The Law Relating to Fixtures According to the Ruling in Botham - Case Study Example

The Law Relating to Fixtures Introduction Theoretically, fixtures are objects that are permanently attached to the land and are distinguishable from personal chattels. However, in practice, there are times and circumstances in which a chattel can be transformed into a fixture. This is significant because the classification of chattels and other objects as a fixture or a chattel determines how it devolves. For instance a fixture will pass with the land to which it is attached, because by law, it is a part of the land.1 In order to overcome the difficulties with distinguishing between chattels and fixtures the courts have developed a test for defining and classifying fixtures. The test is adequately summarized in the case of Botham v TSB Plc [1996]. According to the ruling in Botham the degree of annexation and the purpose of the annexation will function together in deciding whether or not an object is a fixture.2 Essentially, an examination of the common law principles applied by the courts over the years have demonstrated that the test put forth in Botham is an adequate representation of the principles to be applied when determining whether or not an object is a fixture. Quite often, it may be difficult to distinguish between a chattel and a fixture and the question therefore turns on whether the test set out in Botham and followed by the courts is sufficient to overcome this confusion. The discussion that follows demonstrates that while the Botham ruling is no more than a reiteration of the principles used by the courts to determine whether or not an object is a fixture, it is insufficient to resolve the confusion that often arises in distinguishing a chattel from a fixture. Definition of Fixture Section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925 obviates the need for a clear or at the very least, satisfactory definition of fixtures. This is because, Section 62 automatically invites a presumption that fixtures will pass with the land to which it is annexed. Fixtures are objects which are conjoined with the freehold by virtue of their physical connection to the property or reference to the purpose for which they have been connected to the land.3 The person affixing the object becomes dispossessed of the fixture unless he himself is the freehold owner.4 The definition of fixtures is perhaps more suitably understood by reference to differentiation in the sense that its meaning if more properly explained by distinguishing the fixture from the chattel. Chattels are personal property and do not form a part of the land and do not move from the vendor to the purchaser under the sale of land.5 In this regard, the distinction between chattels and fixtures can be illusive since a chattel can by virtue of its annexation and purpose of annexation can be properly deemed a fixture.6 The Test for Classifying Fixtures In general the test for determining whether or not an object can be deemed a fixture was summarized by Blackburn J in a case that predates Botham. In the case, Holland v Hodgson [1872] LR 7 CP 328 Blackburn J ruled that the appropriate test for discerning whether an object is a fixture is by reference to the degree to which the object is attached to the property and by reference to the purpose for which it was annexed.7 This test is clearly no different from the test laid out in the Botham case and likewise implies that both parts of the test must form the basis of the enquiry with equal attention and significance to both. Even so, there have been instances where the courts have insisted that the degree of annexation was the most important line of inquiry. For instance in Mather v Fraser [1856] 2 K & J 536 it was held that the degree of annexation was the most important factor and that that any object that was supported by its own weight was a chattel.8 The courts have also ruled that in order for an object to be properly deemed a fixture it had to be attached to the land in a particularly significant manner even if it was possible for it to be removed easily.9 Be that as it may, there is more than sufficient consensus among a plethora of case law to support the contention that the presumption of annexation can be superseded by evidence of purpose and/or attention with respect to the annexation of the object.10 For instance it was held by the House of Lords in Leigh v Taylor that when an object is annexed to land, it is automatically presumed that the object is a fixture. Even so, the House of Lords went on to add that the presumption is rebuttable by reference to the purpose of the annexation.11 In Leigh an occupier with a life interest attached tapestries to a wall in a house subject to the life interest. After the occupier’s death, a remainder issue claimed that the tapestries were fixtures and therefore passed with the house. The House of Lords did not agree and ruled that the tapestries were chattels and had never changed so that they were fixtures since they were merely annexed to the walls to enhance the enjoyment of the chattels.12 Re Whaley [1908] 1 Ch 615 demonstrates how a chattel can be deemed a fixture. In this case, the court held that the tapestries in question had become fixtures because they were affixed to form a part of a room’s theme and had not been annexed as chattels.13 As Dixon explains: Thus, where affixing is necessary for the proper use of the article and applies nothing about its relation to the land, the item may remain a chattel. Conversely, items intended to enhance the value of the property may be fixtures even though resting on their own weight.14 In this regard, it comes down to a proper construction of the facts and circumstances of each case. Attention must be given to the property’s nature, the object’s use and its physical connection to the land. In any event, the degree of annexation and the purpose of annexation are the underlying principles by which an object is determined to be a fixture. The test is adequately stated in the Botham ruling to reflect this concept. It is also true as stated in Botham, that some degree of annexation must exist. The courts have adopted what has been described as a gravity test to ascertain whether or not the degree of annexation is sufficient to warrant a fixture classification.15 In other words if an object is not supported by its own weight and is affixed to the land by virtue of some other means, it can be properly classified as a fixture. However, it has been held that not everything that is bolted to land will automatically be deemed a fixture.16 On the other hand, objects with tenuous connections to the land such as cabinets, fans and heaters can be properly classified as fixtures.17 In order to fully understand how and why some annexed objects are regarded as fixtures and others are not, the courts’ approach to the purpose of the annexation must likewise be considered. Recent cases have displayed a tendency to lean toward the application of “more subtle considerations relating to the objectively understood purpose” of the annexation.18 This new direction points to a shift away from the degree of annexation test. As Gray explains: The physical circumstances of a particular installation point only to a prima facie classification as a fixture or chattel which is rebuttable by evidence of some contrary purpose or scheme underlying the installation.19 In other words, just as suggested by the Botham case, there must be some physical connection to the land in the first place. The fact that the purpose of the annexation is also looked at, also suggested in the Botham ruling, clearly indicates that the annexation alone is insufficient to substantiate a classification of the object as a fixture. The purpose of the annexation can function to rebut this presumption. With respect to the objective purpose, this test is satisfied by reference to the facts and circumstances of the case.20 As Lord Cockburn stated, it is not possible for an individual to “make his property real or personal by merely thinking it so.”21 In the final analysis it all comes down to an enquiry as to whether on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the annexation of the object would typically be intended to form a permanent part of the land or could be intended to provide an improvement or was intended to be temporary or removed.22 As stated by the House of Lords in Elitstone, the more significant question is the intention, and intention was to be determined by virtue of an objective test.23 The objective test was applied in Hamp v Bygrave [1982] 266 EG 720 where it was determined that garden ornaments by their continuous design were part of the landscape and as such were fixtures.24 This was so, despite the fact that the garden ornaments were only supported by virtue of their own weight. The obvious implication is that the primitive inclination toward the gravity test has been altered by a more objective and common sense approach to what constitutes chattels and what otherwise constitutes fixtures. In order to make an appropriate classification, the court relies on physical observations as means of determining the purpose and intention of the annexation. Certainly the degree of annexation is no more than some indication of that intention and/or purpose. In this regard, the degree of annexation is by no means conclusive. Logically, the result of the objective purpose/intention case will invariably mean that what may be regarded as a chattel in one case may very well be regarded as a fixture in another. This was already demonstrated by the courts’ findings in Leigh v Taylor and Re Whaley (discussed above). In Leigh, tapestries affixed to the wall were not regarded as fixtures, whereas tapestries affixed to the wall in Re Whaley were. These findings were based on the application of the dual test where annexation may rebut the presumption that mere annexation renders an object a fixture. This accords with the observation made in Botham that courts are inclined to take a common sense approach to the principles applicable to determining whether or not an object is a fixture or not.25 Clearly the law of fixtures has evolved so that it reflects the dual test described in the Botham case. Previously the emphasis was on the physical connection of the object to the land. Although the emphasis has shifted to the purpose or intention of the annexation, the degree of annexation will always be a relevant, although not the only determining factor. Scarman LJ pointed out in Berkley v Poulet [1976] 242 EG 39, that if the degree of annexation is such that the object cannot be removed without causing serious injury to the or some form of destruction of the land this will be a strong indication that the object is in fact a fixture.26 This might explain why a house boat was deemed a chattel despite it’s connection to the land via its moorings and connection to utilities via the land.27 The court ruled that the connection to the land via moorings can be seen as no more than an attempt to prevent the houseboat drifting out to sea.28 In the final analysis, the question of whether an object can be classified as a fixture is more case-based and context oriented so that the distinction between fixtures and chattels has now become tenuous. The degree of annexation will not automatically determine whether or not an object is a fixture. The increasing emphasis on intention and purpose is entirely necessary and accords with common sense. Quite often, putative buyers may be lured to purchase realty on the basis of an annexed object which increases the value and appeal of the land. It would be entirely unfair to the putative purchaser who purchases the realty on the basis of its appeal and value which are contributed by certain affixed objects and those objects are removed prior to the conclusion of the sale. From the vendor’s perspective, it will be entirely unfair to him/her should they affix an heirloom to the property merely for the purpose of displaying it for easy access or to enhance enjoyment of the object, only to have it deemed a fixture. Certainly, in the circumstances, the fact that the vendor never intended that the object become a part of the land should therefore be taken into account to avoid unfairness. Conclusion The ruling in Botham which merely restates the dual test with reference to the principles applied in determining whether an object is a fixture or not, reflects the developing and emerging principles of the law of fixtures. It is obviously no longer feasible to merely distinguish between a chattel and fixture. The more recent approach is simply to determine both the actual and intended connection of the object to the land. This new approach is significant because fixtures, unlike chattels pass with the land. It therefore follows that in the event a chattel was intended to pass with the land, it ought not be excluded simply because it is not by definition and physical attachment a fixture. Likewise, just because an object is firmly affixed to realty does not automatically mean that the object was intended to form a part of the land. The current state of the law of fixtures recognizes these possibilities and ensures that physical connections alone will not exclude or include an object without a more meaningful investigation into the facts and circumstances of the case. The proper approach is to determine the correct classification by reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. In essence, the Botham case is merely a summary of these emerging and developing principles that currently shape the law of fixtures. The intended purpose of the annexation is more relevant than previously and in some cases is the dominant issue. Even so, the degree of annexation will certainly be a relevant issue. In the final analysis, the Botham ruling is an adequate summary of the current law of fixtures with respect to the principles by which to determined whether or not an annexed object is a fixture. Bibliography Aircool Installations v British Telecommunications [1995] CLY 821. Berkley v Poulet [1976] 242 EG 39. Botham v TSB Plc [1996] 73 P and CR D 1. Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co. v Pope [2000] 1 WLR 1941. Culling v Tufnal [1694] Bull NP 34 840. Dixon, M. (2005) Land Law. Routledge Cavendish. Dixon v Fisher [1843]5 D 775. Elitestone Ltd. v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687 Gray, K. and Gray, S. (2007) Land Law. Oxford University Press Hamp v Bygrave [1982] 266 EG 720 Holland v Hodgson [1872] LR 7 CP 328 Law of Property Act 1925 Leigh v Taylor [1902] AC 157. Luther, P. (2004) “Fixtures and Chattels: A Question of More or Less.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 24(4): 597-618. Mather v Fraser [1856] 2 K & J 536. Re Whaley [1908] 1 Ch 615 Read More