The Historical Extension of the Federal Government's Power Over the States - Research Paper Example

? The Historical Extension of the Federal Government's Power over the s Task The fourteenth amendment, to the United States Constitution, revered for containing the Bill of Rights and imposing limitations upon the state. For the majority of constitutional law theorists, the main function for the fourteenth amendment is to define the state limit beyond which state legislation may invade on individual rights (Hammerstrom, 2004). It attained this by prohibiting the states from infringing upon the rights and protection of the American populace. It also prevents the state from arbitral denial of the right to life and property without the due course of the decrees, and affords every individual within the jurisdiction of the state equal protection of the law. Over the years, the Supreme Court and the federal courts have adopted different interpretations of the fourteenth amendment. It is this reinterpretation, of the amendment, that has gradually changed the law of on the fourteenth amendment. This reinterpretation was reflected in various case laws that have been decided over the years. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) This was the first judicial interpretation on whether the Bill of rights could limit sate powers. In this case, Baron had argued that the Constitution limited powers of both the state and federal governments, and proceeded to give the limitations on state power specified under Article 1 Section 5 (Phelan, 2008). Marshal J, in a dissenting opinion, held that the Bill of Rights in any way did not limit state power, and if it was intended to limit sate power, it could have expressly stated so (Phelan, 2008). In his judgment, Marshal J applied the law as it was as opposed to what it ought to have been. He directly and strictly interpreted the fourteenth amendment to hold that it did not apply in limiting state power, but rather acted only to limit the power of the federal government. In informing his decision, Marshal J noted that the provisions that were sought to be relied upon were in the passive voice, as opposed to direct language, and the provisions under Article 1 could not be applied to limit state power. The use of passive voice, could not answer the question ‘by whom’ and it was thus incapable of determining whether the provisions of Article 1 were binding upon the states as well (Rosenkranz, 2011, 1010). Article 1, on which Barrron sought to rely on, was framed in general terms, read passive voice, and could thus not be directly linked to limiting the state power because it could not answer the question; limited by whom? Had such provision been intended to limit state power, it could have taken a more direct tone. This, for example, could have been evidenced by the use of direct terminology such as ‘the state shall....’ or ‘No state shall....’ Although convectional wisdom may have dictated the fact that the use of the passive voice is ambiguous, Marshal J was undeterred in his stance as he applied the constitutional interpretation rule that the constitution ought to be read as a whole (Rosenkranz, 2011, 1012). In light of this therefore, if Article 1 section 9 were meant to limit state powers, then it would not have been framed in general terms. It should thus have been framed in a manner that answered the ‘by whom’ question. The logic applied in Barron is that when the Constitution seeks to limit power in passive voice, it is then limiting the authority of the government that it established. This logic is not necessarily correct because there is the horizontal dimension to separation of state power (Rosenkranz, 2011, 1015). If an interpretation were sought using this concept, then the court would have found that the Bill of rights could also limit state power horizontally. In other words, the strict application of the canon of grammatical consistency need not be construed so rigidly as to rule out flexibility in interpretation (Rosenkranz, 2011, 1016). Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914) This case sought to give an interpretation of the fourth amendment right of people to be secure in their person and protection of illegal searches and seizure. The question before the court was whether evidence obtained by unconstitutional means could be admitted in court. The evidence in question revolved around documents obtained by a state marshal without an official search warrant, and without securing the presence of the defendant during the search and seizure operation. In holding that such evidence founded upon a breach of the fourth amendment could not be sustained, the court also found that the federal government was bound by the duty of affording every citizen protection from a violation of the Bill of rights. It was therefore the paramount duty of every law enforcement authority to not only prevent and detect crime, but also their duty to enforce the constitutional rights of every citizen (Carmen and Walker, 2011, p.9). In this respect therefore, the court was extending the limitation of state power beyond the actions of an individual to the federal government. In light of this therefore, the Fourth Amendment was not intended for individual transgression of such officials, but rather its limitations extend to the Federal government and its agencies as well (Carmen and Walker, 2011, p.10). This case thus introduced a new concept to the limitation of federal powers by establishing the rule that the Bill of rights acted to limit the conduct of federal powers as no power was beyond the Bill of rights. The Fourth Amendment thus reigned supreme over the supremacy of the federal government. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) This case marked a revolution in the understanding of the Bill of rights. This is because initially, as discussed in the above two cases, the Bill f rights under the Fourth Amendment was understood to be protection from the issuance of too loose search warrants. However, the 19th centaury judges revolutionized the initial understanding by reinventing the criminal procedure into the Fifth Amendment as the search and seizure doctrine (Davis, 2010, p. 937). This case is best understood as a part of the national judicial movement to impose minimum standards on the state criminal justice system. Despite the Warren court majority, not explicitly acknowledging that their main goal was to ensure a mobilization of the federal system under supervision of the Bill of Rights, under realism it was quite evident that their intention was to curb racism out of the majority of the states criminal justice system (Davis, 2010, p. 938). In this case, Mapp had police officers enter her home without a warrant and her consent, and proceeded to search for a fugitive. However, during the search the police discovered pornographic materials that violated Ohio’s obscenity laws. The state proceeded to try to convict her of the offence based on the evidence obtained during the search for the renegade. The issue then was whether the clauses of due process and equivalent fortification on the fourth amendment could be extended to state officers. In a majority decision, the court held that the guarantee on the fourth amendment against illegal search and seizure was an entitlement to every individual citizen of America, and the clauses of due process and equal treatment applied on all the states. This therefore marked the slow but gradual evolution of the courts interpretation of the Bill of rights as limiting on not only the federal government, but also the individual state governments. References Carmen V and Walker T, (2011), Briefs of Leading Cases in Law Enforcement, Wyman Street, Anderson publishing, Inc 2011. Davies, Thomas Y. (2010), ‘The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment 'Search and Seizure'. Doctrine Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 100, No. 3, pp. 933-1041, 2010; University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 137. Retrieved on 8 November 2011from SSRN: Hammerstrom Dough, (2004), The Hijacking of the Fourteenth Amendment Retrieved on 8 November 2011from reclaimdemocracy.org/personhood/fourteenth_amendment_hammerstrom.pdf Phelan Wesley, (2008), Historical Overview: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights Retrieved on 8 November 2011from Rosenkranz, Nicholas Quinn, (2011), ‘The Objects of the Constitution’. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 5, 2011; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 11-49. Retrieved on 8 November 2011from SSRN: Read More