Toleration Between Citizenship - Essay Example

IS TOLERATION NECESSARY FOR CITIZENSHIP? Introduction In a democratic, modern political it is an unavoidable social fact that the citizenry or populace is heterogenous in its composition of race, class, religion, culture, etc. A purposeful democracy requires that all citizens should have equal standing and influence on national processes (Bohman, 2003: 757). According to the progressive model of citizenship, toleration is the liberal principle based on which each person should be left free to live according to their own ideals and style of life, as long as they do not cause any harm to others. This concept is supported by the theoretical model which stresses respect for other people’s autonomy. Problems of toleration are generated by dislikes towards important differences manifesting in other individuals or groups, with subsequent interference in their activities. Hence toleration is defined as the “suspension of the power of interference towards disliked or disapproved differences” so long as no harm is caused to anyone by the existence of these differences (Galeotti, 1993: 587). The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of toleration for citizenship. It will be determined whether political tolerance exercised by the government has an influence on the practise of toleration by citizens in society. The importance of the cultivation of friendship between diverse people for beneficial impact on toleration among citizens, and toleration towards sexual minorities and their inclusion will be discussed. The argument detailing how toleration and citizenship cannot be completely free from exclusion, the paradoxes in toleration and the contradictions in citizenship will serve to give a different perspective to the debate. Discussion In a planned or deliberate democracy, there is more expected from citizens than the mere silent toleration of attitudes and reasons that they dislike; especially if it is acknowledged that an important goal of democratic functioning is to find optimal and mutually agreeable solutions to problems and conflicts. Since citizens have to critically engage with each other, toleration pertaining to non-interference would not help for confrontational yet cooperative discussion. Further, when toleration is exercised by a majority, it may even be undemocratic. A deliberative theory of tolerance underscores how deliberation across differences can be both tolerant and democratic. “In a democracy, tolerance is exercised in resolving conflicts, and in making disagreements fruitful”(Bohman, 2003: 758, 762). Further, it is found that a deliberative regime of toleration is reflexive because the appeal to an open process of public deliberation helps to face challenges in ways in which a liberal regime cannot (McKinnon & Castiglione, 2003: 119). Political Tolerance and Citizenship Political intolerance can lead to intolerance among citizens. In 1989 in France, a controversy raged among the public regarding the wearing of head scarves by Muslim girls to school. Since the girls, supported by their families and the Islamic community, refused to comply with the political rule to dress like all the other students, they were expelled, but were later re-instated under legal directions to do so. This kind of political intolerance emerges when political authority is faced with the question of whether certain kinds of practices or behaviour are entitled to non-interference or protection by the state. Further, the emphasis on permitting the practices of only the majority religion of the country, has to be scrutinized. Had the issue been resolved using a more liberal outlook and progressive principle of citizenship, the nation’s public would have followed the inclusive, secular influences. The matter becoming a dispute and ultimately a political problem was a set-back to France which is in fact a liberal democracy “that overcame religious wars a long time ago and where the value of toleration is recognized and embodied in political institutions” (Galeotti, 1993: 585-586). In connection with the above issue, various questions that arise are: to what extent does the government accommodate the belief and practice of the main or majority religion within a pluralist democracy, what is the proper limit to accommodating the majority religion, and when does accommodation of the majority religion become discriminatory toward religious minorities? The Constitution of a democratic nation observes the doctrine of governmental neutrality towards religion as mandatory, though there may be differences in the meaning and application of this concept. At times, there may be a relenting to permit some public sphere accommodation so long as governmental support is nonsectarian and non-discriminatory (Bader, 1999: 606). Whether the liberal state should tolerate the nonliberal practices of minority groups for the purpose of legitimate diversity is determined by Crowder (2007: 121), with the help of the concept of “value pluralism” advocated by Galston (2002: 5). Value pluralism promotes a form of liberalism that accommodates nonliberal groups and their practices to the greatest extent; and personal autonomy is considered to be a central public ideal. This infers that toleration towards minority groups and their customary activities; and also promotion of individual autonomy are considered to be necessary for citizenship. The Importance of Friendship to Toleration and Citizenship Liberal societies have gradually degenerated to a condition of pluralism in which “citizens are divided and conquered by special interests, and public opinion manufactured by powerful media forces” (Scorza, 2004: 87). Ties uniting citizens are practically non-existent, except as taxpayers and clients, and in the abstract level where citizens love their country, but are indifferent to their countrymen. While toleration merely requires citizens to put up with differences, to achieve this condition and maintain the liberal outlook in a sustained manner, it has been advocated by Ralph Waldo Emerson in his 1844 essay “Politics” that friendship without discrimination should be cultivated among citizens for moving beyond toleration towards a progressive society. The two aspects of friendship are identified by Emerson as truth and tenderness, which can be considered to be contradictory norms. Truth can give rise to an incivility based on frankness and can test the bonds of friendship; whereas tenderness is concerned with consideration and compromises, and works towards preserving the bonds. Both the norms work together, overcoming the silence as well as violence of intoleration, towards a sustained social union and meaningful harmony among all citizens. If the norms cultivated within friendships are extended to political communites, then good citizenship based on acknowledgement of extensive human rights, democratic inter-connections, and toleration towards each other is likely to emerge from the actual unity and reciprocal goodwill between fellow citizens. However, it is not necessary that friendship should become the concrete foundation of the state. At least initially, people will practice toleration and good citizenship by recognizing that the “same norms that work for friendship will work to preserve and strengthen modern liberal societies”, even when there are inevitable disagreements based on different values and interests, states Scorza (2004: 103-104). Though toleration towards people of other religions and their practices is one of the main issues in citizenship matters, other areas where intolerance arises include class, colour, status, and sexual orientation. Attitudes towards sexual minorities manifests as eruptions of violence and hate crimes against the differently oriented individuals and groups. Citizenship and Toleration of Sexual Minorities in England and Wales Lesbian and gay communities as well as bisexual and transgender communities are being encouraged in England and Wales in the new millennium, to move out of the sidelines and participate more fully in the social spheres of mainstream society. Currently the war against hate crime that is being waged includes action against homophobic attacks by members of the public, which is considered as an indicator of increasing toleration and inclusion in citizenship of lesbians and gays in society. Homosexuals will be increasingly encouraged to join with their heterosexual counterparts in waging war against sexual minority groups who pose a threat to vulnerable groups in society, in particular children (McGhee, 2004: 358-359, 372). Inherent Exclusion Forms a Part of Toleration and Citizenship Toleration implies recognition of the other individual or group as an equal. In a democratic setting, any measure of universality that arises is bound to be limited and cannot be completely pure in content, state Arditi & Valentine (1999: 132). Exclusion is built in to some extent, in the case of anything that stands for an index of toleration. Some conception of the limits of toleration or notion of the intolerable always enters while considering the notion of toleration of otherness. It is believed that pure or unlimited toleration, and similarly universal citizenship are both empty claims. This is illustrated by the fact that in the nineteenth century, liberalism brought political equality through the notion of citizenship; however, citizenship was not universal because women, illiterates, and the young were excluded. Hence, citizenship was challenged not because of its content, but because of its doubtful claim to universality. The fact that it was formulated as universal made it a strategic tool to contest exclusion. Thus an argument concerning the universality of citizenship became necessary. While claims for equality focused on the goal of citizenship, “it never assumed the status of absolute or pure universality” (Arditi & Valentine, 1999: 132). Some exclusion remained, whether due to minimum age requirements, place of birth or other reasons. This new, impure, universal citizenship forms a fresh platform for the formulation of claims of equality, and the disputes related to equality. That in essence, means that complete citizenship is a contested notion, while total toleration is seen to be impossible, as there will always exist some exclusionary factors. The Paradoxes in Toleration and the Contradictions of Citizenship Liberal toleration is paradoxical because the liberal state must often tolerate illiberal communities, “although the liberal state can discourage these communities from treasuring illiberal values” (Spinner-Halev, 1995: 7). Liberalism is considered as a theory of neutrality on the good life, which infers that as long as citizens do not harm one another, they should be allowed to live as they please. However, this statement is misleading. Certain liberal virtues are encouraged by liberal institutions, and it is necessary that at least some of the citizens believe in equality for a liberal democracy to function. Liberal toleration means that some citizens can avoid the liberal virtues, although this should be made difficult by the liberal state. A study of illiberal communities in the liberal state manifest strong cultural pluralism. Cultural pluralists defend values and cultural norms in order to be consistent with their principles, though these values violate the idea of liberal equality, and are detrimental to democracy. Though illiberal values should be discouraged in the democratic state, they cannot always be removed. There are contradictions within liberal citizenship also, as in liberal toleration. “Liberalism creates a contradiction between the universal public sphere and the particular, egoistic private sphere” (Spinner-Halev, 1995: 37). Though citizenship is universal, and all members of the state receive citizenship, yet these very same citizens have their private interests and obligations in civil society, which may contradict their obligations as citizens. The paradox in which the adherent of a particular religion finds himself in respect to his citizenship, is only one aspect of the universal secular contradiction between the political state and civil society. These splits between the public and private, between the state and civil society, mean that the liberal citizen lives a double life. According to Marx, one cannot distinctly be liberal bearers of rights, as well as members of different groups, and also as members of the state, and of the larger community. This means that a Jew is and will always remain as a Jew, even though he is a citizen and hence lives in a universal human condition. His Jewish nature, with all inherent limitations predominates. Jews’ obligations to the Jewish community will take priority over fulfilling obligations to the state; their private interests will take precedence over their public interests, thus demonstrating the flaws of liberal citizenship (Spinner-Halev, 1995: 37). Conclusion This paper has highlighted the importance of toleration to citizenship and why it is essential that there should be toleration towards all groups in society, so that they can take their place as citizens of the nation. Multiculturalism and minority rights are relevant concepts in the contemporary social sphere. How political toleration influences citizens’ toleration towards minority communities, why cultivating friendships among the diverse groups and individuals can serve to increase toleration among citizens, and the toleration of minority groups with different sexual orientations and their inclusion in citizenship are discussed. On the other hand, the non-existence of complete toleration and citizenship since there is always inherent exclusion in these concepts, and the paradoxes and contradictions in the notions have been determined. These inadequacies and paradoxes help to reveal that it is not possible to achieve complete toleration, and that even when complete citizenship prevails among minority communities, it is unlikely that they will be able to prioritize public interest before their personal life interests, and will mostly continue their lifestyle as a member of their ethnic, religious, cultural, or other group. From studying the various perspectives, it can be concluded that despite the self-interests of the minority groups, and the limitations inherent in toleration and citizenship notions, toleration should be promoted and practised to the greatest extent possible, in order to fuel increasing equality in citizenship for achieving social well-being and progress. References Arditi, B. & Valentine, J. 1999. Polemicization: the contingency of the commonplace. Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press. Bader, Veit. 1999. Religious pluralism: secularism or priority for democracy? Political Theory, 27 (5): 597-633. Bohman, J. 2003. Deliberative toleration. Political Theory, 31 (6): 757-779. Crowder, G. 2007. Two concepts of liberal pluralism. Political Theory, 35 (2): 121-146. Galeotti, A.E. 1993. Citizenship and equality: the place for toleration. Political Theory, 21 (4): 585-605. Galston, W. 2002. Liberal pluralism: the implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McKinnon, C. & Castiglione, D. 2003. The culture of toleration in diverse societies: reasonable toleration. The United Kingdom: Manchester University Press. McGhee, D. 2004. Beyond toleration: privacy, citizenship and sexual minorities in England and Wales. The British Journal of Sociology, 55 (3): 357-375. Scorza, J.A. 2004. Liberal citizenship and civic friendship. Political Theory, 32 (1): 85-108. Spinner-Halev, J. 1995. The boundaries of citizenship. Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Read More