Mens Rea in Relation to Accessories - Essay Example

of the of the of the Mens Rea in Relation to Accessories The doctrine of accessory liability deals with the relationship between the principal and the accessory. Under this concpet, the accessory attracts criminal liability for assisting the principal in the commission of a crime. Furthermore, if the accessory encourages or motivates the principal to commit a crime, then he will be held criminally liable for that criminal act1. The accessory will be held liable, on account of his involvement in the criminal acts of the principal. In instances, where the accessory assists the principal in the commission of a crime, the former is deemed to have participated normatively in the crimes of the principal. This state of affairs, renders the accessory criminally liable for the principal’s criminal acts. For instance, if a person provides a weapon to another, with certain knowledge that the weapon will be employed by the latter to murder another person, then it will be construed that the person supplying the weapon has assisted in the murder2. The theory of natural justice requires harmful conduct to be attributable to a person who is to be made criminally liable. Consequently, there should be fairness, while attributing fault or blame to an individual. This is the fundamental requirement of the criminal justice system. Thus, the criminalisation of a person on the basis of another person’s conduct is against the principles of justice. In addition, such criminalisation would be in breach of the basic concept of distinctness of each individual, as a responsible and independent agent. In general, it would be inequitable to hold a person liable for the remote consequences of his actions. It is indisputable and morally justified to attribute criminal liability, only when there is evidence of harmful conduct3. Accessory liability is a contentious issue in legal circles. If the principal has a valid defence or enjoys diplomatic immunity, then the conduct of the principal could be exonerated. On the other hand, the accessory will remain liable, even if the conduct of the principal is absolved, on the basis of a policy based defence. As such, there are two concepts that deal with accessory liability. First, the accessory is liable if he assists the principal in executing the criminal act. Second, the accessory can be held liable for the wrongful acts of the principal, if he had motivated or exhorted the principal to commit the crime4. In the past, the courts had adopted the view that the liability of the principal controlled the liability of the accessory. They had applied the common law requirement that the principal had to be convicted before the accessory was convicted. However, the courts gradually abandoned this principle. At present, it is sufficient to establish that the principal is liable, in order to hold the accessory liable. This suggests that it is inessential to establish the liability of the principal. The extant case law suggests that the accessory can be rendered liable even if the principal is exonerated of his crime, due to some peculiar circumstance, like diplomatic immunity5. The acquittal of the principal, which is the consequence of a fact finding trial by a jury, indicates his innocence. The principle of double jeopardy states that the defendant cannot be tried more than once for the same crime. Under this principle, the defendant is precluded from proving his guilt, during the trial of his accessory. As such, intention is crucial in determining the liability of the accomplice. Thus, the accessory must have acted with the clear intention of influencing or assisting the principal, in the commission of the crime6. If a person unintentionally encourges another to commit a crime, then that person will not be held responsible. Thus, in order to hold a second party responsible for the acts of a first party, it has to be established that the second pary had intended to assist or motivate the first party to commit the offence. Reckless advices with regard to criminal acts do not render the provider of such advice liable7. However, if such reckless advice was provided with the intention of ensuring the executing of a crime, then the provider of the advice will be held liable. In a similar vein, providing disinterested advice, with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of a criminal act, do not render the provider of the advice liable. An accomplice is a person who influences or encourages another individual to commit a crime. If intention is not proved, then the accomplice cannot be held liable8. As such, the doctrine of causation states that a person will be held liable for the consequences of an act, even if he had not intention to commit that act. However, under the complicity doctrine, the intention factor does not have much importance. It cannot preclude a person from being held liable for reckless or negligent advice. If the reckless act of a person results in the death of another, then that person will be held liable for manslaughter9. This applies even if the person did not intend to cause the death of the victim. It is also applicable to cases where another person intentionally helps or influences the principal to commit a reckless or neglignet act. In such cases, the criminal liablity will be equally shared by the accessory and the principal. For instance, if a person knows that a boiler is defective and knowingly encourages another person to fire it, then that person will be held liable, in the event of the boiler exploding and causing death10. It is a difficult task to attribute criminal liability in criminal acts that entail the activities of more than one individual. The principal is termed the defendant, and constitutes the person who commits the complete crime. The term accessory or accomplice is append to the person who assists or encourages the principal to commit the crime. According to the provisions of section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, there are four modes, whereby a person constitutes an accomplice. These are aiding, abetting, counselling, and procuring. The person who performs an action that can be classified under one or more of these categories is deemed to an accomplice of the principal or defendant11. In general, the first two modes of aiding and abetting transpire at the time of commission of the crime. The other two modes, namely those of counselling and procuring take palce prior to the criminal act. The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 states that accomplices are liable for the actions of the principal offenders; and that the punishment inflicted upon them is to be similar to that imposed upon the principal offender12. It had been proposed that the liability of an accesory, with regard to aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a crime was to be supplanted by two inchoate offences. These statutory offences were to be those of assisting in the crime and encouraging the crime. Obviously, the liability of the accessory is of an incipient nature. Thus, the legal culpability of the accessory is complete, on the completion of his act of assistance. Hence, it is immaterial whether the principal committs the criminal act or abstains from doing so, in so far as the culpability of the accesory is concerned13. In assessment of the liability of the accessory, regarding the crime committed by the principal, can only be with relation to the assistance provided and not the actual commission of the crime by the principal. There had been an attempt to simplify the law, by clearly distinguishing betwixt the liabilites of the accessory and the principal offender. This simplification, tends to restrict the liability of the accesory to a very narrow area, namely that of assisting or inciting the principal to commit the crime14. In instances involving aiding , abetting or counselling, the accessory does not commit the offence, in question. In addition, there is no necessity for him to be the cause of the offence or the offence committed by the principal, as this would have the effect of making him the principal. Nevertheless, there is an important exception to this, namely in suicide. In acts of intentionally taking one’s life, aiding and abetting itself constitute the principal offence. Hence, the accessory or the aider and abettor is not rendered liable on account of the principal’s act. Moreover, in such cases the principal is not held to be committing an offence15. The liability of the accessory depends on other factors, and is not independent. Thus, there is a derivative feature, involved with respect to accessorial liability, renders the accessory liable, on the basis of some wrongful act committed by some other person. Thus, liability is attributed to an individual who had not directly committed the criminal act. Thus, it is apparent that a greater proportion of blame is attributed to an accessory than is justified under natural justice. Works Cited Baker, Dennis J. “The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms.” New criminal Law Review 10 (2007), 370. “Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime.” 2006. The Law Commission (LAW COM No. 300). 8 January 2011 . Kadish, Sanford H. “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine.” California Law Review, 73 (1985), 323. Molan, Mike. “Cases and Materials on Criminal Law.” Taylor & Francis, 2007. Williams, Glenys O. “Intention and causation in medical non – killing.” Routledge, 2007. Read More