Sanctions and Limitations Imposed on Law Enforcement by the Supreme Court - Essay Example

Sanctions and Limitations Imposed on Law Enforcement by the Supreme Court Much is expected of the law enforcement that covers a wide rangeof duties and responsibilities (Grant, 2002). Not only are they important in the effectiveness in any criminal justice system, they are also tasked to protect individuals and the community in general according to laws of the land (Grant, 2002). Often they are engaged in such activities such as investigations, interrogations, helping in the prosecution and arrests of those criminally liable (McGuinness, 2009). Hence, they are subject to such scrutiny from different sectors including the Supreme Court (McGuinness, 2009). Cases are then presented in this paper where the Supreme Court has sanctioned or placed limitations on law enforcement. This act of the Court mostly involves cases where there is a violation of the constitutional guarantee by the law enforcement agencies. With these, the paper hopes to give not of criticism but to improve efficiency of law enforcement by presenting circumstances that were sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Sanctions and Limitations Courts were said to have sanctioned prosecutions made on the basis of deprivations of intangible rights (United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14-16 (CA2 1983). According to Avery, Blum and Rudovsky, some of the claims against police officers include: “negligence claims; arrest and detention involving warrantless arrests claims; arrests under unconstitutional statutes and ordinances; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; retaliatory prosecution; illegal searches and seizures; deprivations through improper use of informants and undercover agents; deprivation of First Amendment rights based on retaliatory actions; illegal interrogations; denial of medical attention; denial of counsel; defamation; verbal abuse and harassment; failure to provide police protection in various contexts, including domestic violence; conspiracies to violate civil rights; interference with family relationships; failure to disclose or act upon exculpatory evidence; negligence or deliberate indifference in the establishment or maintenance of road blocks, police pursuits, and others; misuse of weapons; invasion of privacy; and discrimination” (p. 8). In the case of Bustos v. City of Rochester, 23 A.D.3d 1048, 804 N.Y.S.2d 227, N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept., 2005, a police officer was found guilty of misconduct due to substantial evidence that pointed to the officer’s guilt in documenting false information in a police report of the cash retrieved from suspect’s vehicle which was incident to the arrest made and also, during a locker search, bags of cocaine were found in the officer’s winter service coat located in his locker (2005). Said police officer was then terminated from his employment because of this, to which he sought to annul the said determination (2005). The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, confirmed the said termination and held that the said penalty was not shocking to ones sense of fairness (2005). The court reasoned that such termination was fair and just as the severity or seriousness of the charges against the said police officer was proven through substantial evidence and was even pleaded guilty by the said defendant (2005). In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court did not allow a racist joke made by an investigator in a testimonial dinner for retiring members of city council to constitute a speech covered under the First Amendment (Pereira v. Commissioner of Social Services, 432 Mass. 251, 733 N.E.2d 112, Mass., 2000). In this case, the Court considered the issue of whether an investigator working with the Department of Social Services or the Department, may be disciplined for making such an offensive racist comment at a testimonial dinner (2000). In weighing the efficiency of public service against the investigator’s act of telling a joke, the Court gave more emphasis on public services and concluded that the decision to discharge said investigator by the public agency must be upheld (2000). It explained that there was evidence that behavior of Pereira affected the integrity of the Department in the Fall River community and that it undermined the Department’s relations with people in the community who trust and confidence in them (2000). It further stressed that such a racial and unthinking remark that has the effect of unduly harming the effectiveness or integrity the Department is not entitled to a claim of protection for her speech (2000). This public interest of efficiency in the service, therefore outweighs the investigator’s act of telling such a joke (2000). The Supreme Court also sets limitations especially involving possible violations of the Fourth Amendment. In the case of Minnesota vs Mustafaa Naji Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003), the Court now disallowed ‘consent searches’ done usually in traffic stops (2003). The Court explained that “investigative stops” are justified if there is a ground to suspect that there is criminal activity being done (2003). In this case, a vehicle was subjected to investigation because of some traffic violation which led to the police officer questioning the defendant aimed at getting some form of evidence for drug and weapons possession (2003). It further reasoned that although the initial stop was just proper, “the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop” (State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). The officer testified in this case that he did not suspect the defendant of a crime other than the traffic violation committed (2003). In this case, the goal was merely to check for violations of “speeding and cracked windshield” and thereby lacking in the reasonable suspicion requirement under the law (2003). The Court therefore concluded that such an “investigative questioning, consent inquiry, and subsequent search” went further than their original aim of merely a traffic stop and a lack of reasonable suspicion and thereby reversed the Court of Appeals decision (2003). In the case of Kyllo V. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), law enforcement agents who suspected petitioner of growing marijuana in his home, utilized a “thermal imaging device” to examine Kyllo’s home to find out if the heat used would be similar to that used in growing indoor marijuana (2001). The agents based on the scan determined that the “garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest of his home” (2001). This then led to the issuance of a warrant to search the petitioner’s home on the basis of the said thermal imaging, and thereby finding marijuana in his home (2001). The petitioner was then charged for such discovery of marijuana in his home but the petitioner however moved that such evidence seized from his home be suppressed (2001). In this case, the Court held that the government’s use of a device not generally not utilized publicly in order to investigate or search a private home, without knowledge of the owner thereof, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and is “presumptively unreasonable without warrant” (2001). The Court explained that this was similar to an eavesdropping made in Katz case, which even without physical intrusion violated the sanctity and privacy of ones home (2001). Said scan constituted as an unlawful search and was therefore not sanctioned by the Court (2001). In the case of Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843 (2003), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a 17-year-old boy suspected of murdering a 14-year-old girl in Harris County, Texas for an illegally obtained confession in violation of the Fourth Amendment (2003). This case involved Kaupp who was brought in by the police for questioning at three in the morning despite having failed to secure a warrant in order to question the said petitioner (2003). The six police officers woke him up, handcuffed him and brought to the officers’ patrol car without even briefing him of his right to decline the said invitation (2003). After having read the Miranda rights, the officers proceeded to question him of the murder that happened which appeared that Thetford, Kaupp’s brother, handed him the knife used after stabbing the victim (2003). A conviction and a sentence to 55 years of imprisonment was given to Kaupp to which the defendant appealed and eventually reaching the Supreme Court (2003). The Court in this case stressed the importance of a warrant before any suspect may be involuntarily removed from his home (2003). Furthermore, no evidence was found to corroborate Kaupp’s involvement in the murder (2003). The police claimed of the voluntariness of Kaupp’s accompanying them to the police station for questioning, which was contrary to the circumstances at hand (2003). The Supreme Court in this case then reversed the Texas Court of Appeals decision stressing that a confession following an illegal arrest was considered a fruit of the poisonous tree and must therefore be suppressed, being a coercive act of deriving confession (2003). Finally, in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the checkpoints on the road contravened the Fourth Amendment reasoning that there is a generality as to the primary purpose of the said checkpoint program and possibility of any kind of interrogation or inspection (2000). Said program cannot be justified by mere threat of a criminal problem alone but must coincide the interests that are threatened with the practices of law enforcement (2000). Conclusion Most of the above cited cases sanctions and puts limits to law enforcement activities as they violate constitutional guarantees of individuals who also expect protection from police officers. Law enforcement must therefore take into consideration always, in the fulfillment of their task, as well as relevant laws and constitutional guarantees to effectively perform their duties. References Avery, M., Blum Karen & Rudovsky D. (2008). Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation, 3rd edition. New York: West Thomson. Bustos v. City of Rochester, 23 A.D.3d 1048, 804 N.Y.S.2d 227, N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept. (2005). Grant, J. K. (2002). Ethics and Law Enforcement. The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved 11 April 2009 from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_12_71/ai_96453523/?tag=content;col1 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843 (2003). Kyllo V. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). McGuinness, J. M. Representing Law Enforcement Officers in Personnel Disputes and Employment Litigation. American Jurisprudence Trials, vol. 77 (1). Minnesota vs Mustafaa Naji Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 2003). Pereira v. Commissioner of Social Services, 432 Mass. 251, 733 N.E.2d 112, Mass. (2000). State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002). United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14-16 (CA2 1983). Read More