moe. Ronald, Traditional Organizational Principles and the Managerial Presidency: From Phoenix to Ashes. Public Administration Review 50(2): 111-22. 10. Taylor Fredrick (1947b) [1911], The Principles of Scientific Management. New York: Harper & Brothers. 11. Schachter H.L. (2007), Does Fredrick Taylor's Ghost Still Haunt the Halls of Government A look at the Concept of Government Efficiency in Our Times; Public Administration Review. September/ October 2007; 800-810. 12. Arnold, Peri.E.(1986), Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning; 1905-1980 Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 13. National Performance Review (NPR). 1993. From Red Tape to Results: Creating Government that Works Better and Costs Less. Washington DC. Government Printing Press. Read More