Criminal Law Problem - Assignment Example

Criminal Law Problem Question A criminal act that deliberately causes the death of another person is termed as murder. From the legal perspective, a person is generally held to be guilty of murder, if the illegal act committed by that person results in the death of some other person. The fact that the intent behind the illegal act was merely to cause serious physical injury and not death, in no manner mitigates the gravity of the crime. As such, intent to kill is absent in many instances of murder1. Legally a murder transpires, whenever a rational person with malicious aforethought or criminal intent, illegally kills another person. It is sufficient to prove that there was an aim to cause serious physical injury, in order to establish malice. In addition, the perpetrator should have the capacity to differentiate between good and evil, and should also be aware that the act is illegal. Furthermore, the illegal act should culminate in death, not later than a year and a day2. A murder constitutes a more serious offence than manslaughter. However, loss of control on account of intoxication or aggravation effects a reduction in intent and renders the illegal act an act of manslaughter3. In our present problem, the accused Al set fire to Barry’s stables with intent to cause him grievous injury. As a result of his action, Barry’s father Wilf, who was present in the stables, was asphyxiated and succumbed at the hospital. In order to assess the liability of Al, his intention behind the illegal act is to be examined. An illegal act, resulting in the death of the victim, is deemed to be murder, if its perpetrator intentionally renders the victim vulnerable to the threat of death or dire physical danger. Such perpetrators are held to be guilty of murder to the same extent as perpetrators who had wanted the death or grievous physical injury to the victim to occur. These two types of intent cannot be differentiated morally and as their outcome is the same, namely the death of the victim; consequently, it is just to treat the criminal act as equivalent, in both instances4. The Stephens Digest of Criminal Law states that an illegal act, accompanied with malice prepense and which results in death, is murder. Malice aforethought transpires if there is intent to cause severe physical harm or death; or awareness that the criminal act is liable to have such outcomes5. Malice aforethought has conventionally connoted that state of mind that the prosecution has to establish, Vis – a – Vis the murder. This term has been accorded recognition by statute, due to the 1957 Homicide Act’s section 1. Prior to the enactment of this statute, a defendant, had been deemed to be guilty of murder, if that individual had been commissioning some other serious criminal offence that had inadvertently resulted in the death of the victim. Such constructive malice was rescinded by the aforementioned section of the Homicide Act. For instance, in the Moloney case6, the court held that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that the defendant’s intention had been to cause serious physical injury or death of the victim7. As such, the state of mind of the perpetrator at the time of committing the criminal act, is the most important factor for determining whether the perpetrator is guilty of murder or manslaughter. The cases discussed hereunder, specify the circumstances under which death due to an illegal act is classified as either murder or manslaughter by the courts. The gist of section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 is that the term foresight being subjective, should not be assessed from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation or on the basis of what the defendant should have anticipated. Their Lordships’ ruling in Woolin and the Criminal Justice Act, established that the defendant’s state of mind would constitute the relevant mens rea. In the Hyam case, Pearl Hyam suspected Booth of contemplating marriage with her erstwhile beau. This made her extremely jealous and she decided to prevent Booth from embarking upon such a course of action. Accordingly, Hyam caused Booth’s house to catch fire. In this incident, Booth lost two of her children. The House of Lords ruled that a verdict of murder was justified, provided Hyam had anticipated that grievous injury or death would ensue from her criminal act. The topmost plane of mens rea is occupied by specific intent or intent. From the legal perspective, specific intent connotes the commission of a criminal act, in order to achieve the outcome or with the awareness that the criminal act, would in all probability, produce that result8. In our case, Al set fire to Barry’s stables, and his intent was to cause grievous injury by this act, and to teach Barry a lesson. Hence, he was fully aware of the consequences of his illegal act. Thus he had the specific intent to cause grievous bodily harm to Barry, whom he expected to be present in the stables, at the time of his setting fire to them. As such, intent is of two varieties. There is direct intent, if the perpetrator had aspired to realise the outcome of the act performed. Thus a premeditated criminal act constitutes direct intent. On the other hand, a criminal act by the perpetrator that brings forth an unintended result, which the perpetrator knew was likely to transpire, constitutes oblique or indirect intent9. An instance of oblique intent is provided by R v Nedrick, in which a child lost its life. This death happened when the defendant deposited petrol into the house of a woman through the letter box. Thereupon he set the petrol afire. The court directed the jury to return a verdict of murder, if the defendant’s act was certain to have caused death or grievous bodily harm. Accordingly, a verdict of murder was passed against Nedrick by the trial court. However, on appeal to the House of Lords, their Lordships held that as the defendant’s primary desire had not been to harm any person; he was not guilty of murder. Accordingly, the sentence was reduced to one of manslaughter10. Similarly, in the Woolin case, the defendant lost his temper and threw his 3 month old son onto a hard surface, which proved to be fatal for the latter. The trial court held him to be guilty of murder. However, appellate court held that Woolin was guilty of manslaughter, as he had no intention of causing death to his son11. Furthermore, in R v Hancock and Shankland, the defendant’s dropped a concrete block upon a taxi, causing the death of the driver. The trial court returned a verdict of murder, but the House of Lords held that there was no clear intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm; accordingly, it deemed the crime to be manslaughter12. In DPP v Smith The House of Lords held that a person is guilty of murder if an ordinary man would have foreseen that the defendants action would result in death or grievous bodily harm13. The House of Lords opined in R v Cunningham that it was merely sufficient to establish intention to effect grievous bodily harm, and that it was inessential to prove that the perpetrator could have anticipated that the criminal act was likely to result in the death of the victim. As such, section 1(1) of the Homicide Act connotes such mens rea, in the context of implied malice14. It is essential to ascertain whether the chain of causation had been broken due to negligent treatment provided to Wilf in the hospital. In the following case, it was held that incidents between the criminal act and death were insufficient to break the chain of causation. As such, in R v. Smith, the chain of causation was held to be unbroken and that the incidents that had transpired between the infliction of the knife wound and death were deemed to be inadequate to bring about a severance in the chain of causation15. In R v Blaue, the defendant stabbed the victim, who was a Jehovah’s Witness who died in hospital after she refused to have a blood transfusion on religious grounds. The defendant was convicted, despite contending that the victim’s refusal of treatment was unreasonable and had broken the chain of causation16. This case makes it very clear that the incidents that had transpired between the actual crime and death of the victim, constituted an unbroken chain of events. Thus, the criminal act of Al forced Wilf to countenance a situation, wherein he lost his life. Hence, Wilf on being asphyxiated due to the smoke, succumbed in the hospital; and the chain of causation remained unbroken, even though the oxygen cylinder used in his treatment was defective. The Court of Appeal, in the Nedrick case had ruled that the crime was manslaughter and not murder, unless the intent to cause grievous bodily harm or death could be proved17. In our case, Al had possessed the intent to cause grievous bodily harm; hence his unlawful act is to be deemed as murder. As such, the courts differentiate between manslaughter and murder, based on intent. Accordingly a partial defence was developed in respect of murder, by the judiciary and legislature. This defence has been applicable to instances where the defendant’s intent to kill arose on account of provocation or diminished responsibility. Such unlawful acts have been categorized as manslaughter and not murder18. This is in accordance with section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957. If there had been any provocation for Al’s unlawful act, then the crime would have constituted manslaughter. Since, such provocation was absent, the crime constitutes murder. Al’s criminal act was premeditated, and was patently intended to cause severe physical harm. Since, there had been neither provocation nor diminished responsibility, Al cannot plead manslaughter, because mitigating circumstances were absent. Hence, Al is guilty of the crime of murder, under the provisions of the Homicide Act 1957. Bibliography Books: O’Riordan, Jimmy, As Law for Aqa. Published by Heinemann, 2002. Stone, Richard, Offences Against the Person, Published by Routledge, 1999. Journals and Periodicals: Ford, Richard, Murder could be graded from most foul to most merciful, The Times (London), August 6, 2004. Manslaughter versus Murder, The Toronto Star, September 30, 1998. Lord Phillips, PERSPECTIVE: Law ruling on lifers is murder on prisons, Birmingham Post, March 10, 2007. Pannick, David & Cooper, John, Murder is not always most foul, The Times (London), November 30, 2004 Subparagraph (b) of article 223 of Stephens Digest of Criminal Law Cases: DPP v Smith (1961) AC 290 Hyam Appellant v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1975) AC 55 R v Moloney (1985) 2 WLR 648 R v Nedrick (1986) 1 WLR 1025, CA R v Woolin (1999) 1 AC 82 R v Cunningham (19810, 2 All ER 863 R v Smith (1959) 2 All ER 193 R v Blaue (1975) 61 Cr App R 271 Statutes: section 1(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 Read More