Why the United Nations Security Council Supported an Intervention in Libya but Not Syria - Essay Example

Why the UNSC Supported an Intervention in Libya but Not Syria Name: University: Course Title: Instructor: Date: Introduction The conflict situations in both Libya and Syria have been described as significantly similar. This is due to the fact that the developing situations involve opposition movements against corrupt dictatorship leadership as well as governmental violence and brutality against innocent civilians (Totten, 2012, p.23). However, analysts have postulated that the events leading to conflicts as well as the underlying context of the conflicts in Libya and Syria were different and thus needed different approach. According to Zifcak (2012, p.1), the decision by the UN Security Council to support intervention in Libya and not Syria is based on the endorsement by the United Nations World Summit held in 2005. At the summit, global political leaders adopted the “responsibility to protect” doctrine in governing international political behaviour (Zyberi, 2013, p.310). With regard to this doctrine a sovereign state is mandated to prevent mass atrocity crimes within its territory failure of which the international community would assume the mandate in order to avert genocide and crimes against humanity. The purpose of this essay is to critically assess the strategic and international humanitarian law arguments for why the UNSC supported an intervention in Libya but not Syria. UN Security Council Varying Decision in Libya and Syria: Strategic and International Humanitarian Law Arguments Soon after the endorsement of the “responsibility to protect” doctrine in 2005, the UN Security Council was confronted with the Libyan conflict situation in 2011. This followed after large scale civilian causalities were eminent following fighting between Muammar Gaddafi’s government and rebel forces. According to the UN Security Council, the situation in Libya’s fighting seemed to be headed to a humanitarian catastrophe and thus sanctioned the intervention of the NATO forces pursuant to the new doctrine. The UN Security Council’s intervention in Libya was majorly informed by the disintegrating humanitarian situation. A series of condemnatory releases were issued by the relevant UN organs prior to the intervention. For instance, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated to the Libyan authorities that civilian protection was paramount in the maintenance of national order and the rule of law. The UN Secretary General through his advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect reminded Libyan political leadership of its international mandate and obligation of prevention of crimes against humanity failure of which the state would be held accountable (Zifcak, 2012, p.8). Although the military intervention in Libya has largely been described as being successful, this led to the killing of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, loss of thousands of life, immense destruction of property, targeting of infrastructure including government building, electricity grid, as well as fuel dumps among others. However, the question remained whether these actions also falls under the mandate of the civilian protection (Zifcak, 2012, p.8). With regard to the strategic and international humanitarian law arguments, the intervention in Libya can be considered a successful application of the doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect” by the UN World Summit. This is because the intervention succeeded in protecting civilians and ending crimes against humanity and human rights abuses. Secondly, pursuant to international, the intervention legitimized and gave weight to Pillar 3 which is about UN Security Council intervention in emergency circumstances. Finally, the intervention solidified the application of Pillars 1, 2 and 3 requirement of sequential proceeding (Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, 2013, p.73). Soon after the intervention of the UN Security Council in Libya, Syrian conflict erupted and thousands of civilians began to be injured and killed. In 2012, the death toll was estimated at 5400 Syrian rebels, protestors and civilians (Zifcak, 2012, p.8). Additionally, the police ad armed forces had also lost significant numbers of their members. Unlike in the Libyan case, the UN Security Council became paralysed as member states could not agree on either sanctions or military intervention. The Syrian regime has time and again refuted suggestions from the international community to end the repressive violence terming it interference in its domestic affairs (Zifcak, 2012, p.15). the UK, US, Russia and China among other members of the UN Security Council failed to agree on the way forward indicating that the situation could not be considered separately from Libyan experience. Concerns over UN Security Council resolution to use NATO forces in Libya was becoming a model for future interventions by the UN organ and NATO further complicated the matter. This was due to the adverse implications of the experience in Libya where the NATO forces bombed oil refineries, government/public buildings, television stations, as well as other civilian sites. In addition, the aftermath of the intervention has led to naval blockade especially in western Libya and the tragedy in Benghazi spread to other towns in western Libya. As a result, the Libyan experience could not be used to determine the intervention to be undertaken in Syria by the UN Security Council (Daalder and Stavridis, 2012, p.2 & 3). Zifcak (2012, p.26) argues that the proceeding accounts of the conflict situations in Libya and Syria vary in a number of ways hence the different response by the UN Security Council regarding the two crises. Analysts have indicated that politics, principle and competing strategic interest played a crucial role in rapid endorsement of international military intervention in Libya and complete stalemate in the Syrian case. With regard to strategic interests, the critical question is to determine whether or not direct military intervention will achieve protective objective without causing significant harm to the civilians than would otherwise occur (Pattison, 2011, p.273; Bellamy, 2011, p.266). For Libya the answer is yes and no for Syria. This is because both strategically and militarily, Libyan regime was in a weaker position as compared to her Syrian regime. In addition, military intervention on “Resolution 1973” would be detrimental on the entire Middle East region as Syria is surrounded by countries considered to be volatile politically like Lebanon, Damascus, Ankara and Hezbollah. Finally, countries like Russia have political, economic and strategic interest in Syria and would not endorse military intervention in Syria to assume purely humanitarian stance. With regard to politics, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi declared war on protestors in Benghazi and threatened to hunt down his enemies everywhere. This escalated the rebellion and subsequent repression to uncontrollable extents for the government forces. However, in Syria, al-Assad’s regime did not make similar threats, but instead accused the protestors of being influenced by extremists and external forces. Although, there were cases of repression, the Syrian regime also made promises of constitutional and political reforms. Unlike in the case of Libya, this gave protestors in Syria and the international community initial hope. In addition, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime experienced rapid defections of government officials, government soldiers and even the Libyan Permanent Representative to the UN who all joined the opposition. There were few such cases in Syria until recently. In Libya, regional bodies like the Arab League became involved from the onset without much success leading to the isolation of the Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Due to this instability sectarian violence continued hence the need to prevent further crimes against humanity and human rights abuses in Libya (Zifcak, 2012, p.26; Pattison, 2011, p.273; Bellamy, 2011, p.266). Respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity as well as the independence of states is a key principle in negotiations and debates at UN Security Council. Additionally, the principle regarding non-intervention in domestic affairs of a nation is contradictory to the requirements of Pillar 3 “Responsibility to Protect” by the international community (Zyberi, 2013, p.310). However, this contradiction may only be dealt with legally through endorsement of “Responsibility to Protect” pursuant to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In the Libyan case, the intervention to protect Libyan civilians outweighed the reservations of the principle of non-intervention in the country’s sovereign affairs. In addition, the need to protect the civilians was increasingly becoming great as the conflict situation was escalating by day. In Syria however, the sentiments of the opponents of military intervention such as Russia, China as well as the IBSA countries were committed to upholding the principle of non-intervention, but preferred that sanctions be imposed against Syria. China and Russia together with influential countries such as India rejected such intervention as they regarded it as western pressure to overthrow al-Assad government (Wuthnow, 2013; Gertler, 2011, p.5; Suazo, 2013, p.11). Conclusion The purpose of this essay was to critically assess the strategic and international humanitarian law arguments for why the UNSC supported an intervention in Libya but not Syria. The role played by the UN Security Council in preventing crimes against humanity and human rights abuses is critical. While the UN organ can be considered to have succeeded in realizing this mandate in Libya, its inability to reach a solid and conclusive intervention in the case of Syria raise significant amount of concern. However, the different positions taken by the UN Security Council with regard to the conflict situations in Libya and Syria is fundamentally based on the fact that the two cases are not the same. This is due to the fact that the proceedings leading to the escalations of violent rebellion and repression in both Libya and Syria are varying. In addition, the role of both regional and international bodies and community have played a significant role in shaping the decision by the UN Security Council as far as the intervention towards violent conflict and repression in Libya and Syria are concerned. Bibliography Bellamy, A 2011, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm. 25 Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 263, pp.266. Daalder, I & Stavridis, J 2012, NATO’s Victory in Libya – The Right Way to Run an Intervention. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 2–7. Gertler, J 2011, Operation Odyssey Dawn (Libya): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C, Congressional Research Service. Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee 2013, British Foreign Policy and the 'Arab Spring': Second Report of Session 2012-13, London, House of Commons Publishing. Pattison, J 2011, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention in Libya. 25 Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 271, pp. 273–4. Suazo, A 2013, Political Deadlock in Libya and Syria. Conflict Trends, pp. 11-17. Totten, M 2012, Arab Spring or Islamist Winter? World Affairs, January/February, pp. 23–42. Wuthnow, J 2013, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto, Abingdon, Routledge. Zifcak, S 2012, The Responsibility to Protect after Libya and Syria. Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, pp.1-34. Zyberi, G 2013, An Institutional Approach to the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Read More