Criminal Responsibility and Causation - Essay Example

?  Criminal Responsibility and Causation There are many ways that causation is implicated in criminal cases. The general rule in English law, is thatthere must be a direct link between the behavior of the defendant and the person who was harmed by the defendant. One can look at English negligence law to find out how this works, because the rules are similar between English tort law and English criminal law. There are different tests for English causation in torts law. One is the but-for test, which means that the defendant is only liable if, but for his actions, the negligence and the harm would not have occurred.1 For instance, there are some circumstances where somebody can be negligent in certain ways, but if this negligence does not cause the harm, then this breaks the chain of causation. For instance, in Empire Jamaica (1955),2 the owners sent a vessel out to sea, and it crashed because the pilot fell asleep. The only negligence that the owners were guilty of were that the officers did not have their licenses. But this had nothing to do with the crash, so, even though there was a negligent act, it was not the cause of the damages. Similarly, in Christopher Andrews v. Barnett Waddingham LLP and RAJ Waddingham3 there was insufficient causation between the negligence of the financial advisors and the loss that was suffered by the claimant. Moreover, there is a general rule in English law that there are certain acts that would break the chain of causation. For instance, the acts of a third party are likely to break the chain of causation.4 This often when the defendant does not have control over the third party's actions, but, if the actions of the third party are foreseeable by the defendant in any way, the chain of causation is not broken.5 While these are torts cases, there are criminal cases as well, and these criminal cases define the boundaries and the contours of causation in the criminal courts. In criminal law, there must be an action (actus reus) combined with the state of mind (mens rea), and the actus reus plus the mens rea must have caused the actual crime.6 Moreover, there might be instances where there is a supervening or intervening cause that would break the chain of causation.7 There are exceptions to this, of course. For instance, there might be a case where somebody does great bodily damage to somebody else, but does not do enough damage to kill the person. But, the person might be a Jehovah's Witness and refuses a blood transfusion. If the transfusion was received, then that person would have lived. The defendant would still be guilty of manslaughter or murder, because of what is known as the ?hin skull rule- this means, generally, that you take the victim as you find him or her.8 At the same time, there are times when an omission might give rise to criminal liability, such that a crime can be heightened if the person does nothing for somebody who was damaged by the criminal defendant.9 For instance, if somebody beats somebody up, and doesn't get medical attention for the person, and the person dies, then that person is guilty of murder or manslaughter.10 Likewise, there is also an issue regarding intervening causation.11 One of the leading cases for this is R v. Cheshire.12 In R v. Cheshire, the appellant attacked and shot a man in a fish and chip shop, and he underwent surgery. When he was in surgery there was a negligent act, in which the doctor could not diagnose the reason why the patient died. The doctor misdiagnosed the reason behind the patient's breathlessness and respiratory obstruction. However, it was found that the only way that the causation would be broken would be if the medical staff was reckless, not merely negligent. Therefore, the defendant in this case was found to be liable for the death, because he put the causation into motion with his battery in the first place.13 That said, there can also be a case where the negligence of a third party would break the chain of causation, such that the defendant who put the act into motion would not be negligent for the death.14 This was established by the case of R v. Jordan.15 In this case, the appellants were involved in stabbing a man who was admitted to the hospital. In this case, however, the treatment that the patient received was so negligent that the chain of causation was broken, so the men were only liable for the initial battery, but not the death. In that case, the patient was intolerant of terramycin, which is an antibiotic that prevents infection. This caused the patient to develop diarrhea. However, although this antibiotic was stopped, another doctor ordered it to be resumed the next day. This was the cause of death, as the stab wound had healed by the time that this patient died. This was sufficiently negligent to break the chain of causation.16 Other cases that have been presented demonstrate the causation issue as well. For instance, in R v. Dear,17 the defendant stabbed the victim. But the victim apparently reopened the wounds two days later, which means that he effectively committed suicide by doing so. Still, the defendant was found guilty for the death, as the defendant made the wound in the first place. R v. Smith18 is another case. In this case, there was a stabbing, but there were two different people who caused the death. A soldier dropped the victim twice, and the medical captain was busy and did not recognize the extent of the injuries, so he was negligent. However, the original defendant who stabbed the victim was ultimately liable for the death, because that person was the one who caused the injuries in the first place.19 Then there is another issue with causation, in that the defendant's action must be taken with a sufficent mens rea, which means that the state of mind must fit the crime, and there must be an actus reus, which means that the actions are actually what caused the damages.20 There are exceptions where the person's actions might have caused the crime, but they are still judged to be not guilty for some other reason.21 This would mean that the causation would be the other reason, not the actus reus of the defendant.22 Such is an example of R v. Quick.23 In this case, the defendant was a nurse at a mental hospital and was charged with assaulting a patient. His claim was that his act was involuntary, because it was the result of a diabetic hypoglycaemia, which was induced by too much insulin, and this made him violently aggressive. The appellate court ruled that this would be an excuse that would absolve the person of criminal liability, if the person could show that the diabetic episode was induced by something that was not the result of the negligence of the defendant. This is an example of sane-automatism -the automatism is what caused the problem, not the actus reus of the defendant. While this is not a clear cut case of causation being broken, it is a case where the causation was something other than the act of the defendant. In this case, the causation was attributed to the diabetic incident which made the defendant work on automation. Therefore, criminal responsibility is not present, because the causation was broken by the supervening act of automation.24 Conclusion In criminal law, as in tort law, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant's actions and the harm that results. In other words, the but-for test can be applied, and the question asked is, but for the person's actions, would the victim have died? There are cases that state that the chain of causation can be broken, once it is set into motion, but, generally, this only happens when there is an extremely negligent act by an intervening party. Even the actions of the victim do not break the chain of causation. There is another exception, and that's when it is judged that there isn't mens rea nor actus reus of the defendant involved in the death or injury. This is the case with automatism. That said, it is very difficult to break the chain of causation, and, generally, once a defendant puts something into motion, the defendant is ultimately liable for whatever happens to the victim. References SAAMCO v. York Montague Ltd. [1996] UKHL 10. Empire Jamaica (1955) 1 AER 452. Christopher Andrews v. Barnett Waddingham LLP and RAJ Waddingham (2006) EWCA Civ. 93. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970] AC 1004. Lamb v. Camden LBC [1981] QB 625. R v. Blaue (1975) 61 Cr App R 271. R v. Miller (1983) 2 AC 161. R v. Cheshire (1991) 3 AER 670. R v. Jordan (1956) 40 Cr. App. R. 152. R v. Dear (1996) CLR 595 R v. Smith (1959) 2 QB 35. SAAMCO v. York Montague Ltd. [1996] UKHL 10. Empire Jamaica (1955) 1 AER 452. Christopher Andrews v. Barnett Waddingham LLP and RAJ Waddingham (2006) EWCA Civ. 93. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [1970] AC 1004. Lamb v. Camden LBC [1981] QB 625. R v. Blaue (1975) 61 Cr App R 271. R v. Miller (1983) 2 AC 161. R v. Cheshire (1991) 3 AER 670. R v. Jordan (1956) 40 Cr. App. R. 152. R v. Dear (1996) CLR 595 R v. Smith (1959) 2 QB 35. R v. Quick [1973] QB 910. Perkins, RM (1939) A rationale of mens rea. Harvard Law Review, 52.6, pp. 905-932. Simons, K. (2002) Does punishment for culpable indifference simply punish for bad character? Examining the requisite connection between mens rea and actus reus. Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 6.1, pp. 219-315.     Read More