Deliberative and civil society models of democracy - Coursework Example

?Introduction There are two central view of democracy, according to Habermas (1994). In the republican model of democracy, there is solidarity between disparate groups of people. The different groups who comprise society recognize that they are all unified, and that there is a common good that must be sought after. In this kind of democracy, therefore, there is a societal consensus of norms, so that there is a centralized core of democratic principles which underpin the political process. In the liberal model of democracy, however, there are disparate groups, and these disparate groups do not try to unify with society as a whole. Rather, they compete with one another for political power and resources, and the people vote on whose interests prevail. Therefore, society does not have a centralized core and is in danger of disintegrating. The liberal society is marked by societal preferences, whereas the republic society is marked by societal values. Because of this, some critics, including Habermas and Boesche, believe that liberal societies have a problem with legitimacy of laws, as these laws are not based upon societal norms, but, rather, are based on something less, and these laws are subjected to being dismantled by lawmakers on a seeming whim. The international stage is a macrocosm of these problems, according to Dryzek, as the international relations are marked by competition between disparate groups who do not necessarily agree upon becoming a unified whole. Deliberative democracy may help to overcome the problems which are inherent in a liberal democracy. Deliberative democracy introduces reasoned discourse into the political process, therefore it provides more of a substantial underpinning to the moral arguments which mark liberal societies. The way that deliberative democracy benefits liberal societies is that deliberation provides an educative function, as well as a way of bringing disparate communities together in realizing that they might have common ground. It also is beneficial in that it introduces an element of reason into procedures which determine the common good, which makes these procedures more legitimate. The outcomes are also based upon rationality, which makes the outcomes more legitimate as well. More than this, however, deliberative democracy recognizes that there are certain fundamental truths which should govern all reasoned discourse, these fundamental truths being such aphorisms as respect for others. In this way, deliberative democracy may benefit both state liberal societies and the international stage, which retains many of the elements of a liberal society. Discussion In order to determine the essential question of how deliberative and civil society models of democracy overcome the problems of the liberal democracy, liberal democracy must be compared and contrasted with republican democracy. According to Habermas (1994), these are the two received views of democratic politics. The liberal democratic process, according to Habermas, programs the government in line with societal interest. In this way, the government is an apparatus or tool to achieve the ends of society, and society itself it a connection between individuals. The individuals in this view band together to push government in a way that meets their collective goals. In the liberal democratic process, Habermas states that the government is a mediating process. The republic process, on the other hand, requires solidarity between the disparate groups of people. With the republican view, the different groups of society realize that they are all unified, and there is a recognition that society must be oriented towards the common good. In the democratic process, social integration is achieved through the hierarchical regulations of the state and the decentralized regulations of the market. The orientation towards the common good is the third way that social integration is achieved in the republic view of democracy. It is this horizontal method of social integration that has the priority in this view, according to Habermas. Habermas further states that the citizen has contrasting roles under each of these received views of democratic politics. The major contrast is that under the liberal view, the citizens are defined by the negative rights that they receive from the democracy; under the republic view, the rights that the citizens enjoy are positive. What this means is that, under the liberal view, the rights are defined as freedom from government intervention. The subjects are released from external compulsion. Under the republic view, the rights that citizens enjoy are positive, in that the rights afford the citizens the right to participate in a common praxis. Governmental authority emerges from the citizens power being bundled through self-legislation, and the political process is legitimated by protecting this praxis. The citizens in this view of democracy reach an understanding amongst themselves on the norms and goals which are for the good of the whole, and the political process protects this praxis which determines this. Said in another way, under the republic view, the rights that citizens enjoy are those which are determined by the praxis of citizens; under the liberal view, the rights that citizens enjoy are those which come through natural law, or the law of reason (Habermas, 1994). As a further explanation of natural law, Neumann (1957) explains that this view of the law is such that nature, as a state of paradise, persists as a theoretical grounding for legal principles. These principles will prevail even after the state is formed, and these laws cannot be altered by democratic procedures (Neumann, 1957). In other words, there are certain inalienable principles which are given to man by nature, and no amount of democratic procedures may take them away. Under this view, slavery would be abhorrent to natural law principles, presumably, as one precept of natural law is that man was made to have freedom. The democratic principles in society may legitimate slavery, but natural law would dictate that such laws that enslave man are not legitimate. John Locke, according to Neumann, would state that, in such cases as slavery, man should act against the law. Slavery is against the principles of man's natural goodness, and man should use his “federative power,” which Locke conceived as an independent power, to resist such evil. Another contrast between the two concepts, liberal and republican, is how each views the political process. Under the liberal concept, there are different collectives, each strategically aligned or opposed to one another. The people vote on which of these collectives, usually represented by persons or programs, may be approved. Under the republican view, however, political will obeys not the market, but is determined by mutual understanding of the citizens. Politics concerns values, not just preference (Habermas, 1994). According to Habermas (1994), the republican model has the advantage over the liberal model, because the republican model preserves the original meaning of democracy. Habermas views the original meaning of democracy as autonomous citizens institutionalizing public use. He sees this kind of democracy as fostering the communicative conditions which legitimate political opinion and will-formation, and he further feels that these kind of communicative conditions are the ones which generate reasonable results. On the other hand, the kind of communicative discourse which occurs under the liberal view of democracy involves different and disparate groups who form a pluralism, and each of these groups have equal weight in the political process. Under this view, Habermas feels that there is not a normative core in the democracy. The republican model of democracy does find a normative core, whereas the liberal model is skeptical of reason. The liberal and republican view of state and society differ as well. In the liberal view, the democratic process takes place by compromising between competing interests. On the other hand, the republican model dictates that the will-formation of democracy takes the form of an ethical-political discourse. The citizenry as a whole may culturally establish the consensus. The medium through which society constitutes itself into a political whole is through the citizens' political opinion and will-formation. In this view, democracy is formed through the society as a whole self-organizing. The politics, therefore, is directed against the state and society may develop into a political totality (Habermas, 1994). Habermas (1994), in his post-script to his views on the republican verses liberal democracies, further states that there is a problem in liberal democracies because rules may not be considered to be legitimate. This is a problem in any democracy, according to Habermas, as rules may be changed by lawmakers. The pluralism of a liberal society means that worldviews and ethics have disintegrated, in that they are not comprehensive or collectively binding. Because of this, natural law is no longer substituted by individual conscience and morality. The only source of legitimacy in law in a pluralistic society, then, is the democratic process for the production of law (Habermas, 1994). Neumann (1957) states that natural law declines in the age of liberalism as social contract theory and democracy find acceptance, to the same degree that these other concepts find acceptance in society. At is most destructive and weakest, liberal society may lead to the kind of conditions which are ripe for tyranny, argues Boesche (1995). Liberal society is weak and has an overall inability to act, partially because its lack of unity. The individuals in these democracies produce societies which are atomized and composed of individuals who are isolated, powerless and anonymous. These societies are fragmented, and this makes them ripe for destruction and despotism (Boesche, 1995). Because law in a pluralistic, therefore liberal, society is not grounded in a collective sense of ethics, it must be grounded upon something else. Habermas states that social theory is one such way of grounding the law in these societies. Under this view, law socially integrates society and provides a safety net for the failure to achieve true social integration. There is a mutual recognition in these societies that certain norms are just and proper, and these structures are transmitted by the law and mediates the interactions of strangers. Legal theory is another way of grounding the law, and this theory dictates that law may only be legitimated through self-determination. Citizens are the authors of the law, as well as the addressees of these same laws. Social contract theory forms another basis of legal legitimacy, and this assumes that the bourgeois has formed a quasi-contract that binds one another (Habermas, 1994). Liberal democracies have an inherent weakness, according to these thinkers, because there is not a prevailing norm or a sense of unity in the society. The society is composed of competing groups with competing norms, all of which are seen as equal and all of which are given equal weight in deciding what laws should govern. There is not a prevailing sense of right and wrong upon which all of society might agree, but, rather, each group who competes in society might have their own definition of right and wrong, and these definitions are not considered any less worthy than other, competing groups definitions. This is what is known as moral relativism (Harman, 1980). This makes society, according to the critics of liberalism, weak, as it is not based upon a coherent, unifying principle, but, rather, is based upon the amalgamation of different groups' power. There is not a unifying center, and the interests of everyone are given equal weight. Deliberative democracy, however, may overcome some of the problems which are the hallmark of liberalism. Deliberative democracy, according to Cooke (2000), is a democracy which is based upon reasoned discussion in political life. There are five arguments for Cooke's thesis that deliberative democracy is advantageous. The first argument is that deliberative democracy is educative. In this view, deliberative democracy educates the individual, as the citizenry is encouraged to participate in civil discourse (Cooke, 2000). This function would presumably strengthen liberal society because it gives the individuals who are attempting to have their interests recognized a more educated basis for their requests and beliefs. Instead of every group being out for itself, education in this sense might give these groups a sense of history, as well as give them a better understanding of the opposing views. If this is possible, then it might be also possible to harmonize the different views, which might lead to a societal consensus about certain issues. Deliberative democracy is further helpful in strengthening liberal democracies, and overcoming the problems which are inherent in liberal societies, by producing a community-generating power. Cooke (2000) states that deliberative democracy produces a communitarian emphasis on the common good, which may lead individuals to understand that their membership in the collective form of life comes only through his or her practices of public reasoning with others who underpin their identities with the same values and traditions. Deliberation encourages the participants in democracy to think about the good for all involved when considering a decision (Cooke, 2000). This would obviously be helpful to liberal societies for much the same reason that the educative aspect of deliberative democracy is helpful. Like with the educative function, the community-generating function helps the individual see the common good, and how his or her individual or group's interest are a part of a larger whole. As such, the common good becomes a driving force for making decisions, not just the good of the group or the individual. This might also help to consolidate norms, so that there might be more of a consensus inherent in the overall society as to what is right and what is wrong. Deliberative societies may also help liberal societies overcome their problems by instituting procedures which make the democratic process more just, according to Cooke (2000). Outcomes are considered fair and legitimate if they are the outcomes which are based upon deliberative procedures which are considered fair (Cooke, 2000). The way that this function of the deliberative process might aid liberal society is by simply ensuring that there is a fairness in the proceedings which determine which societal interests should be promoted into the public sphere. For instance, perhaps there is an African-American group who has an interest to promote that might be in conflict with another legitimate group. Deliberative procedures would be able to mediate this conflict, and, because the procedures are based upon the reasoned, deliberative process, the outcome might be seen as more fair then if the decision was made arbitrarily. Practical rationality is another reason why deliberative democracy might be beneficial to liberal societies. Cooke states that deliberation makes the outcome of conflicts seem more rational. Public deliberation, in this view, contributes to the overall quality of democratic outcomes. Cooke cites Habermas' argument about deliberative democracy, stating that public deliberations have a cognitive dimension, in that these deliberations, in seeking to find the best way of regulating matters of public concern, must underpin these debates with rationality and objectivity. This debate endures compromises, but the compromises are presumed to be fair because they are mediated by a procedure which is also a product of deliberation. These compromises have a goal of reaching a consensus which is deemed to be objectively rational (Cooke, 2000). The way that this aspect of deliberative democracy is beneficial to a liberal society is that it, in effect, introduces a rationality into the discussion, and this rationality may form the basis of any compromise that might come about between the interests of competing groups. Since liberal democracy is seen to be weak in part because there is not a consensus in society about normative concepts, deliberative democracy partially corrects this weakness by introducing rationality and objective reason. Rationality and objective reason may, in effect, replace the concept of central societal norms as an underpinning of society, and may mediate conflict more appropriately and successfully than how conflict is currently mediated in liberal thought. The fifth way that deliberative democracy is beneficial to liberal society is that it elucidates an ideal of democracy which is congruent with whom we are. By stating “whom we are,” Cooke states that this phrase means that there are certain normative concepts of knowledge which are integral to Western thought, history and traditions. Rejecting these normative concepts would require a fundamental reorientation of thinking, as opposed to making a simple decision. Moreover, a deliberative democracy can make sense of these normative concepts and apply them to society as a whole (Cooke, 2002). The benefit to a liberal society for this aspect of deliberative democracy is clear – that, even if groups may have competing interests, there is, underneath it all, an overall sense of norms upon which every group may agree. These norms may then form the basis for society, a linchpin between disparate and competing groups. Whether these normative concepts are based upon the notion that autonomous reasoning is a valuable part of human agency, or based upon the importance of publicity, or based upon the view that everybody is deserving of equal respect, these concepts may form a common ground in a liberal society, so that mediating conflicts between competing interests may become easier. International Relations and Deliberative Discourse Deliberative discourse is not just helpful to the national communities who need to overcome the problems of liberalism, but also for international ones. Dryzek (2002) states that liberal theorists and republican theorists, or, at least, theorists who would belong to each of these camps as delineated by Habermas, see international relations very differently. Whereas republic theorists see that there is not a central authority that governs international relations, and, therefore, international relations are governed by anarchy, liberal theorists see international relations very differently. They state, according to Dryzek (2002) that the world system is governed by different sources of order that includes international regimes, international law and international organizations. For them, these independent, yet integrative, sources of law are sufficient to govern the international body. They are not interested in fostering international democracy (Dryzek, 2002). In other words, the international system of order has much in common with liberal democracy. Where in liberal democracy, there is not a societal consensus on norms, and the political process is made up of disparate groups which have competing self-interest, and the political process attempts to find common ground between these interests, the international system of order is much the same. However, it is on a much larger scale, so the problems which face the liberal society are, if anything, magnified on the international stage. Dryzek conceives of the international stage as encompassing diverse groups with often competing interests, just like in a liberal democracy. These groups are non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations and states. Dryzek (2002) sees deliberative democratic principles as a way of mediating this internal conflict. Dryzek states that deliberative democracy is underpinned by discourses, and discourses may bring order by bringing together a shared set of assumptions and capabilities into coherent wholes. These discourses are social, not personal, and, as such, they act a source of order by coordinating the behaviour of the individuals who subscribe to these discourses. Dryzek states that deliberative democratic principles may overcome the inherent problems of international relations and international law. Even though democracy was traditionally conceived as a way for a state to govern within its borders, democratic ideals may be extended to the international system by way of deliberative democracy, according to Dryzek. Under Dryzek's conception of international deliberative democracy, it is not necessarily a hindrance that there is not a common national identity which may override the group identities. Deliberative democracy has the ability to downplay the problem of boundaries, as it may cope with fluid boundaries and focuses upon the outcomes across boundaries. In this way, the link between democracy and the state is severed and is no longer confined to the processes and procedures of the state. The communicative power of the deliberative democracy lies in civil society and its actors taking the lead in the discourse, according to Dryzek. These actors may lead the discourse which underpins the deliberation by having access to money, personnel, the media and by having credibility. Then, these actors must consider whether their actions would make the world a better place. And, by making a world a better place, Dryzek cautions that economic value should not be the primary focus in the reasoning process. He uses the example of the Rainforest Alliance, who argue for rainforest preservation on the grounds that these rainforests are the storehouses of potential pharmaceutical products. This reinforcement of economic value as the focus on preservation efforts in Third World countries is suspect, implies Dryzek. That said, even Dryzek concedes that using the model of deliberative democracy to underpin international affairs is an imperfect one. For one, there is still the question as to whose interest should control. In the absence of civil ways of determining this question, Dryzek states that the answer to this question might come through violence and coercion, as opposed to reasoned inferences that are rooted in democratic principles and practices. Another conundrum posed by scholars with regards to using deliberative democratic principles to the international realm is that is might be difficult to determine the moment of a binding collective decision. Dryzek states that this conundrum may be resolved by the realization that binding collective decisions are the product of government, as opposed to governance. The decisions made by the international community most often come through states acting individually, and these decisions made by the states actually are influenced by discursive forces in the transnational civil society. There is a transnational discourse that underpins the collective decisions, and an example of this cited by Dryzek are the Zapatista rebels in Mexico in the 1990s. The Zapatistas were successful because they were able to connect their cause to the supportive transnational communal discourse (Dryzek, 2002). Dryzek also cites Dennis Thompson (1999) who proposes deliberative democracy as a way to guide international relations. Thompson, states Dryzek, is interested in the voices of moral constituents who are beyond the borders of the states. Put another way, Dryzek states that there is an overall moral compass or code which may be interjected into international proceedings, and this moral compass or code could underpin the democracy of the international stage. Examples of this might be the international consternation regarding child labour, or white slavery. The laws regarding these international atrocities could come from the international community who are well-versed in the morality of these actions, or lack thereof, and use this as a basis for outlawing these and other practices who meet the disapprobation of the international community. Conclusion Deliberative democracy is beneficial to a liberal society because it introduces reason into the negotiations between disparate groups. Each group may think that they have the better argument as to whose interests should prevail in the political process, and may have a difficult time seeing the point of view of the other groups to whom they are opposed. However, there is some common ground, and this common ground is based upon reason. When reason is introduced to these groups, they are able to see and understand that there is common ground with everybody else, and this common ground may create a core to society where there previously was none. In this way, deliberative democracy may make more of a coherent society in states where liberalism prevails, and, in the process, strengthen these societies by introducing a basis and underpinning for the political process upon which everybody can agree. It may do the same for the international stage, as actors across countries may come together to decide upon deliberative strategies to help countries form a core set of principles which can guide the world. In this way, deliberative principles may eventually lead to peace and justice around the world. Bibliography Boesche, R. (1996) Theories of Tyranny from Plato to Arendt. Pittsburgh: Penn State Press. Cooke, M. (2000) “Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 48, pp. 947-969. Dryzek, J. (2002) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. London: Oxford University Press. Habermas, J. (1994) “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Constellations, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-10. Haberman, J. (1994) “Postscript,” Harman, G. (1975) “Moral Relativism Defended,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 84, no. 1, pp. 3-22. Neumann, F. (1966) The Democratic and the Authoritarian State. Ann Arbor: Free Press. Read More