Diagnosing a Need for Organizational Change - Case Study Example

?Diagnosing a need for Organizational Change. Task: Diagnosing a need for Organizational Change. In any organization or body,the aspect of research into any mishap or catastrophe is a matter that needs to be given enough priority. In the course of operations, organizations tend to be faced with challenges that either require their attention or affects them should they not look into it sufficiently (Carnall, 2007). Moreover, the manner in which such situations are handled influences whether or not such an occurrence may recur in the future or not. Therefore, the probes set up to handle catastrophes and disasters must consider all these aspects in the course of their analysis to ensure that they come up with recommendations that curb the recurrence of such disasters (Burke, 2010). In this regard, the disaster that befell the shuttle Challenger provided a strong focal point from which organization within bodies could be viewed. The Challenger broke into pieces moments after takeoff on January 28 1986. Prior to this culmination of events, there had been revealing signs that were overlooked by the bodies in authority. A commission was formed to look into the matter and it filed its report after carrying out its research. In light of the above, NASA made most of the recommended changes brought forth by the commission that was looking into the Challenger disaster. Despite this, the occurrence of the Columbia accident on February 1, 2003 opened a new chapter into the effectiveness of the recommendations, and most importantly, shed some light on the issue of organizational culture that tends to undermine the effectiveness of organizations. Organizational culture is the aspect or custom of workers of an organization tending to carry out their activities in a way that may not be fully recommended, but in their organization, it is the norm (Carnall, 2007). While trying to counter this, models have been set up to ensure the best productivity of organizations. Such is the Burke-Litwin model for organizational change. It aims at bringing change to an organization through the creation of connections between performance and the factors within or without the organization, which has an effect over the performance (Burke, 2010). The model relies upon a framework through which the analysis of both internal or organizational factors and external or environmental factors can be linked together to ensure superb performance of an organization. It links both theoretical aspects and practical ideas to result in the best performance (Burke, 2010). This is done in twelve dimensions each of which caters for a particular aspect of the organization. Therefore, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report and recommendations as put under the Burke-Litwin model would give a better view as follows: 1. External Environment. Following the Columbia disaster, CAIB realized that a number of external factors also indirectly resulted in the catastrophe. Such included such aspects as performance pressures from the public that tended to rush the organization into action hastily. Moreover, the budgetary allocations for the agency proved to be insufficient following shifting national priorities. 2. Mission and Strategy. Furthermore, CAIB analyzed NASA’s mission, and in comparison to the strategy employed to achieve that mission, the two were found not to tally. Moreover, the employees’ perspective was not in tandem with that of the top management (James, 2007). 3. Leadership. CAIB’s report found the leadership of NASA solely to blame for the disaster. It stated that the leadership lacked open-mindedness and could have acted quickly upon realizing that the space ship was damaged. However, this was not done hence exposing the laxity of leadership at NASA (James, 2007). 4. Organizational Culture. The report found out that NASA had come to adopt a culture through which matters were casually schemed through thereby leading to loopholes that provided avenues for such disasters. The foam responsible for the disaster had been noticed in earlier missions, but it became a norm within NASA, only to turnout tragic. NASA considered it a tolerable occurrence thereby showing the dangerous culture adopted by the organization. 5. Structure. The report realized that the organizational structure at NASA lacked proper effective aspects that needed it to deliver superior performance. Communications within it were not effective enough as engineers had noticed something was amiss but failed to communicate this to the management for proper action (James, 2007). Moreover, the decision-making, authority and control structure at NASA could not provide the platform needed for the effective integration of all sectors of the organization. 6. Systems. The systems at NASA, much like the organizational structure, were ineffective at providing convenient and smooth amalgamation of the factors that were at the core of the organization. The policies and the procedures lacked that crucial factor that combines both the personnel and operations to yield required results thereby leading to the disaster (James, 2007). 7. Management Practices. The management practices were found to be the most contributing factor to the Columbia disaster by CAIB. The management failed to conform effectively to the strategies laid down to manage the organization effectively. This was through the realization that the management team conventions were not highly respected by the managers, and they had little concern for the safety of the mission hence leading to the calamity (James, 2007). 8. Work Unit Climate. The CAIB report finalized that due to the nature of the management, their culture slowly trickled down and infiltrated into the overall employee attitude for NASA. This resulted in a work unit climate of laxity with most personnel interviewed alluding to an attitude that lacked the commitment required of such operations. 9. Tasks and Skills. CAIB recommended that those in authority needed to possess the required experience and technical know how to run things in their areas of authority. Moreover, in the wake of the accident, Sean O’Keefe replaced NASA’s nine-year administrator Daniel Goldin. This was with the realization that NASA required a more management-oriented head than a science mind. 10. Individual Values and Needs. The dimension of values and needs of on focuses on considering the workers opinions regarding their work, and CAIB considered this in their recommendations (James, 2007). The recommendations highlighted that such factors as personal preferences of an employee needed to be taken into account while assigning duties to realize maximum potential. 11. Motivation Level The motivation levels of the employees at NASA were significantly low in the days prior to the disaster as highlighted by the CAIB commission. This was attributed mostly to intense schedules that fatigued the workers thereby leading to laidback operations. The board recommended that employee motivation levels need constant uplifting to ensure more dedication at work. 12. Individual and Overall Performance. The overall organizational performance is solely dependent upon the individual performance of the employees of that organization. Basing on this, CAIB realized that the managerial flaws of NASA were because of individual mismanagement of the top authority that affected the entire organization. The research carried out by CAIB unearthed various managerial flaws within NASA that bear the greatest blame for the Columbia accident. This was the most critical aspect of the factors that propagated the occurrence of the accident. The main reason for this is that the other causes for the accident all stem from the lack of proper management in the top most corridors of NASA. The recommendations aptly stressed the issue of proper management within NASA. Therefore, this was the most crucial cause of the Columbia accident. In the course of assessing the data, archival records are constantly referred to get the state of affairs within NASA from an earlier perspective. This is used to have a clear view of the build-up of activities gradually through to the occurrence of the accident. Interviews were also used intensively to obtain the views of the personnel involved with the operation and the general employee attitude at NASA. In the analysis of the CAIB report, the Burke-Litwin model forms a basis from which the findings can be effectively assessed. This model is especially helpful as it breaks down the data into dimensions for easier and quicker evaluation (Burke, 2010). The major way in which it fails to deliver is the aspect whereby some dimensions tend to override each other which may lead to repetition. Despite this, it still forms a compelling lens through which the findings of CAIB can be evaluated for organizational change (Craig, 2009). References. Carnall, C. (2007). Managing Change in Organizations. New York, NY: Prentice Hall. Craig, D. (2009). Action Research Essentials. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons. Burke, W. (2010). Organization Change: Theory and Practice. California, CA: SAGE. James, E. (2007). A Case Study of NASA’s Columbia Tragedy. Michigan, MI: ProQuest. Read More