Who, If Anyone, Is Criminally Responsible for the Death of William - Case Study Example

William’s death raises complex issues as to liability under the law of murder and manslaughter. In particular, the issue arises as to who in fact isliable and if liability can be established under criminal law, whether any defences are available under the circumstances. 1. Simon Simon could potentially be liable for murder or manslaughter under the law of homicide. The classic definition of murder under English Law was propounded by Sir Edward Coke1, asserting the two stage definition requiring actus reus and mens rea. If we consider actus reus, it must be established that Simon committed an unlawful act which caused William’s death. Both factual and legal causation of death must be established. The factual test applicable is the “but for” principle established in the case of R v White2. Simon will be criminally liable if his conduct was the factual cause of William’s death and the consequence of death would not have happened “but for” Simon’s conduct. If we apply the “but for” test to the current situation, William would not have been in hospital with severe injuries and loss of blood if had not been for Simon’s actions, therefore under the “but for test”, it is more than likely that Simon’s conduct will have satisfied the requirement of factual cause of death. However, it is also evident from the facts that the medical staff at the hospital gave Williams the wrong blood type in the blood transfusion. As a result, William died two days later and this begs the question as to whether Simon was in fact the legal cause of death or whether the blood transfusion was the cause of death. Under the legal causation test, it is not necessary for Simon’s conduct to be the sole cause of death however it must be the substantial cause and have made a significant contribution to Simon’s death3. Ultimately, this is determined according to the facts of each case, however case law has established that the original wound must still be operating and a substantial cause at the time of death4. With regard to the current scenario, the doctors administered the wrong blood type in the transfusion therefore it is arguable that it was their failure that was the substantial cause of Simon’s death. However, UK courts have been reluctant to break the chain of causation in cases where medical negligence is involved. A prime example is the case of R v Smith,5 where the victim was stabbed by Smith and a series of “unfortunate occurrences6” followed contributing to the chain of causation. Despite there being a 75% chance of recovery but for these events occurring, the courts still held that the chain of causation was not broken and that Smith’s conduct was the cause of death. Although a different approach was used in the case of R v Jordan7 where negligent medical treatment was received, the case was distinguished by Lord Parker as the victim’s wounds had almost healed at the time of negligent medical treatment. However, in the current scenario, William had suffered severe injuries and had continued to lose blood therefore the R v Jordan rationale is not applicable. In R v Smith8 it was also asserted that only if “the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of history can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound9”. This was confirmed in R v Cheshire.10 If we apply these principles to the current situation, if it could be established that Simon’s conduct was merely part of the background and that the intervening medical negligence in administering the wrong blood type was so independent to be the substantial cause of death, then Simon’s conduct will not constitute the cause of death. However, as a general rule courts are reluctant to hold doctors liable despite the presence of negligence on the basis of the “but for” principle11. Moreover, in line with the judicial approach there is a strong likelihood that any arguments regarding causation put forward by Simon will be negated on grounds that William would not have needed a blood transfusion “but for” Simon’s actions. In addition to actus reus, it must be established that Simon had the necessary mens rea to be criminally liable for murder. The implementation of the Homicide Act 1957 further reinforced by the decision of R v Vickers12 establishes that the requirement of mens rea is not restricted to an intention to kill and that an intention to cause grievous bodily harm will also suffice and constitute malice aforethought. This was further asserted by the House of Lords in R v Moloney13, where, the following guidance was given as to factors to be taken into account when determining mens rea: 1) Whether the death or really serious injury was a natural consequence of the accused’s voluntary act; and 2) Whether the accused foresaw that it would be a natural consequence of his act. The House of Lords asserted that if the above two stage test could be answered in the affirmative, there would be a presumption that the defendant intended the consequence and therefore had the necessary mens rea required for the offence. This was again reiterated in the case of R v Woolin14, where it was asserted that there must have been an intention on the defendant’s part to bring about the series of events and that it was foreseeable that such conduct could cause death. Even if Simon did not have an intention to kill William, he could still be liable for murder on grounds of having oblique intention15. Oblique intention occurs where the defendant does not desire the consequence and his aim is something else, however his actions have the effect of making the consequence happen16. Moreover, in the case of Hyam v DPP17 it was held that for oblique intention it had to be established that the consequence was highly probable. Additionally, in the case of R v Hancock v Shankland18, it was asserted that the probability of the consequence occurring is important in deciding if there is evidence from which to infer intention Therefore, where the defendant’s conduct creates a risk of death as opposed to foreseeing death, they will have oblique intention for murder. If we apply this to the current scenario, Simon did not appear to subjectively foresee the risk of death or have an intention to kill William per se. However it is foreseeable that his actions would cause grievous bodily harm and therefore it is highly probable that this satisfies the requirement that serious injury was a natural consequence of his conduct and that he foresaw that this was the case. Moreover, Simon clearly created a risk of death and injury and therefore may have oblique intention for the purpose of murder. Alternatively, if Simon’s mens rea is not considered sufficient for liability in murder, he could be liable for manslaughter on grounds of recklessness or involuntary (constructive) manslaughter. In the case of R v Creamer19 it was held that an individual is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when they intend an unlawful act to the person but death results which is neither foreseen or intended. In the current case, Simon’s actions satisfy the common law definition of assault and falls within the statutory offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. In the case of R v Dawson20, the Court of Appeal applied a test based on the sober and reasonable bystander who could assume to know the risk. Moreover, the case of R v Carey21 limits the scope of unlawful act manslaughter and held that the unlawful act must be dangerous in the sense that sober and reasonable persons would recognise the act was such to subject the victim to the risk pf physical harm. If further consider the mens rea for manslaughter, recklessness is an alternative fault element for manslaughter offence and covers criminal liability for taking “unjustified” risks22. However, the law relating to liability on grounds of recklessness distinguished between subjective and objective recklessness and varies according to different offences23. Subjective recklessness was established in R v Cunningham24, as being when the defendant when acting realised there was some risk of harm occurring, but undertook the dangerous act notwithstanding. The second stage required the defendant to have foreseen the risk himself. However, in the case of R v Parker25 it was held that where the accused “closed his mind to the obvious26” he could still be reckless. Additionally, the test for objective recklessness was set out in the case of R v Caldwell27, where it was determined that a defendant could still be criminally liable even if he had not appreciated the risk but “an ordinary prudent individual” would have realised the risk. The issue was ultimately up to the jury to determine upon the facts of the case. Again, if we apply these principles to Simon’s position, if it cannot be established that he has sufficient mens rea for murder, there nevertheless appears to be sufficient grounds to argue that he failed to appreciate the risk that “an ordinary prudent individual would”. As such, Simon appears to have been both subjectively and objectively reckless. Unless Simon can establish that he did not have the necessary mens rea for murder, it seems highly probable that he could be criminally liable for murder unless he can successfully rely on the partial defence of provocation under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, which by virtue of common law reduce his offence to constructive manslaughter. In order to rely on the defence of provocation, Simon would have the burden of proving that something was said or done that provoked him to hit William over the head with a beer bottle28. The common law definition of provocation determined in the case of R v Duffy sets out the following two stage test for the defence of provocation29: 1. Subjective test – whereby the accused must have lost self control, which was a sudden and temporary loss; and 2. Objective test- where by what the defendant did, any reasonable person would have done the same if he was provoked. It is evident from the case law dealing with the subjective test that any element of pre-meditation will negate the requirement of “sudden loss”30. If we apply the common law to Simon’s position, it is evident that prior to the incident, Simon was devastated at his wife having left him. Furthermore, there appears to be a pre-existing relationship between Simon and William and as soon as William entered the pub, he taunted Simon about his wife having an affair and leaving him. Having determined that Simon was subjectively provoked, the next step is to establish whether a reasonable person would have acted as Simon did. In the case of DPP v Camplin31, Lord Diplock asserted that the relevant question was not whether such a person would be provoked to lose their self control in the circumstances, but whether they would react to the provocation as the defendant did. It is also vital to consider the gravity of the provocation and the entire factual circumstances32. In the case of R v Smith33 the House of Lords asserted that it was not sufficient that something had caused the mere loss of self control, but the relevant question was whether the loss of control was sufficiently excusable to reduce the gravity of the offence from murder to manslaughter. Although the first part of the test for the defence of provocation has been established, the difficulty for Simon will lie in the second part of the test as the general presumption under the test is that the reasonable person is expected to retain their self control34. Whilst on the objective test a reasonable person would highly likely have reacted to the taunts, the problem for Simon will be the nature and force of the violent act in hitting William over the head with a beer bottle. Although it is reasonable that such provocation would result in a reaction, the difficulty for Simon will be arguing that a reasonable person would have resorted to violence and hit William over the head with a beer bottle. It is evident from the factual scenario that Simon was drinking at the time of the incident, which raises the issue regarding intoxication as a defence to criminal liability. In general terms, intoxication is not a defence to criminal liability35. However, in the case of DPP v Beard36, it was asserted that in order for intoxication to be considered as a possible defence, it would have to be demonstrated that the defendant “was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent required”37. Whilst intoxication may negate mens rea for murder, it will not prevent liability arising where recklessness is sufficient for liability in manslaughter. The leading case of DPP v Majewski38, created a distinction between offences of “basic intent” and offences of “specific intent”, permitting intoxication to be considered as a defence for the latter but not the former39. In the current scenario, Simon’s intoxication may negate liability form murder, but provided the causation test is satisfied, he will still be liable for manslaughter, where intoxication will provide no defence. Indeed, in the Caldwell case it was held that where recklessness is required for imposition of criminal liability, then any evidence of intoxication is taken to be irrelevant due to the act of self-intoxication being deemed reckless. 2. Duty Officer Liability With regard to the officer’s criminal responsibility in connection with William’s death, whilst not injuring the William in a positive act, it is possible to be liable for omissions as an actus reus in criminal law40. For example, in the case of R v Dytham,41 an officer was found liable for breach of official duty. In this case the defendant was a police officer on duty and witnessed a man being ejected from a nightclub, who was then beaten to death outside the club. He then left without calling for assistance or summoning an ambulance. In this case, the officer was liable for wilful misconduct in a public offence and Lord Widgery stated that “the allegation made was not of mere non-feasance, but of deliberate failure and wilful neglect. This involves an element of culpability which is not restricted to corruption of dishonesty but which must be to such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment42”. However, whilst the officer will be liable for wilful misconduct, it is highly unlikely that the officer’s omission constitute a sufficient novus actus interveniens to negate Simon’s liability. 3. Medical Negligence Whilst there clearly appears to have been medical negligence through the administering of the wrong blood type, unless Simon can establish that this was a sufficient novus actus interveniens to break the chain of causation, it is highly unlikely that the medical staff will be liable for William’s death for gross negligent manslaughter. Conclusion In summary, it is highly likely that Simon will be liable for William’s death factually and legally on the causation test. Whilst the police officer’s breach of public duty and the medical negligence contributed to William’s death, these acts are unlikely to constitute a sufficient novus actus interveniens to break the chain of causation. It does not seem that Simon had an intention to kill William particularly as he regretted the decision instantly and was on his way to the hospital with William when stopped by the police. However, Simon may be liable for murder on grounds of oblique intention. If liable for murder on grounds of oblique intention mens rea, it is highly unlikely that he will be able to rely on the defence of provocation on grounds of failing to satisfy the objective test. However, as murder requires a specific intent, on the Majewski rationale, Simon’s intoxication may negate liability for murder. Alternatively, it is most likely that Simon will be liable for William’s death in manslaughter, where his intoxication will be no defence. BIBLIOGRAPHY Michael Allen (2007) Textbook on Criminal Law, 9th Edition Oxford University Press. C. Elliot & F. Quinn (2006). Criminal Law. 6th Edition Longman. Jerome Hall (2005) Principles of Criminal Law, The Lawbook Exchange Limited. D. Omerod (2008). Smith and Hogan Criminal Law. 12th Edition Oxford University Press. William Wilson (2003), Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 2nd Edition, Longman All UK legislation available online at www.opsi.gov.uk and www.statutelaw.gov.uk List of Cases R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260. R v Smith [1959] 2 All ER R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App Rep 152. R v Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 193. R v Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664. R v Moloney [1985] 2 WLR 648. R v Nedrick(1986) 8 Cr App R 179 R v Woolin [1997] 4 ALL ER 103 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55. R v Hancock v Shankland [1985] 2 WLR 257. R v Cunningham {1957] 2 QB 396 R v Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600 R v Caldwell [1982] AC 382 R v Duffy [1949] 1All ER 932 R v Ibrams and Gregory (1981) 74 Cr App. R 154 R v Thornton [1992] 1 All ER 306. R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008. DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705. Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1961] UKHL 2. DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479 DPP v Majewski 1976] UKHL 2 R v Dytham [1979] CA Statutes Homicide Act 1957 Read More