Analysis of of Angie That Dropped out of Law School - Case Study Example

­­­­­­­­­Interoffice Memorandum Background Facts: We are instructed by our long time client Mr. Martin Zanders who is concerned about his daughter Angie, a first year law student at Harlard Law School in Los Angeles. According to Martin Zanders his daughter dropped out of law school as a result of unpleasant experiences with professor Kingsfield at Harlard Law School. If there is a claim against professor Kingsfield it will have to be founded under the law of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) under the auspices of outrageous conduct. The evidence in support of such a claim is found in the interview conducted with Angie Zanders. Angie, we are told is an exceptionally gifted student who was able to obtain a first degree at age 19 and to complete high school by the age of 16. At age 19 she is purportedly the youngest law student to have ever become fully matriculated at Halard Law School. However, her experience thus far has been upsetting since her first day attending professor Kingsfield’s law class. According to Angie’s recitation of the facts her professor called attention to her young age in front a class of approximately 90 and made statements aligning her youth to ignorance, incompetence and immaturity. He also called her names which suggest that Angie is a spoiled and pampered child and would fail his class. At one point Angie arrived for class and found a poster on the class room door which reflected the professor’s stated low opinion of her. At one stage prior to this the professor’s disparaging remarks regarding Angie’s age elicited laughter from the classroom. Not surprisingly Angie has been upset and discouraged by Kingsfield’s treatment of her and as a young person accustomed to academic success she is very sensitive to his stated opinion that she is not up to the academic task at law school. She has been experiencing nightmares, sleeplessness and headaches as a result of her experience with Kingsfield and is currently receiving treatment from Dr. Norman Miller. Problem: The primary issue is the impact that professor Kingsfield conduct has had on Angie’s academic career. Angie, who has enjoyed academic success until now had high prospects of graduating from law school as quickly as she did from both college and high school. The fact is Angie has dropped out of law school as a direct result of Kingsfield’s treatment of her and her father wants to explore a course of action against Kingsfield in respect of the impact his conduct has had on Angie’s academic career and future career prospects in general. Legal Issues and Application of the Law: In order to substantiate a claim against professor Kingsfield for IIED it will be necessary to prove that Kingsfield’s conduct amounted to outrageous conduct in the eyes of the law. It is certainly not enough to merely show that Kingsfield’s conduct was insulting and upsetting. While it is not entirely certain what the courts will regard as amounting to outrageous conduct it clear that the courts will not award damages for IIED in every case that includes abusive or offensive conduct. (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) The key issue is therefore a determination of whether or not professor Kingsfield’s conduct was such that it rises to the level of outrageous conduct so as to justify damages for IIED. The guidelines for courts to follow is set out in the recurrent statement that outrageous conduct is conduct that is: “...so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) Although this standard is judged by reference to the particular facts of each case, including the plaintiff’s own tolerance threshold, there will be no award for damages for insults, threats, annoyance and indignity in the absence of aggravating circumstances. (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) In other words the courts will not award damages for IIED unless the conduct is so extreme that it results in very serious mental distress. (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) Thus far, it does not seem likely that the consequences for Angie was very serious. According to her psychiatrist she is being treated for sleeplessness and headaches both of which are quite common mental maladies. In the Yurick v The Superior Court of Battle County the plaintiff suffered similar age discrimination harassment at his work place when his supervisor commented in the front of others that his age indicated that he was senile. (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) The court considered that while the supervisor’s conduct was offensive “and in breach of common standards of civility” it ws not so extreme as to justify a claim in IIED. The court explained that: “...offensive conduct...may be irritating, insulting or even distressing but it is not actionable and must simply be endured without resort to legal redress.” (Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County) Applying this hypothesis of the law, professor Kingsfield’s conduct may have been insulting, irritating and distressing but it is not such that it can justify a legal claim under IIED. In attempting to understand what might arise to the necessary component of aggravating circumstances some guidance can be gleaned from the case of McDaniel v. Gile. In this case the attorney’s conduct in which he demanded sexual favors from the client as a form of fee arrangement was considered outrageous conduct. (McDaniel v. Gile) Based on the ruling in this case it is easy to see why the sexual harassment rises to the level of outrageous conduct since sexual abuse is obviously not tolerated in a civilized society. Unlike age harassment, sexual harassment is the subject of criminal codes and can easily be viewed as presenting an aggravating circumstance. Perhaps the most obvious evidence of aggravating circumstances exists in evidence of physical harm as a result of the outrageous conduct giving rise to a claim in IIED. (Perati v. Atkinson) The California District Court of Appeal, First District ruled in Perati v. Atkinson that: “Intentional infliction of emotional distress without physical trauma, can be a ground of liability but only when the defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ or ‘has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency.’” (Perati v. Atkinson) The courts generally take the approach that when there is no physical evidence to support the claim of IIED the outrageous conduct complained of requires: “’...more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious.’” . (Perati v. Atkinson) In applying the test set forth in Perati v Atkinson it appears that Angie’s claim of IIED in the absence of evidence of physical trauma will not likely succeed against the professor. Her claim requires evidence of very serious mental distress. Based on her doctor’s report the emotional or mental distress is not by any stretch of the imagination serious. Even so, the courts will not be entirely convinced that the doctor’s report is objective given Angie’s comments that she obtained the best education that money could buy. Although it is obvious that Angie was academically gifted the implication is clear. Her father is in a position to obtain a report to back up his daughter’s claim to a certain extent at least. Although there is no evidence of impropriety it can reasonably be inferred that the doctor’s report is merely sympathetic to his client and not as neutral as the court’s would like for the purposes of assessing damages. In other words, while something more serious is required, the single doctor’s report is not sufficient to convince the court of the seriousness and the authenticity of Angie’s mental malady in the absence of physical trauma or injury. In all likelihood Angie’s claim for IIED in the context of the facts provided may not even disclose a cause of action in IIED. In Trerice v Blue Cross of California it was determined that there are essentially four elements required to sustaining a cause of action under IIED. They are: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” (Trerice v Blue Cross of California) Angie’s complaint can be reconciled with the facts of the Trerice v Blue Cross of California case, although slightly different in content. At the end of the day the plaintiff in this case was the subject of a course of action that directly impacted her career path as it did Angie’s. The plaintiff in Trerice v Blue Cross of California was subjected to a number of administrative decisions that were plainly disorganized and impulsive in action resulting in a notice of termination by her employer to withdrawal of the termination and a demotion followed by a notice of termination. The plaintiff claimed that during the period of demotion she became the object to curiosity and in-office jokes and ridicule with the result that she suffered sleeplessness, loss of appetite, anxiety, weight loss and worries about her economical welfare. The consequences for the plaintiff in Trerice v Blue Cross of California is not unlike those complained of by Angie. In fact if anything, Trerice’s mental distress appears to be more severe than Angies, yet the court determined that Trerice’s situation did not support a case for severe or extreme mental distress so as to justify a claim for IIED and therefore did not disclose a cause of action. (Trerice v Blue Cross of California) When one compares the facts of this case to Angie’s the parallels are so strong that it is conceivable that the court will likely take the same position with respect to Angie’s claim and rule that Angie’s complaint does not disclose a cause of action in IIED. The fact remains the courts of the state of California have made it abundantly clear that a case for IIED will not succeed if the conduct complained of is merely rude and/or insensitive. (Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) Some guidance as to what kind of conduct is so outrageous that it gives rise to a claim in IIED was gleaned from the judge’s discussion of the law and facts in Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. In this case the court looked at an earlier ruling and determined that conduct on the part of an employer that amounted to screaming at an employee while “criticizing” that employee’s mistakes, threatening dismissal and “making threatening gestures” did not: “...exhibit that ‘outrageousness’ necessary to rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) Albeit the conduct was rude and insensitive it was not outrageous for the purpose of a claim in IIED. Drawing on the facts of this case the ruling of the California court and its endorsement in Braunling v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. it is very unlikely that Angie’s case will succeed. No doubt professor Kingsfield was rude and insensitive, but according to the manner in which the courts of California have treated the facts in the context of established principles of law, neither Kingsfield’s conduct nor Angie’s purported mental distress gives rise to outrageous conduct with serious mental distress justifying a claim in IIED. The fact is, Angie basically claimed that she was largely humiliated and when one considers the requirements for substantiating a claim of outrageous conduct, humiliation is not an emotion that persons in a civilized community can reasonably expect to avoid. (Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.) Cochran v Cochran distinguishes between those cases in which outrageous conduct and the resulting harm would justify a claim in IIED and those cases where such a claim could not be sustained. On example of a case substantiating a claim in IIED was founded when a defendant bank encouraged the plaintiff to assign “all past, present and future accounts” to the bank on a promise that it would extend further loans to the plaintiff. (Cochran v Cochran) However, having secured the plaintiff’s accounts the defendant bank not only refused further loans but publicly “ridiculed” the plaintiffs. (Cochran v Cochran) Another case worthy of note with respect to a viable claim for IIED founded on outrageous conduct occurred when a plaintiff was terminated from his employment on racial grounds and the termination was accompanied by “racial epithets.” (Cochran v Cochran) It is obvious in both cases that the plaintiffs were not merely subjected to distress but also some level of physical or tangible harm. In the first example provided the plaintiffs were denied a loan after being forced to turn over assets to the bank for the express purpose of obtaining a loan. When this is compared to Angie’s case she was merely encouraged to do that which was required of her in the first place and that is to prepare for class and to participate in class. Although she was humiliated in the process she was certainly not forced to do anything that she would not have otherwise been required to do. In the second example provided the plaintiff was subjected to conduct and treatment specifically forbidden in modern society and that is termination from a job on the basis of race. The plaintiff was forbidden to return to his job whereas Angie was encouraged to return to class. She might have not anticipated returning to the previous conditions but she was not prevented the option of returning. Moreover, when one considers that it was only one class, Angie’s response itself was extreme. She could have taken a course of action calculated to drop the class and sign up for another. Examples provided by the court in Cochran v Cochran where conduct complained of did not give rise to outrageous conduct and therefore unable to justify an award of damages for IIED are not unlike Angie’s case. (Cochran v Cochran) As previously noted screaming at a plaintiff while criticizing their work is not outrageous conduct. (Cochran v Cochran) Likewise fear of retaliation or further reprisals will not justify a claim in IIED. (Cochran v Cochran) Angie’s recurrent nightmares and fears of continued humiliation will likewise not give rise to a claim in IIED. Similarly, personal insults will not substantiate a claim in IIED. (Cochran v Cochran) Based on these distinctions between cases capable of substantiating a claim in IIED for outrageous conduct it is very unlikely that Angie’s claim will meet with any degree of success. Even if Kingsfield’s conduct is capable of being characterized as outrageous or extreme Angie has another evidential threshold to cross. That threshold requires proof that professor Kingsfield intended to cause her emotional distress. (KOVR-TV v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County) It is highly unlikely that professor Kingsfield intended to do anything more than to harden Angie’s sensibilities with a view to facilitating her transition into law school having regard to her relatively young age. While his technique may have been insulting and humiliating it is very unlikely that he intended her to suffer emotional distress. As it turns out her emotional distress however was not legally sufficient to substantiate a claim in IIED. Conclusion Based on the foregoing discussion of the applicable law and the facts of this particular case it is very unlikely that Angie will succeed in an action for IIED. To start with the courts have been very clear that not only must the conduct complained of be extreme or entirely outrageous it must be accompanied by very serious mental distress. Moreover, in the absence of physical injury, the evidence of mental distress must be accompanied by aggravated circumstances. Examples of physical injury and aggravated circumstances exists in cases where there is conduct that is not tolerated by society as a whole. For instance dismissal from a job on the grounds of race, sexual abuse by a professional, deceit on the part of a corporation and conduct calculated to bring about mental distress of the kind necessary to substantiate a claim in IIED. Legal redress will not be allowed if the plaintiff’s injury is merely injury to feelings as in Angie’s case. The medical report does not reflect serious mental harm or any physical harm outside of headaches which could be accounted for by the ordinary stresses of daily life. In all the circumstances Angie should take the matter up with Harlard Law School and seek to either change classes or drop the class altogether. It is entirely unreasonable that she should opt out of college altogether on the basis of an unpleasant experience with just one class. The damages sustained are entirely of her own doing and only proves her professor right in his assertion that she is too young to succeed in law school. Bibliography Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 220 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) Cochran v. Cochran, 65 Cal. App. 4th 488, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540 (1998) KOVR-TV v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1023, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (1995) McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1991) Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal. App. 2d 472, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898 (Ct. App. 1963) Trerice v. Blue Cross of California, 209 Cal. App. 3d 878, 257 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1989) Yurick v. The Superior Court of Butte County, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1116, 257 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1989) Read More